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ABSTRACT
Recent research has suggested the seemingly ironic possibility that in order to be able 
to remember effectively, we must be able to forget. Despite the fact that forgetting is 
typically conceived of as a wholly negative experience it may, nonetheless, have 
adaptive consequences for the efficient updating of memory. Without a method for 
setting aside out-of-date or unwanted information, we may be unable to satisfy current 
memorial goals. Recent research suggests that inhibitory processes operating during 
retrieval may be responsible for the temporary forgetting of unwanted information so 
that desired memories can be successfully retrieved (referred to as retrieval-induced 
forgetting^ M.C. Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994).
The present thesis attempts to enhance our understanding of the basic 
mechanisms that underlie our ability to update our memories by examining the role of 
inhibitoiy processes in the misinformation effect. The misinformation effect is a form 
of memory error whereby individuals mistakenly report post-event misleading 
information rather than information that was originally encoded during an initial study 
phase (e.g., E.F. Loftus, 1979a). In order to examine whether the underlying 
mechanisms in the misinformation effect (and more generally in memoiy updating) 
are inhibitoiy in nature, five theory-driven experiments were conducted and reported 
in this thesis.
An inhibitory account of misinformation effects assumes that significant 
misinformation effects should only be detected when information from an initial event 
has been inhibited, and therefore is unavailable to conscious inspection. A new 
paradigm was designed for investigating the memorial processes responsible for the 
misinformation effect, which combined key features from the retrieval practice
paradigm with that of the misinformation paradigm (cf. E.F. Loftus, Miller & Burns, 
1978). In Experiments 1 and 2, the boundary conditions of varying the retrieval status 
of target items within this new paradigm were explored. More specifically, in 
Experiment 1, significant misinformation effects were found only when misleading 
information was presented on items that were subject to retrieval-induced forgetting, 
i.e., the original information was unavailable to conscious inspection, leaving only the 
post-event information available for retrieval. A further test of the retrieval-induced 
forgetting account was examined in Experiment 2 whereby the presence of retrieval- 
induced forgetting was manipulated through the insertion of a delay. Experiment 2 
indicated that the production of misinformation effects was dependent on retrieval- 
induced forgetting remaining active (i.e., under condition of no delay, or where a 
delay occurred between study and retrieval practice). In contrast, significant 
misinformation effects were not found when retrieval-induced forgetting dissipated 
over a retention inteival (i.e., when a delay was inserted between retrieval practice 
and final test).
Despite Experiments 1 - 2  suggesting that retrieval-induced forgetting may 
play an influential role in the production of misinformation effect, the new 
misinformation paradigm cannot differentiate between the possible inhibitory and 
non-inhibitoiy processes that may underlie retrieval-induced forgetting. This is 
primarily due to the new paradigm employing a ft ee recall test rather than using a 
memoiy test that can separate the actions of inhibitory from non-inhibitoiy processes. 
However, as the ‘independent probe’ method (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995) can 
perform this task, it was modified for use in Experiments 3 - 5 ,  which more closely 
examined whether inhibitoiy processes were indeed responsible for both retrieval- 
induced forgetting and misinformation effects. More specifically. Experiment 3
found that inhibitory processes were the primaiy mechanism behind retrieval-induced 
forgetting, while Experiment 4 demonstrated that any item that competes with target 
material for retrieval is subject to inhibition (referred to as cross-categoiy and second- 
order inhibition). Experiment 5 extended the findings of Experiment 3 and 4, and 
found that inhibitory processes were not only responsible for misinformation effects, 
but that all inhibited information is susceptible to the effects of post-event 
information. The present studies suggest that that an adaptive function on inhibition 
(i.e., the updating of memory) may be responsible for unwanted and undesired effect 
in memory under certain circumstances (i.e., the production of misinformation effects 
and eyewitness errors).
In order to examine more fully the role of inhibitoiy processes in the 
production of misinformation effects, and more generally, in memory updating, the 
present thesis considers both classical and modern research on forgetting. Chapter 1 
outlines recent theorising that forgetting should not be considered an exclusively 
negative phenomenon, and that it should, in fact, be considered an essential and 
necessary process that keeps our memoiy systems running optimally. This possibility 
is examined in more thorough detail in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 considers both 
classical interference research, and the more recent inhibitory accounts of intentional 
forgetting, while Chapter 3 examines how successh.il these inhibitoiy accounts have 
been applied to research concerning unintentional forgetting. In contrast. Chapter 4 
examines a rather different approach to memory updating as viewed through 
misinformation studies. A new paradigm for investigating misinformation effects is 
introduced in Chapter 5, and the empirical Chapters 5 - 9  discuss the application of 
this new paradigm to the investigation of misinformation effects. Finally, the 
conclusions and implications of unintentional forgetting for theories of memory
updating are discussed in Chapter 10. The work presented in this thesis suggests that 
not only can inhibition promote the updating of memory, but it can also leave our 
memories vulnerable to the unintentional integration of incorrect information.
Adaptive Forgetting
CHAPTER 1
THE ADAPTIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF FORGETTING THROUGH INHIBITORY
CONTROL
It is argued in the current chapter that the psychological enquiiy into how honest 
errors in memoiy are made has largely ignored the mechanisms that underlie normal 
memoiy updating. However, the increasing acceptance of inhibitory accounts of 
retrieval processes has seen a recent proliferation in research examining the possible 
adaptive benefit of inhibitoiy mechanisms in memoiy updating. Specifically, the 
present chapter considers the possibility that inhibiting unwanted memories may 
provide a positive feature to forgetting. However, there are a number of potentially 
negative consequences associated with material that has been forgotten, and the 
current chapter briefly considers some of these.
Forgetting as an Adaptive Function o f Memory
For most of us, forgetting is typically conceived as a distinctly and intuitively 
negative experience that continually disrupts our cognitive lives. Such forgetting 
appears to occur irrespective of how motivated we are to recall information or how 
inconvenient it might prove if we were unable to bring a desired memoiy into 
conscious awareness. Not only do desired memories seem to reside (often 
fmstratingly so) just beyond our reach, but similar episodically- or semantically- 
related unwanted information can be recalled instead. Accompanying the recall of 
erroneous material is the feeling that we would be able to recollect the desired 
memoiy if only we could set aside the impostor. Thus, life would seem easier if we
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never suffered from the fmstrating and sometimes embarrassing situation of 
forgetting.
However, in many instances, forgetting is exactly what is needed to keep our 
memoiy systems up-to-date and to keep the retrieval process ninning optimally. Not 
only do we need a process for setting aside out-of-date information, but we also need 
a process that can prevent related, but unwanted, information from interfering with the 
retrieval of target material (M.D. MacLeod, Bjork & Bjork, 2003). This ability to 
selectively retrieve a target from a field of similar competitors seems a highly 
desirable feature of memoiy that would suggest an adaptive role to forgetting. Given 
this possibility, forgetting may have arisen as an adaptive response to the seemingly 
limitless storage capacity of memoiy that contrasts with an imperfect and limited 
retrieval system (R.A. Bjork, 1989; RA. Bjork & Bjork, 1992). While we seem to be 
adept at storing information, especially that which we can understand in terms of oui' 
current knowledge and schemas, we often experience difficulties in gaining access to 
specific information and bringing it into conscious awareness.
Complementing these observations, recent research suggests that forgetting 
may play an adaptive role in memoiy via the goal-directed forgetting of unwanted and 
out-of-date information. Not only can this forgetting fimction be seen as a relatively 
unintentional consequence of the retrieval process (e.g., retrieval-induced forgetting), 
but we can also attempt to set aside information intentionally (e.g., suppression). 
Irrespective of whether information can be set aside intentionally or not forgetting 
may allow us to update our memories in a relatively quick and efficient manner 
without erasing the out-of-date or unwanted information. In contrast, if we were 
unable to selectively access a target memory by setting aside the multitude of related
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memories, we would experience difficulties in recalling our desired memoiy. Thus, 
in effect, we need to be able to forget in order to be able to remember.
Inhibition: Describing an Empirical Phenomenon or asserting the Presence o f a 
Mechanism?
While past theories of forgetting have explained retrieval failures through exclusively 
non-inhibitory processes that exert their influence on retrieval cues and retrieval 
routes, recent theories suggest that forgetting can also be due to the actions of 
inhibitory processes acting at the level of the memorial representations. More 
specifically, an increasing number of researchers have suggested that a specific type 
of inhibition may be present in memory, namely retrieval inhibition (e.g., M.C. 
Anderson & Bjork, 1994; E.L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996; E.L. Bjork, Bjork & Anderson, 
1998; E.L. Bjork, Bjork & MacLeod, in press; Geiselman, Bjork & Fishman, 1983; 
Macrae & MacLeod, 1999). It is thought that retrieval inhibition may represent a set 
of mechanisms that prevents or reduces retrieval access to certain items without 
affecting the overall availability of those items in memory (Tulving & Pearlstone, 
1966). In addition, retrieval inhibition is also thought to control not only intentional 
forgetting (e.g., M.C. Anderson & Green, 2001; E.L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996), and thus 
our deliberate attempts to update memoiy, but is also thought to underlie certain types 
of unintentional forgetting (e.g., E.L. Bjork et al., in press; M.D. MacLeod et al., 
2003), allowing it to satisfy the requirements of a flexible and adaptive goal-directed 
forgetting mechanism.
However, there are some difficulties with the use of the term inhibition in any 
theoiy of remembering and forgetting. In the past, the teim inhibition has been used 
in many ways within the memoiy literature to describe very different effects. At its
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theoretically weakest, retrieval inhibition merely refers to an empirical finding that is 
the opposite of facilitation (M.C. Anderson & Bjork, 1994; R.A, Bjork, 1989). 
Similarly C.M. MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson & Bibi (2003) have suggested that 
any empirical finding that demonstrates a decrease in performance compared to the 
baseline should be considered a theoretically weak form of inhibition. Thus, 
inhibition is being used as a descriptor of a pattern of memory performance rather 
than ascribing the presence of inhibitory processes. In fact, empirical findings of such 
types of ‘inhibition’ can be accounted for exclusively in terms of the strength- 
dependent competition assumptions of non-inhibitory processes. These non- 
inhibitoiy theories assume that items that share a common cue compete with one 
another for retrieval, and strengthening the association between one item and its cue 
(typically the target item) results in a weakening of the association between that cue 
and the remaining competing items. This definition of retrieval inhibition can be seen 
throughout the interference literature, although it is typically referred to as 
interference or impairment (see also C.M. MacLeod et al., 2003), and appears to be 
primarily due to impairment occurring at the level of the retrieval cue or the retrieval 
route. These interference effects, and the non-inhibitory processes that are believed to 
underlie them, are discussed in more depth in Chapter 2.
Retrieval inhibition, however, can be used in a more mechanistic sense to 
suggest the de-activation or reduction in activity of a memorial representation through 
the actions of inhibitory processes. However, despite mechanistic retrieval inhibition 
implying the actions of inhibitoiy neurons, it remains unclear as to whether they are 
really involved, or whether “inhibition is (only) to be taken metaphorically” (M.C. 
Anderson & Bjork, 1994, p. 313). While individual inhibitory neurons acting on 
memorial representations do not appear to be involved, groups or networks of neurons
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may represent an item in memory and the inhibition of some of these neurons may 
produce retrieval inhibition (M.C. Anderson & Bjork, 1994). Similarly, retrieval 
inhibition may be an example of multiple neurons acting together, producing a 
collective inhibitory effect. Another possibility is that inhibitory neurons are not just 
activated once, but are, in fact, activated repeatedly in order to sustain the inhibition 
of certain representations -  perhaps to prevent a rebound effect that would make these 
unwanted memories become hyperaccessible (see M.C. Anderson & Bjork, 1994, for 
further discussion on these latter points). The success of applying inhibitory 
mechanisms to account for forgetting is examined in more depth in Chapter 3.
The Evolution o f Inhibitory Processes and their Acceptance in Theories o f Memory 
and Cognition
The role of inhibitory mechanisms as an explanation of higher-order cognition is not a 
new concept. The actions of both excitatoiy and inhibitory neurons can be found in 
the nervous systems of animals ranging from single-celled organisms to humans, 
suggesting that inhibition is a fairly basic function of any organism’s nei*vous system. 
The role of inhibition in higher cognition in humans is thought to have evolved as a 
response to social pressures that allowed humans to withhold aggressive and 
emotional responses. The ability to suppress these behaviours is thought to have 
encouraged co-operation within groups while similarly promoting competition 
between groups, which, in turn, led to the enlargement of the frontal cortex and an 
increase in neural connections between the frontal lobes and the limbic system. With 
this increase in frontal cortex volume came greater inhibitoiy control over aggressive 
behaviours, which led to larger social groups. The increase in inter-dependence 
within groups, and the increase in competition with out-groups, fiirther increased the
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ability of humans to inhibit unacceptable behaviours on a voluntary basis. This cycle 
of influence of social factors on inhibitory control of aggressive behaviours, and vice 
versa, continued and evolved to allow inhibitory control over other lower- and higher- 
order social and cognitive behaviours (see Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995, for 
further discussion).
It is not just inhibitory mechanisms that have evolved, however, but also 
theorists’ acceptance of their role in human behaviour and cognition. While many 
researchers accept that inhibitory mechanisms probably play a role in many higher- 
cognitive actions, empirical demonstrations of inhibition in action remain ambiguous. 
For example, the prehontal cortex is believed to regulate inhibitory control because 
damage to the frontal lobes can result in an inability to inhibit unwanted and irrelevant 
responses to stimuli, called ‘disinhibition’ (Luria, 1966). Disinhibition can result in a 
variety of cognitive disorders that are collectively known as dysexecutive syndrome 
(Baddeley, 1986), which are characterised by impairments in planning, monitoring, 
initiation, organisation, and perseveration. However, while frontal lobe damage can 
cause disinhibition in cognitive behaviours, the task of pinpointing the role of 
inhibitoiy neurons, or groups of inhibitory neurons, is a difficult one. Thus, 
overcoming these difficulties in order to put fomard the possibility that inhibitory 
mechanisms can be responsible for cognitive behaviours is a complex task.
Until veiy recently, inhibitoiy mechanisms have also played little role in 
theories of memoiy, partly due to the difficulty in demonstrating that inhibitoiy 
mechanisms underlie empirical inhibitoiy effects, and partly because of its potential 
association with psychoanalytic theoiy (e.g., R.A Bjork, 1989, 1998), and the 
repressed memory therapy movement (E.F. Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Ofshe, 1992). 
The notion that individuals could intentionally inhibit or suppress memories fiom
10
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conscious awareness is one of the most basic premises of Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theoiy (Freud, 1915), although Erdelyi (1993) asserts that Anna Freud argued that 
repression could also take place at an unconscious level. However, it is interesting to 
note that confiision over the term repression nicely mirrors that of retrieval inhibition 
(Erdelyi, 1993).
It has also been suggested that the notion of inhibition in memory was 
incompatible with the computer metaphor of information processing that was 
prevalent in psychology from the 1950s through to the end of the 1970s (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird, 1977). As R.A. Bjork (1989) noted, researchers were poorly served 
by the computer metaphor, which has led us to think of human memory “in terms of 
processes like storing, scanning, grouping, erasing, and so forth. Notions like 
inhibition, suppression, unlearning, and spontaneous recovery are not easily 
compatible with the computer metaphor” (R.A. Bjork, 1989, p. 310). As such, the 
human memoiy system has little in common with that of artificial memoiy devices.
The proliferation of facilitatory processes during the 1960s and 1970s also 
prevented the rise of inhibition as an explanatory account of various cognitive 
behaviours. This meant that empirical inhibitoiy effects were explained as being the 
result of more than one facilitatory process making use of the same resources. For 
example, the fact that the Stroop effect could be explained as the activation of two 
similar representations in competition against each other made it difficult to choose to 
argue for a role for inhibition.
Despite the delay in accepting an inhibitory account, many theories of 
cognition in recent years have asserted the presence of inhibition, including language 
comprehension (e.g., Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991), visual selective attention (Tipper, 
2001), fact retrieval e.g., M.C. Anderson & Bell, 2002), executive functions such as
11
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task switching (e.g., Mayr, 2002) and the stopping of thoughts and behaviours 
(Logan, 1994). Similarly, as inhibitory mechanisms have been incorporated into 
models of normal cognition, a loss of inhibitoiy control has also been suggested in 
clinical disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (Enright & Beech, 1993), 
schizophrenia, frontal lobe syndrome (Schacter, Moscovitch, Tulving, McLachlan & 
Frendman, 1986), hyperactive attention deficit disorder (Schachai* & Logan, 1990), 
and amnesic syndrome (Bauml, Kissler & Rak, 2002). A gradual loss of inhibition 
has also been suggested to underlie changes in cognitive abilities in normal ageing 
(e.g., Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks & Rypma, 1991), while a loss of inhibition in the 
extreme may underlie some of the symptoms associated with Alzheimer’s disease 
(e.g., Faust, Balota, Duckek, Gernsbacher & Smith, 1997).
The current thesis will focus on the role of inhibitory processing in memory 
retrieval and memory updating. Inhibitory mechanisms have previously been 
suggested to operate within both semantic (e.g., Blaxton & Neely, 1983; Dagenbach 
& Carr, 1994), and episodic memory (e.g., M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995). For 
example, Dagenbach and Carr (1994) have suggested that inhibitory processes may be 
a necessary feature for memoiy updating within semantic memoiy networks in order 
to counteract the effects of spreading activation. Dagenbach and Carr wondered how 
updating occurred within the semantic memoiy system, and how newly acquired 
information could be accessed as it was being integrated into the system, given that 
semantic memory consists of well-learned stable memorial representations. Any 
memory updating system must find a critical balance between flexibility and stability 
within the system. If the system is too inflexible it will be unmodifiable and newly 
encountered information will fail to be integrated into memory. Similarly, if the 
system were easily updated then any newly encoded information would displace older
12
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information, even if this newer information were blatantly false, leading to an 
unstable system that would be prone to erratic and extreme changes in storage and 
retrieval. While there are instances of this latter point, such as reading spelling errors 
making it difficult to determine the correct spelling (e.g., Jacoby & Hollingshead, 
1990), the integration of new semantic information with older information appears to 
be a much slower process (Dagenbach, Horst & Carr, 1990).
Dagenbach and Carr (1994) suggested that an exclusively facilitatoiy account 
of new learning in semantic memory might be problematic if this new learning only 
occurred relatively slowly. This is primarily due to newly learned items being fairly 
weak compared to the strength of older information. As a result, the retrieval of 
newer items may be at risk from blocking, which might occur through the spreading 
of activation from stronger items. Thus, Dagenbach and Carr propose that inhibitory 
processes may provide a mechanism by which memoiy can be updated, that not only 
allows the newly encoded information to remain available for retrieval during 
integration, but also prevents stronger representations from blocking the retrieval of 
newer items. It achieves this by suppressing similar representations, especially 
stronger ones, which might interfere with the retrieval of the desired representation 
(Dagenbach, Carr & Barnhart, 1990).
Negative Consequences o f Forgetting
While the inhibition of information has recently been advanced as a necessary 
function of memoiy (e.g., E.L. Bjork et al., in press; E.L. Bjork et al., 1998; R.A. 
Bjork, 1989; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999), it can also have a number of unintended 
negative consequences. Any material that cannot be brought into consciousness is 
likely to be unable to influence current thoughts, decision processes or behaviours, or
13
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be in a vulnerable position, and be displaced by other information. While information 
that is deliberately banished from conscious awareness is perhaps less likely to have 
negative consequences, there is an interesting exception. Wegner and colleagues have 
found that trying to suppress a thought or memory intentionally can have the opposite 
effect, that is, the item becomes hyperaccessible (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992). Thus, 
individuals who have attempted to suppress a thought find themselves thinking of it 
during the episode of suppression as well as afteiwards. Gold and Wegner (1995) 
have suggested that attempting to inhibit a single thought or memory is an almost 
impossible task, and “we end up placing a marker on the very thought we are trying to 
bury” (Gold & Wegner, 1995, p. 1254).
In contrast, there is increasing evidence that the unintentional forgetting of 
information through new learning or the retrieval of already encoded information may 
have several unintended consequences on cognitive behaviours. For example, using a 
mock exam context, Macrae and MacLeod (1999, Experiment 2) demonstrated that 
even though participants were motivated to recall all the information from the study 
phase, they were unable to overcome the inhibition of previously unwanted items. 
Similarly, participants have been unable to ‘release inhibition’ in mock eyewitness 
contexts (M.D. MacLeod, 2002; Shaw, Bjork & Handel, 1995), while Dunn and 
Spellman (2003) have found that both stereotypical and individuating information 
about individuals can be unintentionally inhibited. Although the ability to suppress 
stereotypes may be beneficial for our ability to interact in socially desirable ways with 
others, especially out-group members, the unintended inhibition of individuating 
information may actually maintain our stereotypic beliefs.
14
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Unintentional Consequences o f Forgetting: Inhibitory Processes in the Reporting of 
Misleading Post-event Information
As this prior research suggests, there can be numerous negative consequences to both 
intentional and unintentional forgetting. In the case of unintentional forgetting, these 
negative consequences can include not only the omission of information, such as in 
examination situations (M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 1999, Experiment 2), and 
eyewitness events (M.D. MacLeod, 2002; Shaw et al., 1995), but also in terms of our 
thoughts and behaviours via the manipulation of memoiy availability (Dunn & 
Spellman, 2003). In the latter case, where our ability to access stereotypic and 
individuating information varies, it would seem that we can report potentially 
unwanted information in place of more desirable information -  and we seem to be 
unaware of such mistakes.
In other areas of research, such as the misinformation effect, we may also 
unsuspectingly report unwanted information due to the inhibition of desired 
memories. Misinformation effects are a form of memory error whereby individuals 
have a tendency to report a piece of post-event information in place of an original 
study item. As misinformation effects are typically induced through the presentation 
of contradictory information about a previously studied event, the misinformation 
effect resembles the type of memoiy updating scenario whereby conflicting 
information is integrated into an established memory. As the misinformation effect is 
also examined though the use of complex visual materials, and the explicit 
introduction of contradictoiy information, it provides an alternative method of 
examining memory updating to that typically employed through studies of forgetting. 
However, despite the misinformation effect providing the opportunity to examine the 
underlying memorial processes involved in the updating of memory, surprisingly little
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research has actually done so. Research examining misinformation effects has instead 
primarily focused on questions concerning the permanency of memoiy. More 
specifically, researchers have debated whether memory is updated through a 
destmctive updating mechanism (e.g., E.F. Loftus, 1979a), by which the older original 
memoiy is permanently erased, or whether this older information continues to reside 
in memory after the encoding of contradictoiy information (e.g., Clnistiaansen & 
Ochalek, 1983; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a, 1989b). Thus, this rather myopic view of 
misinformation effects has resulted in the underlying mechanisms that control this 
interplay between old and new memories being largely ignored. If older traces are 
destroyed or altered during memory updating, how does this occur, and conversely, if 
older memories continue to coexist after the encoding of newer information, how is 
this newer information reported without also accessing the older trace? It is 
conceivable that inhibitory processes may provide a mechanism by which post-event 
misleading information can be reported in place of the correct details that were 
encoded during an initial study phase. If information fi om a target event were to be 
inhibited, and thus were unavailable to conscious inspection, could conflicting details 
be integrated into memory for that event, resulting in the reporting of those incorrect 
details? Given that the forgetting of information may provide a method of examining 
the misinformation effect, this thesis more closely considers the role of retrieval 
inhibition in the production of misinformation effects.
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CHAPTER 2
STRENGTH-DEPENDENT COMPETITION MODELS OF INTERFERENCE AND 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF RETRIEVAL INHIBITION
If asked, many of us would say that the biggest problem with out memory is that we 
forget, and that we usually forget things that we would rather remember. Whether we 
forget someone’s name, a telephone number, or where we parked the car, forgetting is 
typically seen as an irritating and annoying feature of memory. The present chapter 
considers seminal research, as well as current theories of memory, which suggest that 
forgetting may actually be a necessary function of memory in order to allow us to 
retrieve information from long-term memoiy with relative ease and accuracy. Classic 
studies are considered which suggest that forgetting unwanted or distracting 
information can help us complete current memorial goals. More recent theories are 
also examined, which suggest that we can voluntarily set aside unwanted information 
so that we can retrieve desired memories. Thus, forgetting can be seen as a process 
that may allow the updating of our memory systems with new information that can be 
achieved either through the deliberate setting aside of unwanted information, or 
through more automatic processes.
Classical Interference Era
During the classical interference era, interference was typically defined as a retrieval 
failure brought about through the learning of new information that was related to 
material currently targeted for retrieval. Research into retrieval interference has 
contributed greatly to our understanding of how memory works, as well as how and 
why forgetting occurs. Principles learned as long ago as the beginning of the 20 '^
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century still provide the foundation of current and newer conceptions of how we 
account for the phenomenon of forgetting, such as McGeoch’s (1936, 1942) basic 
argument that items compete for retrieval access through a shared cue. However, 
while most accounts of interference agree on key assumptions concerning why 
retrieval interference occurs, they do differ on how these retrieval failures come 
about.
Nevertheless, these accounts do share some basic assumptions about how the 
retrieval process typically works. There is general consensus, for example, that the 
retrieval of a target from memoiy is the result of the progression of some form of 
activity from a retrieval cue, along the retrieval route, through to the target. Retrieval 
cues come in many forms, ranging from simply presenting the first letter of the target
(e.g., O ), to presenting fragments of the target memory (e.g., ORA ), to a
category label (e.g., FRUIT), or even contextual details that were present at the time 
of encoding (e.g., the smell of oranges). Similarly, the successfiil retrieval of a target 
memoiy is dependent on the quality and quantity of retrieval cues. Typically, the 
more general the retrieval cue, the less likely the target memory will be retrieved as 
these general cues are non-specific to a target and are likely to activate many related 
item in memory. In contrast, retrieval success is more likely if more specific cues are 
employed that are related to only a small sub-set of items. In addition, employing 
multiple cues is more likely to result in a successftil retrieval attempt than employing 
only a few cues. However, cues are not the sole property of the retrieval process that 
may influence the retrieval of a target. Retrieval routes that are associated with 
retrieval cues play an influential role as well. When a memory is highly associated to 
a retrieval cue then the retrieval route is likely to be strong, and thus the target item is 
more likely to be recalled. In contrast, when the retrieval route between a retrieval
18
Strength-Dependent Competition
cue and a target is weak then the target is less likely to be retrieved, and instead, a 
related item that is more strongly related to the cue may be mistakenly retrieved.
The Competition Assumption
It is in this situation, where a cue is related to multiple target items, that interference is 
thought to come into effect (McGeoch, 1936, 1942). These unwanted but related 
items are typically referred to as competitors or competing items, which aptly 
describes the interference created during the retrieval process with the target material. 
These unwanted items are thought to compete for retrieval with the target, a process 
sometimes referred to as the competition assumption (M.C. Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 
1994), which leads to competitors interfering with the retrieval of the target. Thus, 
any impairment in the retrieval process that is caused by these competitors is 
interference. The more competitors that are associated with a cue, the more 
interference is created, leading to progressively slower retrieval and more retrieval 
failures (J.R. Anderson, 1974; Watkins, 1978), see Figure 1. As a result, the more 
specific a cue is, the fewer competing items will be accessed and the smaller the 
interference effect is likely to be. In addition to the role that specified retrieval cues 
play in minimising the interference of competitors, the association between the cue 
and the target compared to the strength of association between competitors and that 
cue also play an influential role. Typically, retrieval of a target is more likely if the 
association between a retrieval cue and the target is a strong one (i.e., the item is 
highly associated with the retrieval cue), and is stronger than the association between 
that cue and the competing items. Thus, the use of sufficiently specified cues that are 
strongly associated to a target are more likely to identify a specific target than more 
general cues that are only weakly related to the target.
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Maximising Competition: The Paired-Associate Pcn adigm
Many of the assumptions concerning the impact of competitors on retrieval of a target 
come from classic interference paradigms designed to maximise the effects of 
interference. Interference is maximised thiough manipulating three factors that 
influence the interference effect: (1) the cues that individuals associate a target to; (2) 
the cues that individuals use to aid recall; and (3) the number of other items that are 
associated with that cue. The basic interference paradigm, that of the paired- 
associated paradigm, manipulates all three of these factors, and has been varied in 
different ways in order to study a variety of interference phenomena. :
The paired-associate paradigm takes the form of list learning exercises, 
whereby participants learn new responses (i.e., items) to stimuli (i.e., cues).
Participants are presented with lists of word pairs, where one word is paired with 1
another unrelated word. These word pairs are studied to such a degree that, when the 
first word is presented, it cues the second word. This new learning should foster the 
encoding of associations between the stimulus and the response, and vice versa, as 
well as encoding background information (e.g., the association of the word pair to the 
whole list). Typically, participants learn one list of paired-associates (e.g., A-B), 
followed by a second list (e.g., A-D), where the responses on this list are related to 
stimuli from the first list. By associating the stimulus term (i.e., A term) from List 1 
with response terms from both the first (i.e., B term) and second list (i.e., D term), the 
effects of learning a new set of responses on the initial list can be measured.
The A-B, A-D paradigm is the most widely used stimulus-response 
combination, where the second list (A-D) shares stimuli with the first list (A-B), but 
differ in responses. It is this sharing of the stimulus with more than one response that 
is expected to maximise interference effects in memory and can reveal the most to us
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about competition at retrieval. Other popular paired-associate paradigms include the 
A-B, C-B paradigm whereby the two lists share responses but differ in stimuli, and 
the A-B, C-D paradigm where both lists differ in both stimuli and responses. The A- 
B, A-B paradigm is also used and sees the second list being identical to the first list 
and is therefore a paradigm that examines repetition effects in memory.
Outside of these manipulations to the stimuli and responses, varying the 
testing phase can also inform us about competition in memory. Prior to 1959 the most 
common testing procedure was the modified free recall task (Undeiwood, 1948a), 
which was not a tine free recall task, but was in fact a cued-recall task. In the 
modified free recall task, participants were presented with the stimulus and had to 
write down the first response that came to mind. Only one response was allowed for 
each stimulus and it was inconsequential which list the item was retrieved from. The 
modified recall task was superseded by the modified modified free recall task (Barnes 
& Undeiwood, 1959). Again, this task was actually a cued-recall task whereby 
participants were presented with the stimulus and asked to recall all the items they 
could think of from the lists that were associated with the stimulus. This task more 
accurately measured the contents of conscious awareness than did the modified free 
recall task.
Reti'oactive Interference
Retroactive interference is probably the most studied phenomenon within the classical 
interference era and is a form of memoiy impairment induced by new learning (e.g., 
the D responses from List 2) between the initial encoding of target information (e.g., 
the B tei*m from List 2; see figure 2) and its eventual retrieval. This period of new
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learning is thought to interfere with the retrieval of the original target material (e.g., 
A-B), leading to impaired recall of responses from List 1.
The magnitude of the retroactive interference effect is dependent on several 
factors that are manipulated within the paired-associate paradigm. Large retroactive 
interference effects are typically found when the modified free recall test is employed, 
as well as when two different responses are associated to the same stimulus, such as in 
the A-B, A-D paradigm (Undeiwood & Postman, 1960). These two features of the 
paired-associate design maximise the competition between responses in List 1 and 
List 2 that share a retrieval cue, and support the competition assumption of 
interference theoiy. However, small interference effects are still found when two 
different stimuli are used, such as in the A-B, C-D paradigm (McGovern, 1964), 
which suggests that competition for retrieval is not always a necessary condition for 
interference to affect the retrieval of target information.
Retroactive interference effects are also reduced or even eliminated when 
recognition tests aie used, which suggests that new learning does not permanently 
erase or alter older information (Postman & Stark, 1969, but see Chandler, 1989,
1993). This reversal of retroactive interference is in stark contrast to the impaired 
recall performance on the modified free recall and modified modified free recall tests, 
implying that recognition tests reduce or eliminate the type of competition that occurs 
at retrieval in these recall tests. Similarly, retroactive interference effects dissipate as 
the retention interval between List 2 and final recall increases. This recovery fi'om 
interference takes the form of increased recall of List 1 items and is referred to as 
spontaneous recovery. This spontaneous recoveiy of the B responses from List 1 has 
been found with both the modified free recall test that maximises retrieval 
competition (Undeiwood, 1948a, 1948b), and with the modified modified free recall
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test (Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Wheeler, 1995). However, some researchers have 
failed to find a spontaneous recovery effect (Abra, 1967; Birnbaum, 1965), or only 
very small effects (Koppenaal, 1963; Slamecka, 1966).
Figure 2: Measuring retroactive interference in the paired-associate pat^adigm
Experimental
List 1
List 2
Control
List 1
Memoiy Test
Note. In the retroactive interference paradigm above, participants in the experimental 
condition receive two lists before completing a memoiy test, while participants in the control 
condition receive only the fust list before completing the test. When measuring retroactive 
interference, recall of items from List 1 is compared with the recall of List 1 items in the 
control condition.
Proactive Interference
Proactive interference occurs when previously learned information impairs our recall 
for newly acquired material, and thus can be considered the reverse of retroactive 
interference. The experimental method for investigating proactive interference 
follows a similar method to that for retroactive interference except for participants in
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the experimental condition only being tested on paired-associates from List 2 (see 
Figure 3). Participants demonstrate proactive interference when recall for List 2 
responses is poorer than recall for List 2 in the control.
Variations in the paradigm and in the degree of relatedness between the two 
lists affect the magnitude of proactive interference in a similar manner to that of 
retroactive interference. Impaired recall of second list responses is greatest when both 
lists shaie retrieval cues (e.g., A-B, A-D), as well as when recall is tested rather than 
recognition, and when a long delay occurs between the initial encoding and final 
recall (Postman, Stark & Fraser, 1968; Underwood, 1948a). Thus, while retroactive 
interference is typically found at shorter retention intervals, proactive interference is 
more likely to be found at longer retention inteiwals (e.g., Postman et al., 1968).
Research on both retroactive and proactive interference contributed greatly to 
our understanding of the influential role that competition at retrieval plays in 
controlling the content of our memories. Both fields of research support McGeoch’s 
(1936, 1942) original assumption that interference results from competition for 
retrieval between items that share a common cue. However, competition between 
items is not the only factor that influences the retrieval process. The strength of the 
association between the stimulus and the target response, as well as the strength 
between that same stimulus and competing responses, also plays a role.
77îe Strength-Dependent Assumption
The strength-dependent assumption explains retroactive interference as being the 
result of changes in the strength of association between stimulus and target responses 
compared to changes in the strength of association between competing responses and 
the stimulus (M.C. Anderson & Bjork, 1994; M.C. Anderson et al., 1994; M.C.
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Anderson & Neely, 1996). This assumption asserts that responses that are highly 
associated to the stimulus will create the most competition at retrieval and, in turn, 
will create the most interference in the retrieval of the target response. As a result of 
the increase in strength of association between one stimulus and response pairing, the 
strength of other responses association to the stimulus will decrease.
Figure 3: Measuring proactive interference in the paired-associate pcu'adigni
Experimental Control
List 1
List 2 List 2
Memory Test
Note, hi the proactive interference paradigm, participants in the experimental condition 
receive two lists before completing a memory test, while participants in the control condition 
onl)' receive the second list before completing the test. When measuring proactive 
interference, recall of List 2 items in the experimental condition is compared with recall of List 2 in the control.
This strength-dependent assumption is based on McGeoch’s (1936, 1942) 
observation that interference is greatest under conditions that promote intense 
competition among responses, such as in the A-B, A-D paradigm, and under modified 
free recall conditions that only allow one response to be reported for each stimulus.
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In this paradigm, the B and D responses are both associated with the same stimulus, 
resulting in both responses competing and interfering with each other in an attempt to 
gain retrieval supremacy. While the response that won this competition would be 
rewarded with its retrieval, the losing item would be subject to what McGeoch called 
reproductive inhibition. The strength-dependent assumption explains retroactive 
interference as being the result of strengthening the association between the stimulus i
and new responses (i.e., A-D), which leads to a weakening of the association between ?
the previously learned A-B stimulus-response pairing. Thus, when memory for the A- f
B association is tested, the stronger A-D associations will continually intrude into i
?
memory reports. Similarly, strengthening the A-D association through additional J
learning will also lead to greater impaired recall of the initial A-B stimulus-response 
pairings, see Figure 4.
Strength-dependent assumptions concerning retrieval have not only influenced 
classical interference accounts of retrieval failures, such as occlusion, but have also 
formed the foundation of modern theories of interference as well as models of how ^
memory is organised. These theories and models assume that successful retrieval is »
determined by the strength of association between a cue and the desired target relative 
to the strength of the associations between that cue and all other competitors. For 
example, the SAM model (Mensink & Raajimakers, 1988; Raajimakers & Shiffrin,
1981), and J.R. Anderson’s (1983) ACT model are all based on this strength- 
dependent assumption.
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Part-set Cueing
Another interference phenomenon that is based on the strength-dependent assumption 
is part-set cueing (e.g., Nickerson, 1984; Rundus, 1973). In the part-set paradigm, 
participants learn a list of items that belong to various categories, followed by an 
immediate category-cued recall test. A common finding is that if some of the 
previously learned items are presented alongside the original category cues at 
retrieval, then recall of the remaining categoiy members will be impaired. The 
impairment of the remaining categoiy members compared to controls who only 
receive the categoiy name as a cue is believed to be due to the operation of pctrt-set 
cueing inhibition^ (e.g., Mueller & Watkins, 1977; Roediger & Neely, 1982; 
Slamecka, 1968). Part-set cueing is an unusual interference effect as its occurrence is 
contraiy to the expectation that presenting retrieval cues will aid the recall of the 
remaining categoiy members.
Slamecka (1968) unexpectedly demonstrated part-set cueing in an episodic 
memory task where participants studied word lists composed of items fi'om five 
semantic categories that were inter-mixed with each other. On the recall test, 
participants from the experimental condition received some of the categoiy members 
as cues to help aid recall of the remaining category members, while participants in the 
control condition received all of the cues. Contraiy to the assumption that the 
presentation of a category member at retrieval would act as a cue and facilitate recall 
for the remaining categoiy members, participants who received cues recollected fewer 
remaining non-cued items that participants who did not receive any cues. Mueller and
 ^ T h e  u s e  o f  t l i e  t e n u  ' i i i l i i b i t i o n ’ i n  p a i t - s e t  c u e i n g  d o e s  n o t  i m p l y  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a n  i n l i i b i t o i y  
m e c h a n i s m ,  b u t  r a l l i e r ,  u s e s  t l i e  t e r m  i n  a  d e s c r i p t i v e  s e n s e  t o  i n f e r  a n  e f f e c t  opposite t o  t l i a t  o f  
f a c i l i t a t i o n  ( R .A .  B j o r k ,  1 9 8 9 ) .  T h e  u s e  o f  t h e  t e r m  T n l u b i t i o n ’ i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  g i e a t e r  d e t a i l  l a t e r  i n  
t l i i s  c h a p t e r .
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Watkins (1977) later named this impairment ‘part-set cueing inhibition’ because 
utilising some category members as cues appeared to inhibit participant’s recall of the 
remaining category members. This interpretation of the finding gained strength from 
various findings that the likelihood of recalling the remaining category members 
decreased as the number of cues presented for recall increased (Roediger, 1973; 
Rundus, 1973; Slamecka, 1968, 1972; Watkins, 1975). Thus, part-set cueing would 
seem to increase as the number of categoiy members remaining to be recalled 
decreases.
Despite the apparent strength of the part-set cueing effect in recall memory, 
the effect disappears when recognition tests are used. Slamecka (1975) found no 
impairment when categoiy members were used as cues in a forced-choice recognition 
test, regardless of the number of cues presented. Small part-set cueing effects on 
recognition tasks are typically only found when categoiy exemplars that have not 
been used in the experiment appear on the forced-choice recognition task (Todres & 
Watkins, 1981). As recognition memory remains fairly unaffected, it would appear 
that target memories remain relatively intact, and it is the retrieval access of the 
desired memory that is impaired by part-set cueing.
Part-sei Cueing as an Example o f Interference in Episodic Memory 
Unlike classical interference accounts of retrieval failures, part-set cueing considered 
the role that interference played in episodic memoiy. Tulving’s (1972) original 
distinction between semantic and episodic memory systems occurred after interest in 
classical interference dwindled, and thus classical accounts of interference never 
considered the domains in which these effects occurred. In contrast, part-set cueing is 
classed as an interference effect that occurs in episodic memory primarily because it
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can still be found when lists of items are used that do not share a semantic categoiy 
(Slamecka, 1968). The part-set cueing effect has also been found to be independent 
of variables such as word hequency, rhyme and unrelated cues (the same as the 
paired-associated paradigms, Mueller & Watkins, 1977), and can occur simply 
because the items are presented within the same experimental episode (Roediger, ^
Stellon & Tulving, 1977; Slamecka, 1968). Similarly, it has even been found to i
operate for category labels. Roediger (1978) found that participants who were 
presented with previously studied category labels were impaired in their recall of non- 
cued categoiy labels in a free recall task. This intriguing result suggests that not only 
do the items within a category constitute a set, and thus are susceptible to part-set 
cueing inhibition, but the category labels also form a set that is subject to inhibition as 
well.
The Role o f Compétition in Part-set Cueing
Several theories have been proposed to account for the part-set cueing effect, but the 
most widely accepted; and influential on current theories of retrieval, is that advanced 
by Rundus (1973), and what Nickerson (1984) classifies as a ‘competition at retrieval 
hypothesis ', which is based on the competition assumption and the strength-dependent 
assumption. This theory assumes that the presentation of category members as cues 
at recall results in the strengthening of the retrieval routes between that cue and its 
associated target. This strengthening of the association between the cue and its target 
will facilitate the retrieval availability of the target in comparison to the remaining 
non-cued items within that set. Thus, these stronger more accessible items are likely 
to block retrieval access of the remaining non-cued category members through part- 
set cueing.
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The Strength-Dependent Assumption and Part-set Cueing
In terms of the strength-dependent assumption, and the competition assumption, part- 
set cueing predicts that the probability of a categoiy member being retrieved is 
dependent on the strength of the association between a categoiy label and its target 
member relative to the strength of that category label to all other competing category 
members. According to strength-dependent assumptions, strengthening the 
association between a cue and a specific item will raise the probability of that item 
being recalled on any subsequent retrieval attempt but decreases the probability of 
other items located at the same level in the hierarchy from being recalled on that 
subsequent attempt. This means that the association between the cue and competing 
items will be weakened through the strengthening of target associations, resulting in 
the competing items being subject to part-set cueing inhibition.
However, not all research is unilateral in its support of the strength-dependent 
assumption in part-set cueing as D.R. Basden, Basden & Galloway (1977) believe that 
it is the weakest assumption of Rundus’ model. The strength-dependent assumption 
assumes that the probability of retrieving a non-cued member is dependent on its 
association to the categoiy relative to the strength of association between the category 
and the rest of its members. This being so, D.R. Basden et al. predicted that the 
chances of recalling a weak target member from a categoiy from the same level as 
other weak members should be the same as the probability of retrieving a strong target 
member from a field of strong members. In contrast, if a list of items is comprised of 
half strong members and half weak members, then the ratio mle predicts that more of 
the strong members should be recalled compared to a list composed exclusively of 
strong members. However, D.R. Basden et al.’s findings failed to support these 
predictions. Strong items from a mixed strong-weak list where not recalled in greater
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numbers than strong items from a list composed of exclusively strong members, nor 
were weak items from a mixed list recalled poorer than items from a list composed 
only of weak items.
Despite D.R. Basden et al.’s results, the assumptions of part-set cueing are 
generally upheld by empirical data. In terms of the strength-dependent and 
competition assumption, increasing the number of cues at test will lead to a 
coiTesponding decrease in the number of remaining items recalled because an 
increasing number of competitors have been strengthened through their presentation 
as cues (Roediger, 1973; Slamecka, 1968, 1972; Watkins, 1975). As a result, part-set 
cueing should occur tlirough the simple presentation of items from a category or set as 
cues as this, in itself, is sufficient to increase the strength of these items. Similarly, 
part-set cueing should be found irrespective of whether the categoiy is semantic or 
episodic in nature (Mueller & Watkins, 1977; Roediger, Stellon & Tulving, 1977; 
Tulving, 1977; Slamecka, 1986), as well as occurring within the set of category cues 
employed at test (Roediger, 1978). Finally, part-set cueing should not be found under 
conditions where competition is absent, such as in recognition tests where the 
presentation of all items from the category or set resolves competition among items 
(Slamecka, 1975; Todres & Watkins, 1981).
Strength-Dependent Models and Inhibitory Accounts o f Interference 
Whether considered individually, or together, both the competition and strength- 
dependent assumptions contributed greatly to both classical and modern accounts of 
retrieval interference. Both of these assumptions have been combined into what M.C. 
Anderson and colleagues referred to as stt'ength-dependent competition models o f 
interference (M.C. Anderson & Bjork, 1994; M.C. Anderson et al., 1994), along with
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a tliird assumption called the retrieval-based learning assumption. This third 
assumption states that the retrieval process in itself is a potent learning event and is 
sufficient to strengthen items in memoiy which, in turn, results in impaired recall of 
items that have not been strengthened through the retrieval process. However, there is 
a substantial body of research that suggests that the prior retrieval of information may 
not be a necessary condition for strengthening items in memory within strength- 
dependent competition models. For example, neither the SAM model (Mensink & 
Raajimakers, 1988), nor part-set cueing (Rundus, 1973), which are both prime 
examples of strength-dependent competition models, require items to be strengthened 
through the retrieval process in order to produce interference effects. According to 
these models, merely allowing extra study time, or re-presenting target items, should 
be sufficient to strengthen these items and induce interference. The case for 
presenting items being sufficient to strengthen those items is particularly convincing 
in part-set cueing, given that the retrieval impairment is due to the presentation of a 
sub-set of items as cues at test.
Similarly, the pre-experimental strength of items that share a common cue is 
thought to be irrelevant to the strengthening process in strength-dependent 
competition models of interference. This is primarily because the critical factor in the 
strengthening of items in these models is the initial retrieval strength of the target and 
not the initial retrieval strength of the competing items. While strong targets will 
require less strengthening in order to interfere with the competing items, weak targets 
will require substantially more strengthening. In contrast, the initial strength of 
competing items will contribute little to this strengthening process, with weak 
competitors just as susceptible to impairment as competitors that are high in retrieval 
strength.
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As it is the strengthening of the association between the target and the cue that 
interferes with the retrieval of competing items, this suggests that the focus of 
interference is along the retrieval route between the shared cue and the memoiy trace 
of the competing items. Thus, the impairment of these competing items can be 
reversed through resolving competition for access to the shared cue by simply 
changing the cues used for recall. More specifically, if recall of competing items is 
impaired through their use of the same retrieval cue as the strengthened target, then 
using a novel cue at retrieval should see the competing items being easily recalled.
Finally, these assumptions and predictions of strength-dependent competition 
models of interference strongly suggest that non~inhihitoiy processes underlie these 
forms of retrieval interference. The weakening of the associations between the cue 
and targets does not indicate the presence of any form of retrieval inhibition 
mechanism or mechanisms that resolves competition through the active suppression 
or inhibition of unwanted competing items. While inhibitory accounts of interference 
are in agreement with the assumption concerning the role of competition at retrieval, 
they differ in their interpretation of strength-dependent and retrieval-based learning 
assumptions. In contrast to non-inhibitoiy theories, inhibitory accounts assume that it 
is the initial strength of competing items that has the primaiy influence on the 
interference effect, rather than the focus being on the strength of the target item. 
Thus, inhibitoiy theories assume that strong competitors will require much more 
suppression or inhibition in order to prevent them interfering with the retrieval of the 
target items than will be required to inhibit weak competitors.
Inhibitory accounts of interference are also retiieval specific^ with presentation 
or additional study being insufficient to trigger the inhibition of competing items. 
This is primarily due to inhibitory theories assuming that presenting competitors, or
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allowing additional time to study those items, creates only minimal competition 
thereby negating any need to suppress those items. For example, supporters of 
inhibitoiy theories suggest that interference effects that are found through the 
presentation of items at recall (e.g., part-set cueing) are not the result of any kind of 
inhibitory process that reduces interference, but is actually due to a change in strategy 
from the study phase to that used during recall (D.R. Basden & Basden, 1995; 
Sloman, Bower & Roher, 1991),
Finally, as inhibitoiy accounts assume that the retrieval strength of competing 
items has been actively inhibited, they predict that these items will remain unavailable 
for retrieval even when retrieval cues are used that differ from those used during an 
episode of strengthening. This prediction differs from non-inhibitory theories as 
inhibitory accounts place the primary locus of impairment at the level of the memorial 
representations. If a memorial representation is taily inhibited, then it should be 
irrelevant whether the retrieval cue is novel or not, the end result is expected to be the 
same: the competing item remains impaired in memory.
Resolving Competition through Retrieval Inhibition
One of the first areas of interference research that saw the wide spread use of the term 
retrieval inhibition was that of directed forgetting. The directed forgetting effect, and 
the paradigm typically used to investigate this type of interference phenomenon, 
differs markedly from that used in classic and modern interference. While paired- 
associate and part-set cueing pai adigms measured the effects of implicit cues to forget 
on subsequent memory performance, directed forgetting research employs explicit 
cues to forget. Thus, this makes directed forgetting a form of motivated or intentional 
forgetting that resembles real-life situations, whereby we wish intentionally to remove
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thoughts or memories from our conscious awareness. In this way, directed forgetting 
provides a technique for examining the deliberate updating of our own memories, and 
for examining the possible role that retrieval inhibition may play in this updating 
process.
The Directed Forgetting Paradigm
In a typical directed forgetting paradigm, participants are presented with a list of 
words to study for a later free recall test. However, half way through that list, some 
participants are asked to forget the previous items but to continue on and try and 
remember the following items, and these participants form the forget condition. 
These instructions to forget or remember certain parts of a list effectively divides the 
stimuli into two separate lists: the to-be-forgotten list and the to-be-remembered list. 
In contrast, other participants are not asked to forget the initial list and so have to try 
to remember all of the items from both of the lists. These participants form the 
remember condition. In addition, a control condition can be added where participants 
complete an unrelated filler task in place of the first list and then carry on and study 
the second list. This control condition can act as a baseline measure of recall for both 
the to-be-forgotten list and the to-be-remembered list. After all of the items on the 
final to-be-remembered list have been presented, participants are asked to recall items 
from either the to-be-remembered list only, the to-be-forgotten list only, or items from 
both lists, see Figure 5. Additionally, the directed forgetting paradigm can take the 
form of entire lists being presented before an instmction to remember or forget is 
issued, called the list method, or the remember or forget cue is presented after each 
individual word, typically called the item, or item-by-item method (see review by 
C.M. MacLeod, 1998).
Strength-Dependent Competition
Recall performance and the success of instructions to remember or forget can 
be measured in various ways. Directed forgetting can be measured by comparing the 
recall of to-be-remembered items to that of to-be-forgotten items within the forget 
condition. Directed forgetting can also be measured across conditions by comparing 
the recall performance for to-be-forgotten items with to-be-remembered items in the 
remember condition and in the control condition.
Figure 5: Directed forgetting pat adigm
Forget Remember Control
Condition Condition Condition
List 1
Forget
List 1
Remember
List 2 List 2 List 2
I
Memoiy Test
Note. To pical paradigm used in the directed forgetting paradigm using the list method
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Typical Findings from the Directed Forgetting Paradigm
There are three typical findings that have been found across studies using the directed 
forgetting paradigm suggesting this method of intentional forgetting can produce 
robust effects. First of all, participants instaicted to forget the initial list typically 
report more to-be-remembered items than participants who are instmcted to remember 
both lists in the remember condition (e.g., E.L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996). This is due to 
recall in the remember condition being impaired thi ough strong proactive interference 
effects. Thus, the successful forgetting of the initial list reduces, or even eliminates, 
the proactive interference that typically operates in the second list.
Second, participants asked to forget the first list recall the remember words 
from the second list equally as well as do participants in a control condition who have 
completed an unrelated filler task in place of the initial list. Primarily this is due to an 
absence or reduction in proactive interference during participant’s recall of the to-be- 
remembered list in both of these conditions. Finally, recall for to-be-forgotten items 
is worse than for to-be-remembered words suggesting that participants have 
successfully followed instructions to disregard the first list (see C.M. MacLeod, 1998 
for a flill discussion on the basic directed forgetting effects.
Retrieval Inhibition as an Explanation of Directed Forgetting
While several accounts have been proposed to explain directed forgetting, including 
an erasure mechanism (Muther, 1965), and a segregation and selective rehearsal 
mechanism (R.A. Bjork, 1970), the retrieval inhibition account is favoured by many 
researchers as a convincing explanation of directed forgetting in the list method (e.g., 
R.A. Bjorlc, 1989; E.L. Bjork et al., 1998; E.L. Bjork et al., in press; Geiselman & 
Bagheri, 1985; Geiselman et al., 1983).
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Instmcting participants to forget a list that has just been presented is thought to 
trigger retrieval inhibition which, in turn, reduces retrieval access to those items. This 
loss of retrieval availability to the to-be-forgotten items prevents them from 
interfering with the retrieval of the new target items -  the to-be-remembered items. 
As the to-be-forgotten items no longer interfere with the retrieval of the tai get items, 
proactive interference is eliminated, or at least significantly reduced. In contrast, 
participants who are not instmcted to forget the initial list, and thus do not direct 
retrieval inhibition at these items, remain susceptible to proactive interference. As 
these participants are unable to inhibit items on the initial list, the items interfere with 
the retrieval of items from the second list. As a result, recall of items on the second 
list is typically impaired in comparison to participants who were instmcted to forget 
the initial list.
List Method versus Item Method
Although some researchers have previously proposed that the retrieval inhibition may 
underlie both methods of producing directed forgetting effects (e.g., Geiselman & 
Bagheri, 1985; C.M. MacLeod, 1989), others have argued that the mechanisms that 
drive directed forgetting in the list method differ to those in the item method (B.H. 
Basden & Basden, 1996, 1998; B.H. Basden, Basden & Gargano, 1993). It has been 
suggested that each presentation method encourages different processing styles. 
While the item method may foster distinctive processing, the list method may 
encourage participants to encode and process the entire list using a relational 
processing style (Einstein & Hunt, 1981; Hunt & Einstein, 1980). With the item 
method, as each word is presented individually with remember or forget instructions, 
this may foster a unique and distinctive processing style that draws participant’s
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attention to the uniqueness of each item within the list. In contrast, the presentation of 
the remember or forget cue after the encoding of a list may encourage participants to 
process items within that list in relation to each other, as well as various contextual 
information, such as each item’s temporal location within the list. Thus, retrieval 
inhibition would be more likely to act as a method of overcoming interference in the 
list method, where it could impair retrieval access to the list, rather than having to act 
on each individual item. Instead, a selective rehearsal mechanism has been proposed 
as the primary mechanism in the directed forgetting effect found with the item method 
(B.H. Basden & Basden, 1998; B.H. Basden et al., 1993). As such, only the list 
method, and retrieval inhibitions implied role in it, will be the basis of discussion (but 
see C.M. MacLeod et al., 2003, for recent discussion on directed forgetting using the 
list method also being due to differential encoding).
Retrieval Availability and Release fiom  Inhibition
Despite the observed impairment in retrieving to-be-forgotten items, these items are 
not believed to be permanently lost from memory. Recognition memory for the to-be- 
forgotten items appears to be unaffected, that is items are recognised at the same level 
as to-be-forgotten items (e.g., R.A. Bjork, 1989; Block, 1971; Elmes, Adams & 
Roediger, 1970; Geiselman et al., 1983). If these items were permanently forgotten 
through the actions of an erasing process, then recognition memoiy should also have 
been impaired. Similarly, re-presentation of the to-be-forgotten items during an 
interpolated task resulted in the reinstatement of proactive interference in a 
subsequent recall task. In fact, presenting as few as four to-be-forgotten items can be 
sufficient to reinstate proactive interference to a similar level as that found in 
conditions where participants have to remember both lists (E.L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996).
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While it could be argued that participants are merely re-encoding to-be-forgotten 
items that have been erased in memoiy tln ough the instmction to forget, the fact that 
only a sub-set of to-be-forgotten items can reinstate proactive interference, rather than 
requiring the re-exposure of the complete list, suggests that this assumption is 
incorrect.
In terms of retrieval inhibition, the finding of intact recognition memory for 
to-be-forgotten items plus the reinstatement of proactive interference, suggests that re­
exposure to even a minority of inhibited items is sufficient to result in the ‘release’ of 
retrieval inhibition. Thus, it would appear that retrieval inhibition is easily elicited 
and easily overcome. This would allow for a flexible updating process in memory 
that could quickly adapt to changing goal states. Finally, results from re-learning 
paradigms further add to the likelihood that the to-be-forgotten items are maintained 
in memory at full strength, but are only temporarily inaccessible (Geiselman & 
Bagheri, 1985). To-be-forgotten items are typically re-learned as quickly as to-be- 
recalled items, suggesting that despite having been inhibited, these items have equally 
as strong storage strength as to-be-forgotten items.
The Nature ofRetiieval Inhibition: What Exactly is Inhibited?
While previous findings using recognition tests and re-learning paradigms suggest 
that to-be-forgotten items remain stored in memory and are not permanently 
forgotten, it does not tell us what form this inhibition takes. That is, does the to-be- 
forgotten list form a separate memoiy, is it retrieval access to this episodic memory 
that is inhibited, or are the memorial representations of each item in long-term 
memory actually inhibited? As directed forgetting is typically investigated using 
explicit memoiy tests that direct participants to recall information from the study
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phase, these types of direct memory tests tell us very little about the nature of the 
inhibition. In contrast, implicit memory tests provide a way of investigating what 
level the inhibition operates at by bypassing any episodic memories formed from the 
study phase and directly accessing the stored memorial representations in long-term 
memory.
Implicit memory tests have been used in the list method as well as in the item 
method. While directed forgetting is sometimes found using the item method (e.g., 
B.H. Basden & Basden, 1996; C.M. MacLeod, 1989; Palier, 1990), impaired recall of 
to-be-forgotten items has never been found using implicit tests in the list method (e.g., 
B.H. Basden & Basden, 1996; E.L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996; Palier, 1990). This is 
despite several different tests being used, such as general knowledge (B.H. Basden & 
Basden, 1996; B.H. Basden et al., 1993), stem completion (Palier, 1990), and word 
fiagment completion tasks (E.L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996). B.H. Basden and Basden 
(1998) have suggested that directed forgetting is not found in implicit tests using the 
list method because the to-be-remembered list and the to-be-forgotten lists are 
processed in a relational manner as two integrated units rather than as distinct and 
unique items. Thus, retrieval inhibition acts on the to-be-forgotten items, not as 
individual memorial representations, but as a whole list, suggesting that it may be 
more appropriate to refer to these items as a ‘to-be-forgotten list’.
Therefore, the finding that directed forgetting in the list method only occurs on 
explicit tests would seem to suggest that the to-be-remembered list and the to-be- 
forgotten list are forming new and distinct episodic memories. Retrieval inhibition 
only appears to prevent participants gaining access to the episodic memory of the to- 
be-forgotten list by acting on an individual’s newer episodic memories for 
information encoded during the experimental episode. As directed forgetting is not
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found with implicit memoiy tests using the list method, it would suggest that retrieval 
inhibition does not inhibit memorial representations that are stored in long-term 
semantic memoiy.
Continuing Influences o f Inhibited Items
Results from various studies appear to suggest that the to-be-forgotten list may be 
able to continue to influence thoughts and behaviours despite being inhibited. If only 
the to-be-forgotten items’ retrieval strength is impaired by the actions of retrieval 
inhibition directed at those items, and to-be-forgotten items remain at full strength in 
memory, then these inhibited items may continue to influence behaviour in other 
ways.
While the use of recognition tests and re-learning paradigms would suggest 
that the to-be-forgotten items remain at full storage strength (e.g., R.A. Bjork & 
Bjork, 1992; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966), despite their inhibited state, implicit tests 
suggest that it is only the episodic representation of the to-be-forgotten list that is 
inhibited, rather than individual memorial representations stored in long-term 
memory. This being so, it is entirely possible that the non-inhibited semantic 
representations of items from the to-be-forgotten list stored in long-term memory 
could continue to influence an individual’s thought processes and behaviours. If 
inhibited memories do continue to influence our thoughts and behaviours, then this 
could have implications for situations where thoughts, memories, and actions need to 
be banished from conscious thought to prevent them from interfering with current 
goals, such as attempting to ignore obsessive or repetitive thoughts in clinical 
disorders, instiiicting juries to disregard evidence, attempting to ignore a mistake 
during an oral or practical examination, etc.
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E.L. Bjork and Bjork (1996) examined this possibility by delaying a final 
recall task via an implicit memory test. After having demonstrated a directed 
forgetting effect in conditions where participants were instmcted to forget specific 
lists, some participants then completed a word fragment test. This test should not 
require access to the materials learned during the study phase, and should instead 
require the retrieval of semantically stored material. After having completed this 
implicit memory test, participants completed a further recall task.
Consistent with previous research, a directed forgetting effect was not found 
with the intermediate implicit memoiy test. However, a directed forgetting effect was 
present in the delayed recall test that occurred after the word fragment completion 
task. This suggests that the recall task and the word fragment task were employing 
cues that accessed different types of memories, and because of this, the intermediate 
retrieval task did not release the inhibition of the to-be-forgotten list.
What is of interest, however, is that the prior presentation of the to-be- 
forgotten items in the study phase primed performance for those items in the word 
fragment task to the same degree as the to-be-remembered items (see also B.H. 
Basden et al., 1993). Participants completed more word fragments that referred to 
items presented during the study phase than for control items that were absent from 
this initial study phase. This further suggests that, not only may retrieval inhibition 
act on an episodic memory of the initial study phase rather than on long-term 
memorial representations, but also that the to-be-forgotten item’s coiresponding 
representation in semantic memory for the to-be-forgotten items can continue to guide 
and influence current memorial goals.
An instance where to-be-forgotten information has been successfully inhibited 
but continues to influence subsequent behaviours on indirect measures is that of jury
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decision making following an instmction to disregard certain evidence. While mock 
juries appear to successfully inhibit disregarded evidence, they are more likely to find 
the defendant guilty than are control participants who did not receive biasing 
testimony (e.g., Caretta & Moreland, 1983; J.M. Golding, Fowler, Long & Latta, 
1990). Similarly, in real jury trials, the more negative pre-trial publicity that a juiy 
has been exposed to, the more likely they are to find the defendant guilty, despite the 
jury members continuing to claim impartiality (Constantin! & King, 1980/1981; 
Moran & Cutler, 1991).
Output Interference: A Case o f Interference in the Absence o f Competition 
Output interference provides an interesting exception to perhaps the most fimdamental 
arguments of interference theoiy, that of the competition assumption. Output 
interference refers to the deleterious effects of the earlier retrieval of information on 
information that is retrieved later. For example, individuals who constmct lists (e.g., 
lists of things to do, shopping lists) may find that it becomes more difficult to generate 
items after several examples have already been reported. If important items are 
missed from such a list then it is likely that they have been omitted due to output 
interference.
In a typical output interference paradigm, participants are presented with lists 
of items that belong to various categories, and after a brief retention interval, are cued 
to recall each item within each categoiy. Items that are cued early within each 
category at test tend to be recalled better than items that are cued ftirther down each 
categoiy, and this output interference appears to be unaffected by the initial position 
of each categoiy within the initial study list, as well as the position of each item 
within the initial study list (Roediger & Schmidt, 1980).
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The retrieval process has been specifically implicated in output interference as 
the active retrieval of items from memory appears to be a necessary condition to 
induce impairment in memory. Simply presenting a categoiy label with instaictions 
to forget the category members appears to be insufficient to produce output 
interference (Roediger & Schmidt, 1980). This finding suggest that it is the very act 
of accessing information in memoiy during the retrieval process that leads to 
forgetting, an observation first made by Roediger earlier in 1974.
Not only does output interference suggest that the retrieval process in itself 
can create interference, but even more surprising is the finding that competition is not 
a necessary condition for output interference to occur. Rather than output interference 
being the result of the resolution of competition between a target and its competitors, 
it appears that output interference is simply the result of the prior retrieval of other 
information irrespective of whether these items share a common cue or not. For 
example, A.D. Smith (1971) had participants recall items from seven unrelated 
categories. As participants worked theii way through the recall task from category 
one to categoiy seven, output interference effects within each category increased. 
Recall of the first category was relatively high at 70%, but by the time participants 
reached the cued-recall of the final categoiy, recall had dropped to only 45%. 
Similarly, Roediger & Schmidt (1980) also found a decline in memoiy performance 
within and across sets of unrelated paired-associates. Thus, even in the absence of 
competition for retrieval by a common cue, strong interference effects can still be 
found simply through the retrieval of items, and therefore provides a relatively ‘pure’ 
measure of the possible detrimental effects of the retrieval process.
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Conclusions from Interference Theojy
Studies of interference effects in episodic and semantic memory systems have 
highlighted and contributed several important findings to our understanding of the 
mechanisms governing interference effects in long-term memory, and continue to 
influence current theories. Decades of research into a variety of interference effects 
suggest that many causes of forgetting can be traced back to the effects of many items 
sharing a common cue. Under conditions where a single cue is associated to multiple 
targets, memory impairment is usually found. However, this is not always the case, 
and output interference has proven to be an interesting exception to the competition 
assumption. The strength-dependent assumption has also received much support from 
classical and modern interference research, suggesting that strengthening the 
association between a cue and a target may weaken the association between that 
shared cue and competing items.
However, recent research into modern interference effects, such as directed 
forgetting and output interference challenge some of these long held beliefs about the 
retrieval process. While output interference suggests that the retrieval process can be 
a direct cause of forgetting even in the absence of competition, directed forgetting can 
provide a model not only of intentional forgetting, but perhaps also the presence of an 
inhibitory retrieval process directed at unwanted competing items. Thus, retrieval 
inhibition may provide an alternative explanation to traditional strength-dependent 
competition models of interference.
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CHAPTER 3
INHIBITORY PROCESSES IN RETRIEVAL-INDUCED FORGETTING
Research into intentional (e.g., directed forgetting) and unintentional forgetting (e.g., 
output interference, part-set cueing) has highlighted many interesting properties of 
memoiy, as well as greatly increasing our understanding of updating processes in 
memory. In the past, interference effects have primarily been explained by non- 
inhibitoiy theories, although more recently inhibitory processes in episodic memoiy 
have been inferred (i.e., retrieval inhibition in directed forgetting). Following on from 
the prior discussion of retrieval inhibition in intentional forgetting, the current chapter 
considers the evidence for inhibitory processes in unintentional forgetting, and 
specifically its role in retrieval-induced forgetting. As non-inhibitory theories can 
provide a more simplistic account of retrieval-induced forgetting, the case for 
inhibitoiy theories is examined through direct comparisons and tests of the 
assumptions and predictions of inhibitory versus non-inhibitory theories.
Retrieval as a Memory Modifier
The act of retrieval has long been perceived as a process far more complex than 
merely reading the contents of long-term memory; it has been assigned a more active 
status in controlling the information of which we are consciously aware. For 
example, an item can be strengthened in memory tln ough its prior retrieval, thereby 
increasing the probability that it will be reported on a subsequent recall attempt. 
Thus, retrieval in itself can be a potent learning event (Allen et al., 1969; R.A. Bjork, 
1975; R.A. Bjork & Bjork, 1992; Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Morris & Fritz, 2000,
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2002), and typically, the greater the difficulty of this retrieval attempt, the greater the 
benefit for any foture retrieval attempts (Landauer & Bjork, 1978).
Despite such positive consequences, recent research has indicated that 
retrieval can also have negative consequences for some memories, suggesting that the 
retrieval process itself may be a source of unintentional forgetting. For example, 
output interference appears to be the direct result of the earlier retrieval of items 
during a current retrieval attempt (e.g., Roediger, 1974; Roediger & Schmidt, 1980). 
Similarly, R.A. Bjork and Geiselman (1978) have observed both positive and negative 
consequences of retrieval within a single experiment. Using lists of word pairs in an 
item-by-item directed forgetting paradigm, the to-be-remembered items on each list 
were tested either immediately after presentation, or following a delay. At the 
conclusion of the experiment, all participants completed a free recall task of all items 
from both lists. Thus, some participants recalled all of the items only at the end of the 
experiment, or they retrieved the to-be-remembered items on an interpolated task 
before completing the final recall test.
The results indicated that participants who recalled the to-be-remembered 
items on an interpolated test recalled more to-be-remembered items on the final 
memoiy task than did participants who had not engaged in a prior period of selective 
retrieval. More interestingly, participants who had previously recalled the to-be- 
remembered items were poorer in their recall of the remaining to-be-forgotten items 
than were participants who never recalled any of the items during the retention 
interval. This finding of poorer recall for to-be-forgotten items after a period of 
selective retrieval is quite surprising given that the to-be-forgotten items have been 
treated in the same way in both conditions (i.e., they have been presented the same 
number of times and have been subject to the same directed forgetting instmctions).
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Thus, retrieval can modify memory by strengthening some items, by increasing the 
likelihood of their subsequent retrieval, while simultaneously reducing the 
retrievability of other items. R.A Bjork and Geiselman’s study also demonstrates that 
forgetting may not only be the result of intentional attempts to disregard information, 
but also unintentional effects of the retrieval process itself.
Rettieval-indiiced Forgetting
While output interference suggests that unintentional forgetting can occur dming the 
recall process, can the positive and negative consequences of an earlier retrieval 
attempt, as implied by R.A Bjork and Geiselman (1978), also be present during a later 
retrieval attempt without a direct instruction to forget? M.C. Anderson et al. (1994) 
set about examining these possibilities using a novel paradigm, called the retiieval 
practice paradigm, that allowed them to measure the effects of an earlier retrieval 
attempt on subsequent retrieval.
This retrieval practice paradigm typically contains four phases; a study phase; 
a retrieval practice phase; a distracter; and a final recall task. In the study phase 
participants are presented with lists of categories containing related items, for 
example, in Anderson et al. (1994), there aie eight categories containing six 
exemplars in each, such as the category FRUIT, and the exemplars APPLE, 
ORANGE, BANANA, etc. After studying these lists, participants engage in a 
retrieval practice task, such as presenting the category cue FRUIT and the exemplar
stem AP . This retrieval practice task requires participants to access items from
selective categories (practiced categories), while ignoring others (unpracticed 
categories). Participants are required to retrieve repeatedly half of the exemplars from 
half of the categories (for example, retrieve APPLE three times). This task creates
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three distinct types of items: practiced items from the practiced category (RP+ items); 
unpracticed items from the practiced category (RP- items); and unpracticed 
categories, where no exemplars have been practiced (NRP items), see Figure 6
Figure 6: Retrieval practice par'adigru
CUED RECALL
20-minute
DISTRACTER
STUDY PHASE 
8 categories containing 6 exemplars
RETRIEVAL PRACTICE 
Cue-pliis-stem presented three times each 
e.g., FRUlT-or
In line with other memory tasks, recall of the practiced RP+ items was 
significantly higher than that of the unpracticed NRP categoiy (e.g., Allen et al., 1969; 
Carrier & Pashler, 1992). Enhanced recall of RP+ items confirms that the act of 
retrieval is a potent learning event that strengthens the trace in memory. However, 
this paradigm also gives rise to findings that are contraiy to facilitatoiy priming 
effects (e.g., Neely, 1976, 1977), and spreading activation models (J.R. Anderson, 
1983; Freedman & Loftus, 1971; E.F. Loftus, 1973; G.R. Loftus & Loftus, 1974; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Specifically, the recall of RP- items from the 
practiced category tends to be poorer than for NRP recall despite both item types 
being treated identically (i.e., participants studied both items only once, and for the
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same duration, during the study phase). The impairment in the retrieval of non­
practiced RP- items relative to the NRP baseline is typically referred to as rettieval- 
indiicedforgetting.
Resolving Competition in the Retiieval Practice Pai'adigm through Non-inhibitory 
and Inhibitory Processes
What kind of processes might be responsible for the impaired recall of RP- items? 
Perhaps the most parsimonious account of retrieval-induced forgetting is that 
proposed by non-inhibitory theories that require fewer steps to explain the impaired 
RP- performance than other more complex inhibitoiy theories. More specifically, this 
basic retrieval-induced forgetting effect can be accommodated by the competition and 
cue-specific assumptions of non-inhibitory theories. For example, non-inhibitory 
theories predict that retrieval-induced forgetting will be a cue-specific effect, and thus 
only non-retrieved items that share a common cue with the target items should be 
subject to impaired retrieval. Similarly, these theories also predict that items that 
share a common cue will compete for retrieval. Wlien a sub-set of these items are 
strengthened through the retrieval process the association between the shared cue and 
the remaining non-retrieved items should be weakened. These predictions were both 
supported, with only the RP- items, which share a common cue with the target items 
and thus compete for retrieval with them, being impaired (M.C. Anderson et al.,
1994). In contrast, the recall of items from the unpracticed categories, which do not 
share a retrieval cue with the target items and therefore do not compete for retrieval 
with the RP+ items, remain unaffected.
Retrieval-induced forgetting, however, can also be accounted for by inhibitoiy 
theories that encompass the general assumptions previously described for non-
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inhibitory theories. That is, inhibitoiy theories predict that competition for retrieval is 
resolved through the actions of inhibitory processes directed at competing items. In 
the case of the retrieval practice paradigm, presenting the retrieval practice cue is 
thought to result in all items associated with that cue competing for retrieval. In order 
to prevent unwanted competitors creating interference and disrupting the retrieval of 
RP+ items, inhibitory processes are brought to bear on the RP- items.
However, as R.A. Bjork (1989) has previously highlighted, what form would 
this inhibitory process take? In its “most theoretically neutral sense” (M.C. Anderson 
& Bjork, 1994, p. 267), the term ‘inhibition’ has been used to describe an effect that 
would not have occurred in the absence of the independent variable (see also C.M. 
MacLeod et al, 2003). Similarly, a weak descriptive interpretation of inhibition 
makes no theoretical assumptions concerning memory traces, and merely describes an 
empirical finding that is the opposite of facilitation. In contrast, the strongest 
interpretation goes beyond describing an empirical effect and asserts the presence of 
an inhibitoiy mechanism that acts on the memorial representation to actively reduce 
its level of activation. But does retrieval-induced forgetting qualify as the effect of a 
true inhibitoiy mechanism, or is it merely the description of an empirical effect?
Inferring Inhibitory Processes
Inhibitory processes have previously been advanced as an explanation for the directed 
forgetting effect in episodic memoiy, but can examples of retrieval inhibition only be 
found in motivated forgetting, or can it also be inferred in more common cases of 
unintentional forgetting? Given that non-inhibitory processes can provide a more 
parsimonious account of the basic retrieval-induced forgetting effect (see M.C. 
Anderson & Bjork, 1994; M.C. Anderson & Neely, 1996; M.C. Anderson &
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Spellman, 1995, for flirther discussion), retrieval inhibition can only be inferred if 
non-inhibitory theories fail to provide a complete and adequate account of these 
retrieval failures. Despite this, non-inhibitoiy theories may not always be the more 
appropriate explanation of retrieval-induced forgetting. One of the primaiy 
predictions of non-inhibitoiy theories concerns the effects of strengthening the 
association between a cue and its target on other items that are also associated with 
that cue. While non-inhibitoiy theories assume that interference is a direct effect of 
the act of strengthening a target’s association with its cue, inhibitory theories assume 
that the probability of interference occurring is more dependent on the initial strength 
of competing items rather than the strengthening of the target.
In an effort to test this hypothesis more vigorously concerning the underlying 
processes of retrieval-induced forgetting, M.C. Anderson et al. (1994) manipulated 
the taxonomic strength of items within the RP+, RP-, and NRP sub-sets, i.e., the RP+ 
sub-set could consist of exclusively strong or weak categoiy members; the RP- set 
could consist entirely of strong or weak items; and half of the NRP set could be 
composed of strong items with the remaining items being only weakly associated to 
the cue. As inhibitoiy theories assume that vaiying the strength of the RP- items will 
affect the magnitude of retrieval-induced forgetting, interference is likely only to be 
found when the RP- item is of strong taxonomic strength, see Figure 7.
Non-inhibitoiy theories, in contrast, assume that it is the strength of the RP+ 
item that impaii s recall of competing items, and so retrieval-induced forgetting should 
be found irrespective of the strength of the RP- items, see Figure 8. Following this 
line of argument, retrieval-induced forgetting should be found in any condition where 
practice effects are demonstrated, indicating that the RP+ items have been sufficiently 
strengthened.
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Figure 7: The role o f initial exemplar strength in inhibitory theories
FRUIT
+.50
strawbenyapple
CompetitorTarget
FRUIT
+.50 +.40
apple guava
Target Competitor
Note. Targets in both exemplars aie strengthened to the same degree, however, 'strawbery ' 
is more strongly associated with die cue TRUIT’ than 'guava’ is. Thus, 'strawbeny ’ is a 
stronger competitor and is likely to create more interference than 'guava’. As such, in order 
to resolve this competition, 'strawbeny is subject to a greater degree of inhibition than 
'guava’.
M.C. Anderson et al. (1994), however, found that vaiying the strength of the 
RP- items was the best predictor of retrieval-induced forgetting, with robust 
impairment found when the RP- items were of a strong taxonomic strength. In 
contrast, retrieval-induced forgetting was entirely absent when the RP- items were 
only weakly associated to the cue. Recall of the RP- items actually benefited from 
sharing a cue with the practiced items. Inhibitoiy theories explain this variation in 
retrieval-induced forgetting thiough the assumption that strong RP- items are in a 
stronger position than weak RP- items to compete for retrieval with RP+ items. As 
stronger competitors, these RP- items are likely to create more interference during 
retrieval of RP+ items.
56
ill
Retrieval-induced Forgetting
Figure 8: The role o f initial exemplar strength in non-inhibitory theories
FRUIT
+.50 +.25
apple
CompetitorTarget
FRUIT
+.25+.50
apple guava
Target Competitor
Note. Targets in both examples are strengthened to the same degree, and so the strength- 
dependent assumption would predict that both 'strawbeny' and 'guava’ should be impaired to 
the same degree b) the retrieval practice of the target 'apple’.
Thus, here is an example of non-inhibitoiy theories being unable to account 
for the selective interference of strong RP- items in the retrieval-induced forgetting 
effect. Thus, the actions of an additional inhibitoiy mechanism may be inferred as a 
possible solution for these findings. An inhibitoiy account of retrieval-induced 
forgetting assumes that the presentation of the category cue during retrieval practice 
leads to all categoiy members vying for retrieval access. This means that, in addition 
to the target item preparing itself for retrieval, all related but unwanted items also 
compete for retrieval access with the target item. In addition, the stronger the 
association between the competing item and its cue the more severe the interference 
will be. If these related but unwanted items remain at a high level of retrieval 
strength, then they will create interference at the retrieval stage leading to the slow
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retrieval of the desired item, or at the extreme, retrieval failure. In order to prevent 
such inefficient retrieval, a suppression/inliibition process would actively reduce 
accessibility to memorial representations of any competing items, preventing them 
from interfering with the retrieval of target items. As such, the use of the term 
suppression or inhibition is used in its strongest sense to infer the actions of an 
inhibitory mechanism (M.C. Anderson & Neely, 1996; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 
1995; R.A. Bjork, 1989). Following on from this, it is assumed that the stronger the 
item the greater the interference that could potentially be created. In contrast, the 
weaker the item the weaker the interference. Therefore, stronger items are subject to 
greater inhibition or suppression through the actions of an inhibitoiy mechanism than 
are weaker items.
Bauml (1998) found similar support for this inhibitory account of strength- 
dependent competitor (rather than the strength-dependent competition assumed by 
non-inhibitory theories) impairment using an output interference paradigm. 
Participants studied lists containing categories composed of either moderate and 
strong category members, or of moderate and weak categoiy members and were 
subsequently prompted to recall either the moderate categoiy members before the 
strong members, or the moderate category members before the weak members. In 
line with inhibitory theories, the prior recall of moderate items impaired the later 
recall of strong items to a much greater degree than it impaired weak items. As these 
strong categoiy members create more interference during the retrieval of the moderate 
strength members, the strong items will be subject to greater inhibition in order to 
reduce this interference. In contrast, as weak members are unlikely to compete for 
retrieval with moderate items, they will create little interference and thus be subject to 
little, if any, inhibition.
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In a similar study, Bauml, Kissler and Rak (2002) investigated the role of 
exemplar strength in part-set cueing effects in healthy control participants and patients 
suffering from amnesia caused by various brain traumas. Amnesic patients were used 
because individuals suffering from this syndrome typically display intact short-term 
and semantic memory, but also typically suffer from deficits in recalling recently 
encoded episodic information (Baddeley, 1997). Using the same moderate/strong and 
moderate/weak lists, the part-set cueing of moderate categoiy members was found to 
impair the recall of strong members, but not the recall of weak members in the healthy 
population. In contrast, the amnesic patients demonstrated part-set cueing effects 
from both strong and weak items, suggesting that this population may suffer from 
more general retrieval impairments than healthy populations. In addition, as amnesics 
usually demonstrate intact retroactive and proactive interference (Isaac & Mayes, 
1999; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1978), the presence of strong part-set cueing effects 
in Bauml et al.’s study suggests that the type of interference seen in part-set cueing 
may be mediated by different mechanisms to that typically attributed to retroactive 
and proactive interference. This raises the, as yet, unaddressed question of whether 
the mechanisms underlying retrieval-induced forgetting and part-set cueing are, in 
fact, the same.
In contrast, Williams and Zacks (2001) failed to find a distinction between 
strong and weak competitors using ‘similar’ materials to M.C. Anderson et al. (1994), 
with weak RP- items giving rise to similai* retrieval-induced forgetting effects as 
strong RP- items. Williams and Zacks suggest that their data support the presence of 
non-inhibitoiy processes and further propose that retrieval-induced forgetting is 
actually a product of output order during final recall rather than inhibitory processes. 
Unfortunately, their claim is not without some difficulties. For example, the average
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rank score of the materials used, according to Battig and Montague (1969), was 7.5 
for the strong exemplars (eliciting a retrieval-induced forgetting effect o f -6.95), and 
32.4 for the weak exemplars (eliciting a retrieval-induced forgetting effect o f -6.4). 
When average rank scores, and size of retrieval-induced forgetting effects in M.C. 
Anderson et al. (1994) are considered alongside that of Williams and Zacks their 
results actually fall in line with M.C. Anderson et al.’s inhibitoiy interpretation. In 
M.C. Anderson et al. (1994), the first two studies used exemplars of similar strength 
(average rank order of 8 for strong exemplars, and 33 for weak exemplars) to that 
employed by Williams and Zacks. M.C. Anderson et al. found a reduced retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect for weak exemplars of -6.3% (compared to -15.7% for 
strong competitors) in the first experiment, but the results were confounded by output 
interference, and no difference in the second experiment (+0.2%, compared to -8.0 
for strong competitors) when output interference effects were controlled for. 
However, in a subsequent experiment, where the taxonomic strength of the RP- items 
was weakened further (M= 50), M.C. Anderson et al. discovered that these extremely 
weak RP- items actually benefited fr om sharing a retrieval cue with the RP+ items 
(RP- recall = +8.8%). Thus, it is possible that if Williams and Zacks had used even 
weaker exemplars, they may also have found that weak RP- items benefited from 
sharing a category with the practiced items.
Williams and Zacks belief that retrieval-induced forgetting is the result of 
interference acting at retrieval, rather than inhibitoiy processes elicited during 
retrieval practice, is also not without difficulties. While output interference has 
previously been found to influence recall in the retrieval practice paradigm (M.C. 
Anderson et al., 1994; Shaw et al., 1995), Williams and Zacks only assume that output 
interference is operating during final recall. That is, they neither controlled for, nor
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demonstrated through post-hoc statistical analysis, that output interference was 
influencing recall.
The Role o f Retrieval in Inhibitory Theories o f Interference
Inhibitory and non-inhibitory theories also differ in their assumptions and predictions 
concerning how the strengthening of RP+ items is achieved. The strength-dependent 
assumption of non-inhibitory theories is relatively non-specific, suggesting that RP- 
performance can be impaired by strengthening the target item through its retrieval, or 
through additional presentations of those target items, or extra study time, implying 
that retrieval may not be a necessaiy condition in the production of retrieval-induced 
forgetting. In contrast, inhibitoiy theories assume that retrieval-induced forgetting is a 
retrieval-specific interference effect that is elicited through the active retrieval of a 
sub-set of items. In support of this retrieval-specific assumption, simply re-exposing 
target materials has been found to be insufficient to impair recall of competing item 
(M.C. Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 2000a). For example, Blaxton and Neely (1983) 
found that participants were slower to retrieve a member of a semantic categoiy after 
having previously retrieved other members of that same category. On the other hand, 
participants were faster to retrieve a target categoiy member if they had previously 
been re-exposed to other categoiy members.
Similarly, Bauml (1996) investigated the effects of studying word lists during 
the retention interval between initial encoding of target material and their final 
retrieval on the retroactive interference effect. Exposure to the inteiwening word lists 
was manipulated from low exposure (2 seconds to view each item) to high exposure 
(5 seconds per item). Following the final list, memoiy for the target material from the 
initial list was tested first, followed by recall of the additional intervening lists. While
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ability to recall the items from the inteiwening lists was found to be significantly 
better in the high exposure group compared to the low exposure group, there was no 
increase in retroactive interference between the two groups. Thus, these two studies 
suggest that, not only is strengthening an item through additional study trials 
insufficient to create impairment, but that retrieval is a necessaiy process to impair 
related information.
These findings of retrieval-specific interference may indicate that retrieval- 
induced forgetting could also be a retrieval-specific process. M.C. Anderson et al. 
(2000a) investigated this possibility using the retrieval practice paradigm. Recall 
performance from a condition where participants performed active retrieval practice
(e.g., FRUIT-or ) was compared with another condition where participants were
re-presented with the target item and retrieved its category cue instead (e.g., FR -
orange). According to inhibitoiy theories, retrieval-induced forgetting should only be 
found in the retrieval practice condition, as presentation of the retrieval practice cue 
should encourage RP- items to compete for retrieval, resulting in these items being 
suppressed in order to reduce interference. However, while re-presenting the RP+ 
items strengthening them, it does not create competition and thus interference is 
unlikely to occur at retrieval. On the other hand, non-inhibitoiy theories predict that 
strengthening an item through re-presentation is sufficient to create interference and 
impair the recall of RP- items. Therefore, while participants in both of these 
conditions must complete a retrieval task, only the retrieval practice task requires the 
active and specific retrieval of target item, and thus is the only condition that creates 
competition.
The findings of M.C. Anderson et al. (2000a) support an inhibitory account for 
the obseiwed memoiy performance. Impaired recall of RP- items was only found in
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the standard retrieval practice condition where target items were subject to retrieval 
practice. Not only was RP- performance not depressed in the re-exposure condition, 
but the recall performance of these items actually benefited from the re-presentation 
of fellow categoiy members. Similarly, Ciranni and Shimamura (1999) and Bauml 
(2002) found that simply re-presenting RP+ items was insufficient to elicit retrieval- 
induced forgetting. RP+ items had to be actively retrieved in order to produce RP- 
impairment. Non-inhibitoiy theories aie unable to account for these failures to 
produce impairment through the strengthening of RP+ items without their active 
retrieval.
The retrieval-specific nature of retrieval-induced forgetting is not just a result 
of retrieving information from episodic memoiy, but also generalises to retrieving 
items from long-term semantic memoiy as well. Bauml (2002) found that retrieval- 
induced forgetting could be elicited through the semantic generation of RP+ items that 
had not previously been presented at any point during the experiment. Thus, the 
target RP+ items were not di awn from the same episode as that of the RP- items, and 
instead were generated from long-term memory. This suggests that not only do target 
items and their competitors not have to come from the same episode in order to elicit 
retrieval-induced forgetting, but retrieving information from long-term memory can 
also produce the same effect.
Cue-independent Forgetting in Inhibitory Theories
Thus far, non-inhibitory theories have been unable to folly account for the failure to 
find retrieval-induced forgetting where RP+ items are strengthened through non­
competitive retrieval conditions, or where competitors were only weakly associated to 
a common cue. However, the failure of non-inhibitory theories to folly account for
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retrieval-induced forgetting is Anther compounded by the finding that this form of 
retrieval interference is also a cue-independent forgetting effect (e.g., M.C. Anderson 
& Green, 2001; M.C. Anderson, Green & McCulloch, 2000b; Levy & M.C. 
Anderson, 2002; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Currently, this is perhaps the 
strongest and most convincing evidence for the presence of inhibitoiy processes (M.C. 
Anderson & Bjork, 1994; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995). The notion that 
competitors can remain inhibited even when a different retrieval cue is used is strong 
evidence against the primary assumption of cue-dependent forgetting in non- 
inhibitoiy theories. This assumption is a direct result of how non-inhibitory theories 
organise information in memory and how they conceive the retrieval process. Thus, 
multiple memories are assumed to be associated to a single cue, and increasing the 
number of items accessed by a cue is likely to lead to a corresponding increase in 
competition, and thus interference. As it is the sharing of a common cue (i.e., the 
non-specificity of retrieval cues) that triggers retrieval-induced forgetting, non- 
inhibitoiy theories predict that retrieval impairment is a cue-dependent phenomenon. 
Strengthening the association between a cue and its target weakens the association 
between competitors and that shared cue, resulting in impaired retrieval of those 
competitors, see Figure 9. However, the interference from competitors can be 
overcome by simply using a new retrieval cue that is not shared by the target. Thus, 
non-inhibitory theories assume that retrieval-induced forgetting is due to interference 
occurring along the retrieval route between cue and competitor.
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Figure 9: Cue-dependent forgetting
Retrieval-induced Forgetting
Retrieval Practice Cue Final Recall Cue
FRUIT RED
apple
Taiget Competitor
Note. As non-inhibitoiy theories assume that RP- items are impaired due to interference 
occurring along the retrieval route between FRUIT-strawbeny, RP- items can be retrieved 
when a new retrieval route in employed that is free from interference (e.g., RED).
In contrast, inhibitory theories assume that retrieval-induced forgetting can 
also be cue-independent. As the level of activation of the memorial representations of 
competing items may be reduced by inhibition, the number of items associated with a 
common cue is less critical to inhibitoiy theories. As such, retrieval-induced 
forgetting should still be found when a new retrieval cue is used that differs from the 
one used to strengthen the association between the target and its cue, see Figure 10.
65
Figure 10: Cue-independeni forgetting
Retrieval-induced Forgetting
Retrieval Practice Cue Final Recall Cue
FRUIT RED
apple
CompetitorTaiget
Note. As inhibitoiy theories assume that the memorial representation of the RP- item has 
been inhibited in long-term memory-, this item should remain unavailable for retrieval even 
when a novel cue is used during final recall.
M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995) used this distinction between cue- 
independent and cue-dependent forgetting effects to design a novel testing procedure 
for determining whether memorial representations are suppressed or not. The 
independent probe method employs retrieval cues at test that differ from those used 
during retiieval practice to strengthen the association between the RP+ items and their 
cue. By using novel retrieval cues, any interference occurring along the retrieval 
route between the cue and the RP- item is bypassed, see Figure 11. Therefore, if RP- 
items are recalled, then it suggests that non-inhibitory processes primarily underlie 
retrieval-induced forgetting, and fiirther implies that memorial representations in 
long-term memory remain unaffected. In contrast, if recall of the RP- items remains
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impaired then it suggests that the memorial representations of those items may 
actually be suppressed in long-term memory.
Figure 11: Independent probe method (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995)
Retrieval Practice Cue Final Recall Cue
Target Competitor
FRUIT RED
apple
Note. The independent probe method requires recall cues to be used that differ from those
used during retrieval practice. While presentation of 'FRUIT-ap______ ' during retrieval
practice strengthens the relationship between cue and target, it also results in the weakening
the association between TRUIT-st______ % either through inhibitoiy or non-inhibitoi^
processes. However, as inhibitoiy theories assume that the memorial representation of the 
RP- item has been inhibited in long-term memoiy, tliis item should remain unavailable for 
retrieval even when a novel cue has been emplo> ed during final recall, hi contrast, as non- 
inhibitoiy theories assiune that RP- items are impaired due to interference occurring along the 
retrieval route between ‘FRUIT-strawberiy’, tlie RP- item can be retrieved when a new 
retrieval route in emploj ed that is fiee from interference (e.g., 'RED'’).
M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995) uncovered two major findings using this 
independent probe method that are consistent with an inhibitory account. First, and 
most importantly, retrieval-induced forgetting was still present even when these novel 
cues where used at recall (M.C. Anderson & Green, 2001; M.C. Anderson et al.
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2000b; Ciranni & Shimamura, 1999). That forgetting occurs independently of the 
type of retrieval cues employed at recall, suggests the presence of an inhibitory 
mechanism that acts on competitors to suppress their memorial representations. It 
also has a number of interesting implications for retrieval techniques that have 
previously been based on cue-dependent forgetting (e.g., cognitive inteiwiew, 
Bekerian & Dennett, 1993; Fisher & Geiselman, 1988; Geiselman, Fisher, 
MacKinnon & Holland, 1985).
More recently, cue-independent forgetting has been demonstrated in a 
different paradigm called the Think/No-Think task. M.C, Anderson and Green (2001) 
adapted the Go/No-Go task, a form of stop signal task, which is typically employed in 
neuropsychological research and requires participants to with hold a motor action in 
response to an external signal. However, the Think/No-Think task goes beyond 
requiring participants to tiy and withhold a pre-potent response and attempts to 
encourage participants to try and prevent specific information from entering conscious 
awareness. Participants attempt this by exerting control over these unwanted 
memories and intentionally suppressing them.
Not only were participants less likely to recall these suppressed items in a 
subsequent test compared to items that had neither been previously retrieved or 
suppressed (see also ITertel & Gerstle, in press), but unwanted items remained 
suppressed even when novel cues were employed at recall. M.C. Anderson and Green
(2001) suggested that unwanted information is suppressed through the recmitment of 
executive control processes, thus going one step further than M.C. Anderson and 
Spellman (1995) and directly inferring the actions of inhibitoiy neurons in controlling 
the conscious awareness of memories. By suppressing unwanted information in this 
manner, an individual can ensure that the unwanted information never reaches
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conscious awareness. Thus, not only can inhibitoiy processes be ascribed to the 
unconscious forgetting of competing information at the level of the memorial 
representations (i.e., retrieval-induced forgetting), but also to the conscious and 
deliberate suppression of unwanted memories.
Beyond the work of M.C. Anderson lab, only one other laboratoiy has 
provided corroborating evidence for cue-independent forgetting. In a study by 
Ciranni and Shimamura (1999), the type of retrieval cue used at final recall was 
manipulated using visuo-spatial materials. In a typical condition, the cues used during 
the recall stage matched those used during the retrieval practice phase. As expected, 
retrieval-induced forgetting was found, but as the cues used during retrieval practice 
were also used during the recall stage, non-inhibitoiy theories cannot be discounted as 
a possible explanation. In one study, however, the cues used during final recall were 
the same ones as those under which the stimuli were originally encoded. This means 
with which the cues that the RP+ items have become strongly associated during 
retrieval practice were not used during final recall, and thus the design of this study 
may constitute a more simplistic form of the independent probe method. As retrieval- 
induced forgetting was still found when these non-retrieval practice cues were used at 
recall, it implies that RP- items themselves have been inhibited rather than retrieval 
access being blocked through non-inhibitoiy means.
The second major finding of M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995) was that of 
cross-category impairment. Not only did the independent probe method determine 
that RP- items were inhibited, but also any items from the unpracticed categoiy that 
were semantically similar to items from the practiced categoiy (called NRP-Similar 
items) were also found to have been suppressed. A particularly compelling case of 
cross-category impairment is second-order inhibition, where NRP-Similar items are
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inhibited due to their similarity with the RP- items, see Figure 12. While inhibitoiy 
theories predict that NRP-Similar performance would be impaired if some of the NRP 
items shared a related category with RP+ items, it does not seem instantly obvious as 
to why NRP-Similar items should also be inhibited if they are semantically similar to 
RP- items. Similarly, non-inhibitory theories cannot explain second-order 
impairment, as the RP+ items do not share a common cue with the NRP-Similar 
items, and thus the NRP-Similar items should remain unimpaired. In contrast, 
inhibitoiy theories can explain second-order inhibition, although they are not a 
primary prediction of inhibitoiy theories (see M.C, Anderson & Spellman, 1995, for 
further discussion). For example, inhibitoiy theories may be able to explain second- 
order inhibition by assuming that inhibition Teaks’ from the inhibited RP- items to 
any related items, thus making NRP-Similar items act like a second RP- group.
The likelihood of this unusual finding being the result of inhibitory processes 
gains credibility through the additional experimentation that M.C. Anderson and 
Spellman undertook to ensure that non-inhibitoiy theories could not explain these 
results. For example, second-order inhibition, as well as the inhibition of RP- items, 
may be explained by the cue-overload principle (Watkins, 1975, 1978). This was a 
possibility due to the RP- items also belonging to the same implicit category as some 
of the NRP items and so more items were associated with a single cue compared to a 
control condition where the RP- items did not share a related category with some of 
the NRP items. However, second-order inhibitory effects were found to be dependent 
on both the prior retrieval of RP+ items and the shared similarity between NRP and 
RP- items. The absence of second-order inhibition when participants performed 
retrieval practice on unrelated filler categories instead of on target items indicates that 
cue-
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overload cannot account for second-order inhibition. As this condition was the same 
as in the retrieval practice condition (i.e., that there was the same number of RP- items 
sharing a related category with NRP items), it would suggest that the increased 
number of items sharing a retrieval cue in the conditions that contain related 
categories is not a cause of second-order inhibition. Further to this, NRP performance 
was unimpaired by the prior retrieval of RP+ items if none of the NRP items shared a 
related categoiy with any of the items from the practiced category.
Retiieval-induced forgetting in Recognition Tests: The Continuing Persistence o f  
Inhibition
Recognition tests have been repeatedly used in interference research due to their 
alleged ability to resolve retrieval competition thiough presenting both targets and 
competitors at test (Ratcliffe, Clark & Shiffrin, 1990), and provide another avenue of 
exploring for the inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting. Non-inhibitory 
theories predict that re-presenting RP- items on a recognition test should remove the 
effects of competition, and thus predict that retrieval-induced forgetting will not be 
found. In contrast, inhibitory models predict that the memorial representation of the 
RP- items will be inhibited and remain unavailable to conscious inspection. Thus, 
even when the RP- items are re-presented, if these items are truly inhibited, then 
recognition of RP- items will remain impaired (but see concluding paragraph of this 
sub-section).
In support of inhibitory theories, Hicks and Starns (in press) found significant 
retrieval-induced forgetting effects on recognition tests, but even more interestingly, 
participants were also more likely to claim that the RP- items were new items (i.e., 
had not appeared on the initial study list) than they were to make the same claim for
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NRP items. This is quite a startling result, given that participants were exposed to 
both the NRP and RP- items only once. This pattern of results suggests that the 
memorial representation of RP- items may be inhibited in memory and unavailable to 
conscious inspection. However, while these results are consistent with an inhibitory 
account of retrieval-induced forgetting, Hicks and Starns dismissal of non-inhibitory 
theories would have been strengthened with the inclusion of a control condition. If 
retrieval-induced forgetting was absent at recognition after participants had performed 
additional study trials, this would have significantly strengthened Hicks and Starns 
interpretation of their results, especially as Koutstaal, Schacter, Johnson and 
Galluccio (1999) failed to find the effect for actions in a recognition test (although 
this may be the result of actions being more richly encoded than the study lists used in 
Hicks & Starns, in press). Despite this, retrieval-induced forgetting in recognition 
tests has also been found in an unpublished study by M.C. Anderson, De Kok and 
Childs (1997, reported in M.C. Anderson, 2001) using a different set of stimuli that 
were encoded using a categoiy cue.
However, this assumption that inhibitory theories predict retrieval-induced 
forgetting in recognition tests should only be accepted with caution. Not only has 
very little research examined the recognition memoiy in retrieval-induced forgetting, 
but consists of one study that found the effect, another unpublished study, and one 
under-powered study where retrieval-induced forgetting was not found. Even more 
troubling is the seeming inconsistency between the predictions made by directed 
forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting concerning the use of recognition tests. 
While an inhibitoiy account of directed forgetting proposes that the presentation of 
items at test should release inhibition (e.g., Geiselman et al., 1983), an inhibitoiy 
account of retrieval-induced forgetting proposes the converse (e.g., M.C. Anderson,
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2001). Although this discrepancy may be due to different forms of inhibition 
underlying directed forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting, or inhibition acting at 
different levels in the retrieval process (e.g., episodic and semantic inhibition), it 
remains too early to form any firm conclusions.
Inhibitory Models
The failure of non-inhibitory theories to account fiilly for findings such as the 
differential effects of exemplar strength and cue-independent forgetting allows the 
possibility of inhibitory processes to be considered. But what type of inhibitory 
model might explain these findings? Pattern suppression models have been advanced 
as the most appropriate account of retrieval-induced forgetting (M.C. Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995), despite being less computationally developed than other inhibitory 
models (e.g., lateral inhibition). The advantage of pattern suppression comes from 
assumptions about how memories are represented in memoiy and utilises complex 
memorial representations, which contain internal semantic features that are acted on 
by facilitatoiy or inhibitoiy processes. It is these internal semantic features that allow 
pattern suppression to account for the unusual findings of second-order inhibition 
across categories. In contrast, other inhibitoiy accounts such as lateral inhibition, use 
discrete and unitary memoiy representations with no internal features.
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I' ignre 13: Representations o f memoiy trac es and internal semantic features in the 
pattern suppression model
emerald apple
Note. Larger circles represent memorial representations o f items, while smaller circles 
represent the internal semantic features.
In the pattern suppression account, the memorial representation of an item is 
composed of semantic feature units. Figure 13 demonstrates how items and their 
internal features are represented in the pattern suppression model. The internal 
semantic feature units are typically represented as small circles, encompassed by a 
larger circle that represents where an item 'ends’ in memory, separating items from 
one another. These smaller semantic features can be activated when they are present 
within an environmental context, or when the features of a related item are activated. 
The activation of features in a related item is also aided by the assumption that the 
memorial representations of related items 'cross-over’ or 'intersect’ Therefore, if 
two distinct but related items share semantic features, then the activation of features in 
one of the items will activate these same features in the related item
It is the assumptions concerning the organisation of memorial representations 
that makes the pattern suppression model sufficiently flexible to account for second- 
order inhibition. Therefore, the presence of various retrieval cues in the environment
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will activate all of the semantic features in memory that are associated with it (this 
does not necessarily mean that all of the features of an item will be activated). The 
activation of some semantic features of an item will, in turn, activate those remaining 
items that were not activated by the cue. In terms of the retrieval practice procedure, 
the presentation of the categoiy cue during the retrieval practice phase will activate all 
semantic features associated with that cue. For example, the presentation of the 
retrieval cue RED will activate features associated with that cue that are shared by 
both BLOOD and CHILLI. In turn, the activation of those features associated with 
the cue will activate the remaining features of both BLOOD and CHILLI. However, 
as retrieval practice only requires the selective retrieval of a sub-set of items 
associated with the cue RED, only the RED-BLOOD association will be practiced. 
Therefore, as only the semantic features associated with BLOOD will be facilitated by 
practice, a mechanism is required that inhibits the activated semantic features of 
competing items, such as CHILLI. Therefore, semantic features associated with the 
to-be-remembered item will be activated by retrieval practice and suppress competing 
features in non-target items. As the majority of competitor feature units will be 
inhibited, competitors should not create competition at retrieval with the to-be- 
remembered item, and it should not be recalled. In addition, any item that shares 
inhibited semantic features with those competitors will also share the same fate of 
inhibition. For example, the majority of semantic features of RED-CHILLI will be 
inhibited through the retrieval of RED-BLOOD. However, RED-CHILLI shaies 
semantic features with GREEN-PEAS as both items share the implicit category of 
VEGETABLES. Thus, the retrieval of GREEN-PEAS will be impaired because it 
shares semantic features with RED-CHILLI. This conclusion is further supported by 
the finding that second-order inhibition is dependent on NRP-Similai' items sharing a
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related category with the RP- items (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Not only is 
the second-order inhibition effect dependent on the sharing of related features 
between RP- items and NRP items, but the retrieval of the NRP-Dissimilar item 
GREEN -DOLLAR will not be impaired, as it shares semantic features with the RP- 
item RED-CHILLI. In addition, the recall performance of NRP-Dissimilar items will 
not be facilitated by the inhibition of NRP-Similar items, an effect predicted by the 
lateral inhibition model. As the recall of NRP-Dissimilar items in conditions 
containing related categories was not greater than those items recalled in conditions 
where there were no related categories, the assumptions of the pattern suppression 
model are again upheld.
Lateral inhibition models can also account for second-order inhibition. 
However, according to this account, the magnitude of the second-order inhibitory 
effect should not be as great as for first-order inhibition due to the suppression of the 
RP- item and therefore its ability to inhibit related material (i.e., NRP-Similar items). 
This, therefore, suggests that the recall of NRP-Similar items should not be as 
impaired as that of the RP- items. Unfortunately, there is little support for this 
prediction concerning second-order inhibition. For example, M.C. Anderson and 
Spellman (1995) found that their second-order inhibitoiy effect was larger than the 
first-order effect (experiment 2), a finding that is incompatible with lateral inhibition 
accounts of retrieval-induced forgetting.
In contrast, pattern suppression models predict that the extent of second-order 
inhibition will be dependent on the degree of overlapping features shared between the 
RP- items and NRP-Similar items. This latter point suggests that the degree of 
facilitation and inhibition in pattern suppression models is based on a trade-off 
between the number of overlapping semantic features that are activated and the
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number of overlapping semantic features that are suppressed. This means that a 
member of the unpracticed category could be suppressed to a greater degree than an 
RP- item. In an example given by Anderson and Spellman (1995), an RP- item can 
share 35% of the facilitated semantic features with the RP+ item leading to the 
remaining 65% of the RP- items feature units being suppressed by the retrieval 
practice of the RP+ items. This leads to the inhibition of the RP- item. However, if 
the NRP item shares 95% of its semantic features with the inhibited features of the 
RP- item, then this NRP item is likely to be subject to more inhibition than the RP- 
item. The greater inhibition of NRP-Similar items could occur despite the NRP item 
not being directly related to the RP+ item. Therefore, the pattern suppression model 
suggests that there are ‘degrees’ of inhibition, rather than inhibition being a 
mechanism that is turned ‘on’ and ‘off. This proposition is also supported by the 
different degrees of inhibition demonstrated between the suppression of RP- and 
related NRP items compared to umelated NRP items, and between items that are 
strong and weak members of a categoiy.
Pattern Suppression: Evidence for a Two-Factor Model
Research into the effects of integration and similarity on retrieval-induced forgetting 
has also supplied additional empirical support for the pattern suppression model. This 
area of research indicates that items that share a high degree of similarity can both 
eliminate retrieval-induced forgetting (M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; M.C. Anderson 
& McCulloch, 1999; Bauml & Haitinger, 2002), as well as producing robust 
impairment (M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; R.E. Smith & Hunt, 2000) -  findings 
which are not easily resolved by interference accounts. Comparable conflision is 
mirrored in the classic interference literature. Retroactive interference effects have
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been found to increase when a high degree of similarity is shared between the paired- 
associates across lists (McGeoch & McDonald, 1931; Shuell, 1968). On the other 
hand, increasing similarity between items across list can eliminate retroactive 
interference (Osgood, 1946, Postman, 1964). To add to the conftision, inter-category 
similarity has been found to have no effect on the magnitude of the output 
interference effect (Roediger & Schmidt, 1980). Osgood (1949) referred to such 
contradictoiy effects of similarity on recall as the ‘similarUy paradox \
Despite the failure of the classical interference literature to help resolve this 
issue, the pattern suppression model can accommodate these apparently contradictory 
findings by examining the effects of similarity at the level of the semantic feature 
units. The adaptive target discrimination interpretation of retrieval-induced forgetting 
assumes that the inhibition of competitors increases the discriminability of the target. 
Thus, the more similar the competitor is to the target, the greater the level of 
inhibition to which that competing item will be subject. However, this interpretation 
fails to take into account the effect of retrieving (and therefore activating) those 
semantic features on a competitor that also shares those activated features. This 
adaptive account assumes that during retrieval practice, the retrieval of a target item 
will result in the activation of only those semantic features that constitute the target 
pattern. Any other patterns that compete for retrieval in response to the cue during 
retrieval practice will be inhibited due to reduced interference.
L Target-Compelitor Similarity
This standard interpretation of how the adaptive target discrimination account of 
retrieval-induced forgetting works within the pattern suppression model is non­
specific concerning the fate of competitors that share activated features with a target
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item. This variable is what M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) referred to as ‘target- 
competitor similaiity As it is well established that retrieval of an item strengthens 
that item in memoiy (Allen et al., 1969; R.A. Bjork, 1975; Carrier & Pashler, 1992), 
the activation of a target pattern’s features will strengthen and facilitate those features. 
However, the strengthening and facilitation of these features is not restricted to the 
target pattern. Those semantic features will be strengthened in all competing patterns 
as well. Therefore, any competing pattern that overlaps with the target pattern will 
share in those strengthened features, resulting in the facilitation of those features in 
the competing pattern. The remaining distinct features of the competing pattern will 
also be subject to a greater degree of inhibition due to the competing pattern being so 
similar to the target, and because there are fewer distinct features than shared features. 
This being so, the degree of retrieval-induced forgetting will be dependent on the 
number of shared strengthened features compared to the number of inhibited distinct 
features.
This possibility adds a ftirther factor for consideration when trying to predict 
under what conditions retrieval-induced forgetting is likely to occur. By taking into 
account the effects of strengthening and facilitation on shared semantic features it is 
not inevitable that impairment will occur just because a competitor is deemed to be 
‘similar’ to the target. Taking into account this trade-off between shared facilitated 
features and suppressed distinctive features, any increase in the similarity between a 
target and its competitors should actually reduce, rather than increase, retrieval- 
induced forgetting.
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Figure 14: An example o f the trade off between activation and inhibition
LEMON _ _ .  \ LIME
Note. An example of the sharing of semantic features between a target (LEMON) and a 
similar competitor (LIME). As the target and competitor are both citrus finits they share 
a high degree of semantic features. As the retrieval of the target results in the facilitation 
of its features the competing item’s semantic features also benefit.
Figure 14 illustrates this trade-off when a target and competitor are highly 
similar. As the pattern of the target item LEMON is very similar to that of its 
competitor LIME it will be very difficult to retrieve selectively the target without also 
activating its competitor. This will occur because during retrieval practice the 
features of the target LEMON are strengthened and facilitated through their retrieval. 
As many of the features of the competing item LIME is shared by LEMON then the 
shared features in LIME will also be strengthened and facilitated. In addition, in 
order to try and make the target more distinctive in memory, the remaining unique 
features of the competitor will be subject to greater inhibition than a less similar 
competitor. However, the additional inhibition of any remaining unique features is 
unlikely to be sufficient to overcome the powerflil facilitatoiy effects of the stronger 
shared features. This can be assumed from the empirical work demonstrating that the 
facilitatoiy effects of retrieval tend to be greater than the inhibitory effects. For 
example, the average facilitation of strong items in M.C. Anderson et al. (1994) was
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16.3% and the average inhibitory effect was 11%. Therefore, during final recall, the 
competitor LIME should be recalled. This is exactly what Bauml and Hartinger
(2002) found using sets of sub-categories within larger categories. Retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects were abolished when the RP+ and RP- items shared both a category 
and a sub-categoiy.
In contrast, where a target and competitor are highly similar, retrieval-induced 
forgetting is expected to occur when the similarity between a taiget and competitor is 
decreased. For example, in Figure 15, both the target LEMON and its competitor 
STRAWBERRY are from the same categoiy FRUIT but both items are fairly 
distinctive within that categoiy. This being so, the competing STRAWBERRY will 
share fewer semantic features with the target LEMON and so will not create as much 
interference at retrieval. Therefore, during retrieval practice, the retrieval of the target 
will result in the strengthening and facilitation of its features. However, the 
competing item shares very few of these strengthened features. In addition, as the 
competitor’s pattern is not very similai* to the target pattern, it is unlikely to be a 
particularly strong competitor. Due to this, not all of its remaining unique features 
will be subject to inhibition. Only a proportion of the competitor’s features will need 
to be inhibited in order to increase the target item’s pattern more distinctiveness in 
memory. However, because the competing pattern is subject to more inhibition than 
facilitation it is unlikely to be retrieved at recall. This prediction of categoiy members 
being inhibited is supported by the majority of retrieval-induced forgetting studies 
(e.g., M.C. Anderson et al., 1994, M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; M.C. Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995; MacLeod, 2002; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999).
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Figure 15: Target-competitor similarity
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RP-
GRAPE
Note. The black circles represent facilitated semantic features, while the circles containing 
crosses represent inhibited features. When target-competitor similarity is only moderate the 
competing RP- items do not share man) features with the RP+ item. Thus, the RP- items 
share few strengthened features, but also, as tliese items are onl) moderate strength 
competitors, the) are also not subject to strong inhibition.
M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) directly tested the predictions of the pattern 
suppression model of manipulating target-competitor similarity in retrieval-induced 
forgetting. Sets of triple words were used as stimuli and were composed of a cue and 
two category members (e.g., RED Tomato Radish). In an initial study phase, 
participants completed a judgement task that required participants to rate how good an 
example each item was as an example of a category member. This task encouraged 
participants to encode each item individually and associate it to the categoiy cue 
thereby creating competition. The judgement task also attempted to control and 
reduce any natural encoding strategies that see the category members being associated 
to one another rather than to the category label. With all participants having initially 
encoded the stimuli in a similar manner, paiticipants were required to either find 
similarities or differences between an item that would later receive retrieval practice
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(e.g., the target item ‘Tomato’) and another item that would not receive practice (e.g., 
the competing item ‘Radish’).
The results supported the predictions of the pattern suppression model. When 
similarities were encoded between a target and a competitor, retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects were eliminated and reversed. Under these encoding conditions 
participants recalled more RP- items than NRP items. This is also consistent with 
Bauml and Hartinger’s (2002) findings that, inter-relating the RP+ and RP- items 
through sharing a sub-category, facilitates the later recall performance of RP- items. 
Therefore, it is assumed that target-competitor similarity is increased through 
increasing the number of shared facilitated features between the RP+ and RP- item. 
In contrast, when target-competitor similarity is reduced thiough the encoding of 
unique properties a strong retrieval-induced forgetting effect was found. This is also 
in line with Bauml and Hartinger, who found that when RP+ items were drawn from 
the same categoiy but a different sub-category, a robust retrieval-induced forgetting 
effect was demonstrated. The pattern suppression model assumes that decreasing 
target-competitor similarity reduced the number of shared facilitated features leaving 
the remaining unique features of the RP- items vulnerable to inhibition. In addition, 
as M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) employed novel cues at recall, it can be asserted that 
the features of the RP- items were subject to inhibitory processes.
11. Competitor-Competitor Similatity
As already noted, under some circumstances, attempts to decrease the similarity 
between items has led to both the elimination of retrieval-induced forgetting (R.E. 
Smith & Hunt, 2000), and the production of strong impairment (Bauml & Hartinger, 
2002). The pattern suppression model suggests that shared inhibited features between
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competitors may explain these apparently contradictoiy results; what M.C. Anderson 
et al. (2000b) referred to as 'competitor-competitor similarity '. This variable is likely 
to influence the pattern of recall when there is more than one item competing with the 
target. As competing patterns can create interference during retrieval, the unique 
features of the competitors are inhibited in order to increase the discriminability of the 
target. However, if the competitors are similar to one another, with many overlapping 
features, these items are likely to share many inhibited features. Under these 
conditions, the inhibition of shared features is likely to have a greater net, inhibitory 
effect than if the same number of features were inhibited in less similar competitors 
(e.g., when the competing items are RASBERRY and GRAPE). It is under these 
conditions of high competitor-competitor similarity that the strongest retrieval- 
induced forgetting effects are likely to occur. Figure 16 demonstrates a situation 
where competitors are highly similar to one another. These competing items in these 
two examples do differ in their similarity to one another with many overlapping 
features.
During retrieval practice, the features of the target LEMON are strengthened 
and facilitated through their retrieval. However, veiy few of these strengthened 
features are shared with the competing items, and so only a minimal number of 
features in the patterns of competing items is facilitated. The remaining unique 
features of the competitors will be subject to inhibition in order to reduce interference 
created by these competing items. As these competing patterns are not overly similar 
to the target, as indicated by the few shared facilitated features, their individual 
patterns would normally be subject to weak to moderate levels of inhibition only (see 
Figure 16). However, as competitor-competitor similarity increases, the patterns of 
competing items will become more similar to one another due to an increase in the
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number of shared many features. In addition, these items are likely to share inhibited 
features. The effects of sharing inhibited features is thus likely to create a larger 
inhibitory effect than if less similar competitors were subject to inhibition separately. 
M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) referred to this increased net inhibitoiy effect as the 
inhibited features doing ‘double duty’ to indicate that sharing inhibited features 
impairs patterns to a greater degree than the same number of features being inhibited 
in unsimilar competitors. Under these conditions of high competitor-competitor 
similarity a strong retrieval-induced forgetting effect is expected.
Figure 16: Competitor-competitor similarity
RP+
LEMON
RP-
RASBERRY
RP-
STRAWBERRY
Note. The black circles represent facilitated semantic features, while the circles containing 
crosses represent inhibited features. When competing items share may features, the) are 
likel) to share man) inhibited features, thereb) increasing the net inhibitoiy effect.
M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) interpret the elimination of retrieval-induced 
forgetting through encoding differences between items (R E. Smith & Hunt, 2000) 
within this competitor-competitor framework. The task of encoding differences 
between items may not eliminate retrieval-induced forgetting through making the
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pattern of the target more distinctive but instead this task may make the pattern of the 
competitors more unique from one another. That is, retrieval-induced forgetting was 
attenuated through decreasing competitor-competitor similarity.
As this work on distinctive encoding did not specifically addresses competitor- 
competitor similarity within the pattern suppression model, M.C. Anderson et al. 
(2000b) set about testing the model’s predictions that varying the relatedness of 
competing items to one another will also vary the magnitude of the retrieval-induced 
forgetting effect in specific directions. Participants were presented with sets of word 
triplets (e.g., RED Tomato Radish) and initially associated each categoiy members to 
its category label. Following this initial encoding task, participants were required to 
find either similarities or differences between the competitors (e.g., Tomato Radish). 
These pairs of category members would either receive retrieval practice in the 
following phase (making these items target pairs), or the word pairs would receive no 
practice, making these items competitors.
M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) found that the effects of encoding similarities or 
differences between competitors had a significant impact on the pattern of recall. 
When similarities were encoded between competitors, significant retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects were found. This result supported R E. Smith and Hunt’s (2000) 
prior findings of significant impairment when similarities are encoded between 
categoiy members. It is assumed that the number of inhibited features shared by the 
competitors is raised through encoding competitors in the manner as well as resulting 
in a decrease in the number of unique features for each individual competitor. In 
contrast, when differences were encoded between competing items, retrieval-induced 
forgetting was eliminated. This result was also in line with the finding by R E. Smith 
and Hunt that encoding differences between category members eliminated retrieval-
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induced forgetting. It is assumed that decreasing this competitor-competitor 
similarity reduced the number of shared inhibited features between the items and 
increased the number of features unique to each individual competitor. This reduction 
in the number of shared inhibited features through the promotion of unique properties 
is expected to have reduced the net inhibitory effect acting on the RP- items. In 
addition, category members were cued at recall using novel cues ensuring that the 
features of RP- items were subject to inhibition.
In conclusion, the contradictoiy results of Bauml and Hartinger (2002) and 
R.E. Smith and Hunt (2000) can be accommodated within the pattern suppression 
model. Bauml and Hartinger clearly manipulated target-competitor similarity by 
drawing the RP- items fi'om either the same sub-categoiy or a different one. Despite 
being a less clear manipulation, the focus of R E. Smith and Hunt’s study appears to 
have been to increase the similarity between items that could potentially act as 
competitors, as well as increasing similarity between targets and competitors. 
However, as the retrieval-induced forgetting effect in M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) 
increased with a corresponding increase in competitor-competitor similarity, the 
findings of strong retrieval-induced forgetting effects though encoding similarities in 
the R.E. Smith and Hunt study may also be due to an increase in competitor- 
competitor similarity. With this interpretation in mind, the elimination of retrieval- 
induced forgetting with distinctive encoding may also have been due to a reduction in 
competitor-competitor similarity. This account of R E. Smith and Hunt’s encoding 
instmctions is supported by the additional finding of M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) 
that increasing target-competitor similarity reversed the retrieval-induced forgetting 
effect, a pattern of recall opposite to increasing competitor-competitor similarity. Of 
course, R E. Smith and Hunt’s encoding instructions also included a target-competitor
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manipulation as well, which is not accounted for. Varying the similarity of the 
competitor to the target should also have affected the recall of the RP- items. 
However, M.C. Anderson et al. suggest that the instmctions to encode similarity or 
differences between one item and the remaining categoiy members may have resulted 
in many partial comparisons that were rejected because the comparison did not apply 
to all categoiy members. The encoding, but rejection, of many possible comparisons 
may have increased the number of competitor-competitor similarities or differences. 
By increasing the number of independent competitor-competitor similarities between 
some members of the categoiy, retrieval-induced forgetting could be increased. In 
contrast, encoding many independent unique features between a sub-set of competing 
items will also have made these items more resistant to retrieval-induced forgetting. 
In addition to this possibility, it is unknown what effect encoding both target- 
competitor similarities and competitor-competitor similarities has on the net retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect predicted by the pattern suppression model. Given that 
subsequent retrieval is easily facilitated by the retrieval of an item from memoiy, 
perhaps encoding competitor-competitor similarities is a more potent and distinctive 
event than encoding target-competitor similarities.
Difficulties in the Inhibitoiy Account o f Retrieval-induced Forgetting: Theoretical or 
Experimental?
There has, however, been mixed evidence in support of the inhibitory account of 
retrieval-induced forgetting, although this appears to be primarily due to 
methodological weaknesses. For example, Williams and Zacks (2001) attempted to 
reproduce cue-independent forgetting using different categories to that originally used 
by M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995). However, Williams and Zacks may have
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misinterpreted inhibitoiy theories, mistaking cue independence in retrieval-induced 
forgetting (i.e., first-order inhibition) for that of second-order inhibition. Thus,
Williams and Zacks dismiss their marginally significant retrieval-induced forgetting 
effects with the independent probe method (p < 0.07), and concentrate on their failure 
to find second-order inhibition (an effect that is not in itself predicted by inhibitoiy 
theories, but which can be accommodated by them to a better degree than non- j
inhibitory theories). ■ J
Unfortunately, there are other methodological weaknesses in the study, which 
may explain the weak retrieval-induced forgetting effect as well the failure to find 
second-order inhibition. For example, one serious problem concerns the strength of 
the category exemplars, which varied dramatically, and according to Battig and 
Montague (1969), averaged 19.1 and ranged from 2 to 53. This means that the 
average strength of the categoiy members was only moderate, and while some 
members were extremely strong, other were veiy weak exemplars of their categoiy.
In the case of these very weak exemplars, if an inhibitoiy mechanism was present it is 
unlikely to be triggered due to their lack of competitive strength. In fact, weak RP- 
items are more likely to be facilitated by their relatedness to practiced items (M.C.
Anderson et al. 1994). A further difficulty with Williams and Zacks (2001) 
interpretation against an inhibitoiy account of retrieval-induced forgetting concerns 
how they tested recall. It is unclear what type of test was used, although it is assumed 
to be the same categoiy cue plus free recall test that was employed in the other studies 
reported by Williams and Zacks in their examination of the effects of exemplar 
strength on retrieval-induced forgetting. Also, output interference effects could not be 
dismissed as possible influences on the observed pattern of recall.
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A loss of inhibitoiy control has also been put foivvard to explain memory 
deficits in older adults and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; 
Hasher, Zacks & May, 1999), although facilitatoiy effects are believed to remain 
intact (Faust et al., 1997). Based on the assumption that inhibitory control declines 
with advancing years, older adults should show less retrieval-induced forgetting than 
do younger adults, resulting in more competing items vying for retrieval and 
increased retrieval times. Moulin, Perfect, Conway, North, Jones and James (2002) 
examined retrieval-induced forgetting effects in a population of patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease, and matched healthy older adults. Retrieval-induced forgetting 
effects were found in both groups, and the size for the effect in the Alzheimer’s group 
was of a similar magnitude to that found for the healthy older adults. Moulin et al. 
(2002) interpret this result as indicating that the inhibition of competing items in 
episodic memory remains intact in Alzheimer’s disease, and that this form of 
inhibition is a “low-level attentional process” (p. 866). However, it is difficult to 
assess whether this study actually measured inhibitoiy processes or not. For a study 
that makes claims that there are inhibitoiy deficits in the episodic memories of 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease, it would be necessary to mle out non-inhibitory 
effects first. For example, the cued-recall task that was employed by Moulin et al. is 
similar to that used in experiment one of M.C. Anderson et al. (1994) where the 
retrieval-induced forgetting effect was obscured by output interference. However, 
just like Williams and Zacks (2001), Moulin et al. never controlled for output order 
during the experiment by employing a cue-plus-stem recall test, or calculate post-hoc 
whether any output interference effects were present. Given the use of an immediate 
test after retrieval practice, where it could be argued that output interference effects 
could be at their strongest, and the fact that older people are more susceptible to
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interference effects, calculating the presence of output interference would have been 
desirable. This failure to calculate output interference seems a particularly critical 
omission given M.D. MacLeod’s (2003) findings that older adults retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects may be strongly influenced by output interference, while younger 
adults are not.
Koutstaal et al. (1999) also examined the abilities of older healthy adults to 
inhibit competing information. Older adults acted out a set of actions during the study 
phase and then reviewed a sub-set of these items through photographic cues two days 
later. Four measures of recall were measured during a free recall task: general recall 
of activities, number of objects, number of actions, and number of pictorial or 
conceptual representations. In all four measures of performance, retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects were found. However, like Moulin et al. (2001), Koutstaal et al. 
failed to determine if output interference was operating during retrieval. Therefore, it 
is unknown whether the impaired recall of RP- items was more likely to be due to the 
specific inhibition of those items, or the blocking of weaker RP- items by the earlier 
output of the stronger RP+ items.
The active inhibition of memorial representations has been investigated using 
other implicit memory tests that vary in their perceptual and conceptual properties. 
Butler, Williams, Zacks and Maki (2001) examined whether retrieval-induced 
forgetting could be found using various memory tests. As already demonstrated, 
retrieval-induced forgetting has been found using categoiy cue plus free recall (M.C. 
Anderson et al., 1994; Moulin et al, 2002; Williams & Zacks, 2001), categoiy 
member generation (Moulin et al, 2002), and cue-plüs-stem recall (M.C. Anderson et 
al, 1994; M.C. Anderson et al, 2000a; Bâuml, 2002). It is assumed that if the 
memorial representation of the RP- item is truly inhibited, then it should not matter
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what kind of test is employed, retrieval-induced forgetting effects should be found. 
Butler et al. (2001) studied retrieval-induced forgetting in the category cue plus free 
recall task, as well as word-fragment tasks (with and without an episodic cue 
referencing participants back to the study phase, or with a category cue), and the cue- 
plus-stem task previously employed by M.C. Anderson and colleagues (M.C. 
Anderson et al., 1994; M.C. Anderson et al., 2000a; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 
1995). However, significant RP- impairment was detected only in the cue plus free 
recall task, and RP- performance actually improved with the use of the cue-plus-stem 
task typically used by M.C. Anderson and colleagues. There are difficulties, 
however, in interpreting these results due to methodological issues. In the cue plus 
free recall condition, Butler et al. did not calculate if output interference effects were 
present, making it difficult to ascertain whether the pattern of RP- impairment was 
due to the inhibition of the RP- items during retrieval practice, or the blocking of 
weaker RP- items by the stronger RP+ items during the retrieval stage. In addition, 
output interference effects were not controlled for during the remaining memory tests, 
nor calculated post-hoc. While the cueing of eveiy target items at test was 
randomised, no effort was made to ensure that the weaker RP- or NRP items were 
recalled before the stronger items. This being so, Butler et al. needed to calculate 
whether the impairment in the RP- performance was due to the uncontrolled output of 
items at test or not. It should also be noted that Butler et al. used stimuli of a 
moderate strength, as ranked by Battig and Montague (1969), which may have 
contributed to the weak retrieval-induced forgetting effect in the cue plus free recall 
condition, and its absence in the remaining test conditions. Despite these issues, 
Butler et al. suggested that retrieval-induced forgetting may be absent in conditions 
were memoiy tests reinstate strong contextual cues for individual items, a conclusion
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supported by Koutstaal et al. (1999). Conditions where word-fragments are used 
could be considered one of the strongest cueing conditions possible without actually 
re-presenting the item. However, Koutstaal et al.’s account of retrieval-induced 
forgetting is inconsistent with inhibitory theories and is actually more akin to the 
encoding specificity hypothesis, which is a cue-dependent forgetting account of 
retrieval failures (Tulving, 1974; Tulving & Osier, 1968; Tulving & Thompson, 1973; 
Wiseman & Tulving, 1976).
Beyond Word Lists: Visual Materials and Retrieval-induced Forgetting 
As the inhibition of competing information has been advocated as an adaptive process 
that recmits inhibitory processes in order to maintain a flexible and stable memory 
system (e.g., M.C. Anderson & Green, 2001; E.L. Bjork et al., in press; R.A. Bjork, 
1989; Dagenbach & Carr, 1994), it is essential that retrieval-induced forgetting is 
found using materials more in keeping with everyday social cognition tasks. If, 
however, retrieval-induced forgetting can only be found using word lists, then the 
assumption that it sei*ves an adaptive function in eveiyday memoiy may be misplaced. 
Retrieval-induced forgetting has already been demonstrated using materials that are 
highly organised in memoiy, such as semantic categories, suggesting that information 
stored in implicit categories in long-term memory is susceptible to the effect (e.g., 
M.C. Anderson et al., 1994; M.C. Anderson et al., 2000a; M.C. Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995; Bauml & Hartinger, 2002; R.E. Smith & Hunt, 2000). Can retrieval- 
induced forgetting, however, also be found with other types of materials, such as 
meaningful stimuli occurring within a context other than lists of words? Can the 
inhibition of competing information persist even when participants are highly 
motivated to try and recollect all relevant materials?
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Perhaps one of the most unusual sets of materials employed in a retrieval- 
induced forgetting study is that of the sets of visuo-spatial stimuli used by Ciranni and 
Shimamura (1999). Wliile these materials could be grouped by shape (i.e., 4 circles, 4 
triangles, 4 crosses), each item also had a distinct colour and location. Retrieval 
practice consisted of participants retrieving a sub-set of items using shape and 
location as cues (i.e., 2 circles, 2 triangles), and having to recall the colour of all of the 
items at final recall. Ciranni and Shimamura (1999) found that the retrieval of a sub­
set of items from one perceptual group (i.e., shape) resulted in the impaired recall of 
the remaining items from that group. This finding of impaired RP- performance was 
found despite participant’s attention not being explicitly drawn to the shape categoiy. 
That is, participants organised stimuli into this arbitrary categoiy of shape even 
though each item had its own unique colour and location. With this distinctive 
information, participants could have completed the tasks without relying on the 
implicit grouping categoiy, which resulted in impairment. In addition, this retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect was found not only when items were cued at final recall 
using the same cue that was used at retrieval practice, but also when the original cues 
employed during encoding were used. This latter point suggests that, as different cues 
were used to the ones that RP+ items were strengthened under, then the strengthened 
RP+ items were not blocking the retrieval of weaker RP- items. The elimination of a 
strength-dependent explanation suggests that inhibitory processes may be functioning 
under these conditions.
Retrieval-induced forgetting effects have also been investigated using 
complex, and more natural visual materials. Koutstaal et al. (1999) had participant’s 
act out a set of activities, which should have provided a rich memorial context and 
produced many possible retrieval routes to the target information. Two days later
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participants either ‘reviewed’ half of those items or complete a set of unrelated tasks. 
This review task consisted of participants viewing photographs of other individuals 
performing some of the tasks that the participants themselves had completed two days 
earlier and to try and recall themselves performing these activities. Significant 
retrieval-induced forgetting effects were found for the number of general activities 
that participants recalled, and for the number of objects that were recalled. 
Marginally significant impairment was also found for the number of actions that were 
recalled, and for the number of pictorial or conceptual representations that had been 
acted out in the study phase. Despite these latter measures being only marginally 
significant (p < .10 to .15), the size of the retrieval-induced forgetting effect was 
actually quite large (-.13), compared to the size of effect found in other studies (e.g., 
-.08 in M.C. Anderson et al, 1994). This marginal significance is likely to be due to 
the between-participants design and the likelihood that the study was under-powered 
(only twelve participants in each condition). Similar problems can be found in a 
second study where retrieval-induced forgetting was not found using a combined 
cued-recall/recognition task, where there were only eight participants in each 
condition.
Temporal Boundaries o f Retiieval-induced Forgetting
Retrieval-induced forgetting has been advanced as an adaptive process in long-term 
memoiy that can prevent related competing information, and out-of-date information, 
from interfering with the retrieval of target information in order to satisfy some 
memorial goal (e.g., M.C. Anderson et al, 1995; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995; 
E.L. Bjork et al, in press; R.A. Bjork, 1989; M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Macrae 
& MacLeod, 1999). This being so, if retrieval-induced forgetting is to be assigned an
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adaptive role in the retrieval of information from memory to complete every day 
tasks, then time becomes a potential boundaiy condition (M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 
2001). One of these boundaries is that the inhibition of competing memorial 
representations is not constrained by the age of the memory. In the typical retrieval- 
induced forgetting paradigm, retrieval practice immediately follows the encoding of 
the target materials. However, there are few opportunities in daily life where retrieval 
practice would occur immediately after encoding information. It is more likely that 
the selective retrieval of information would occur some time after an event or 
information was experienced. Thus, in order for retrieval-induced forgetting to serve 
an adaptive function, it must still be elicited when retrieval practice occurs long after 
original encoding.
M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001) examined this potential temporal boundary 
in an impression formation task. After forming impressions of two individuals, 24- 
hours elapsed between this initial encoding and the eventual retrieval practice of a 
sub-set of personality traits about one of the targets. Despite this significant retention 
interval, a robust retrieval-induced forgetting effect emerged. Although impairment 
in RP- performance was smaller than that found in a similar condition where retrieval 
practice was immediate, this was primarily due to a decrease in the NRP baseline. 
Similai'ly, Koutstaal et al. (1999) found retrieval-induced forgetting effects when a 
two-day delay was inserted between study and retrieval practice.
The adaptive role assigned to retrieval-induced forgetting (e.g., M.C. 
Anderson, 2001; E.L. Bjork et al, in press; Levy & M.C. Anderson, 2002; M.D. 
MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999) also places potential 
constraints on the duration of the effect. According to this adaptive interpretation of 
inhibition, the primary constraint on the temporal duration of inhibition is whether a
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goal state has been satisfied or not. Therefore, it can be assumed, that for certain 
types of information, this inhibition will be transitoiy, while for other types of 
material, inhibition may be longer lasting, or even permanent. As goal states are 
constantly changing (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000), 
inhibition need only last long enough to satisfy the current goal-state. If inhibition 
was to endure after having satisfied current cognitive goals, then the successful 
completion of future goals could be compromised. That is, while unwanted 
information may be currently inhibited to prevent it interfering with the target 
material, today’s unwanted information may be tomorrow’s target material. 
Therefore, under many circumstances it would not be adaptive to subject information 
to either long-lasting or permanent inhibition. Despite this, there are situations where 
it could potentially be adaptive to subject information to either extremely long-lasting 
inhibition, or to permanently inhibit that information, such as veiy old, irrelevant, or 
false information, and unwanted or traumatic memories (M.C. Anderson, 2001; M.C. 
Anderson & Green, 2001; Freyd, 1996; Levy & M.C. Anderson, 2002; M.D. 
MacLeod et al., 2003). However, under conditions where information is permanently 
inhibited, it would be impossible to between erasure and inhibition.
As the adaptive account of retrieval-induced forgetting predicts that, under 
‘ordinaiy’ circumstances, inhibition should only remain evident until a goal has been 
satisfied, then retrieval-induced forgetting should only be found under circumstances 
where the retention inteiwal between retrieval practice and delay is relatively short. 
This retention interval is likely to control the duration of inhibition as the goal of 
resolving retrieval competition occurs during the retrieval practice phase (M.C. 
Anderson et al., 1994; M.C. Anderson et al., 2000a; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 
1995). Studies have found retrieval-induced forgetting effects with various retention
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lengths following retrieval practice, varying from immediate tests (Ciranni & 
Shimamura, 1999; Moulin et al., 2002), thiough to 20 minute delays (e.g., M.C. 
Anderson et al., 1994; R.E. Smith & Hunt, 2000). As inhibition in other cognitive 
domains typically lasts for much briefer periods of time (e.g.. Tipper, 2001), the 
finding that inhibition elicited during retrieval can last at as long as 20 minutes is of 
considerable importance.
How long does it take for the effect to dissipate? The answer to this question 
most probably depends on an individual’s goals (see M.D. MacLeod et al., 2003). 
During many information-processing tasks it would be an undesirable feature of 
memoiy if this inhibitoiy effect were long lasting. For example, inhibition should be 
relatively short-lived during the resolution of retrieval competition for information 
relevant to daily life, such as telephone numbers, car parking spots, shopping lists, etc. 
M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001) have demonstrated that retrieval-induced 
forgetting is a transitory effect that dissipates when the previous goal (i.e., retrieving 
RP+ items during the retrieval practice phase) becomes irrelevant. In the case of the 
impression formation task employed in M.D. MacLeod and Macrae, inhibition 
dissipated over a 24-hour period subsequent to the retrieval practice phase, with slight 
recoveiy in recall performance for RP- items.
Changing Goal States: Unintended Consequences o f Prior Retrieval 
Thus far, retrieval-induced forgetting and inhibitory processes have been advanced as 
an adaptive process that allows for competition between similar items to be resolved 
without the permanent erasure of those competitors. Despite such positive 
interpretations, forgetting can have unintended consequences. For example, how 
might the prior retrieval of a sub-set of items affect subsequent memory performance
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for individuals who are highly motivated to recall as much information as they can? 
One such condition where individuals are highly motivated to remember as much of 
the target material as possible is examinations. Individuals who wish to perform to 
the best of their abilities typically revise material through study techniques, such as 
answering mock test questions that may appear on the exam script. As the prior 
retrieval of information facilitates the likelihood of that information being retrieved in 
the future, then any questions in an exam that refers to this practiced information 
should be answered relatively easily. However, if an exam question refers to 
unpracticed information from a previously revised topic, then individuals may 
actually perform more poorly than others who have not revised any information from 
that same topic.
Macrae and MacLeod (1999) examined whether participant’s motivation to do 
well in exams would circumvent retrieval-induced forgetting and prevent it from 
interfering with performance. Participants were informed that they would be taking 
part in a mock geography exam and were required to study twenty facts about two 
islands (fictitious). During retrieval practice, half of the items from one of the islands 
were repeatedly retrieved. Following a distracter task, participants were prompted to 
recall as many facts as possible about both of the islands. Despite knowing that they 
would be tested on their knowledge of the two islands, participants still recalled fewer 
unpracticed facts that came from the same set as the practiced items, than participants 
engaged in non-relevant retrieval practice. Thus, while a period of review in 
preparation for an exam can be beneficial to performance for those revised items, it 
can also have the unintentional consequence of impairing recall for related, but non­
reviewed items.
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People are also aware of the consequences of forgetting in social-information 
processing scenarios, such as impression formation, and eyewitness scenarios. For 
example, not only do participants demonstrate impaired recall of RP- traits after 
forming impressions of individuals, (Macrae & MacLeod, 1999; M.D. MacLeod & 
Macrae, 2001), but retrieval-induced forgetting has also been found to prevent both 
individuating and stereotypic information about an individual from being retrieved 
(Dunn & Spellman, 2003). More specifically, when participants performed retrieval 
practice on either individuating or stereotypic traits this prior retrieval was found to 
inhibit participant’s recall of the other type of trait. While the suppression of 
stereotypical information may be beneficial, especially given that the intentional 
suppression of stereotypical information has been found to be fairly ineffective 
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Ford, 1997), inhibition of individuating information 
may result in the maintenance of inaccurate beliefs about individuals based on group 
membership.
Retrieval-induced forgetting has also been examined under mock eyewitness 
contexts, were it is critical that participants recall as many details as possible. Shaw 
et al. (1995) noted that the repeated questioning of eyewitnesses during a police 
interrogation might elicit the same set of mechanisms as the retrieval practice 
procedure elicits. This is because the retrieval practice procedure and the interrogation 
of witnesses are similar in two basic respects. The first is that the questioning of 
witnesses constitutes an incomplete retrieval task, much like the retrieval practice 
procedure. It is not pragmatic to expect police officers or solicitors to be able to ask 
every question relevant to every aspect of an incident encoded in a witness’ memory. 
Thus, the questioning of an eyewitness will always be incomplete, as will the witness’ 
re-telling and reconstruction of the event.
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The second is that, just as participants are encouraged to repeatedly retrieve 
the same sub-set of items over and over again in the retrieval practice procedure, 
witnesses are also typically questioned repeatedly about an incident by both the police 
and, if the case goes to court, by solicitors. It is generally accepted that this type of 
questioning has beneficial effects on the retrieval of information from a witness. 
Even alternative methods to that of the standard police interview, such as the 
cognitive intei*view, employ repeated questioning as the basis for gaining a complete 
account of what happened (e.g., Fisher & Geiselman, 1988). However, any notion 
that the questioning of witnesses is merely taking account of what an individual 
perceived during a criminal incident is inappropriate.
The notion that the actual retrieval of information could result in an 
incomplete account of an incident, and that this could be due to inhibitory processes 
was a novel approach to the problem of inteiwiewing eyewitnesses. An inhibitory 
account has the potential not only to explain why the statements of eyewitnesses 
typically contain only a proportion of the information encoded during an incident, but 
also why witnesses have difficulty in recognising a suspect after verbally describing 
that individual (i.e., verbal overshadowing effect, Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 
1990).
Shaw et al. (1995) altered the standard retrieval practice procedure (i.e., M.C. 
Anderson et al., 1994) in order to make it more applicable to studying eyewitness 
memoiy. Instead of using paired-associates that are highly organised within semantic 
memory, visual materials were used that consisted of slides depicting an incident 
concerning the theft of a wallet at a party. In addition, sets of questions that increased 
in difficulty with each preceding set were employed during retrieval practice in order 
to maximise the effects of retrieval (Landauer & Bjork, 1978). These questions
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required participants to retrieve information repeatedly from the slides in a mock 
interrogation phase. Finally, a ‘no interrogation’ control condition was employed in 
order to compare with the positive and negative consequences of interrogation.
A significant retrieval-induced forgetting effect was found in the interrogation 
condition, suggesting that the repeated retrieval of information in response to 
interrogation can impair the recall of related but unretrieved information. Practice 
and retrieval-induced forgetting effects were absent in the no interrogation condition, 
demonstrating that while the absence of questioning does not facilitate the subsequent 
retrieval of information, it also does not directly impair the retrieval of information 
either. In addition, while more RP+ items were recalled compared to the no 
interrogation condition, fewer RP- items in the interrogation condition were also 
recalled. This suggests that while prior retrieval of information about an incident 
facilitates the later recall of those items, it can also impair the recall of related 
information that has not been previously retrieved. Unfortunately, the retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect in Shaw et al. (1995) was obscured by the possible presence 
of output interference operating during the final recall phase. Practiced items were 
more likely to feature in the first three recall positions than the last four positions, 
suggesting that these stronger items may have blocked the subsequent recall of the 
weaker RP- items.
More recently, M.D. MacLeod (2002) found significant retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects in two eyewitness memory paradigms even when output 
interference was eliminated. Both studies used complex visual materials presented as 
a series of slides. In one study, participants were asked to pay close attention to a 
series of slides, as they were to imagine that they were police officers investigating 
two burglaries. The slides contained items that had been stolen from each house, and
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fell into two semantic categories (electrical and non-electrical items). In the second 
study, participants viewed a series of slides depicting two women making bogus 
charity collections. The target information contained within these slides was the 
appearance of two suspects and thus did not fall into well-organised explicit 
categories. However, prior pilot work demonstrated that eveiy individual who viewed 
these slides noted that one of the women had brown hair and the other had blonde 
hair. Thus, the target information formed two implicit categories. Participant’s 
attention was not specifically drawn to the two women, but instead, participants were 
told that they were to imagine that they had witnessed the event. Thus, the slides not 
only contained the two suspects, but also placed those suspects within a context of 
them going from door-to-door collecting money.
M.D. MacLeod (2002) demonstrated that the repeated questioning of 
witnesses could lead to the impaired recall of related information that was not 
retrieved in response to a question. In addition, this effect still occurs when 
individuals aie motivated to remember, and when attention is not explicitly drawn to 
target material. M.D. MacLeod’s study also represented the only empirical work 
examining the effects of retrieving a sub-set of details about the description of an 
individual. This study suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting can occur when an 
individual is attempting to describe a suspect’s appearance, and implies that not only 
is an eyewitnesses’ statement about an incident susceptible to inhibition, but also the 
description of a suspect. Research on the verbal overshadowing effect has already 
demonstrated that verbally describing a face using free recall procedures can lead to 
impaired recognition of that face on a subsequent test (e.g.. Schooler & Engstler- 
Schooler, 1990). As the retrieval of only a sub-set of items describing a suspect’s 
appearance also results in an impaired ability to describe that suspect at a later date, it
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may be that the inhibitoiy mechanism underlying retrieval-induced forgetting is also 
responsible for the verbal overshadowing effect. This interpretation of the verbal 
overshadowing effect is strengthened by the finding that the cognitive inteiview, 
which is also based on incomplete retrieval of information, is also susceptible to 
verbal overshadowing (Finger & Pezdek, 1999). This being so, the retrieval of 
information concerning the face of a suspect, and their general appearance, may be 
especially susceptible to inhibitoiy effects! This is of considerable importance for 
successful police investigations given that the description of a suspect is used for the 
constniction of line-ups and photo-fits.
The results of both Shaw et al. (1995) and M.D. MacLeod (2002) also have 
interesting possible implications concerning the use of interrogation procedures that 
utilise repeated and selective questioning of witnesses. Procedures such as the 
cognitive interview (Geiselman et al., 1985), are based on various principles taken 
from cognitive psychology, particularly the encoding specificity principle, and have 
successfully made the transition from the laboratoiy to the field. This inteiviewing 
technique has been advanced as being more efficient at extracting information from 
witnesses as well as reducing the number of ‘honest errors’ made by well-meaning 
eyewitnesses. However, the basis of the cognitive interview is the repeated 
questioning of witnesses through mental reinstatement, different temporal orders, and 
different viewpoints. Thus, this method is likely to be just as susceptible to retrieval- 
induced forgetting as the standard questioning method.
The findings of retrieval-induced forgetting with very different materials, and 
under various goal-directed forgetting conditions, suggests that this process is both 
adaptive and flexible. As retrieval-induced forgetting operates within even the most 
complex visual contexts (e.g., M.D. MacLeod, 2002), and abstract materials (Ciranni
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& Shimamura, 1999), it strongly suggests that the inhibition of competing information 
is likely to fonction under everyday remembering and forgetting conditions.
Having established that retrieval-induced forgetting is not constrained by 
factors such as materials (e.g., Ciranni & Shimamura, 1999), or explicit instnictions to 
encode information (e.g., Macrae & MacLeod, 1999), one major constraint could be 
that target information must be repeatedly retrieved. In a typical study, participants 
would normally engage in three retrieval practices (e.g., M.C. Anderson et al., 1994; 
Bâuml & Hartinger, 2002; Ciranni & Shimamura, 1999; R.E. Smith & Hunt, 2000). 
If this repeated retrieval were necessaiy to produce the effect then the adaptive role of 
retrieval-induced forgetting, and its underlying inhibitory processes would be severely 
curtailed. However, research has demonstrated that information does not have to be 
repeatedly retrieved from memory in order to elicit inhibition. There is no significant 
difference between the magnitude of the retrieval-induced forgetting effect when 
participants have engaged in either one, three, or six retrieval practices (Macrae & 
MacLeod, 1999). The only other study not to employ the typical three retrieval 
practices is that of Hicks and Starns (in press) who found RP- impairment with only 
two retrieval practices. This is not to say, however, that more retrieval practices 
might not result in more inhibition, especially given M.C. Anderson and Green’s 
(2001) finding of increasing suppression effects when the number of suppression 
trials is increased from one to sixteen in the Think/No-Think paradigm.
Protecting Memories from Inhibition
The inhibition of competitors has so far been advanced as an adaptive feature of 
memoiy that reduces interference from outdated information (R.A. Bjork, 1989), and 
aids the discrimination of targets from competitors (Dagenbach, Carr & Barnhardt,
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1990; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995). For example, second-order inhibition 
suggests that competitors that are highly similar to one another will be subject to 
inhibition in order to increase the discriminability of targets in memoiy (M.C. 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995). But there are examples where this adaptive and 
discriminatoiy feature of memoiy actually seems counter-intuitive. It would not be 
adaptive for an expert to forget his or her facts about their field of expertise (a 
problem highlighted by research into the fan effect), or information that is central to a 
concept or any well-known knowledge. How could individuals function if recalling a 
well-known fact resulted in the inhibition of another well-known and highly related 
item (e.g., retrieving ‘chairs have legs’ inhibits ‘chairs have arms’)?
This conundmm led M.C. Anderson and McCulloch (1999) to wonder how 
facilitation and inhibition fiinctions in memory without disiupting the stability of 
complex knowledge stmctures. This thinking is not just based on what seems 
intuitively right, as it has a precedent in retrieval competition, whereby participants 
are encouraged to form their own associations between competitors. This process of 
forming connections between related but competing items is called ‘integration ’ (E.E. 
Smith, Adams & Schorr, 1978). The self-generation of connections between 
competitors has been found to reduce retroactive and proactive interference effects 
(e.g.. Postman, 1964), and reduce fan effects (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991; E.E. Smith 
et al., 1978), and may explain why experts tend not to forget their facts. Radvansky 
and Zacks (1991) argued that when items are integrated into a larger mental 
representation (a situation model), the facts cease to compete with each other, while 
E.E. Smith et al. (1978) similarly believed that introducing a theme helped connect 
competing items together. Such studies suggest that the difference between experts 
and non-experts is not the volume of stored knowledge, but rather the greater degree
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to which experts integrate new information with old information. Thus, the more 
thorough integration of similar facts into a single concept by experts helps to reduce, 
or even eliminate, competition and interference (see also M.D. MacLeod et al., 2003).
As this research suggests that integrating competing information with a 
concept (i.e., cue) prevents these items creating competition, and thus interfering with 
the target material, integration within the retrieval practice paradigm may also provide 
a method for participants to protect themselves from inhibition. Competition could be 
resolved in this paradigm by encouraging participants to integrate competing items 
with the target material in order to prevent inhibition from being triggered through the 
retrieval process. This could be achieved thiough the encoding of similarities 
between targets and competitors.
M.C. Anderson and McCulloch (1999) were the first to examine this 
possibility through instmcting participants to integrate each exemplar with each other 
and to their category cue in a meaningflil way (i.e., through finding similarities 
between items). M.C. Anderson and McCulloch not only found that participants who 
were explicitly instructed to integrate item failed to exhibit retrieval-induced 
forgetting, but that participants who naturally integrated items in this manner also 
failed to show retrieval-induced forgetting.
Similarly, Bâuml and Hartinger (2002) manipulated the degree of relatedness 
between targets and competing items through the use of categories and sub-categories. 
More specifically, RP+ and RP- items were either drawn from the same categoiy and 
sub-category (e.g., tiger and lion are both FOUR LEGGED ANIMALS and 
PREDATORS), or from the same categoiy but different sub-categories (e.g., tiger and 
horse are both FOUR LEGGED ANIMALS, but horse is not a predator). Further to 
these experimentally determined similarities, participants were also instmcted to
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relate each item to its category and to its sub-categoiy (if it belonged to one). As 
expected, retrieval-induced forgetting was eliminated when the RP+ and RP- items 
belonged to the same category and sub-category, but robust findings were found when 
these items belonged only to the same category.
Similarly, M.C. Anderson et al. (2000b) also found that instmcting 
participants to integrate RP+ and RP- items eliminated retrieval-induced forgetting, 
and, in fact, RP- items benefited from this increased degree of similarity with the 
target items. These results have been interpreted within M.C. Anderson et al.’s two- 
factor pattern suppression model, suggesting that RP- items benefit from sharing a 
high degree of similarity with the RP+ items, which in turn facilitates their retrieval. 
Under these retrieval conditions, RP- items are believed to be protected from 
inhibition due to the loss of competition between these competing items and the target 
RP+ items. With competition having been resolved through this integration, retrieval- 
induced forgetting is not triggered. In contrast, when targets and competing items are 
not highly integrated, competition occurs during retrieval practice and is resolved 
through the typical inhibition of the RP- items (M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; Bâuml 
& Hartinger, 2002).
One such condition where it could be beneficial to protect memories from 
retrieval-induced forgetting may be information that is personally relevant. For 
example, we tend not to forget our home address, where we parked the car, or the 
names of members of our family, nor would it be adaptive for us to do so. Much like 
an expert who is unlikely to forget highly integrated information from his or her field 
of expertise, personally relevant information is also likely to be highly integrated, and 
thus protected fiom the effects of inhibition. If information that defines us as 
individuals were susceptible to such inhibitoiy effects, then our cognitive lives would
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be host to a myriad of problems. Not only would we be unable to remember personal 
information that would allow us to complete everyday tasks, our own self-image of 
ourselves could become unstable through changes in the facilitation and inhibition of 
information. In support of this reasoning, Macrae and Roseveare (2002) found that 
retrieval-induced forgetting effects were eliminated when information was encoded 
with relevance to the self. In contrast, strong retrieval-induced forgetting effects were 
found when participants encoded information that was relevant to another person 
(either a best friend or an unspecified other). Contrary to self-referent information, 
information about other people, even best friends, will not be subject to the same 
degree of integration, and thus will be susceptible to inhibition. However, the latter 
point may be dependent on whether the information tells us something positive about 
another individual, or something negative. It may not be adaptive to inhibit some 
negative information (e.g., that the individual is violent), although under some 
circumstances this may be untme (e.g., an abused child or beaten wife who is unable 
to escape the abusive environment, Freyd, 1996). Further to this, some information 
about others, such as first impressions and out-of-role behaviours may be resistant to 
inhibition due to the rich information they provide about an individual.
M.D. MacLeod et al. (2003) have also suggested that inhibitory processes may 
play an important role in regulating mood and self-image. For example, the retrieval 
of negative memories in clinically depressed patients may inhibit the retrieval of more 
positive memories, resulting in the maintenance of a depressive episode. Similarly, 
the inhibition of unpleasant memories about personal failures may help to maintain a 
positive mood and self-image in non-clinical populations, while the inhibition of 
memories concerning personal successes may contribute to the unstable self-image
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that typifies personality disorders such as borderline personality and narcissistic 
personality disorder.
The seeds of this possibility can be seen in a study by Amir, Coles, Brigidi and 
Foa (2001), who found that participants who suffered from generalised social phobia 
were unable to inhibit negative social information. In contrast, non-anxious control 
participants displayed the typical pattern of retrieval-induced forgetting, and thus 
were able to inhibit this negative social information. In the case of the phobic 
population, the negative social information is likely to be highly integrated into their 
self-image, thus making this information very difficult to suppress. On the other 
hand, negative social information is unlikely to be overly integrated into the self- 
image of non-anxious individuals. This being so, an interesting addition to this study 
would have been to examine the ability of recovered social phobics to inhibit negative 
social information. Would this type of information still be self-referential, despite 
recovery from the anxiety disorder?
Conclusions from Retrieval-induced Forgetiing
To summarise, retrieval-induced forgetting has provided a novel approach to studying 
inhibitory process in unintentional forgetting that has allowed various adaptive 
properties to be inferred about forgetting. The inhibitory processes underlying 
retrieval-induced forgetting appear to be flexible and are not constrained by variables 
such as repeated retrieval, age of memories, or the complexity of the materials. 
Retrieval-induced forgetting appears to be a form of goal-directed forgetting that 
allows individuals to ftilfil current memorial goals through the inhibition of unwanted 
but related material. However, it can also have unintended consequences for friture 
cognitive tasks that require those inhibited items. Under such conditions, where
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information is unavailable for retrieval, individuals are unable to base their friture 
decisions or behaviours on that information. In situations such as an interview with 
an eyewitness these individuals may have glaring omissions in their testimony, while 
individuals under examination conditions may be unable to complete an exam script. 
Similarly, when we are unable to access information about others we may base our 
thoughts and behaviours on inappropriate information, such as stereotypical 
information.
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CHAPTER 4
INVESTIGATING THE UPDATING OF MEMORY THROUGH THE 
MISINFORMATION EFFECT
The previous chapter has examined recent research into retrieval-induced forgetting 
which suggests that there may be numerous negative repercussions of the updating 
process. Not only can information be omitted from memory for an event (e.g., M.D. 
MacLeod, 2002; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999), but we can also find ourselves relying 
on inappropriate information in place of inaccessible memories (e.g., Dunn & 
Spellman, 2003). In a similar area of research, memory suggestibility has previously 
provided a method for examining memory updating, and more specifically, for 
examining the negative consequences of forgetting. Despite the memoiy 
suggestibility approach providing an ideal method of examining the mechanisms that 
underlie memory updating the majority of this field has primarily concerned itself 
with more basic questions regarding the permanency of memoiy. The current chapter 
considers various ai'guments that have been advanced, with reference to the 
destmctive updating and coexistence accounts of memory. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by considering the role that retrieval inhibition may play in memory 
suggestibility.
Exam ining Memory Siiggestibility through Leading Questions
After witnessing an event we are sometimes exposed to additional or contradictory 
information that can influence our memoiy of that event. This had been investigated 
using the paired-associate paradigm with word lists, demonstrating that information 
encountered after an original event can impair memoiy for that original event
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(Chandler & Gargano, 1998; Undei'wood & Postman, 1960). This effect can also 
occur in more naturalistic contexts, where the original scene is a complex event and 
where subsequent information is verbal in nature (e.g., eyewitness memory; E.F. 
Loftus, 1975; E.F. Loftus & Palmer, 1974; E.F. Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Pezdek, 1977). 
Memory impairment has also been investigated where the original information and the 
post-event information appear in the same modality, such as when they are both 
presented visually (e.g.. Chandler, 1989, 1991), or verbally (e.g.. Chandler, Gargano 
& Holt, 2001). Under these eyewitness memory conditions, additional or 
contradictoiy information can come from many sources, such as through discussing 
an incident with each other, with friends and family after the event, and with the 
police during an inteiwiew. For example, information that a witness never originally 
encountered can be added to their memoiy of an incident through discussion with 
another witness. Equally as damaging to the validity of an eyewitness’ testimony is 
exposure to contradictory information. A witness can come to believe a contradictoiy 
piece of post-event information to be tiue for many reasons, such as believing that 
other witnesses have better memories, pre-conceptions concerning criminal incidents, 
etc.
The wording of questions can also influence an individual’s memoiy for an 
event. An eyewitness can be asked questions concerning an incident many times, and 
from various sources, such as the police at the scene, and at the police station, pre-trial 
questioning by solicitors, and questioning during a trial. The effects of questioning on 
memory has been largely investigated using a leading question paradigm and has 
demonstrated the ease by which memory for the original event can be manipulated 
(e.g., E.F. Loftus & Palmer, 1974). For example, the question ‘About how fast were 
the cars going when they smashed into each other?’ resulted in participants estimating
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a higher speed for the cars than when ‘smashed’ was replaced with less graphical 
words such as ‘collided’ or ‘bumped’, or neutral words such as ‘contacted’ or ‘hit’.
The phrasing of a question does not just affect the immediate response to that 
question, but can continue to impact on memory for an event, and responses to 
subsequent measures of memoiy. For example, ‘How fast was car A going when it 
ran the stop sigriT assumes that a stop sign was in fact present during the slide 
sequence. If a stop sign was present, then this question confirms this object’s 
presence and ‘points’ to where this information may be located in memory for that 
event. After having received such a question, participants are more likely to say that 
they saw a ‘stop sign’ on a later test of memory than participants who received the 
question ‘How fast was car A going when it turned rightT (E.F. Loftus, 1975). This 
effect is also present after a 7-day retention interval (E.F. Loftus & Palmer, 1974).
The phrasing of a question can also add new details to memoiy for an event 
(Harris, 1973; E.F. Loftus & Zanni, 1975), and can inform us about how information 
is integrated into memory. For example, participants were more likely to claim that 
they had seen a broken headlight in a slide sequence of a car accident if asked the 
question ‘Did you see the broken headlight?’ compared to the question ‘Did you see a 
broken headlight?’ The definite article leads participants to assume that the broken 
headlight was present and to merely confirm its presence, while the use of the 
indefinite article is a more neutral turn-of-phi'ase and contains fewer assumptions. In 
addition, post-event misleading information contained within a question can also 
impair performance on subsequent memory tests. This style of questioning is quite 
different from the previous examples, as the answer to these questions is not the focus 
of attention. Instead, what is of interest is the impact of the misleading information 
contained within this question on later memory tests. For example, after viewing a
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slide sequence containing eight demonstrators, participants who were asked ‘Was the 
leader of the twelve demonstrators who entered the classroom a male?’ typically 
estimated more demonstrators on a test one week later than did participants who had 
received the same question indicating that there were only four demonstrators (E.F. 
Loftus, 1975, 1977).
TheKF.
This early work examining the impact of leading questions on eyewitness memory 
raised many interesting questions concerning the original event information after 
exposure to post-event information that have been examined more closely using a 
similar paradigm. However, the majority of this work was concerned with the role of 
language in influencing participant’s responses to those questions, and its relevance to 
the topic of the reliability of eyewitness memory. Thus, this research was primarily 
concerned with highlighting problems with eyewitness memoiy and the methods 
typically employed to extract a statement fi'om such a witness, rather than specifically 
investigating the effect of additional or false information on the underlying memorial 
representation of the initial event.
Further to these issues, a criticism of the design of the original leading 
question paradigm was raised concerning a mis-match between the stimuli used 
during the study phase and the test phase (E.F. Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978). In the 
typical leading question paradigm, the study phase consisted of visual stimuli, while a 
verbal test was used during the test phase. As the leading questions were also usually 
verbal in nature, it could be argued that a verbal test would be more likely to aid 
retrieval of the additional or contradictoiy information contained within the questions, 
rather than aid the retrieval of information from the visually presented incident. Thus,
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there is an inherent bias within the leading question paradigm that favours the 
retrieval of information contained within the question, making it difficult to formulate 
assumptions concerning the memorial representation of the incident.
The most significant change to the leading question paradigm was from a 
verbal test that required either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response to a recognition test that used 
visual stimuli. Thus, the use of visual materials at test matched the use of visual 
materials during the initial encoding stage and should help address questions that 
concern the underlying memorial traces. That is, if the original trace exists intact then 
the use of a visual recognition test should result in the simple matching of the items 
shown at test to the original trace. In contrast, if the original trace has been altered, 
then participants will be unable to match the items shown at test with their memorial 
representation of the initial event.
This new paradigm was also specifically interested in the influence of post­
event misleading information on later memory performance and what it could tell us 
about underlying processes in the updating of memory. This paradigm was called the 
misinformation paradigm and was designed to follow the three critical stages that 
resemble the integration of information into memory (E.F. Loftus & Loftus, 1980). 
That is, the paradigm has an initial acquisition phase (i.e., encoding of event), a 
subsequent acquisition phase (integration of post-event information and updating of 
memory), and a retrieval phase. First, participants view a series of slides depicting an 
incident (e.g., a car ninning over a pedestrian), and then receive a post-event 
questionnaire (e.g., E.F. Loftus et al, 1978; or a post-event narrative, e.g., E.F. Loftus, 
Bonders, Hoffman & Schooler, 1989) about the incident. In the misled condition, 
participants receive a single piece of misleading information embedded within a 
question (e.g., Did another car pass the red Datsun while it was stopped at the stop
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sign?). Typically only one piece of misinformation is introduced in the questionnaire 
so as not to arouse suspicion (e.g., the stop sign). After completing a distracter task 
for 20-minutes, participants complete a two-alternative forced-choice recognition task 
that requires participants to choose the slide they believe appeared in the presentation 
phase. This recognition test places slides of the original items in direct competition 
with slides of the erroneous information. For the critical question (i.e., the measure of 
the misinformation effect), participants have to choose between the original critical 
item and the misinformation (e.g., yield sign versus stop sign). In this case, 
participants would be presented with the original slide from the presentation phase 
showing the Datsun stopped at a yield sign side-by-side with a nearly identical slide 
showing the Datsun stopped at a stop sign. For the remaining non-critical questions, 
the original non-critical information is in opposition with a new item, see Figure 17.
This misinformation paradigm is attributed to E.F. Loftus, and paradigms that 
use recognition tasks where the new item is placed in competition with the 
misinformation item tend to be referred to as the E.F. Loftus misinformation paradigm 
or the standard paradigm (e.g., McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). Thus, the study by 
E.F. Loftus et al. (1978) using this standard paradigm is typically seen as the classic 
misinformation study. E.F. Loftus et al. compared performance on a recognition test 
after they had either received information in the questionnaire that was consistent or 
inconsistent with the slides. Participants who received consistent post-event 
information chose the original item on a recognition test 75% of the time, while 
participants who received post-event misinformation only chose the original item 41% 
of the time. Therefore, when participants are exposed to misinformation they perform 
at less than chance levels on subsequent tests of memoiy. When misled participants
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choose the misinformation item over the original item at test it is referred to as the
misinformation effect.
Figure 17: The misinformation paradigm
EVENT 
e.g., slide sequence of 
car accident
POST-EVENT INFORMATION 
e.g., questions concerning event, usually contains 
a single piece of misleading information
RECOGNITION TEST 
Critical question: original vs 
misinformation item 
Non-critical questions : original vs new
The misinformation effect has been replicated many times by many different 
laboratories (e.g., Belli, 1989; Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Chandler et al., 2001; 
Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Dodson & Reisberg, 1991; Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989a, 1989b; Pirolli & Mitterer, 1984). Not only have stop signs been mis- 
remembered as yield signs (and vice versa), but also green cars have been mis- 
remembered as blue, hammers as wrenches, and something large and salient such as a 
barn has been mis-remembered as being in an empty field. Importantly, as well as 
alerting us to the danger of misleading information, the misinformation effect also 
allows us to investigate various important questions concerning memory. How is 
memory updated? Once information is encoded into long-term memoiy, is it stored
119
The Misinformation Effect
permanently? Or, can that information be “erased” in a similar manner to computer 
memory? While the finding that post-event misinformation effect can affect memoiy 
for an incident is not in dispute (but see Zaragoza and colleagues, e.g., McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985a; Zaragoza, McCloskey & Jamis, 1987), the reasons why it does so 
have been the subject of intense debate.
Boimdaiy Conditions o f the Misinformation Effect
There has been a great deal of research that has investigated possible boundaiy 
conditions of the misinformation effect. Under what condition are misinformation 
effects maximised or minimised? Can resistance to misinformation be induced? Are 
certain groups of individuals more susceptible to the misinformation effect than are 
others?
One of the most obvious constraints on the misinformation effect is the initial 
strength of the original trace. A strong memoiy for the original item will be much 
more difficult to alter than a weak original trace. One of the easiest ways of creating a 
strong original trace is to simply re-present the original slide sequence for a second 
time. Shaughnessy and Mand (1982) did just this and found that if the original slide 
sequence was re-presented to misled participants then the misinformation effect was 
abolished.
The strength of the original trace, and the strength of the misinformation trace, 
can also be altered by varying the length of the retention inteiwals between the 
original slide sequence and the post-event information, and between the post-event 
information and the final test. E.F. Loftus et al. (1978) manipulated the length of the 
retention inteiwal between the study phase and the post-event questionnaire. The 
length of this retention inteiwal varied from administering an immediate questionnaire.
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to delaying it by 20-minutes, one day, two days, or one week. Under these conditions, 
the introduction of misleading post-event information had the least impact when the 
questionnaire was presented either immediately, after 20-minutes, or after one day. 
However, 60% of misled participants still favoured the misinformation item over the 
original item. At delays of two-days and one week, up to 80% of misled participants 
chose the misinformation on a recognition test, which is similar to the level reported 
for participants who had received entirely consistent post-event information. These 
results are in marked contrast to participants who received no post-event information 
of any kind. By the two-day delay, these participants were performing at chance 
levels.
While these results indicate that the post-event review of an incident can 
influence subsequent memory performance, the effects either can be beneficial, 
through the strengthening of the original information, or potentially negative through 
the integration of false information into memoiy for that episode. Interestingly, 
participants who received no post-event information appeared to be guessing after a 
prolonged delay, but participants who received post-event information (regardless of 
whether it was consistent or not) performed well above chance. This suggests that by 
a two-day delay, memoiy for the incident and the trace of the original target item is 
very weak. One possibility, therefore, is that participants may be basing the majority 
of their choices on the post-event questionnaire. This being so, E.F. Loftus et al. 
(1978) assumed that misinformation has its greatest influence on memory when the 
original trace has been weakened. Thus, the weaker the trace of the original item, the 
easier it becomes to alter it. On the other hand, if the trace of the misinformation item 
has also been weakened, then misled participants can be expected to perform at 
chance levels. In fact, E.F. Loftus et al. found exactly this when a prolonged delay
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occuned between the post-event questionnaire and forced-choice recognition. Under 
these conditions, misled participants appeared to be guessing at test, suggesting that 
the long retention interval had resulted in both the memoiy of the original item from 
the incident becoming weaker, and the trace of the misinformation item also 
becoming progressively weaker with time. Thus, when the original trace is relatively 
weak it is fairly easy to introduce misinformation on that item. However, if both the 
original trace and the misinformation trace are weak, then participants merely perform 
at chance levels.
The boundaiy effect created by manipulating the strength of the original item 
also implies that resistance to misinformation can be induced by strengthening the 
original trace, perhaps through additional exposure or through retrieval practice. 
Obviously, Shaughnessy and Maud’s (1982) finding that re-presenting the original 
information twice, thereby increasing the strength of the original trace, is a simple and 
effective method of inducing resistance to misinformation. Other ways of inducing 
resistance that make intuitive sense is through presenting a warning that misleading 
information is present in the post-event narrative. It can be assumed that presenting 
misled participants with a warning about possible misleading information being 
present in the post-event narrative should influence their performance at test. The 
influence of warnings has a long precedence in research examining factors that affect 
belief change. If an expert’s opinion is attacked, or their credibility undermined, then 
that expert’s persuasive argument has little influence on changing participant’s own 
opinion (e.g., Mills & Harvey, 1972), but only if the attack occurs before the expert 
has given their persuasive argument (Gmder et al., 1978). Thus, the belief change 
literature would suggest that forewarnings (either explicit warnings or non-credible 
sources) presented before the misinformation should prevent that item from
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influencing misled participants, but only if that warning occurs before misinformation 
exposure. If a warning appears after exposure to misinformation, then a 
misinformation effect should still occur, as the misinformation will already have been 
integrated into the initial representation of the event held in memory.
Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) found that when misled participants were 
informed that the post-event information would be from a source with possible 
intentions to mislead (e.g., the driver that caused an accident), thus making the post­
event information biased and low in credibility, misinformation effects did not occur. 
However, other warning studies have not found that warning provide a constraint on 
the misinformation effect (Greene, Flynn & Loftus, 1982). While presenting a 
warning that misinformation may be present in the post-event narrative increased the 
length of time that misled participants spent reading the narrative; it did not lead to an 
increase in performance on the original item. That is, increased scmtiny of the post­
event narrative did not lead to misled participants favouring the original item at test. 
Misled participants who received the warning prior to the post-event narrative tended 
to correctly identify the original item slightly more than misled participants who 
received the warning subsequent to the narrative. However, presenting a warning at 
any stage of the experiment tended to result in reduced recognition of the original 
item and higher misinformation effects compared to a no warning condition. The 
findings of misinformation effects, despite warnings, suggests that when participants 
encounter the misinformation item it is spontaneously integrated into memory, 
immediately updating the memorial representation of the event in memory.
Christiaansen and Ochalek (1983) found the converse. An explicit warning 
presented prior to the post-event narrative resulted in improved performance on a test 
for the original item. In addition, even when a warning about misleading information
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appeared after participants had read the post-event narrative, a misinformation effect 
was not found. So, regardless of whether the warning came before or after exposure to 
misinformation, misled participants demonstrated better memory for the original item 
than misled participants who were not warned or control participants who were not 
misled in the first place. Christiaansen and Ochalek explained their results in terms of 
misled participants being able to review their memory for the original event and “edit 
out” the misinformation from it.
Misinformation also fails to influence the choices of misled participants at test 
when it contradicts a central or salient item from the original event. Information that 
is central to an event or a slide is likely to be fairly salient item resulting in their deep 
encoding and storage as a strong trace in memory. In contrast, information that is 
peripheral to an event or slide may not be deeply encoded resulting in a weak trace (or 
it may not even be encoded). Consistent with this account, Dritsas and Hamilton 
(1977, discussed in E.F. Loftus, 1979a) found that participants who were misled over 
a salient or central item were fairly resistant to the misinformation. These participants 
typically had a high degree of accuracy in choosing the original item at test and 
ignoring misinformation. On the other hand, participants were easily misled 
concerning peripheral items. In a similar vein, memoiy for an event tends to be 
unaffected by exposure to post-event information that is blatantly untrue. When 
misinformation contradicts a highly salient and central original item from the slides 
then misled participants fail to be affected by it (E.F. Loftus, 1979b). In addition, the 
presence of this blatantly false information colours misled participants perceptions of 
any other more subtle misinformation that is presented in the same narrative as the 
blatant misleading information.
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Retrieval conditions present at test can also influence the misinformation 
effect. As already mentioned, the typical test used in the leading question paradigm 
could be criticised for biasing misled participants at test to rely on the misleading 
information contained in the questions. This criticism was levelled at the leading 
question paradigm because the leading questions were either written or verbal in 
nature and the test that was typically used was also written or verbal. E.F. Loftus et 
al. (1978) suggested that having a written test may be a better match to the written 
questions than to the visual slide sequence containing the original information. Thus, 
the retrieval conditions at test were a better match for retrieving the misleading 
information than retrieving the original item. The typical misinformation paradigm 
attempted to remove this bias by changing the written test to a visual forced-choice 
test that should encourage misled participants to retrieve the original item. A visual 
test should provide more retrieval cues to the original item by being a better retrieval 
match. Therefore, if the misinformation effect still occurs in spite of the more 
favourable retrieval conditions, it could be aigued that a retrieval failure account of 
the misinformation effect would be inadequate.
Despite the retrieval match between the original item and test, retrieval 
conditions at test have still been shown to provide an important boundary condition to 
the production of misinformation effects. The notion that forgetting (and 
remembering) is heavily cue-dependent has precedence in the encoding specificity 
principle put foiward by Tulving (e.g., Tulving & Thompson, 1973), and can be 
applied to the misinformation effect. Bekerian and colleagues have demonstrated that 
when retrieval conditions at test are sufficiently strong to reinstate the retrieval 
conditions present at the encoding of the original item then the original item is chosen 
at test. In contrast, if the retrieval conditions at test are a better match for the retrieval
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conditions present at the encoding of the misinformation item then the misinformation 
is more likely to be chosen at test (Abeles & Morton, 1999; Bekerian & Bowers, 
1983; Morton, Hammersley & Bekerian, 1985). These kinds of context-reinstatement 
effects have also been used with some success in the cognitive interview technique.
When is Misinformation Integrated into Memory for an Event?
A major question of interest concerning the misinformation effect is Mdwn the 
misinformation item is integrated into an individuaTs memory for an event. Is the 
misinformation spontaneously integrated into memory when participants are exposed 
to misleading information, or does the misinformation item become integrated into 
event memoiy during the forced-choice recognition test when participants are asked to 
remember the original event? Considering this latter question, if the misinformation 
is integrated into memoiy at test, is there a conflict between the original item and the 
misinformation item that must be resolved before misled participants can make a 
choice at test?
These questions were initially investigated by E.F. Loftus (1979b) using 
blatant and subtle misinformation. E.F. Loftus reasoned that, if the integration of the 
misinformation into event memoiy was occurring relatively instantaneously after 
exposure to misleading post-event information, then blatant misinformation will only 
have a “spill-over effect” if it is presented along side more subtle misinformation. 
That is, if blatant misinformation causes misled participants to more closely scmtinise 
their memories for an original event, then misled participants may become more 
resistant to other subtler misinformation presented in the same post-event question. If 
the misinformation item is integrated into event memory at test, when participants are 
asked to recall the original event, misled participants are likely be more careftil about
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relying on their memoiy for the original event and not rely on any information that 
came from the post-event questions. Under these conditions, even when blatant 
misinformation is presented much later than the subtle misinformation, the subtle 
misinformation items will not be integrated into memory until test. Thus, the 
resistance to misinformation that can be created by blatant misinformation can still 
spill over and affect the integration of the subtle misinformation even if the blatant 
misinformation was perceived after the more subtle items. On the other hand, if 
misled participants are exposed to subtler misinformation first then there should be no 
spill over effects from the later encoding of blatant misinformation because the subtle 
misleading information has already been encoded.
E.F. Loftus (1979b) found evidence consistent with the misinformation being 
integrated rapidly with memoiy for an original event. When subtle misinformation 
was encountered in the same post-event question as the blatant misinformation, 
misled participants never accepted any of the misleading items. Most importantly, 
when the subtle misinformation occurred prior to the presentation of blatant 
misinformation (i.e., by one day), misled participants appeared to accept these more 
subtle suggestions. Under these conditions, misled participants still rejected the 
blatant misinformation, but chose the subtler misinformation item at test. This finding 
suggests that the subtle misleading information was integrated into memoiy for the 
original event soon after its presentation. Thus, when the blatant misinformation was 
presented it was too late for misled participants to scmtinise their memoiy for the 
event and try and “edit out” the subtle misleading items.
It could be argued that the introduction of blatant misinformation is not really 
an adequate measure of whether the misinformation is integrated into memory upon 
its introduction, or whether it is integrated during the test phase. The use of blatant
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misinformation is more appropriate for addressing experimental hypotheses that 
concern how easily manipulated memoiy is, or whether misled participants are 
responding to demand characteristic (e.g., the experimenter prepared the post-event 
information and so must know what is contained in the slides despite this post-event 
information obviously contradicting the slides), or the effects of warning on the 
misinformation effect (e.g., blatant misinformation could be considered a warning that 
the post-event information is not to be trusted).
Discrepancy detection work provides another more indirect measure of when 
misinformation is integrated into memory for an event. Tousignant, Hall and Loftus 
(1986) considered that misled participants who were given more time to detect the 
discrepancies between the post-event information and the slides may be more resistant 
to integrating the misinformation into their memory for the event compared to misled 
participants who were not given sufficient time to detect these discrepancies. 
Therefore, if the integration of misinformation occurs at its introduction during the 
post-event information, misled participants who are induced to scrutinise this post­
event information may detect that the misinformation item contradicts information 
from the original event, resulting in the misinformation not being integrated into 
memoiy. In contrast, misled participants who are not encouraged to scmtinise the 
post-event information, may be less likely to detect the inaccuracies, resulting in the 
integration of the misinformation into memory for the event. However, should the 
assimilation of misinformation not occur at the time of its introduction during the 
post-event information phase, but instead occur at test when participants are recalling 
the event, then any additional time to scmtinise the post-event information should 
have no effect.
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Tousignant et al. (1986) encouraged misled participants to detect the 
discrepancies between the post-event information and the original slide sequence by 
instaicting misled participants to read the post-event information either slowly or 
quickly. By encouraging misled participants to read the information more slowly, it 
gives them more opportunity to recall the original event and compare the post-event 
information with it. Tousignant et al. found that misled participants who were 
instaicted to read the post-event narrative slowly were more resistant to 
misinformation, while misled participants instructed to read the post-event 
information quickly were susceptible to the misinformation. That is, participants who 
read the post-event narratives slowly had more opportunity to scaitinise their memoiy 
of the event. Having detected discrepancies between their memory of the event and 
the post-event narrative, these misled participants did not integrate the misinformation 
into their memoiy for the event. On the other hand, misled participants who read the 
narrative quickly did not have as great an opportunity to scrutinise the narrative for 
errors, resulting in the rapid assimilation of the misinformation into memory. This 
pattern of results was also found for participants who were naturally slow or fast 
readers suggesting that some individuals are more susceptible to misinformation than 
other individuals.
One technique that could be considered a more direct and appropriate method 
of addressing when misinformation is integrated into event memory would be to 
measure the time taken to make a choice at test. Not only are reaction times seen as a 
useful method for measuring when information is processed (Howell, 1973), but this 
technique has already been used with varying success in examining whether 
judgements are made at comprehension or during final test (e.g., Hintzman, 1976; 
Voss, Vereb & Bisanz, 1975). Measuring how fast misled participants are to choose
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an item at test can inform us about whether misled participants complete the critical 
question with a memory for both the original item and the misinformation item. That 
is, if misled participants are slow to choose an item at test, it not only suggests that 
they have a memory for both the original item and the misinformation item, but it also 
suggests that the misinformation item is not rapidly integrated into memory for the 
event. On the other hand, if misled participants respond quickly on the critical 
question, it would suggest that any conflict between the original item and the 
misinformation item has been resolved before the test phase. Thus, misled 
participants only remember one of the items, and if it is the misinformation item, it is 
likely to have been integrated into memoiy for the original event soon after its 
presentation.
Cole and Loftus (1979) were the first to examine reaction times at test after 
exposure to misinformation using a Yes/No test that required participants to confirm 
whether an item had occurred in the study phase or not. While Cole and Loftus found 
that misled participants tended to be slightly faster to say that the misinformation has 
been present in the study phase than to confirm that an original item had come from 
the study phase, no significant misinformation effect was actually found. There was 
only a reduction of 8% in misled participants who chose the original item at test 
compared with control participants who received consistent post-event information. 
Thus, while misled participants are equally as fast to choose an item at test, the non­
significant misinformation effect makes it difficult to interpret the faster reaction 
times in favour of the misinformation item being integrated into memory at its 
introduction. Any conflict resolution between the original item and the 
misinformation item has obviously been resolved, as indicated by the fast reaction
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times, but this conflict resolution has not favoured the acceptance and integration of 
the misinformation item.
E.F. Loftus et al. (1989) discovered that misled participants were actually 
faster to choose the misinformation item on the critical question at test than they were 
to choose an original item on a non-critical question. This suggests that misled 
participants who chose the misinformation item on the forced-choice recognition test 
only remembered the misinformation item on reaching the test phase. That is, any 
conflict between memories for the original item and the misinformation item may 
have been resolved before participants reached the test phase. The finding of fast 
responses in choosing the misinformation item strongly suggests that misinformation 
is integrated into memoiy for an event before the test phase, and likely soon after its 
encoding.
The various findings from indirect measures of misinformation integration, 
such as blatant misinformation (E.F. Loftus, 1979b), and discrepancy detection 
(Tousignant et al., 1986), as well as the direct measure of reaction times (Cole & 
Loftus, 1979; E.F. Loftus et al., 1989) strongly suggest that any conflict between the 
original item and misinformation is resolved before the test. The results from these 
studies are consistent with the integration of misinformation into memoiy for an event 
occurring soon after exposure to misleading information.
Interpreting the Misinformation Effect: Trace Alteration or Trace Coexistence?
The design of this misinformation paradigm is quite similar to that of the A-B, A-D 
paired-associate procedure that was used during the classic interference era, and the 
misinformation effect can be viewed as a form of retroactive interference. That is, the 
learning of the new misinformation item during an interpolated task (e.g.,
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questionnaire, post-event narrative) interferes with the ability to recall the original 
target item. In terms of the misinformation paradigm, the A stimulus represents the 
incident, while the B response represents the original target item that is associated 
with the incident. The D response represents the misinformation item, and if it is 
assumed that the misinformation does effect memoiy (e.g., E.F. Loftus et al., 1978; 
Bekerian & Bowers, 1983), it creates a retroactive interference effect, resulting in 
impaired memoiy for the original target item.
In a similar manner to the retroactive interference effect, the misinformation 
effect has been subject to the same arguments concerning the fate of the original item 
as the B response was in the A-B, A-D paradigm. The majority of research has 
argued either that the misinformation effect is the result of a storage failure, whereby 
the underlying trace of the original item is permanently altered, erased, or weakened 
through exposure to the misinformation (e.g., E.F. Loftus, 1975, 1977; E.F. Loftus et 
al., 1989; E.F. Loftus et al., 1978), or is the result of retrieval failures (e.g., Bekerian 
& Bowers, 1983; Chandler & Gargano, 1995, 1998; Morton et al., 1985). Thus, while 
the A-B, A-D paradigm could be criticised for having little external validity due to its 
use of word lists, the misinformation pai adigm demonstrates that interference effects 
can generalise to materials other than paired-associated, and more importantly, 
perhaps to eveiyday memory.
Trace Alteration: Destructive Updating
The earliest interpretation of the misinformation effect was that the misleading 
information erased the original trace. At its most extreme, this destructive updating 
hypothesis proposes that the original trace is completely and permanently destroyed or 
erased through a destinctive updating mechanism. This destmctive updating
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mechanism was an essential feature of E.F. Loftus’ theoiy of how information was 
integrated into memory as she believed that there could only ever be one memorial 
representation of an event stored in memoiy at any one time (E.F. Loftus, 1979b). 
Thus, if additional or contradictory information about a perceived event was 
experienced then the stored event was updated in memoiy. This updating occurred 
through the erasure of the out-of-date or contradictory information, and this 
information was replaced by the new or correct information. As computers erase old 
information when their memory is updated, the destmctive updating account, and its 
use of terms such as ‘permanent erasure’ or ‘trace destmction’ is veiy reminiscent of 
the computer analogy of the brain. Despite the precedence of destaictive updating in 
computer science, few specific details of how this mechanism would manifest itself 
have ever been advanced. Does this erasure occur before the original memoiy has had 
time to consolidate? How would a destmctive updating mechanism know what 
information to erase and what to preseiwe? Are all memoiy traces placed at risk of 
being erased when newer information or contradictory information is encountered?
The assumption that the original item has been permanently altered also has 
implications for how one would go about recovering that item. As the trace 
corresponding to the original item is believed to have been destroyed, the only way to 
retiun that original item back to the memorial representation of an event is to re-alter 
the misinformation back to the original item. This means that misled participants 
would have to re-encode the original item in order for it to destroy the trace of the 
misinformation item. Consistent with this view, Shaughnessy and Mand (1982) found 
that if misled participants were re-exposed to the original item through viewing the 
slide sequence again after post-event questioning, the original item was chosen at a 
level similar to that of neutral control information, and nearly as high as consistent
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information. This result could be interpreted as indicating that the misinformation 
item altered the trace of the original item, and then re-exposure to the original item led 
to the original item to alter the misinformation trace back again.
In order to support the hypothesis that the original trace has been 
compromised, either through erasure, weakening, or blending, every effort must be 
made to demonstrate that the original item is not present in memory. The majority of 
studies that provide support for the assumption of memory alteration come from failed 
attempts to recover the original item after exposure to misinformation. Various 
techniques have been used in an attempt to recover the original event memoiy, such as 
using blatant misinformation, second-guess techniques, incentives and hypnosis.
The use of blatant misinformation is believed to encourage participants to 
scmtinise their memories, to reject contradictoiy information, and not to tmst the 
source of the misinformation. E.F. Loftus (1979b) discovered that, overall, 
participants were likely to detect the presence of blatantly false information and reject 
all subtle misinformation related to that source. That is, when subtler misinformation 
appeared along side the blatant misinformation, such as in the same post-event 
question, then misled participants tended not to choose any of these misleading item 
at test. This may be due to misled participants rejecting the post-event information as 
a reliable source to base their choices on at test. However, when the introduction of 
blatant misinformation was delayed, so that the subtle misinformation appeared one 
day before the blatant misinformation, misled participants were likely to incorporate 
the previously presented subtle misinformation into their memory for the event, even 
though they rejected the blatant misinformation at test. E.F. Loftus interpreted these 
results as evidence for the subtle misinformation being integrated into event memory 
immediately, or soon after, misled participants are exposed to it, rather than
134
The Misinformation Effect
participants holding both the original item and the misinformation in memoiy until 
test where they make a decision between them based on which trace is the strongest. 
This being so, misled participants’ memory for the event is updated fairly quickly 
through the erasure of the original item and integration of the misinformation item. 
Even when subsequent information suggests that misled participants should not tmst 
any information contained in the post-event information (i.e., blatant misinformation), 
it is too late for misled participants. They have already integrated the subtle 
misinformation into their memory for the event. Thus, for misled participants, the 
memorial representation of the event has already been permanently updated with the 
subtle misinformation items through the destmction of the original trace. Under these 
conditions, the only way to recover the original item would be to re-alter memoiy for 
the misinformation back to the original item.
E.F. Loftus (1979a) also theorised that if participants have no memory for the 
original item due to the misinformation over-writing it then, even if participants aie 
given a second chance to choose the correct items at test, they will perform at chance 
levels. If participants have even a fragment of the original item in memoiy, they 
should choose that item at above chance levels. Using a forced-choice recognition 
task that contained three options, the original item, the misinformation, and a novel 
item, E.F. Loftus had participants who failed to choose the original item make a 
second choice. The majority of the misled participants failed to choose the original 
items on their first attempt, however, they also failed to choose the correct item above 
chance levels when given a second opportunity. E.F. Loftus interpreted this result as 
evidence that misled participants had no trace of the original item in memory because 
if they did, when given a second choice between the original item and an item that 
they had never seen before, they would have chosen the original item. As they failed
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to do so, it suggests that misled participants treated the original item as if it was also 
an item that they had never seen before.
E.F. Loftus (1979a) also explored a possible social explanation for why 
participants fail to retrieve the original item when prompted to do so -  misled 
participants may be insufficiently motivated to do so. In separate experiments using 
monetaiy and verbal incentives, however, E.F. Loftus failed to find any evidence that 
the original item was still present in the memories of participants who had been 
exposed to misinformation. Finally, hypnosis has been used as a technique to recover 
the original item from the memories of misled participants. Participants placed in a 
hypnotic state, however, have also been unable to recall the original item when 
encouraged to do so (Sheehan, Grigg & McCann, 1984).
Of course, while these studies may all be consistent with the hypothesis that 
the original item has been erased by the misinformation through a destructive 
updating mechanism, it can be argued that E.F. Loftus and colleagues have simply not 
used a sufficiently strong manipulation or retrieval method in order to recover the 
original item. This remains perhaps the greatest remaining thorn in the side of the 
destmctive updating hypothesis. Unfortunately, unless the state of the original trace 
can be examined at a neural level, the original item can never be shown to have been 
erased by the misinformation.
Trace Coexistence: 1. Retrieval Accessibility
An alternative to the notion that memoiy is destmctively updated is the theory that, 
once information is encoded into long-term memory, it permanently resides in 
memoiy. This theoiy that memories ‘coexist’ suggests that forgetting is more likely 
to be due to retrieval failures, such as an inappropriate or ineffective retrieval cue, or
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due to participants mistaking the misleading item as having originated from the 
original event, rather than being due to the destruction of memoiy traces. This 
coexistence of memorial traces also has an important adaptive advantage over the 
destructive updating hypothesis. As the destructive updating hypothesis proposes that 
old or out-of-date information is erased by newer information, the only way to recover 
that erased information is to re-encode it. In contrast, as the coexistence hypothesis 
proposes that information is permanently stored in long-term memory, then old or out- 
of-date information can be retrieved through the use of the coirect retrieval strategies, 
or through paying close attention to the source of certain memories.
The finding that both the original item and the misinformation item coexist in 
memoiy has been replicated many times (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Chandler & 
Gargano, 1998; Clii'istiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a, 1989b; 
Pirolli & Mitterer, 1984). Typically, retrieval conditions at test are manipulated in 
order for the original item to be successfiilly retrieved. This dependence on retrieval 
conditions has led to the supporters of the coexistence hypothesis interpreting the 
misinformation effect as being due to either a mis-matching of encoding and retrieval 
cues (e.g., Morton et al, 1985), the retrieval access of misinformation ‘blocking’ the 
retrieval of the original item (Chandler, 1991), or the misattribution of the 
misinformation to the original event (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a). However, there are 
many studies that merely replicate that the original item still continues to reside in 
memory after the encoding of the misinformation without adding insight into the 
memorial processes that may underlie this effect (e.g., Christiaansen & Ochalek, 
1983; Pirolli & Mitterer, 1984). These studies merely coiToborate the idea that the 
destmctive updating hypothesis of the misinformation effect is inadequate to account 
for these findings of trace coexistence. For example, Christiaansen and Ochalek
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(1983) provide evidence that the original item remains unaltered in memory after the 
introduction of post-event information.
On the other hand, many of the assumptions of the coexistence hypothesis 
concern the conditions that are present during the encoding and retrieval of 
information. Tulving’s encoding specificity principle directly influences these 
assumptions (Thompson & Tulving, 1970; Tulving & Osier, 1968; Tulving & 
Thompson, 1973). The encoding specificity theoiy proposes that every memoiy that 
is encoded into long-term memory is encoded within a context. The memory and the 
related contextual information that is encoded alongside it form a ‘unique trace’ 
(Wiseman & Tulving, 1976). Information that is stored with the memory can include 
external contextual information such as the time of the memoiy, the location of the 
memoiy, texture, modality (e.g., verbal, pictorial), smell, etc., as well as internal 
contextual information, such as an individual’s mood, feelings, or thoughts, etc. This 
contextual information can act as retrieval cues with their presence within the retrieval 
environment aiding recall of related memories, and their absence hindering the 
retrieval of related memories. Thus, the success of retrieving that stored information 
will depend on the number of contextual cues present at retrieval that match with 
those contextual features that were encoded with the memoiy. The more contextual 
retrieval cues present the easier and more successful the retrieval process will be. 
Thus, Tulving proposes that memoiy retrieval is cm  dependent and retrieval failures 
are due to cue dependent forgetting (Tulving & Psotka, 1971). That is, information 
can be available in memory but not currently accessible (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). 
For example, in a memoiy experiment where participants are being asked to 
remember a word list, in addition to encoding the word list, participants also encode 
contextual information concerning the room that the experiment is conducted in, the
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time of day, the mood of the individual, etc. When asked to retrieve that word list, 
participants are likely to be more success&l if asked to recall the words in the same 
room that they were encoded in, rather than having to tiy and recall the list in a 
second room. However, while changes in environmental context during the encoding 
and retrieval of the original event and the post-event information can affect 
performance at test (e.g., Lindsay, 1990) there is actually very little support for the 
idea (e.g., Bonto & Payne, 1991).
A more successful application of the encoding specificity principle has been to 
the reinstatement of thematic information encoded at study. Bekerian and Bowers 
(1983) proposed that the misinformation effects found with the typical misinformation 
paradigm may be due to a mis-match between encoding and retrieval cues. During 
the original encoding phase, participants watch a slide sequence that shows a car 
accident occurring in a foiward temporal order, from start to finish. These slides are 
shown in sequence, creating “themes”, such as the incident, setting, and context that 
are all connected to each other. This “thematic information” allows a participant to 
understand the general global details as well as the finer details of the event. On the 
other hand, if the incident was viewed out of sequence, there may be difficulty, or a 
complete inability, to understand what was observed. While the slides are usually 
viewed in order, the items that are tested in the recognition task are typically tested in 
a random order. This randomisation of the test slides may minimise the number of 
thematic retrieval cues that paiticipants are able to access and use to access the 
original memoiy. As few of these thematic cues are available at test, participants may 
come to rely on their most recent memoiy concerning the tai’get event, specifically the 
post-event information that contains the misleading information.
139
The Misinformation Effect
Bekerian and Bowers (1983) hypothesised that reinstating the thematic 
features from the study phase during the test phase should abolish the misinformation 
effect. Reinstating contextual cues should allow participants to use the same thematic 
information that they encoded in the slides as retrieval cues during the recognition 
test. This should allow participants to have much easier access to their memory of the 
original event, due to a greater matching of encoding and retrieval cues, than their 
memory of the post-event information. The results, in general, support this 
hypothesis. Misled participants were much more likely to choose the misinformation 
item on a recognition test when the test slides were presented in a random order, than 
when they were presented in a sequential order. In fact, misled participants who were 
administered a sequential test performed at the same levels as did other participants 
who received the same test but who had not been misled. Thus, the original and 
misinformation traces appear to coexist in memory, a finding inconsistent with the 
destmctive updating account of memory.
An interesting but ignored finding concerns performance by the control 
participants who received no misleading post-event information. While the order of 
test slides had no effect on performance for non-critical item, control participants 
performed better on the critical item under random testing conditions (6% error), than 
under sequential testing conditions (15% eiTor). Bekerian and Bowers (1983) seem to 
have overlooked this finding and fail to account for why random testing did not also 
affect performance for non-critical items or control participants. If random testing 
dismpts thematic retrieval cues, then it is not only likely to impair the retrieval of 
information from the original event, but also from the sequentially ordered post-event 
information as well. Therefore, there should have also been a drop in performance for 
control participants in the random testing condition on both the critical and non-
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critical items. However, this appears not to have been the case, with performance on 
the critical item for control participants greater in the random testing condition (6% 
error) than in the sequential testing condition (15% error).
Expanding on Bekerian and Bowers (1983) assumption that the 
misinformation effect is due to retrieval failures, Morton et al. (1985) proposed that 
memoiy for an event was organised so that the original and misinformation items are 
stored separately and independently in memoiy. Each item encoded from an event is 
stored as individual units called ‘Records’ that remain unconnected to each other. 
Each of these Records has its own set of retrieval cues and retrieval routes, called 
‘Headers’. Unfortunately, the information contained in a Header is unavailable to 
conscious inspection, and so an individual must use a ‘Description’ in order to match 
a Header to a Record. Descriptions are normally defined by a task, such as a question, 
which provides information for matching Headers to Records.
The Headed Records account of the misinformation effect assumes that the 
information contained within the recognition test influences the formation of the 
Description. This, in turn, biases the matching of Headers to Records formed from 
the post-event information. In the context of a misinformation paradigm, this means 
that the information contained within the recognition test, such as the random 
sequence of item, forms a Description that searches relevant Headers in parallel. This 
Description is able to access both the Header of the original item and the Header of 
the misinformation item. However, the Description is most likely to access the 
Header of the misinformation as this Header is more recent. In addition, the Header 
of the original item contains information concerning the sequential nature of the 
original event, sequential information which is absent from the Description being used 
to search the Records. With the access of the misinformation Header, the Record for
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the misinformation is retrieved, and participants choose the misinformation item on 
the recognition test.
While this Headed Record model may be able to account for some 
misinformation effects, it is unclear why the sequential information that would also be 
stored in the Record and Header for the misinformation effect does not also impair 
performance at test. The original event was not the only event that ran in a sequential 
order as the post-event information also ran sequentially. In addition, as the 
Description contains information about the visual nature of slides in the test, should 
the Description not be a better match to the Header for the original item, which also 
contains visual information, rather than the verbal information contained within the 
Header for the misinformation? Thus, other than the Record corresponding to the 
misinformation having been formed closer to the test than the Record for the original 
item, it is unclear how information contained within the Description is a better match 
to the Header for the misinformation rather than the original item.
Kroll, Ogawa and Nieters (1988) also provide additional evidence in support 
of a retrieval failure account of eyewitness memory errors. After completing an 
interpolated test, participants were presented with the original slides either in a 
random order, or in a sequential order, and then completed a final test. Participants 
who were presented with the second set of slides in sequential order were more likely 
to correct any mistakes that had been made on the initial test than participants who 
were presented with the slides in a random order. Thus, the second set of slides 
presented in sequential order may have reinstated any forgotten thematic cues needed 
in order to retrieve original event information. In contrast, when the slides were 
presented in a random order, participants were unlikely to have been able to reinstate 
those thematic cues that would have aided in the retrieval of the original event
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information. However, reinstating thematic cues does not always abolish the 
misinformation effect. Significant misinformation effects have been found with 
sequential tests (Bowers & Bekerian, 1984; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), although 
it remains unclear why sequential tests sometimes eliminate the misinformation effect 
but under other conditions it does not. Bowers and Bekerian (1984) have noted that 
reinstating retrieval cues from the original event is sometimes insufficient to access 
the original item. The retrieval conditions set up during the introduction of the post­
event information also determines whether participants will choose the original item 
or not at test. When the post-event questions are presented in a sequential order, the 
misinformation effect appears regardless of the test. With a sequential test and 
questionnaire, the retrieval cues at test may provide access to both the original item 
and the misinformation item. However, as the misinformation was encountered more 
recently, the more recent memory is retrieved, resulting in a misinformation effect 
(Morton et al., 1985). On the other hand, no misinformation effect occurs if a 
sequential test is presented subsequent to a random questionnaire. Bowers and 
Bekerian suggest that the random questionnaire dismpts thematic cues that would 
normally be set up by a sequential questionnaire, resulting in the retrieval cues from 
the sequential test providing access to the original item.
Trace Coexistence: II. A Discrimination Process
Another set of studies that support the coexistence hypothesis appears to be 
influenced by assumptions fi'om the classical interference era and place the cause of 
the misinformation effect as a problem in the retrieval process. However, some of 
these studies differ from the encoding specificity principle (e.g.. Chandler, 1989, 
1991, 1993; Chandler & Gargano, 1998), while others provide some support for it
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(e.g., Chandler et al., 2001). Many of these studies are very different from typical 
misinformation paradigms. There are no eyewitness events, or post-event narratives, 
and they tend to resemble retroactive interference paradigms. However, these studies 
are directly relevant to the alterations versus coexistence of traces debate, and these 
tightly controlled studies provide a strong theoretical backbone to the coexistence 
hypothesis.
The mis-match of encoding and retrieval cues that is assumed by encoding 
specificity is not the only reason why post-event information can be retrieved in place 
of an original item. Recognition tests that remove the post-event information as an 
option and replace it with a novel item should increase the number of retrieval cues 
that specifically match the original item. Thus, when the original item is in 
competition with a never seen before item, encoding specificity would predict that the 
original item should be chosen because the test provides sufficient perceptual and 
contextual retrieval cues to access the original item. However, this has been shown 
not to be the case. Even when the retrieval cues present at recognition favour the 
retrieval of the original item, participants who have been exposed to post-event 
information tend to perform more poorly than do control participants (Chandler, 1989, 
1991; Chandler & Gargano, 1998). This suggests the presence of other retrieval 
process, such as the retrieval access of the competing post-event trace (Chandler, 
1991; 1993; Chandler et al., 2001; Windschitl, 1996), and the failure of the original 
trace and post-event trace to be discriminated at retrieval (Chandler, 1989, 1991; 
Chandler & Gargano, 1998),
The presence of these other retrieval processes has been demonstrated with 
longer retention intervals. Chandler and Gargano (1998) have suggested the presence 
of a discrimination process and a blocking process that operates at retrieval. Forced-
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choice recognition tests may be especially vulnerable to either a failure to 
discriminate the two traces, or to strong competing items blocking retrieval of weaker 
items. Which of these processes plays a primary, or exclusive role, appears to be 
dependent on the type of stimuli used. While a blocking process is thought to play a 
role in controlling the retrieval of familiar stimuli, a discrimination process is thought 
to control the retrieval of unfamiliar stimuli (Chandler & Gargano, 1998). Both of 
these processes have been examined through manipulating the length of retention 
intervals, and by varying when the post-event information is presented within that 
inteiwal. Retroactive interference from post-event information typically decreases 
over increasing retention intervals, with interference decreasing at inteiwals as short as 
15 minutes with paired-associates (Chandler, 1993), and being completely abolished 
at 48 hours with pictures (Chandler, 1991). This reduction in the interfering effect of 
post-event information may be due to the retrieval accessibility of post-event 
information at the time of test. If the recognition test provides retrieval cues that 
match the post-event information (e.g., the post-event item is an option on the 
recognition test), then both the post-event trace and the original trace are likely to be 
accessed by the retrieval cue, resulting in the post-event trace interfering with the 
original trace (Chandler, 1993). When both traces are accessed in this manner, it may 
become difficult to discriminate these traces.
This difficulty in discriminating between the original and post-event trace can 
occur for various reasons. The discrimination process is likely to fail when the 
original and post-event trace are highly similar, such as when they share perceptual, 
contextual and temporal cues (see also Pezdek, 1977). In contrast, these traces may 
be easier to discriminate when the two traces are more dissimilar and share fewer 
cues. Under these retrieval conditions, retroactive interference effects are absent and
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the original trace is easily retrieved (Chandler & Gargano, 1995, 1998). The 
discrimination process may also fail if the post-event trace is made much more 
accessible than the original trace. The post-event trace can be strengthened by 
presenting the post-event information at the end of a long retention intei*val and just 
prior to test. Under these conditions, the post-event trace is far more accessible and 
interferes retroactively with the original trace (Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy & 
Winfrey, 1992; Chandler, 1993; Chandler et al., 2001). Conversely, increasing the 
retention interval after the presentation of post-event information, or presenting the 
post-event information at the beginning of a fairly long retention inteival, reduces the 
retrieval accessibility of the post-event trace (Chandler, 1993; Windschitl, 1996).
Trace Coexistence: 111. A Blocking Process
Not all of the findings by Chandler and colleagues findings can be accommodated by 
a simple trace coexistence theoiy, such as trace competition or retrieval failure 
explanation (Chandler, 1991; Chandler & Gargano, 1998). For example, as 
retroactive interference effects dissipate over longer retention intervals, proactive 
interference effects increase (Postman, 1971). However, while Chandler (1991) has 
demonstrated that retroactive interference with similar pictures does decrease over a 
48-hour delay, proactive interference effects are completely absent (see also Belli, 
Lindsay, Gales & McCaithy, 1994). This absence of proactive interference is 
contraty to the simple coexistence account of traces typically employed to describe 
misinformation effects. Both the original trace and the post-event trace should have 
competed with each other regardless of the presentation order of these items. Thus, a 
simple retrieval failure or retrieval competition explanation of misinformation effects 
is insufficient to account for this finding. These studies that find that misinformation
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effects still occur even when misleading information appears before the original 
event, strongly suggests that memory is not updated through the destruction of 
information already stored in memory.
Chandler and Gargano (1998) suggest a role for a blocking process operating 
at retrieval. This blocking process is only activated when stimuli are highly primed, 
such as with items that are rehearsed, or familiar information. Thus, blocking would 
only play a role with information that was already integrated into long-term memory 
(e.g., word pairs), rather than unfamiliar scenes (e.g., never seen before nature 
pictures). Blocking predicts that post-event word pairs are more accessible at retrieval 
than the original word pair. Post-event word pairs should be higher in retrieval 
accessibility because they have occurred more recently than the original word pairs. 
Thus, more recent word pairs should be stronger in memory and therefore create more 
interference.
One way of increasing the strength of competitors is to present post-event 
word pairs at test rather than immediately after the presentation of the original word 
pairs. Recent competing items will be stronger and thus more likely to be accessed by 
retrieval cues than the weaker original items. Strong competitors are also more likely 
to block retrieval access to the weaker original word pairs (Chandler & Gargano, 
1998). These retrieval blocks explain the misinformation effect as being due to the 
misinformation blocking the retrieval of the original item. Thus, as the 
misinformation item was encountered more recently than the original item the 
misleading item is more likely to be accessed at retrieval than the original item. Once 
the misleading item ‘yield sign’ has been retrieved it will block the retrieval of the 
original item ‘stop sign’ (Chandler et al., 2001). Support for blocking can also be 
found without having to resort to long retention intervals. Schooler, Foster and Loftus
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(1988) found that forcing participants to choose between two incorrect items from the 
post-event information on an interpolated test resulted in misled participants 
performing more poorly on a subsequent recognition test where the misinformation 
was not an option. In typical misinformation paradigms, participants may read the 
post-event information without paying a great deal of attention to it. When forced to 
choose an incorrect item from the post-event information on a test, the act of doing so 
may have increased the accessibility of the information contained in the narrative. 
When given a choice between the original item and a novel item on the final 
recognition test, participants previous retrieval of post-event information may have 
blocked access to information contained within the original event.
There are some difficulties with the blocking hypothesis, however. 
Misinformation effects have been found when the misinformation was presented two 
days before test when presumably the misleading item was not overly strong (Ceci, 
Ross & Toglia, 1987; Toglia, Ross, Ceci & Hembrooke, 1992). However, these 
retroactive interference effects with weaker competing items do not fully discount the 
notion of a blocking process. Despite the misinformation not being in a particularly 
strong retrieval position, these items were presented a day after the original items, and 
so the post-event information was still stronger than the original event information. 
However, more problematic for the blocking hypothesis is the finding that increasing 
the accessibility of the misinformation through interpolated tests (Schooler et al., 
1988) does not always result in misinformation effects. Interpolated tests containing 
post-event information should increase retrieval access to the post-event information 
on subsequent tests. Having increased accessibility to the misinformation it should 
block retrieval access to the original event. However, Belli (1993) found that 
presenting a standard recognition test (i.e., original item versus misinformation)
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during the retention interval had no impact on performance in a later recognition test 
were the misinformation item was not an option (i.e., original item versus novel item). 
Thus, increasing the accessibility of the post-event information tlirough its prior 
retrieval does not necessarily result in the misinformation becoming more accessible 
and blocking retrieval access to the original event. It remains unclear under what 
retrieval conditions a blocking process would be elicited. Is blocking only triggered 
under certain conditions, such as with long retention inteival s where a degree of 
forgetting from the original event has already occurred in order for the post-event 
information to becoming greatly more accessible? Or does the blocking process 
generalise to any situation where the post-event information is stronger and more 
accessible than the original event?
Alternatively, it has been suggested that as the post-event information is 
presented more recently than the original item it may determine the type of retrieval 
cues that are available at test (referred to as the ‘cue-change’ hypothesis. Chandler & 
Gargano, 1995). For example, if the post-event information is presented more 
recently than the original item (e.g., on different days), then the post-event item may 
change the type of retrieval cues that are available. If the post-event information was 
encountered on the same day as the test then there may be more contextual cues 
present during the test that are a better match to the post-event item than to the 
original item. The post-event item is most likely to determine retrieval cues when a 
long delay has occurred between the original event and the presentation of the post­
event information. Under these conditions, participants may find it difficult to recall 
the original event, and rely on the recently encountered post-event information to 
generate retrieval cues. On the other hand, if the post-event information has not been 
encountered recently, then participants will not be able to rely on this source for
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generating retrieval cues. Thus, there will be fewer retrieval cues available that access 
the post-event item, and so it will be easier for an individual to reinstate the context 
that would facilitate the retrieval of the original item (Chandler & Gargano, 1995; 
Chandler et al, 2001).
More generally, these studies provide strong evidence against the destmctive 
updating hypothesis. As retention inteivals increase, the retroactive interference 
effect decreases in size (Chandler, 1993), and disappears at long intervals (e.g., 48 
hours, Chandler, 1991). This finding (i.e., that the retrieval availability of the original 
item increases as retroactive interference dissipates) suggests that the original item has 
neither been erased nor altered, but remains in tact. Interference with the retrieval of 
the original item also appears to be dependent on the post-event information being 
similar. When the post-event information is dissimilar to the original item then the 
post-event item creates less interference (Chandler, 1989, 1991, 1993; Chandler & 
Gargano, 1995, 1998; Chandler et al, 2001). However, this interference effect can be 
removed by instnicting participants to recall only information from the original event 
and not post-event information. This may be due to the possibility that such generate 
retrieval cues that are specific and unique to the original item, resulting in their 
retrieval (Chandler et al, 2001). Chandler et al (2001) suggest that these interference 
effects (e.g., misinformation effects) can be avoided by emphasising the importance 
of retrieval cues that specifically access information contained within a memory for 
an original event. This can be achieved through encouraging individuals to reinstate 
contextual cues that are unique to the original event, which may result in the original 
memoiy being accessed before memories for related post-event information.
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Trace Coexistence: IV. Source Misattribution
However, there is also strong evidence to suggest that misinformation has no effect on 
the original trace, but is instead due to misled participants mistakenly believing that 
the misinformation occurred in the original event. This type of research allows the 
interesting question ‘Do participants really believe they s-mr the misleading item in 
the original eventT to be investigated. This approach considers that the 
misinformation effect is the result of a failure to monitor the source of their memories. 
The source monitoring account was initially put forwards by Johnson and Lindsay 
(e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a), and suggests that source 
confusion can occur even if the original item is still present within memory for the 
event. Thus, this latter point technically makes source monitoring a coexistence 
explanation as is proposes that misinformation effects can occur despite the original 
item remaining intact in memoiy. However, source monitoring differs from the 
coexistence hypothesis, as it does not assume that misled participants have difficulty 
in retrieving the original item at test. Source monitoring actually proposes quite the 
converse. It does not propose that there is any retrieval access problem to the original 
item, but rather chooses to explain why some misled participants believe that the 
misinformation item actually occurred in the original event. Thus, this blending of 
source of memories can provide quite an intuitive explanation of the misinformation 
effects.
Why might source misattribution errors occur? Misattribution of the source of 
misinformation can occur because the original item and the misinformation both 
concern the same event. As the two sources of these items are very similar, the 
typical eyewitness memory paradigm employed in this type of research fosters the 
ideal conditions for source misattribution errors to occur. If the original event and the
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post-event information were reduced in similarity then participants would be less 
likely to misattribute the misinformation to the original event (Lindsay, 1990). In 
addition, the type of recognition tests used in misinformation paradigms may f
encourage participants to adopt an inappropriate decision making criterion. During 
this test, for non-critical items, participants are typically asked to discriminate 
between a visual slide that they have seen before during the visually presented study 
phase and a new and unfamiliar item that participants have not seen before. This 
placement of an old and familiar item fi*om the slide alongside a new and unfamiliar 
item may encourage participants to adopt a decision making process based on 
familiarity. When misled participants reach the critical comparison between the 
original item and the misinformation item, misled participants may choose the 
misinformation item because it seems more familiar to them and they mistakenly 
believe that item occurred during the slide sequence. The misinformation item could 
seem more familiar for reasons unrelated to the misinformation over-writing the 
original item in memory. For example, misled participants who failed to encode the 
original item may remember that they encountered the misinformation during the 
experimental episode and think that it must have occurred during the original event, or 
participants may choose the misinformation item due it being more salient or having 
been presented more recently.
It should be noted that source monitoring studies tend to use a different 
paradigm to that typically employed in examinations of the misinformation effect.
While typical misinformation studies employ specific pieces of information that 
contradict items from the original event, source monitoring studies typically use 
snpplementcny information that is consistent with the general themes of the original 
event. Thus, source monitoring examines the general suggestibility of eyewitness
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memory through the integration of additional post-event information, rather than the 
effects of exposing participants to contradictory post-event information. For example, 
Zaragoza and Lane (1994) found that misattributing the misleading item to the 
original event is not an inevitable consequence of being exposed to post-event 
information. It would appear that participants are more susceptible to suggestions if 
they are completing a task that requires participants to actively retrieve and 
reconstmct the original event in their memoiy at the same time that the suggested 
detail is being processed. Simply reading a post-event narrative that contained 
suggested details tended to result in very little source misattribution. Participants who 
completed tasks containing suggested details with a higher retrieval component, such 
as unscrambling a nanative, or answering misleading questions, however, were far 
more likely to misattribute the suggested details to the original event.
Research into source confusion has highlighted Zaragoza and Lane’s (1994) 
finding that mere exposure to a suggested detail is insufficient to cause participants to 
misattribute that item to the original event. Zaragoza and Koshmider (1989) have also 
failed to find any evidence for source confiision in the production of misinformation 
effects in a typical misinformation paradigm, or that considering the source of the 
misleading item abolishes the misinformation effect. Misled participants did not 
mistakenly attribute the misleading item to the original event, and correctly identified 
it as having originated from the post-event narrative. Misled participants were also 
able to identify the original item as correctly having originated from the slides to the 
same degree as control participants. However, significantly fewer misled participants 
failed to recognise that the misleading item was inconsistent with their memory for 
the event compared to control participants. This means that there was a degree of 
integration of the misleading item into memory for the event that did not occur with
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control participants. Collectively, these findings suggest that misled participants 
chose the misinformation item despite their awareness that they could not remember 
seeing that item in the original event. Thus, participants can be aware of the source of 
their memories, but still favour the misinformation item over the tme original item, 
suggesting that source confusion is not always an explanation of misinformation 
effects.
As Lindsay and Johnson (1989a) suggested that the misinformation paradigm 
was likely to be susceptible to source monitoring errors due to the original event and 
post-event information referring to the same event, Lindsay (1990) investigated 
whether making these sources more distinct could influence the magnitude of the 
misinformation effect. A two-day delay was inserted between the original event and 
the post-event information, thereby increasing the distinctiveness of these two sources 
in participant’s memoiy, or the original event and post-event information occurred in 
the same session two-days before test, thereby decreasing their distinctiveness in 
memory. Lindsay found that increasing the distinctiveness of the two sources of 
information in memoiy resulted in the abolition of the misinformation effect. Thus, 
these participants are likely to have used the temporal distinctiveness of the original 
event from the post-event information to guide their choices at test. In contrast, when 
the original event and the post-event information occurred within the same session, a 
reduction in the temporal distinctiveness of these two sources, a misinformation effect 
emerged.
Lindsay’s (1990) work suggests that source misattributions between the post­
event information and the original event will be greater when these sources are made 
less distinct. Lindsay increased source confusion by decreasing the temporal 
distinctiveness of the information learned during the original event and that learned
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during the post-event information. Similarly, source monitoring would suggest that 
misled participants who visualise the misleading item should be more susceptible to 
making source misattribution eiTors. Visualising the misinformation item should 
increase its similarity to the visual original event and increase the probability that 
misled participants will choose this item at test. While research using patterns (Finke, 
Johnson & Shyi, 1988), and text (Intraub & Hoffman, 1992) suggests that visualising 
additional post-event information increases source confusion, no studies have been 
conducted to examine the effects of visualising post-event information in the 
misinformation paradigm.
Other researchers suggest that misled participants truly believe that the post­
event information occurred in the original event, but that the original item still 
remains intact in memory (e.g.. Schooler, Gerhard & Loftus, 1986; Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989a; Lindsay, 1990; Weingardt, Loftus & Lindsay, 1995). Misled 
participants have even stated that they saw they misleading item that they read about 
in the original slide sequence (Belli et al., 1994; Weingardt et al., 1995). The source 
monitoring approach suggests that, while the original trace and the misinformation 
coexist, the misinformation had no direct affect on the original trace. As the original 
event and the misinformation source are both highly similar the standard 
misinformation paradigm fosters the ideal conditions necessaiy for misled participants 
to fail to discriminate the two contexts. Thus, the misinformation is perceived as 
belonging to the original event by misled participants (Schooler et al., 1986; Lindsay, 
1990).
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Does Misinformation Really Impair Memory for an Event?
There is also some circumstantial evidence that misinformation impairs memoiy for 
an event. Misled participants are typically just as confident that the misinformation 
item originated from the slide sequence as they are about real original items (Cole & 
Loftus, 1979; Greene et al., 1982; E.F. Loftus et al., 1989). However, given that 
confidence is not a strong correlate of memory accuracy in eyewitness testimony 
research (e.g., Shaw & McClure, 1995; Sporer, Pernod, Read & Cutler, 1995), this 
finding of a high degree of confidence in the misinformation item would mean very 
little without the more direct measures of memoiy, such as reaction times (e.g., E.F. 
Loftus et al, 1989). Not only can misled participants be confident about the origins 
of misleading information, but misled participants are also able to provide quite 
detailed descriptions of the misinformation item (E.F. Loftus, 1979a; Schooler et al, 
1986). While the descriptions provided by misled participants of the misinformation 
item are similar on some dimensions, such as geographic detail, they do differ in some 
respects to descriptions of real events. For example. Schooler et al. (1986) found that 
when using the typical misinformation paradigm with the stop and yield road signs, 
misled participants tended to provide fewer sensoiy details (e.g., colour, shape, size, 
etc.), and provide many more references to the function of the misleading road sign. 
In addition, misled participants tended to provide more details concerning their 
cognitive processes during the slide sequence and while reading the narrative (e.g., 
what participants were thinking of or paying attention to). Misled participants also 
provided many more ‘verbal hedges’ during their descriptions of the misinformation 
item. That is, these participants had a habit of saying verbal hedges, such as ‘I think’ 
or ‘I believe’, during their descriptions of the suggested details. However, despite 
these differences, misled participants were unaware of these differences in their
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descriptions of real and suggested details from an event. While untrained judges who 
were asked to attend to these descriptions and distinguish the real from the suggested 
details were aware of these differences they were still unable to successfully 
differentiate these items. This latter point is quite remarkable given that the 
misinformation item was a written word contained in a written text, while their 
description of it appears to be based on a visual memory of it.
The Non-retention Account o f Misinformation Effects
For many years, there has been much debate concerning the placement of the original 
item in direct competition with the misinformation, and whether including the original 
item at test is an appropriate method for examining misinformation effects. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) suggested that, in order to address whether the trace 
of the original item has been erased by the misinformation, the original item should 
not be placed in competition with the misinformation. Their reasoning is that if the 
trace of the original item has been erased by the misinformation then when 
participants are faced with a choice between the original item and a new item on a 
recognition test, these misled participants will perform at chance levels. That is, 
without an intact memoiy of the original item, misled participants will be forced to 
guess.
In short, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) proposed that misinformation had 
no effect on memoiy at all and that the misinformation effect is actually due to 
demand characteristics inherent in the misinformation paradigm. Misled participants 
who fail to recall the original item due to reasons other than the presentation of 
misinformation may remember the misinformation from the narrative, and therefore 
choose the misinformation at the recognition task. The misinformation will have no
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effect on the original trace because there was no trace at the time of misinformation 
exposure. The misinformation merely acts as additional information filling a hole in 
memoiy (Pirolli & Mitterer, 1984), and thus this account of misinformation effects 
has become known as the non-retention account.
If it is assumed that the null hypothesis is correct, and that misinformation has 
no effect on memory, then certain assumptions can be made concerning performance 
at test. In the control condition, participants receive no post-event information, and so 
are not expected to demonstrate a misinformation effect. Control participants who 
remember seeing the original item during the slide sequence will select that item at 
test when given a choice between the original item and the misinformation (new) 
item. However, a proportion of participants will always fail to either encode the 
original information in the first place, or will forget it during the retention interval 
between the study and testing phase. The control participants who do not remember 
the original item can be expected to guess on a test between the original item and the 
misinformation item. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) supply a hypothetical 
situation in order to illustrate their point where 40% of control participants who 
receive no post-event information remember seeing the original item during the slide 
sequence. However, this means that 60% of control participants did not recall the 
original item (for various reasons), and so they are likely to guess on a recognition test 
and perform at chance levels with 30% choosing the original item and 30% choosing 
the misinformation item. Thus, 70% of control participants will choose the original 
item on a recognition test (40% + 30%).
On the other hand, misled participants are likely to perform more poorly on 
this recognition test than are control participants even if misinformation has no effect. 
This assumption works on the basis that a certain proportion of the misled participants
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who did not recall the original item will recall the misinformation item from the post­
event information. For example, if the same proportion of misled participants recall 
the original item (i.e., 40%), then the remaining 60% will have no memory of that 
original item. Half of these participants (i.e., 30%) will remember the misinformation 
item that appeared during the post-event information phase, and so will choose the 
misinformation at test. However, half of the participants (i.e., 30%) will also have no 
memoiy of the misinformation item either, perhaps because it was never encoded, or 
because it has been forgotten during the retention inteiwal between the post-event 
information and the recognition test. With no memoiy of either the original item or 
the misinformation, when given a choice between those items on a recognition test, 
half of these participants will guess the original item (i.e., 15%), and half will guess 
the misinformation item (i.e., 15%). Thus, only 55% of misled participants will 
choose the original item (i.e., the 40% who recall the original item, and the 15% who 
guessed it), while 45% will choose the misinformation item (i.e., the 30% who recall 
the misinformation item, and the 15% who guessed it), compared to 70% of control 
participants choosing the original item, see Figure 18.
So, if it is assumed that the misinformation has no effect on memoiy for an 
event, misled participants will always perform more poorly than control participants, 
even if the same proportion of participants in both conditions can remember the 
original item. Thus, a misinformation effect will occur in the absence of memory 
alteration as long as a proportion of misled participants fail to remember the original 
item (for reasons not related to trace alteration or destruction); and a proportion of the 
misled participants who fail to recall the original item remember the misinformation 
item instead.
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There is also a third possible source that may contribute towards the 
misinformation effect. In the misled condition, a proportion of participants who recall 
the original item will also recall the misinformation item as well, see Figure 19. If it 
is assumed that 40% of misled participants recall the original item, then half of these 
participants may also recall the misinformation item (i.e., 20%). These misled 
participants who remember both the original item and the misinformation item will 
have to come to a decision over which item they intend to choose at test. Half of 
these participants who vividly recall the original item occurring in the slides will 
favour the original item on a recognition test (i.e., 10%). On the other hand, half of 
the participants may consider that, as the experimenter prepared the post-event 
information they must surely know what was contained within the slides, and so these 
participants are likely to choose the misinformation item (i.e., 10%). Under these 
conditions, only 45% of misled participants will choose the original item at test 
(compared to 70% of controls), and 55% will choose the misinformation item.
Thus, according to McCloskey and Zaragoza, the standard misinformation 
paradigm is inadequate for testing the hypothesis that misinformation affects memoiy 
for an event. The primaiy problem is the recognition test that is typically employed 
where the original item is placed in competition with the misinformation item. As 
there will always be a proportion of control and misled participants who fail to recall 
the original item, control participants will have a 50% chance of guessing correctly. 
Control participants will therefore always perform better than misled participants who 
do not recall the original item as they have less than a 50% chance in guessing the 
original item (as their choice is biased from remembering the misinformation and not 
the original item).
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McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) suggest an alternative recognition test, 
called the modified test procedure, that they believe is more appropriate for studying 
the hypothesis that misinformation alters memoiy for an event. This modified 
recognition test does not place the original item in competition with the 
misinformation item, but rather forces paiticipants to choose between the original and 
a novel item. Thus, participants in the misled condition who have no memory for the 
original item but do remember the misinformation, are not biased by the choices 
available on the recognition test. If the trace of the original item had been erased or 
destroyed by the introduction of misinformation, then misled participants should 
perform at chance levels on this modified test. That is, if misled participants have no 
memoiy of the original item they should be forced to guess on this test. In contrast if 
misinformation does not erase the original item, then misled participants will choose 
the original item.
Using this new recognition test should not affect control participants 
performance and so they should perform at the same level as on the standard test. In 
McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) example, control participants will choose the 
original item 70% of the time (40% who explicitly remember the original item, and 
30% who guessed correctly). In the misled condition, 40% of participants may recall 
the original item, with half of those participants also recalling the misinformation item 
as well (i.e., 20%). Under these conditions, as the misinformation item is not a choice 
on the test, all of these participants will choose the other item that they do remember: 
the original item. The remaining 60% of misled participants will have no memoiy for 
the original item (and as before, this will be for reasons unrelated to the 
misinformation having an effect on memory for the event). Half of these misled 
participants will remember the misinformation item (i.e., 30%). However, as the
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misinformation item is not an available choice on the recognition test, half of these 
participants will guess the original item (i.e., 15%), and the other half will guess the 
new item (i.e., 15%). Out of the remaining misled participants who do not recall the 
original item, they will also have no memoiy of the misinformation item as well (i.e., 
30%). Under these circumstances, half of the misled participants will guess the 
original item (i.e., 15%), and half will guess the new item (i.e., 15%). So, if the null 
hypothesis is assumed to be correct, and the misinformation did not erase the original 
memory, performance in the misled condition should be the same as in the control 
condition. That is, the guessing rates are equal in both the control and misled 
condition resulting in 70% of participants from each condition choosing the original 
item, see Figure 20.
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) compared the effects of introducing 
misinformation on the standard recognition test (i.e., original versus misinformation 
item) with that of the modified test procedure (i.e., original versus new item). Across 
six experiments, misled participants typically performed poorer on the standard test 
than the modified test. That is, in the standard recognition procedure, misled 
participants recalled the original item less than control participants, demonstrating a 
significant misinformation effect. In contrast, misled participants recalled the original 
item at the same'level as control participants when a modified recognition test was 
used. That is, when misled participants are given a choice between the original item 
and a new item, they tend to choose the original item, eliminating the misinformation 
effect. Therefore, the results of the modified test procedure appear to confirm 
McCloskey and Zaragoza’s assumptions concerning demand characteristics, 
differential guessing rates between the misled and control conditions, and the 
misinformation bias in the standard recognition test.
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When these factors are controlled for in a recognition test, misinformation fails to 
influence participant’s performance. On the other hand, if these factors are not 
controlled for (i.e., the standard recognition test), a significant misinformation effect 
occurs. Therefore, the null hypothesis that misinformation has no effect on memory 
for an event is affirmed.
Arguments against the Non-retention Account
Other researchers, however, have also examined the role of demand characteristics in 
producing source monitoring errors through adapting Jacoby, Woloshyn and Kelley’s
(1989) Togic of opposition’ paradigm, such as Lindsay (1990). The application of 
this paradigm to a source monitoring test places the participant’s desire to report the 
misleading item in opposition with their ability to recall the source of that item. 
Participants were told just prior to test that all information contained within the 
narrative was false and participants should not base their responses on information 
from this source. Thus, reporting the misinformation item would go against the 
demand characteristics set up by the experimenter’s instiiictions not to base their 
responses on the post-event information. When there was a high degree of 
discrimination between the original event and the post-event information through 
inserting a two-day delay between these phases, misled participants were very 
successfrd in only reporting details from the original event. On the other hand, 
participants who viewed both the original event and the post-event information within 
the same session mistakenly recalled the misinformation item. These participants 
were unable to discriminate successfully information that occurred in the original 
event from information that came from the original event, and so would report the 
misinformation item in place of the original item. This suggests not only that demand
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characteristics cannot always explain the misinformation effect, but also that 
participants are more likely to make a source monitoring error, and thus a 
misinformation effect, when the original event and post-event information are 
difficult to discriminate in memory.
Similarly, Zaragoza and Lane (1994) have found that misattribution of a 
suggested item to the original event is more likely to occur when participants answer 
suggestive questions rather than when they simply read a narrative containing 
suggestive details. According to the demand characteristic and guessing 
interpretation of source monitoring errors, the suggestive detail is just as likely to be 
misattributed to the original event in either condition. Thus, the differential effect of 
post-event information in the questioning and narrative conditions is unlikely to only 
be due to demand characteristics and guessing.
The logic of opposition task has also been adapted for an implicit memory task 
that can control for demand characteristics in the misinformation paradigm 
(Weingardt et al, 1995; Weingardt, Tolaiid & Loftus, 1994). Once again, the desire 
of participants to recall the misinformation item successfully was placed in opposition 
with their ability to recall the source of that misinformation. Participants were given 
an implicit recall task that required them to generate exemplars of categories. Some 
items from the original event and the post-event information could fall into these 
categories, but participants were informed that they were not to add any items to these 
categories if they had seen those items in the slide sequence. For example, 
participants were asked to list the names of five magazines but not to report any 
magazines that they had seen in the slides. Under these retrieval instructions, misled 
participants were less likely to report the misinformation item than were control 
pai'ticipants who did not receive misleading post-event information. This result
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suggests that misled participants appear to believe that they actually saw the 
misinformation item in the original slide event.
Several researchers have also criticised the modified test as being unsuited to 
hypotheses that require the misinformation item to be a choice at test (Belli, 1989; 
Chandler, 1989; E.F. Lofius, Schooler & Wagenaar, 1985). While the modified test is 
suited to hypotheses concerning the destructive updating of the original item with the 
misinformation, it is not suitable for hypotheses concerning various retrieval failures 
or source monitoring errors that result from encountering misinformation. For 
example, a retrieval impairment explanation of the misinformation effect, called the 
blocking hypothesis, suggests that the high accessibility of the misinformation 
‘blocks’ retrieval access to the original item (Belli et al., 1992; Chandler, 1991), 
normally through recency or saliency. Similarly, source misattribution does not 
require the presumption of impairment of the original trace, but suggests that both the 
original and misinformation item can be recalled (Lindsay, 1990; Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989a; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989). Unfortunately, the removal of the 
misinformation item on the modified test prevents misled participants who mistakenly 
believe that the misinformation occurred during the original event fiom choosing the 
misinformation item. As even strict source monitoring instructions can fail to abolish 
the misinformation effect (Lindsay, 1990), it suggests that the selection of the 
misinformation item can be a very powerfid and almost automatic choice. Thus, there 
may be an argument to be made for modified tests being insensitive to some retrieval 
interference accounts of memory impairment, which could conceivably produce a 
fairly natural account of misinformation effects.
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Is the Modified Test Insensitive to Detecting Memory Impairment?
E.F. Loftus et al. (1985) have also criticised the modified test as being insensitive to 
the small proportion of misled participants who may have genuine memory 
impairments, or who have a blended memoiy of both the original item and the 
misinformation item. As the modified test is a two alternative forced-choice test, 
participants who guess will have a 50% chance of guessing correctly. Thus, any small 
genuine memoiy impairments are likely to be masked by this guessing. If a more 
sensitive measure is used that reduces the influence of guessing, even if it does not 
have the misinformation item as a choice on the test, fewer misled participants should 
choose the original item compared to participants who were not misled. E.F. Loftus 
et al. suggested that a ‘betting form’ method that allows participants to distribute 
weights to their choices would be sufficiently sensitive to detect real memory 
impairment. In fact, Benzing (1985, quoted in E.F. Loftus et al., 1985) used this 
betting form method in both the standard recognition test (i.e., original item vs. 
misinformation), and in the modified test (i.e., original item vs. new item). While 
fewer misled participants chose the original item in both types of test than did 
participants who had not received post-event misleading information, a smaller 
misinformation effect was found in the modified test. The difference between the two 
types of tests would be consistent with McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) assertion 
that a proportion of misled participants may not have encoded the original item. 
However, as Benzing (1985) did find a misinformation effect, it would suggest that 
this proportion of participants who either fail to encode the original item or forget that 
item (for reasons other than the misinformation having any effect on the original item) 
is much smaller than the 60% that McCloskey and Zaragoza originally suggested.
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Unfortunately, memory performance in the betting form test does not provide 
a pure measure of memory accuracy, but also participants’ confidence in the accuracy 
of their memoiy. Exposure to misinformation may influence misled participants’ 
confidence in their memoiy for both the original item and misinformation. Thus, 
misled participants have an intact memory for the original item, but the presentation 
of the misinformation item may decrease misled participants’ confidence in the 
accuracy of their memory for the original item. On the other hand, control 
participants who are not exposed to misinformation will not have their confidence in 
their memoiy of the original item affected. Due to the difference in confidence 
between misled and control participants, misled participants may assign fewer points 
to the original items even if the misinformation item is not a choice at test.
Is E.F. Loftus et al. (1985) justified in criticising the modified recognition test 
as being insensitive to genuine memoiy impairment? Not entirely. Zaragoza and 
McCloskey (1989) addressed E.F. Loftus et al.’s criticism concerning the modified 
test, reiterating its applicability to all hypotheses that do not require the 
misinformation item to be an option on the test (e.g., does misinformation destroy the 
trace of the original item?), including hypotheses that concern the weakening of the 
original trace. While several researchers have failed to find a misinformation effect 
with the modified test (Belli, 1993; Bonto & Payne, 1991; E.F. Loftus et al., 1989; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a; Zaragoza et al., 1987), others have been able to 
demonstrate misinformation effects with this modified test. Chandler and colleagues 
(Chandler, 1989, 1991; Chandler & Gargano, 1998) have consistently demonstrated 
strong misinformation effects using a modified test, although the paradigm was not of 
an eyewitness memory design. Chandler typically uses scenes from nature (e.g., 
leaves), with the post-event information, and the new item on the modified test.
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looking quite similar to the original item. Misinformation effects can also be detected 
with the modified test if a sufficiently long retention inteiwal (i.e., 3-7 days) occurs 
between the original event and the presentation of the post-event information (Belli et 
al., 1992; Ceci et al., 1987; Toglia et al., 1992), This suggests that a degree of 
forgetting for the original event (e.g., trace disintegration) must occur for the 
misinformation to be able to impair the memory for the original item (Belli et al., 
1992), but not so much that the performance of the controls approaches chance levels 
(Chandler, 1989; E.F. Loftus et al., 1989). This interpretation of memoiy impairment 
occurring with the modified test is supported by prior findings that misinformation 
has a greater impairment effect on memory for an event when the trace of the original 
item has degraded over a longer retention interval with the standard test (E.F. Loftus 
et al., 1978). In contrast, misinformation effects tend not to be detected if the 
retention period is veiy short (i.e., 30 minutes or less; Belli et al., 1992; Bonto & 
Payne, 1991; Loftus et al., 1989; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). Misinformation 
effects have also been found using the modified test with pre-school children in a 
more typical misinformation paradigm (Ceci et al., 1987; Toglia et al., 1992).
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the modified test lacks sensitivity 
comes ft'om work measuring reaction times at test. While E.F. Loftus et al. (1989) 
found no evidence of a misinformation effect tlirough measuring memory 
performance, a difference was found between misled participants’ reaction times on 
the critical question and on non-critical questions. When misled participants are 
asked to choose between the original item and a never seen before item, participants 
typically take longer to choose between these items, irrespective of whether they 
finally choose the original item or not. On the other hand, misled participants are as 
fast to choose the original item on non-critical questions that they have not been
171
The Misinformation Effect
misled over as control participants are. This increased deliberation time on questions 
that participants have been misled over suggests that the misinformation has had at 
least some effect on memory for an event without affecting overall performance.
If, contrary to McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) claims, there is at least 
some genuine memoiy impairment occuning in the misinformation effect, just how 
much memoiy impairment is actually occurring? Belli (1989) examined this question 
through adapting the modified test to a Yes/No task in order to tiy and produce a more 
sensitive test to misinformation effects while trying to reduce the influence of 
guessing. This Yes/No test was not a forced-choice test that requires participants to 
choose between two items. Instead, half of the slides presented during the recognition 
test were original items, and the remaining half were new items, and participants had 
to evaluate each item individually and decide whether it had occurred in the original 
event or not. Using this test, ‘misinformation interference’ (either tlirough alteration 
or retrieval failures) was calculated as contributing to the production of 
misinformation effects. Belli suggested that 32.6% of control participants had a 
memory for the original item, compared to only 26% of misled participants having an 
intact memory for the original item. While a 6.6% drop in memoiy performance for 
the original item seems quite small. Belli calculates that this drop in memory accuracy 
for the original item between the misled and control conditions means that misled 
participants actually suffered a 20.2% reduction in performance (6.6% of 32.6%) due 
to the introduction of misinformation in the post-event information. Thus, the 
introduction of misinformation can have a significant impairing effect on misled 
participants’ memoiy for an event.
However, Belli (1989) obtained this memory impairment under very specific 
conditions. Post-event information was presented only five minutes after the original
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event, and the test occuiTed after a fiuther ten minutes. When these timings were 
doubled, no evidence was found for memoiy impairment. In fact, there was instead 
strong evidence for the biasing effect of misinformation on guessing rates, and of 
demand characteristics (Belli groups these non-cognitive explanations together as 
indicating ‘misinformation acceptance’), as well as poor retention of the original item 
in the control condition. However, Belli’s paradigm does not differentiate the effects 
of memoiy impairment (e.g., trace alteration, retrieval failure) from source monitoring 
errors, which requires no assumptions concerning memory impairment. Thus, the 
misinformation effect in Belli’s study could be entirely due to source misattribution of 
the misinformation to the original event, memory impairment, or a combination of 
both effects. Despite this, the results do imply that misinformation can affect memory 
for an event, at least under specific conditions, and that non-retention of the original 
item and misinformation acceptance probably plays a significant role in the large 
misinformation effects typically found in many studies.
Trace Alteration Reconsidered: 1. Weakening o f the Original Trace 
E.F. Loftus and colleagues’ original interpretation of the misinformation effect 
suggested that the original trace was completely erased (e.g., E.F. Loftus, 1979a, 
1979b; E.F. Loftus & Loftus, 1980; E.F. Loftus et al., 1978). This erasure of the 
original trace was believed to occur through the activation of a destmctive updating 
mechanism when participants encountered additional or contradictoiy information. 
As only one representation could exist in memoiy for an event, exposure to 
information that contradicted what was already stored in memory required the trace 
corresponding to the original item to be destroyed and replaced by the new
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misinformation item. Thus, the single representation in memory for the event was 
updated with this new information.
However, after McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a, 1985b) attack on the 
typical E.F. Loftus misinformation paradigm, and their assertion that misinformation 
has no effect on memory for an event, E.F. Loftus and colleagues reconsidered their 
position. What other reasons could explain why the misinformation effect was 
abolished when the misinformation item was removed as an option on the modified 
recognition test? As already noted, various researchers considered the possibility that 
perhaps a smaller proportion of misled participant’s memoiy of the original item was 
erased by the misinformation than originally thought (e.g., Belli, 1989; E.F. Loftus et 
al., 1985), and that the modified test was insufficiently sensitive to detect this small 
impairment. Further to this, the alteration hypothesis was modified to include the 
possibility that the original trace is ‘weakened’ or ‘fades’ thiough subsequent 
exposure to misinformation (E.F. Loftus & Hoffman, 1989), or there is a 
‘disintegration’ of features that constitute an original trace (Brainerd & Reyna, 1988, 
described in E.F. Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). So, under what conditions would the 
weakening, fading or disintegration of the original trace be promoted? As a weakened 
or faded trace should be much easier to alter than a stronger trace, the most obvious 
and simplest manipulation would be to vaiy the retention interval between the original 
event and the introduction of misinformation and application of the final recognition 
test.
There is some evidence to support this view of the alteration hypothesis. 
Misinformation has been shown to have less of an influence on memoiy for an event 
when the post-event information is presented and tested immediately, or soon after, 
viewing the original event with the standard test (e.g., from 20 minutes to one day,
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E.F. Loftus et al., 1978). It should be noted, however, that even at these fairly brief 
retention intervals misled participants still only choose the original item around 40% 
of the time. However, with short retention intervals on the modified test, 
misinformation effects are typically not detected (Belli et al., 1992; Bonto & Payne, 
1991; Loftus et al., 1989; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). At these short intervals, 
the original item and the event are believed to be fresh in memory, resulting in a 
stronger original trace.
Stronger misinformation effects are typically found with longer retention 
intervals, usually between one day and one week between the original event and the 
introduction of misinformation with the standard test (E.F. Loftus et al, 1978). This 
pattern of increased misinformation influence is found even when the modified 
recognition test is used (Belli et al, 1992; Ceci et al, 1987; Toglia et al, 1992). 
Retention inteiwals of around a day appear to be the beginning of this transition from 
a sufficiently strong trace to a weaker trace. Under these longer retention inteiwals, 
the original trace is expected to have weakened through time and disuse making it 
easier to alter the original memory.
What happens if the misinformation trace is also weakened through time and 
disuse? E.F. Loftus et al (1978) found a general trend toward misled participants 
performing at chance levels over the period of one day to one week. After a week had 
elapsed between the presentation of the post-event information and the final test, both 
misled, and control participants who had received no post-event information, 
appeared to be guessing between the original and misinformation item on a standard 
test (E.F. Loftus et al, 1978). However, this pattern does not always occur and the 
misinformation item can continue to influence misled participants’ performance at test 
even when it is presented fi'om three to nine days before a modified test (Ceci et al.j
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1987; Howe, 1991). However, these latter studies used young children as participants 
with stories as stimuli. It has been suggested that young children are more susceptible 
to misinformation because they lack the awareness needed to monitor the credibility 
of the post-event information (Ceci et al., 1987). On the other hand, misinformation 
effects are typically found with the standard test when the post-event information is 
presented shortly before testing (e.g., E.F. Loftus et al., 1989; McSpadden, Schooler 
& Loftus, 1998; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989). These results suggest that the 
misinformation effect can be dependent on the strength of the misinformation trace. 
However, this issue does not seem to be as cut and dry as with the strength of the 
original trace. When the trace is strong in adult participants, they are more likely to 
choose the misleading item. If the misinformation trace is relatively weak, however, 
in addition to the original trace being even weaker, both of these items are in a 
relatively poor retrieval position.
Thus, there appears to be some evidence in favour of weak original traces 
being susceptible to misinformation effects. The original trace may be altered by the 
misinformation either through a weakening, fading, disintegration of features of the 
trace, or perhaps some unknown alteration but the exact mechanism remains 
unknown. On the other hand, if both the original trace and the misinformation trace 
are relatively weak, then participants merely perform at chance levels.
The original trace can also be strengthened through re-presenting the original 
slide sequence. When the original item is strengthened tlnough this method, 
misinformation tends not to have any effect on participant’s memoiy for the event. 
(Shaughnessy & Mand, 1982). Presumably, the re-presentation of the original item 
strengthened the original trace compared to the misinformation item that was only 
presented once. However, this reasoning suggests that if the misinformation item is
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strengthened through its re-presentation, then a misinformation effect will always 
occur. Unfortunately, this is not always so. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) 
presented the post-event information either once or twice, and found no difference in 
the magnitude of the misinformation effect, regardless of whether the standard and 
modified test was used.
Trace Alteration Reconsidered: 11. Blended Memories
E.F. Loftus et al. (1985) also suggested that the modified recognition test was 
insufficiently sensitive to detect blended memories. Blend memories are new 
memories that contain features of both the original item and the misinformation item, 
but are not an exact match to either item. Thus, blended memories can be seen as 
evidence that the misinformation does impair or ‘coniipf the original memory, but 
not to the same degree as the original destmctive updating mechanism suggested. 
However, it should be noted that this explanation of exactly what constitutes a 
blended memory never arose from E.F. Loftus’ early work on blend memories (E.F. 
Loftus, 1975, 1977), and she has never actually completed any further empirical work 
on blended memories since those early studies. This account of blended memories 
was a more fleshed out variation of the original concept that occurred primarily as a 
reaction to McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) criticisms. In fact, McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985b) noted that ‘the notion is not sufficiently well developed to merit 
serious consideration’ (p.386).
Studies of blend memories are not a particularly easy phenomenon to study. 
There are few instances of objects (i.e., original item and misinformation) that could 
theoretically be blended to form a real object. For example, there is no real blend of a 
Stop and a Yield sign, or of Coke and 7-Up cans, or of apples and oranges. However,
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E.F. Loftus et al. (1985) do comment that there is a ‘screwrench’, although it is not a 
tool that is both a screwdriver and a wrench. Despite this, there are some examples 
of things that can theoretically produce blends, typically things that can form a 
continuum or scale, such as colour, numbers of objects, and the size, volume or length 
of objects, speed, or perhaps even music. E.F. Loftus has examined the effects of 
blending in colour memory and memory for numbers of demonstrators. In one such 
study, E.F. Loftus (1977) examined the effects of exposing participants to misleading 
information concerning the colour of a car. Participants viewed a green car, which 
failed to stop at the scene of an accident, and then either received misleading 
information that the car was actually blue, or received no post-event information 
concerning its colour. Using a colour scale, participants who viewed a green car and 
where later told that it had been blue, were more likely to say that it had been of a 
blue-green hue on a recognition task than were control participants who had not been 
subjected to misleading post-event information. In addition, some misled participants 
chose a more bluer-green than other misled participants, suggesting that the post­
event information had vaiying effects on individual participant’s memory for the 
original item. E.F. Loftus (1975) found a similar result of blending with memory for 
numbers of demonstrators. Participants viewed a video of eight demonstrators, and 
later received post-event information that there had actually been four or twelve 
demonstrators in the video. Participant who were told that there was only four 
demonstrators thought that approximately 6.4 demonstrators had been present, while 
participants who received post-event information that there had been twelve 
demonstrators, estimated that approximately 8.9 demonstrators had been present in 
the video.
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The original explanations for these blended memories were rather vague, 
merely mentioning the integration of both the original item and the misleading item 
into memory for the event, resulting on a single memorial representation of the event. 
However, in light of McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) criticism of the destructive 
updating hypothesis, the idea of blended memories was again advanced as a 
possibility, and was considerably expanded upon.
As already noted, several researchers have suggested that the standard 
recognition test (i.e., original item vs. misinformation) is appropriate for testing 
hypotheses that require the misinformation item to be an option at test (Belli, 1989; 
Chandler, 1989; E.F. Loftus et al, 1992; E.F. Loftus et al, 1985). In the case of 
blended memories it could be argued that, to determine whether misled participants 
have an intact original memory, rather than a blended memory, it is necessary to have 
a recognition test that requires those participants to choose between the original item 
and a blended memory. This argument receives some support from a study by 
Weinberg, Wadsworth and Baron (1983) who employed a modified test consisting of 
an original item (i.e., yellow yield sign) and a blended item (i.e., red yield sign). This 
blended item contained features of the original item (the shape) and of the 
misinformation item (the colour). Despite a red yield sign being a fictitious road sign, 
participants performed poorer in the misled condition, even with this modified test. 
Therefore, these results can be interpreted in favour of the blending hypothesis: when 
given the choice between the original item and a blend, misled participants favour the 
blended item because it is a more appropriate match to their memorial representation.
Similarly, if misled participants have a blended memory consisting of some 
features from the original item, but the majority from the misinformation item, then 
removing the misinformation item as a choice from the test prevents participants from
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choosing that item. This is despite the misinformation item being a better match to 
the memorial representation that is presumably stored in memory. Given the choice 
between the original item and a new item, there may be just enough features from the 
original item remaining within the blended memory for misled participants to choose 
that item. For example, consider participants who receive post-event information 
concerning the colour of a car. The true colour of the car is green, but misled 
participants receive misleading information suggesting that the car is actually blue. If 
it is assumed that blending does occur, then a blending of the original colour (i.e., 
green) with the suggested colour (i.e., blue) may be relatively unsuccessful with only 
slight changes occurring to the original trace (e.g., a subtle blue-green mix). Given a 
modified test where participants have to choose between the original and a new item, 
there may be sufficient features remaining of the original green car for misled 
participants to choose the original item. However, this choice of the original item 
may not be a particularly good match to misled participant’s memoiy. In contrast, 
many features of the misleading information may blend with the original trace, 
resulting in a blended trace that contains few features of the original item (e.g., a very 
blue-green mix). Thus, E.F. Loftus et al. (1985) suggested that this modified 
recognition test was insensitive to real alterations in the original trace, either through 
erasure (which could occur for a small proportion of misled pai'ticipants), or through 
blending with the misinformation item. Therefore, the standard recognition test is an 
appropriate and sufficiently sensitive test for examining blended memorial 
representations.
The only published empirical study examining blends since the re­
advancement of the blending hypothesis has been by Belli (1988), who examined how 
much influence the misinformation colour and the original colour memoiy actually
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have on blends. Belli suggested that participants’ preconceptions about the typical 
colour of an item may actually have more influence on blends than the colour 
suggested in the post-event information. A large body of research on the role of 
schemata in recall suggests that an individual’s knowledge and understanding of the 
world influences how we remember an event (Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Treyens, 
1981; Friedman, 1979). That is, we are influenced by what we see as ‘typical’ of a 
situation, or an object, or a person, etc. However, preconceptions tend to have a 
greater influence on memoiy when a memoiy test is delayed, and that this influence 
increases with increasing delays (Crosland, 1921; Daniel, 1972; Graesser, Woll, 
Kowalski & Smith, 1980). First of all. Belli measured participant’s preconceptions 
concerning the colour of a water pitcher, which participants deemed was typically 
yellow. This being so, the colour of the pitcher in the original slide sequence was 
green. Belli found that even when no post-event information was presented on this 
green pitcher, participants tended to favour a yellowish-green or greenish-yellow hue 
when identilying the original colour of the pitcher. This influence of a typical yellow 
colour also became slightly stronger with increasing delay, although the typical 
yellow colour seemed to have a veiy strong influence on memory even with no delay. 
Thus, there seems to be evidence that the typicality of the colour of pitchers can shift 
memoiy for that pitcher away from the original colour (e.g., green) towaids a hue that 
is a mixture of both the original colour and the typical colour of yellow.
Belli (1988) found an influence of this typical colour even after the 
introduction of misleading post-event information that tended to lead to participants’ 
choices being clustered round the original colour, the misinformation, or the typical 
colour. After viewing the slide sequence that contained the green water pitcher, 
participants either received misleading information that the pitcher was blue, no post­
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event information concerning the colour of the pitcher, or post-event information that 
was consistent with the typical colour of a pitcher (i.e., yellow). This manipulation of 
the post-event information produced some very interesting results. Participants who 
received post-event misleading information suggesting that the pitcher was blue 
tended to either choose the colour blue (the misinformation) or green (the original 
colour). On the other hand, participants who received post-event misleading 
information that was consistent with the typical colour of a pitcher (i.e., yellow), 
tended to choose colours that were primarily spread round that colour (i.e., hues that 
were greenish yellow and yellow), with a second smaller cluster around the original 
colour green.
There was some evidence of the post-event information skewing participants’ 
responses towards the end of the spectrum suggested by the post-event information. 
This seemed to be due to the blue misinformation skewing.responses towards the 
blue-green spectrum, while the yellow misinformation skewed responses towards the 
yellowish green spectnim. This meant that participants who received blue 
misinformation rarely chose hues from the orange -  red spectrum, as the blue 
misinformation biased choices towards the blue end of the spectmm. On the other 
hand, participants who received yellow misinformation rarely chose hues from the 
blue -  purple spectmm, as the yellow misinformation seemed to bias participants 
towards the yellow -  orange end of the spectmm. This is perhaps due to the post­
event yellow information ‘confirming’ participants’ preferences towards this colour, 
while the blue misinformation pushes participant’s memoiy towards a colour less 
consistent with that typical colour. However, as the original colour green appears 
closer to the blue end of the spectmm, this meant that participants who received post­
event information that the pitcher was blue chose the original colour green twice as
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much as participants who received post-event information in keeping with the typical 
colour. The influence of typical colour could also be seen in a control condition 
where no post-event information about the colour of the pitcher was presented. While 
very few participants actually chose a pure yellow hue, choices were spread around a 
green -  yellowish green -  greenish yellow spectrum, with a second cluster around the 
yellowish orange -  red spectrum. Very few responses were made in the blue -  purple 
spectrum.
Was there any evidence for blending? There was little evidence for a blending 
of misinformation that was inconsistent with the typical colour of a pitcher (i.e., blue) 
with the original green colour. In this blue misinformation condition, out of three 
bluish green hues, fewer than 10% of participants chose a bluish green compromise. 
As already stated, participants in this condition were far more likely to either choose 
the original colour or the misinformation colour. However, when the post-event 
misleading information was consistent with the typical colour of a pitcher (i.e., 
yellow), there was more evidence of blending of this typical colour with the original 
colour. Nearly 40% of participants in this yellow misinformation condition chose a 
yellowish green -  greenish yellow compromise, while nearly half of participants who 
received no post-event information concerning the colour of the pitcher chose a 
yellowish green -  greenish yellow compromise. Thus, post-event misinformation 
tended to result in far more colour blends when it was consistent with the typical 
colour of the pitcher, than when it was inconsistent with the typical colour. However, 
in the absence of post-event information, typical colouration, or ‘pre-event’ 
information, can also strongly influence participant’s choices.
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Trace Alteration Reconsidered: III. Are Blended Memories due to Deliberate 
Compromises?
But are these blends the result of deliberate compromises (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985a, 1985b, although more fully developed by Belli, 1988), or genuine blending of 
information in memoiy? If misled participants have an intact memoiy of the original 
item and the misinformation item, and were making a deliberate compromise between 
the two colours, then participants who received blue misinformation and those who 
received yellow misinformation should have approximately the same number of 
blends. However, this was clearly not the case, with very few participants who 
received blue misinformation choosing a blue green blend, compared to the high 
number of yellow green blends demonstrated by participants who had received yellow 
misinformation. In addition, participants who received no post-event information 
were still influenced by typical colouration, a source of influence on their memories 
that participants were probably unaware of. Thus, it is unlikely that deliberate 
compromises between the original item and the misinformation would account for a 
majority of the choices at test in the misinformation conditions (and none in the ‘no 
post-event information condition). Further to this, participants who have no memory 
for the original item may base their responses solely on the post-event colour, the 
typical colour, or a deliberate compromise between the two. However, the few 
compromises in the blue misinformation condition would suggest that only a minority 
of participants may have based their choices on the post-event information, the typical 
colour, or some deliberate compromise between the two.
Therefore, there does seem to be some evidence for genuine blending of 
information in memoiy. However, how much of this blending is actually due to post­
event information that is contrary to typical colouration blending with the original
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item, and how much is due to deliberate compromises remains unknown. There 
seems to be more evidence for blending between the original colour and the post­
event information if it is consistent with typical colouration, although again, how 
much of this is genuine memoiy impairment and how much is a deliberate 
compromise also remains unknown Belli’s (1988) work would seem to indicate that 
participants are most likely to choose either the original colour, or the misinformation 
colour, at test, rather than a high proportion of participants choosing a blend of the 
two colours. On the other hand, if the post-event misinformation is consistent with 
pai'ticipants’ preconceptions concerning the typical colour of an object, participants 
are more likely to choose a blend of that typical colour and the original colour. This 
suggests that participants are not just influenced by the original item and the 
misinformation item at test, as previously assumed, but are also influenced by their 
own pre-experimental knowledge.
Unfortunately, Belli’s (1988) results add little to our understanding of how 
blended memories would occur. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985b) complained that 
E.F. Loftus et al.’s (1985) descriptions of how blends would occur seemed to assume 
that ‘intelligent’ blends would occur, whereby there could only be one possible 
outcome (e.g., a red yield sign rather than a yellow stop sign). Belli’s findings that 
post-event information and typical colour information bias participants to favour one 
end of the spectrum over another demonstrates that blended memories would appear 
to be hard to predict and quite messy. For example, a green pitcher plus yellow 
misinformation does not equal a green yellow pitcher, but results in participants 
choosing colours ranging fi'om green tlirough yellow thiough to yellowish orange. 
Thus, each individual participant could have an intact memory of the green pitcher, an 
intact memory of a yellow pitcher, or some ill-defined blend in-between.
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However, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985b) are as equally critical of the idea 
of blended memories as they are over the notion of misinformation erasing the 
original memoiy. As the alteration hypothesis continues to be discussed even after 
the development of the blending hypothesis, under what condition will trace alteration 
occur, and what conditions will trace blending occur? McCloskey and Zaragoza also 
remain unsatisfied over how blending actually occurs and wonder why a red sign plus 
a yellow yield sign results in a red yield sign and not some other configuration (e.g., a 
yellow stop sign, an orange sign with 5.5 sides)? McCloskey and Zaragoza referred 
to E.F. Loftus et al.’s (1985) assumptions concerning blended memories as always 
resulting in ‘intelligent’ and ‘selective’ blending when, theoretically, it should be 
possible to produce some very strange and unusual blends, that are neither 
‘intelligent’ nor intuitive.
Trace Alteration Reconsidered: IV  Performance Blends or Representational Blends? 
Metcalfe (1990) attempted to address some of the issues concerning those processes 
in memoiy that could produce intelligent blends in eyewitness memoiy by examining 
blended memories within the composite trace model CHARM (Composite 
Holographic Associative Recall Model). CHARM is a distributed and associative 
model that proposes that individual memorial traces are stored together as 
superimposed, or blended, traces in the same layer of a network. This assumes that 
information that is encoded at the same time and from the same event has many 
shared features, and that these traces are likely to be associated with each other, 
compressed and stored in a single composite. As an analogy, composite memories 
can be thought of as overlapping transparencies. During the retrieval of this new 
blended memoiy, the composite trace is compared and matched with the whole
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lexicon. The most appropriate match is then recalled. Concerning E.F. Loftus et al.’s 
(1985) notion of intelligent blends, Metcalfe proposed that prior knowledge and 
experience guide the blending of traces. Thus, stored knowledge will only allow 
‘coherent’ blends to occur, and prevent the production o f ‘incoherent’ blends.
Metcalfe (1990) has applied CHARM to the misinformation effect in an 
attempt to provide a formal set of processes and assumptions concerning how and 
when misinformation will impair memoiy for an event. Thus, CHARM not only 
attempts to explain blended memories found using stimuli that lie on a continuum of 
answers (Belli, 1988; E.F. Loftus, 1975, 1977), but also the typical misinformation 
effects found (or not found) with two alternative forced-choice recognition tests (e.g.. 
Belli, 1989; E.F. Loftus et al., 1978; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). CHARM 
proposes that the original and misinformation items are superimposed or blended to 
form a composite trace. Therefore, CHARM proposes that the original memory of an 
event is altered, or transformed, by post-event information. This occurs through a 
three-stage process that simulates the standard thiee-stage misinformation paradigm. 
During the study phase, two ‘vectors’ (a cue and an item) are associated to one 
another. For example, the vector ‘man’ (which also acts as a cue) is associated with 
the original item ‘hammer’. During the post-event information phase, a second vector 
‘wrench’ is also associated with the vector ‘man’, or, in the control condition, ‘tool’ is 
associated with ‘man’. Thus, a composite memoiy is formed that associates both the 
original item and the misinformation with the shared vector ‘man’ in the memories of 
misled participants, resulting in a hammer/wrench blend. In contrast, in the control 
condition, participants have a composite memory that associates the original item with 
the neutral post-event information, resulting in a hammer/tool blend. These blends 
are then compared with the choices provided on a test. When participants are given a
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variety of choices at test, that include the blended item as a possible response, then i
participants are more likely to choose that blend. This is due to the blended memory J
being either a perfect or veiy close match to the options provided at test.
However, given a restricted choice on a forced-choice recognition test where |
I
none of the options match this blend memory, choices are likely to be governed by the ;?
type of test employed. When two alternative forced-choice tests are used, the i
composite trace is compared with the two choices. The item on the test that best }
matches this composite trace is the most likely to be favoured by participants. Misled I
participants, given a choice between the original item and the misinformation, are less >
likely to choose the original item ‘hammer’ than are misled participants who have i
been given a choice between the original and a novel item. In simulations of a 
misinformation paiadigm using CHARM, Metcalfe (1990) found that the original 1
item was chosen less often in the standard recognition test than in the modified test.
This is due to the two options in the standard test having been blended with the cue 1
‘man’, compared to only one of the options in the modified test. :
Schooler and Tanaka (1991) have criticised the application of CHARM to 
misinformation effects as being vague in its use of the term ‘memory blends’. It is I
unclear whether the term ‘blended memoiy’ within CHARM refers solely to 
performance on a test, or whether it also refers to an alteration to the underlying 
memorial representations. That is, Schooler and Tanaka suggest that there may in fact %
be two different classes of memory blends that are brought about by very different 
processes: performance blends and representational blends. In brief, performance 
blends do not require any assumptions to be made concerning the alteration of the 
underlying memorial representation, while representational blends assume that the 
underlying traces have been fundamentally altered.
The Misinformation Effect
Performance blends are memories that contain information that are based in 
either the original event or the post-event information. These types of memories take 
intact features from both of these sources and combine them, through the retiieval 
process, to form a single memory of the event. For example, in the misinformation 
paradigm, the car and the junction fiom the original event is combined with the yield 
sign from the post-event information to form a single blend memoiy of a car at a 
junction with a yield sign. Thus, these performance blends describe the basic 
empirical findings of poorer recognition of the original item in the misled condition, 
without ascribing any underlying changes to the memorial representation of the event 
in the production of misinformation effects. That is, performance blends are not the 
result of any erasure or alteration to the original memory, but instead are a product of 
the retrieval process, and may be a form of source monitoring errors (e.g., Lindsay, 
1990; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989). This being so, the 
blending of the misinformation item with the original event may explain how misled 
participants come to believe that the misleading information actually occurred during 
the original event (Weingardt et al., 1995). Performance blends also make intuitive 
sense as we often mistakenly combine features from different autobiographical 
memories (e.g., Neisser, 1981). While the details contained within the blended 
memoiy may be accurate, they aie drawn from incorrect sources.
Thus, there would appear to be quite strong empirical evidence for 
performance blends occurring in the misinformation paradigm, and in 
autobiographical memory. Unfortunately, there is little evidence from performance 
blends to support the mechanistic processes proposed by CHARM. This is because 
the features that constitute performance blends are intact features from either the 
original event or the post-event information and can be traced to these sources.
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Therefore, performance blends can be explained without asserting any actual memory 
alterations. As CHARM assumes that the exposure to misleading post-event 
information alters memory by adding additional information to the memorial 
representation in order to assess the proposed mechanisms of CHARM, performance 
on a memory test must demonstrate that genuine memoiy alteration has occurred. 
This places performance blends in the same difficult situation as E.F. Loftus’ 
destructive updating mechanism: it is impossible to demonstrate that the memory has 
been truly altered. Thus, McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) non-retention 
explanation of misinformation effects, and supporters of the coexistence hypothesis 
(e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983) provide alternative explanations of performance 
blends that would suggest that the original item and the misinformation are stored 
separately, and not a single composite memory. In addition, as the features from 
performance blends are features from both the original event and the post-event 
information, performance blends may demonstrate a memory reconstaicted from 
multiple retrieval routes and sources.
Representational blends, on the other hand, can provide more support for the 
blending mechanisms of CHARM (E.F. Loftus et al., 1985; Metcalfe, 1990; Schooler 
& Tanaka, 1991). These types of blends produce a memory that may resemble both 
of its sources, but is not an exact match to either one of them. That is, information is 
taken from the original event and the post-event information and blended to produce a 
new memorial representation that had at least one feature that is not found in either 
source. As this blended memory contains new features that are not derived from the 
previously encountered sources, representational b(ends provide the strongest 
evidence for genuine blending of memory traces, and for the processes assumed by 
CHARM. However, while the notion of representational blends is more consistent
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with the mechanisms that Metcalfe (1990) assumes produces composite memories 
within CHARM, there is mixed empirical support for these blends. As already noted, 
only three studies have investigated blend memories in the misinformation paradigm 
(Belli, 1988; E.F. Loftus, 1975, 1977). E.F. Loftus (1977) found evidence for the 
post-event information influencing misled participants to choose a blend of the 
misinformation and the original item, but Belli (1988) found little direct evidence for 
these blends. Instead, Belli found that misled participants preferred to choose either 
the original item (i.e., green) or the misinformation item (e.g., blue), rather than 
choose a specific blend of the two sources (only 8% of participants chose a bluish 
green blend). The only exception appeared to be when the post-event information 
was in line with participants’ expectations concerning the colour of a water pitcher. 
When the misinformation matched participants’ pre-conceptions (i.e., yellow), misled 
participants’ choices at test were biased towards that end of the colour spectrum, 
resulting in far more yellow -  green blends being chosen. Thus, while Belli’s study 
demonstrates that misinformation can influence participant, it provides little evidence 
for genuine representational blends. In addition, CHARM does not exclusively 
predict that participants will choose a blend on a memory test. Schooler and Tanaka 
(1991) indicate that an ‘interval storage hypothesis’ suggested by categorisation 
models can also explain the production of representational blends (Neumann, 1977). 
Inteiwal storage assumes that values on continuous scales are stored in intervals rather 
than exact points on that scale. This means that, in the case of memory blends, such 
as colour, rather than storing the exact colour hue in memory, participants may store a 
more general knowledge of the colour. For example, using Belli’s colour scheme, if 
participants view a car whose colour is green hue 12, participants may store the 
general colour ‘greenish’, which consists of a set of colour values, rather than ‘hue
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12’. After participants are exposed to post-event information that the car was blue, 
misled participants may choose the bluest hue from the set of ‘greenish’ values that 
are stored in memoiy concerning the colour of the car. Thus, the post-event 
information could merely bias choices on a test, rather than seeing the blending of 
traces onto a single composite memory, as suggested by CHARM.
To summarise the empirical evidence, there is a great deal of support for 
performance blends, but little evidence to demonstrate that genuine memory 
alterations actually occur (i.e., blending between the original and misinformation item 
to form a single memory). Thus, performance blends provide little evidence to 
support the blending mechanisms proposed by CHARM and may actually reflect a 
memory comprised of intact features drawn from several retrieval sources. On the 
other hand, representational blends are generally accepted as providing the most 
compelling evidence in support of both CHARM and the blending of traces. 
However, there is weak empirical support for the blending of memorial 
representations to produce a new composite memoiy. In addition, an alternative 
storage interval model can account for the current evidence of blending, without 
having to assume that memorial representations are blended into a single and new 
memory.
A Possible Role for Retrieval Inhibition in the Misinformation Effect 
It is apparent from this review that there is a great deal of variability within the 
literature as to the possible mechanisms underlying the misinformation effect. This 
lack of cohesiveness has resulted in the under-development of theories concerning 
possible updating mechanisms in memoiy. Not only does the presence, or magnitude, 
of the misinformation effect depend on the various manipulations employed (e.g..
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sequential testing, length of retention interval), but also the type of recognition test 
used. Even when only one test is considered, such as the modified test, findings vary 
dramatically between studies. While the modified test has repeatedly failed to 
demonstrate a misinformation effect (e.g., Belli, 1993; Bonto & Payne, 1991; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), others have demonstrated impaired performance 
(e.g., Belli et al., 1992; Ceci et al., 1987; Chandler, 1991). Interestingly, E.F. Loftus 
et al. (1989) failed to find any significant misinformation effect using the modified 
test, but did find that misled participants issued with this test typically took longer to 
choose an item for the critical question than they did to choose a non-critical item that 
they had not been misled over. This study, more than any other, highlights a problem 
with the misinformation literature: misled participants’ performance at test may not 
always truly represent the state of underlying memorial representations. Thus, the 
misinformation effect most likely represents performance change, not 
representational change. This is similar to the problem identified with studies 
examining the cognitive inteiwiew. Recent research has suggested that the possibility 
that the retrieval techniques employed in the cognitive interview may have no effect 
on the accessibility of memorial representations, but instead affects the reporting 
criterion (Memon & Higham, 1999; Roberts & Higham, 2002), This argument has 
also been levelled at the effects of hypnosis on memory, suggesting that while it may 
increase the volume of information given in an interview, it has no effect on the 
availability of the memorial representations (Klatzky & Erdelyi, 1985).
There is a second related possibility concerning whether the misinformation 
effect is tmly a measure of memory change (either permanent or transitoiy). It 
remains possible that there is representational change, but it is not registered in the 
performance of misled participants. For example, E.F. Loftus et al. (1989) found that
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misled participants chose the original item in the modified test at the same level as 
non-misled control participants. However, misled participants were slower to choose 
the original item at test when their reaction times were measured and compared to the 
non-misled participants. This situation may occur for a variety of reasons, such as 
only a minority of the features of the original trace are affected (e.g., a weakening or 
disintegration of features, Brainerd & Reyna, 1988). Thus, here is an example of a 
small representational change without a change in performance on a recognition test.
Finally, the misinformation effect may not only reflect a change in 
performance at test, but also a change at the level of memorial representations. While 
many researchers assume that the misinformation effect is a measure of 
representational change, it has been argued elsewhere that this is not necessarily so 
(e.g., McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a; Schooler & Tanaka, 1991). This problem is 
more understandable when the basic misinformation paradigm is considered. What 
exactly is being manipulated? How does merely introducing inconsistent post-event 
information institute representational change?
Irrespective of whether the misinformation effect is due to destmctive 
updating, blocking, retrieval failures, or alteration, hoM> is the misinformation effect 
represented at the level of memorial representations? That is, what manipulation 
within the misinformation paradigm, before or during the introduction of 
misinformation, results in the original trace losing retrieval strength, or being altered, 
or blocked, etc? Current research into the role of retrieval inhibition in memory 
updating, however, may provide a novel account of why some misinformation effects 
occur. Observations fi'om both the directed forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting 
literature indicate that information that is subject to retrieval inhibition is no longer 
available to conscious inspection. If this is so, then retrieval inhibition may provide a
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fairly natural explanation as to why misled participants appear so susceptible to 
misleading information. Simply put, if the original item is suppressed in memory 
through the actions of an inhibitory process, misled participants will have no choice 
but to rely on their memory for the misleading item.
Selective Retrieval in the Misinformation Paradigm
A potential role for retrieval inhibition in the production of misinformation effects 
becomes clearer when the post-event questionnaire in the typical misinformation 
paradigm is considered (e.g., E.F. Loftus et al., 1978). Many of these paradigms 
typically utilise post-event questionnaires to investigate the misinformation effect. 
The primaiy purpose of these questionnaires is to provide a medium for introducing 
misinformation without raising suspicions about the tine nature of the experiment. 
This being so, the questions cannot be considered an exhaustive retrieval of 
information concerning the tai'get event, that is the questions require the retrieval of 
only a sub-set of items from the target event. As it is the act of retrieving a sub-set of 
items from memory that elicits retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 2000a), 
and that items need only be retrieved once in order for unpracticed items to be 
effectively inhibited (Macrae & MacLeod, 1999), the incomplete retrieval of items in 
the misinformation paradigm may lead to the inhibition of non-retrieved items as 
well. Thus, the retrieval practice and misinformation paradigms both involve the 
incomplete retrieval of information fi-om memoiy. If misinformation was introduced 
about an item that had not been the subject of retrieval during questioning, then 
participants may be more likely to choose the misinformation on a recognition test 
because the original item had been inhibited in memory.
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For example, following a critical question from Loftus et al. (1978); “Did 
another car pass the red Datsun while it was stopped at the stop sign?”, participants 
are directed to retrieve information relevant to a possible second car, while the 
misinformation actually concerns the road sign. Thus, misled participants are not 
directed to retrieve information concerning the original critical item that the 
misinformation is introduced on. If no other questions involve the retrieval of 
information concerning the road sign, then the original sign (i.e.. Yield sign) may be 
inhibited and unavailable for retrieval at testing time. In other words, when misled 
participants are asked what road sign was present within the original event, they 
would be more likely to choose a “Stop” sign than a “Yield” sign as the original 
“Yield” sign will be unable to compete for retrieval. This interpretation suggests that 
it is the post-event questionnaire that sets up the conditions necessaiy in order to 
produce the misinformation effect.
It should be noted, however, that the misinformation effect is not being 
advanced as merely an artefact of the paradigm. Irrespective of whether post-event 
questioning in the typical misinformation paradigm can iilhibit information there 
remains important practical implications to this research as many police interviews 
are based on the selective retrieval of information about a witnessed event.
Conclusions fi'om the Misinformation Effect
To summarise, the misinformation effect has provided a method for specifically 
examining how errors are made in memory through the reporting of contradictoiy 
information. Despite the misinformation effect also providing researchers with the 
opportunity to examine the underlying processes responsible for memory updating, 
this has largely been overlooked in favour of investigating questions concerning
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memory permanence and the practical implications of post-event questioning. As 
such, a great deal of research has focused on whether information is permanently 
encoded in memory, thus suggesting that all information should be ultimately 
retrievable, or whether the encoding of newer information erases older memoiy 
traces. However, the similarities between the typical misinformation paradigm and 
the retrieval practice paradigm may provide an opportunity for investigating the role 
of retrieval inhibition in the misinformation effect. If this is indeed the case, a more 
thorough examination of the underlying mechanisms of the misinformation effect may 
be possible.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT la: RETRIEVAL-INDUCED FORGETTING AND 
MISINFORMATION EFFECTS
The previous chapter reviewed research of the misinformation effect and concluded 
that the possible underlying mechanisms behind this effect have been largely ignored. 
Thus, while the majority of research has focused on questions concerning the 
permanency of information in memoiy, other ftindamental questions related to how 
and why misinformation effects occur have been overlooked. This remains an 
important omission within the misinformation literature. Not only can an 
understanding of the memorial processes behind misinformation effects expand our 
knowledge of how memory errors and memoiy updating can occur, but we can also 
apply this knowledge to real world situations where misinformation can have an 
unwanted influence on our memories (e.g., eyewitness memory).
Answers to these questions might possibly be found in recent advances in 
memoiy research, which suggests that retrieval inhibition may play an important role 
in modulating the contents of our memories. As retrieval inhibition can be brought 
about through the retrieval process, this approach may be able to explain why 
individuals report misleading information, as well as alluding to the underlying 
mechanisms in memory behind the misinformation effect. The possibility that 
retrieval inhibition may be one of the missing mechanisms of the misinformation 
effect seems more likely given the similarities between the retrieval practice and 
misinformation paradigms.
The cuirent chapter presents the preliminaiy stages of investigating a retrieval 
inhibition account of misinformation effects using a new paradigm that combines the
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critical phases of the retrieval practice paradigm (typically used to examine retrieval- 
induced forgetting) with that of the misinformation paradigm. Before the exact 
nature of retrieval inhibition in the misinformation effect can be examined (i.e., is 
retrieval inhibition truly an example of an inhibitory processes or can it be explained 
by non-inhibitoiy processes?), the extent to which retrieval inhibition influences the 
misinformation effect must first be examined. As such, the following experiment 
examines whether retrieval-induced forgetting can provide an explanation for 
misinformation effects.
A NeM' Method o f Studying Misinformation Effects: The Modified Misinformation 
Paradigm
In order to examine the possible role of retrieval inhibition in the misinformation 
effect a modified misinformation paradigm was constructed. The critical phases of 
the retrieval practice and misinformation paradigms were combined into a five-stage 
paradigm, with additional distracter tasks. This meant that the initial study phase, 
retrieval practice phase, and recall phase from the retrieval practice paradigm were 
combined with later misinformation phases, specifically the post-event questioning 
phase and forced-choice recognition. The initial recall phase from the retrieval 
practice part of the new paradigm will allow retrieval-induced forgetting to be 
measured, while the forced-choice recognition test will allow misinformation effects 
to be measured. Thus, the modified misinformation paradigm proceeded in the 
following manner: presentation phase; retrieval practice phase; recall; misinformation 
phase; and forced-choice recognition.
}The presentation phase introduced participants to the target material that was ,j
contained within two separate incidents in order to create a practiced category and an Î
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unpracticed categoiy. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) have previously argued that 
the misinformation effect is partly due to the failure to encode information contained 
within the complex visual scenes contained within the slide sequences typically 
employed in misinformation studies. Taking this into consideration, written 
narratives were instead used. This presentation phase was followed by a retrieval 
practice phase that consisted of questions describing half of the items from one house. 
The effects of this retrieval practice was then measured in a recall task in order to 
measure whether participants demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting before 
misinformation was introduced in the next phase. In this post-event questioning 
phase, each participant received a single piece of misleading information that was 
embedded in a question. These questions required participants to retrieve non-target 
information about the nairatives read during the presentation phase. No target items 
were mentioned in this phase. The effect of introducing this misinformation was 
subsequently tested using a forced-choice recognition test.
Finally, an attempt was made to address McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) 
argument that demand characteristics are inherent to typical misinformation 
paradigms. The primary basis of this argument centres on the fact that only a 
proportion of participants receive misleading information in the typical 
misinformation paradigm. As a result, the effects of demand characteristics are not 
equal across experimental and control conditions. The differential effect of demand 
characteristics in the modified misinformation paradigm was addressed through 
presenting misinformation to each participant.
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Hypotheses
If the assumption that retrieval-induced forgetting influences the misinformation effect 
is correct then a number of specific predictions can be made. First of all, a larger 
misinformation effect is expected when post-event misinformation is introduced on 
items that have been subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting, and are therefore 
unavailable for retrieval. As individuals will be unable to bring these items into 
conscious awareness, participants are more likely to rely on their memoiy for the 
misleading item, an item that is available for retrieval. Thus, significant 
misinformation effects are expected when misleading information is introduced on RP- 
items. In contrast, the smallest misinformation effect is expected to occur when 
misinformation is introduced on items that have previously been practiced, and should 
therefore have been strengthened in memory. The strengthening of these items should 
make them much easier to retrieve, and thus easily brought to mind during the forced- 
choice recognition task. This being so, such items should be fairly resistant to 
misleading information, and veiy few participants should choose the misinformation 
when it is introduced on RP+ items. Similarly, items from the unpracticed category 
should also be fairly resistant to misleading post-event information because NRP items 
should not be subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting. As NRP items belong to a 
category that is unrelated to that of the practiced categoiy, then they should not be 
subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting, and thus should remain available for retrieval. 
Therefore, significant misinformation effects are not expected when misleading 
information is presented on NRP items. Finally, in the MisConti'ol condition where 
participants do not engage in relevant retrieval practice, none of the original items will 
be aided or impaired by previous practice, thereby producing a measure of the 
misinformation effect unaffected by retrieval-induced forgetting. We would expect.
201
Experiment 1
therefore, that the misinformation effect should be of a similar size to that obsei*ved for 
NRP items.
Method
Pai'ticipcmts and Design
One hundred undergraduate students (42 males and 58 females) participated in this 
study on a voluntary basis. The experiment had a single factor (misinformation item; 
MisRP+, MisRP", MisNRP, or MisControl) between-subjects design where post-event 
misinformation was introduced about either an RP+, or RP-, NRP, or Control item. 
The control condition acted as a between-subjects baseline where no relevant retrieval 
practice had taken place. Each condition contained 25 participants.
Materials
In order to examine the possible role of retrieval-induced forgetting in the production 
of misinformation effects, a new paradigm was constmcted that combined critical 
phases from the typical retrieval practice paradigm (e.g., M.D. MacLeod, 2002; Shaw 
et al, 1995), and from misinformation paradigms (e.g., E.F. Loftus et al, 1978; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). The inclusion of phases from the retrieval practice 
paradigm permitted the assessment of retrieval-induced forgetting effects while the 
misinformation phases permitted the introduction of misinformation and the 
assessment of the misinformation effect. This new paradigm consisted of five major 
phases, with additional distracter tasks, and proceeded as follows: study phase; 
retrieval practice; free recall memoiy task; distracter; misinformation and additional
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questioning phase; distracter; and forced choice recognition memoiy task (see Figure 
21 for a summaiy of the experimental procedure).
Figure 21: Procedure used in Experiment la
DISTRACTER
DISTRACTER
FREE RECALL
STUDY PHASE 
Presentation of items stolen from 2 
houses (10 items per house)
RETRIEVAL PRACTICE 
Half the items from one of the houses 
(each item cued 3 times) 
and interleaved with distracter tasks
FORCED-CHOICE RECOGNITION TEST 
Critical Question: original vs. MI. vs. new 
Non-critical questions: original vs. new vs. new
MISINFORMATION PHASE 
MisRP+: MI presented on RP+ items 
MisRP-; MI presented on RP- items 
MisNRP: MI presented on NRP items 
MisControl: MI presented on Control items
Note. MI = misinformation, hi the MisControl condition participants engaged in a non- 
relevant retrieval practice task that required them to retrieve the names of capital cities. All 
other phases within the MisControl condition were identical to the experimental conditions.
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Study Materials
Study materials consisted of two booklets that described items stolen in two separate 
burglai'ies. The first page of each booklet contained a narrative that described where 
and when the incidents had occurred. One narrative concerned the theft of items from 
the Jones’ house and described how the Jones’ daughter had arrived home to find the 
house burgled. This narrative was followed by the description of ten items that had 
been stolen from the house (i.e., Game Boy, sunglasses, mobile phone, painting, 
binoculars, wristwatch, printer, television, coffee maker, china plate). Each item was 
presented embedded within a set of sentences describing where the stolen item had 
originally been located within the house, e.g., ''The television had been in the sitting 
room, M ’hich is at the front o f the house. It v^as sitting in the corner o f the room. The 
remote contt'ol for it hadn 7 been taken. ’ Only the target item was underlined in order 
to emphasise that this was the stolen item. No attempt was made to match any of the 
items in terms of semantic similarity across households although some matching may 
have arisen simply as a ftmction of creating two sets of stealable objects.
The second narrative concerned a burglary at the Smith’s house that similarly 
detailed a number of items that had been stolen (i.e., computer, video recorder, 
telescope, rollerblades, necklace, Discman, camcorder, leather coat, ciystal vase, 
microwave) and presented in the same manner. The stolen items were presented in 
blocked format (i.e., all items about the Jones’ house followed by the Smith’s house 
or vice versa) and their order within each block was fully randomised. The 
information sets for each house were divided into two subgroups (each containing 
five items) for the purpose of creating a practiced (i.e., RP+) and an unpracticed (i.e., 
RP-) set of items for each theft (see M.C. Anderson et al., 1994). The contents of
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each sub-set were randomised for each participant (see Appendix A1 for both sets of 
narratives in their entirety).
Retrieval Practice Questions
Half of the items from one house formed a practice set (i.e., RP+ items) and the 
remaining items formed an unpracticed set (i.e., RP- items). Participants in the 
experimental conditions received fifteen retrieval cues in total that related to the same 
five items. Counterbalancing ensured that each of the items appeal ed equally often in 
the practiced and unpracticed categories. As previous work has suggested that 
increasing the difficulty of a retrieval task maximises practice effects (Landauer & 
Bjork, 1978), the level of question difficulty increased with each proceeding set of 
questions (see Appendix A2). The difficulty of each set of retrieval practice questions 
had been determined in earlier pilot work (cf. M.D. MacLeod, 2002). An independent 
group of participants {n = 12), who had not previously read either of the narratives, had 
been presented with questions from either Set 1 (M= .96), Set 2 (M= .73), or Set 3 (M 
= .42). Questions fiom Set 2 were determined to be significantly more difficult than 
questions from Set 1, / (6) = 4.30, jti < .01, and Set 3 was determined to be significantly 
more difficult than Set 1,  ^(6) = 24.07,/? < .01. Similarly, questions from Set 3 were 
found to be significantly more difficult than questions from Set 2, / (6) = 5.66, /? < .01, 
see Appendix A3 for statistical tables. However, it is accepted that the effect prior 
knowledge may directly, or indirectly, impact on participant’s ability to complete this 
task. As a result, the task may be more difficult, at least in part, for those participants 
in the pilot study who did not receive the original study materials compared to 
participants in the experiment who did receive the original study materials. 
Participants in the MisControl condition did not receive retrieval practice about any of
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the stolen items. Rather, they received non-relevant retrieval practice (cf. Macrae & 
MacLeod, 1999) for the names of capital cities (e.g., the capital city of Cuba is 
Ha ; the capital city of Bulgaria is So , etc), see Appendix A4.
Free Recall
A free recall task was employed as a manipulation check to determine whether 
retrieval-induced forgetting had occurred or not. The task required a written response 
and encouraged the recall of all items from both houses (see Appendix A5). It must, 
however, be noted that the recall of RP- and NRP items during this recall phase my 
change the retrieval status of these items (i.e., perhaps making them RP+ items).
Misinformation and Additional Questioning
Participants were presented with twelve additional questions about one of the 
burglaries. One of the questions contained a piece of misinformation about one of the 
stolen items presented in the original study phase (e.g., 'necklace ’ was replaced with 
‘ecnrings"), see Appendix A6 for a complete list of questions and misinformation items 
(eight misinformation items in total). Thus, depending upon treatment condition, 
participants received an erroneous piece of information about an RP+, or RP-, or NRP 
item. The misinformation item chosen was semantically related in each case to the 
critical item. All the questions used in this phase of the study referred to details that 
were neither the subject of the retrieval practice phase nor formed the basis of the final 
memory test. Participants in the MisControl condition also received a piece of 
misinformation about one of the thefts, thereby providing a baseline misinformation 
effect in the absence of relevant retrieval practice. Only one misinformation item was 
incorporated into each set of twelve questions so as not to arouse suspicions about the
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nature of the study. In order to minimise possible item effects, four items in each 
household were selected as possible critical items against which semantically related 
misinformation would be introduced. The critical items chosen were counterbalanced 
throughout for each condition.
Forced-choice Recognition
The final test consisted of eight multiple-choice questions to test memory for the stolen 
items. Possible answers to each question comprised the originally presented item plus 
two erroneous items. The critical question that measured whether misinformation 
effects were present consisted of the original item, the misinformation item, plus one 
new wrong item (e.g., earrings vs necklace vs bracelet), see Appendix A7.
Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratoiy individually or in groups of up to four and were 
randomly assigned to one of the testing conditions. Participants were informed that 
they would be taking part in a memoiy task and were instructed to read two narratives 
about two separate burglaries. The order of presentation of the two naiTatives was 
alternated between participants throughout the experiment. Information about the 
burglaries was contained within an experimental booklet that also contained a number 
of distracter tasks in addition to appropriate retrieval practice questions, and thus 
resembled the procedure outline in Shaw et al. (1995). Therefore, each retrieval 
practice set was followed by a five-minute distracter task. Participants were prompted 
through each phase of the booklet by the experimenter. Participants were informed 
that the underlined words represented the stolen items. Each item was presented on a 
separate page of the booklet. Participants were instnicted to turn over to the next page
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only on hearing an audible beep emitted by an electronic metronome (5-sec intervals). 
On completing the first narrative, participants were instructed to read the next narrative 
that concerned a burglary at the Smith’s house.
Immediately after the study phase, participants in the experimental conditions 
were presented with a series of questions about one of the subsets of stolen items from 
one of the houses (thereby creating RP+, RP-, and NRP item sets). Following the final 
retrieval practice task, participants were required to perform a final distracter task 
which involved participants writing down the names of ten animals for each letter of 
the alphabet (see Appendix A8 for each task that was included within the retrieval 
practice booklet). Participants were given 5 minutes to accomplish this task. No 
participant successfully completed it within the time set. Following this, participants 
were instmcted to recall all the items they could remember about both burglaries. 
Following recall, participants performed a ftirther distracter task for two minutes (i.e., 
write down as many objects as possible that aie black, wooden, blue, round and green 
for each letter of the alphabet, see Appendix A9). Again, no participant completed the 
task within the time allotted. Subsequent to this, participants were presented with 
twelve additional questions about one of the two burglaries and were given four- 
minutes to complete this task. Participants were then presented with a further 
distracter task in which participants were required to write down the names of ten 
countries for each letter of the alphabet (see Appendix A10). Five minutes were 
allotted to this task. No participant completed the task in the time allowed. The final 
test comprised eight multiple-choice questions that tested participants’ memory for the 
stolen items. On completion of the recognition test, participants were debriefed, 
thanked for their participation and dismissed, (see Figure 21 for an outline of the 
procedure used).
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Results
Retrieval Practice Success and Mean Recall Performance
The retrieval practice success rates for each of the experimental conditions were as 
follows: 90.6% (&D = .11), 88.8% (5D = .08) and 87.7% (5D = .10) for the MisRP+, 
MisRP- and MisNRP conditions respectively. Data displayed in Table 1 reveal that, 
across the various conditions, recall performance was .43 for unpracticed items from 
the unpracticed set, but only .26 for unpracticed items from the practiced set. This 
pattern suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting had occurred. Indeed, the magnitude 
of the difference in recall performance between RP- and NRP items (-.17) was 
comparable to that reported in other studies of retrieval-induced forgetting (e.g., M.C. 
Anderson et al, 1994; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995; M.D. MacLeod, 2002, M.D. 
MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999).
Manipulation Check: Retiieval-induced Forgetting 
MisRP+ Condition
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of item type for the MisRP+ condition, F  (2,48) = 79.13, p  < 
.01, MSq = .04. Cohen’s /  was calculated as an unbiased estimate of effect size 
(Cohen, 1988). This indicated the presence of a large effect for this condition 
(Cohen’s /  = 1.81). Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach to control for 
familywise error, a series of post-hoc paired samples t-tests indicated the presence of 
both facilitatoiy (i.e., RP+ > NRP, t (24) = 8.34, p  < .01) and retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects (i.e., RP- < NRP, t (24) = -2.70, p  < .05), see Appendix B 1.
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Table 1: Mean proportion recall as a function o f item type
Item Type Retrieval-induced
Forgetting
Condition RP+ RP- NRP (RP-)-NRP
MisRP+ .85 .25 .40 -.15
(.12) (.19) (.23)
MisRP- .82 .27 .44 -.17
(.17) (.13) (.18)
MisNRP .83 .26 .46 -.20
(.17) (.15) (.16)
Mean .83 .26 .43 -.17
(.15) (.15) (.19)
Note. RP+ items are practiced items from the practiced categoiy. RP- items are unpracticed 
items from the practiced categoiy. NRP items are items from the unpracticed categoiy. 
MisControl condition (M= .56, SD = .12). Twent)'-five participants were in each condition. 
Standard deviations aie enclosed in parentheses.
MisRP- Condition
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA revealed 
significant effects of item type for the MisRP- condition, F  (2,48) = 85.01, p  < .01, 
MSq = .02, Calculations of effect size indicated the presence of large effects (Cohen’s 
/ =  1.88). Employing Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, post-hoc paired samples 
t-tests revealed that participants recalled significantly more RP+ items than NRP items, 
1 (24) = 7.65, p  < .01, demonstrating the facilitatoiy effects of practice on recall.
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Retrieval-induced forgetting effects were also detected with the recall of RP- items 
significantly lower than for NRP items t (24) = - 4 . 5 6 , <  .01 (see Appendix B2).
MisNRP Condition
A single factor (item type; RP+, or RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA revealed 
significant effects of item type for MisNRP, F  (2,48) = 67.10, ^  < .01, MSq = .03. 
Calculations of effect size indicated the presence of a large effect (Cohen’s/  = 1.68). 
Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, post-hoc paired samples t-tests revealed 
that participants recalled significantly more RP+ items than NRP, t (24) = 6.47, < .01
(i.e., the presence of facilitatoiy effects). Similarly, recall performance for RP- items 
was found to be significantly lower than that for NRP items, t (24) = -4.04, /? < .01, 
respectively (i.e., the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting effects). See Appendix 
B3.
Baseline Measures
A single factor between-subject ANOVA compared recall performance for NRP items 
in each condition with that of the MisControl condition to determine whether retrieval- 
induced forgetting was due to enhanced recall of NRP items. Recall of NRP items in 
the experimental conditions (overall ,43) was found to actually be lower than for 
Control items (M -  .56), F  (3, 96) = 4.01, p  < .01, MSq -  .03, see Appendix B4. A 
series of independent t-tests confirmed that NRP recall performance in each 
experimental condition was significantly lower than the MisControl condition 
(MisRP+: t (48) = -3.25, p <  .01; MisRP-: t (48) -  -2.S5, p  < .01; MisNRP: / (48) -  
-2.68, p  < .01. Thus, the observed difference between RP- and NRP recall
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performance in all three experimental conditions is due to a real di'op in the recall 
performance for RP- items rather than an enhanced recall for NRP items.
These manipulation checks serve to establish that, for all three experimental 
conditions, there are clear indications that the retrieval practice procedure has resulted 
in significantly poorer recall performance for the unpracticed items from the practiced 
set in comparison to the unpracticed items from the unpracticed set (i.e., RP- < NRP).
Misinformation Effects
Having demonstrated the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting in the three 
experimental conditions, we now turn to consider the effects of introducing 
misinformation about items that have been inhibited as a result of the retrieval practice 
procedure. The principal comparison of interest is between the level of misinformation 
effects in the MisRP- condition (i.e., where misinformation had been introduced about 
an item that is subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting) and where misinformation had 
been introduced about items that are not subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting (i.e., 
MisRP+, MisNRP and, MisControl conditions). Figure 22 indicates that when 
misinformation is introduced it has a larger effect on unpracticed items from the 
practiced set (MisRP-: 60% of participants chose the misinformation) than for Control 
items (24% of participants chose the misinformation). Similarly, misinformation has 
little effect on items that are not subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting (MisRP+: 
16%; MisNRP: 20%; and, MisControl: 24%), see Table 2 for proportion of participants 
choosing the original, misinformation, or new item at test.
Thus, it would appear that items that are subjected to retrieval-induced 
forgetting ai*e much more susceptible to post-event misleading information than items 
that are not subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting. Not only were participants in the
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MisRP- condition two to four times more likely to choose the misinformation item 
than participants in other conditions, but they were also more than six times as likely to 
mistakenly choose the misleading item than to make an error on a non-critical item. In 
addition, participants in the MisRP- condition who failed to demonstrate a retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect (// = 6) reported the misleading item much less (17%) than 
participants who did demonstrate retrieval-induced forgetting (74%, n = 19).
Table 2: Likelihood o f pat'ticipants choosing the original item, misinformation, and 
new erroneous item at forced-choice recognition.
Critical item Non-critical items
Condition Original Misinfo New item Mean Error
MisRPH- .84 .16 0 .15
(.17)
MisRP- .40 .60 0 .11
(.16)
MisNRP .80 .20 0 .14
(.18)
MisControl .72 .24 .04 .09
(.13)
Note. MisRP+: where misinformation has been presented on an RP+ item. MisRP-: where 
misinformation has been presented on an RP- item. MisNRP: where misinformation has been 
presented on an NRP item. MisControl: where no relevant retrieval practice has occurred and 
misinformation has been randomly presented on items. For the critical question measuring 
the misinformation effect, participants had to choose from the correct original item, the 
misinformation, and a new erroneous item. Proportion of errors on non-critical items (i.e., 
original item vs. new item vs. new item) is also included as a baseline measure of the 
proportion of errors made at forced-choice recognition. Standard deviations are enclosed in paientheses.
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A chi square analysis was conducted to evaluate whether misinformation had a 
more deleterious effect in conditions where misleading information was introduced on 
items that were subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting. Condition and 
misinformation effect were found to be significantly related, (3, n = 100) = 14.67, 
/? < .01 (see Appendix B5). Effect size was computed Phi (cp = .38), which indicated 
the presence of a medium sized effect.
Figure 22: Percentage o f participants choosing the misinformation option during 
forced-choice recognition in Experiment la
%
Misinfo.
Effect
Control
STATUS OF ITEM MISINFORMATION PRESENTED ON 
(CONDITION)
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Additional paiiwise comparisons were conducted between the control and 
experimental conditions and revealed only one significant result. Participants in the 
MisRP- condition were significantly more likely to select misinformation than were 
participants in the MisControl condition, %^(1, M = 50) = 5.25, p  < .05. Effect size was 
computed using Phi (O = .32), which indicated the presence of a medium-sized effect. 
In contrast, participants in the MisRP+ and MisNRP conditions reported the 
misinformation item as frequently as participants did in the MisControl condition 
(MisRP+: (1, n = 50) = .50, p  -  n.s; MisNRP: (1, n = 50) = .12, /? = n.s). See
Appendix B6 for statistical tables.
If the significant difference in reporting misinformation in the MisRP- and 
MisControl condition is due to the retrieval inhibition of original items in the MisRP- 
condition, then significant differences should also be present between this condition 
and the MisRP+ and MisNRP conditions. Paiiwise comparisons confirmed that there 
were significantly more participants selecting misinformation in the MisRP- condition 
than in the MisRP+ condition, yf (1, n = 50) = 10.27, p  < .01, as well as the MisNRP 
condition, (1, n = 50) = .8.33, ^  < .01. Effect sizes were also computed using Phi 
(MisRP+: 0  = .45; MisNRP: 0  = .41), indicating the presence of a medium-sized 
effect. See Appendix B7 for statistical tables. The non-significant effects for the 
MisRP+ and MisNRP conditions is also unlikely to be due to a lack of power given 
that the values need to reach 3.84 in order to gain significance at 0.05.
There was also no significant difference in performance on the forced-choice 
recognition task across conditions for non-critical items (85%, 89%, 86% and 91% 
correct for the MisRP+, MisRP-, MisNRP and MisControl conditions respectively). 
Thus, it would appear unlikely that the misinformation effect produced in the MisRP- 
condition was due to poorer overall recall perfoiTnance at time of test.
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Additional Analysis 
Output Interference
An alternative interpretation to the impaired recall in the experimental conditions must 
also to be considered. It is possible that the decrease in the recall of RP- items is not 
due to retrieval-induced forgetting but is, in fact, due to output interference resulting 
from the use of a free recall procedure. As participants could recall items in any order 
they chose, paiticipants may have recalled the strengthened RP+ items first, thus 
interfering with the recall of the unstrengthened RP- items. If the reduction in RP- 
performance is due to output interference then participants should only demonstrate 
retrieval-induced forgetting if they retrieved RP+ items early during free recall.
This possibility was examined using the procedure described in Macrae and 
MacLeod (1999) and M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001) for calculating output 
interference effects. Paiticipants’ recall performance was re-classified according to the 
extent to which they commenced their recall with RP+ items or RP- items (skipping 
NRP items). This was calculated by subtracting the mean recall position of RP+ items 
from the mean recall position of RP- items and then dividing the scores in two using a 
median split. The top half of this divide formed the early RP+ output group and the 
bottom half formed the early RP- output group. The retrieval-induced forgetting effect 
was then calculated for the early RP+ and early RP- output groups. If output 
interference significantly contributed to the pattern of forgetting, we could expect a 
bigger retrieval-induced forgetting effect in the early RP+ group in comparison to the 
early RP- group. Using a series of pairwise comparisons, no differences were found in 
the magnitude of the retrieval-induced forgetting effect in the early RP+ output group 
and the eaiiy RP- output group in any of the conditions, MisRP+ {M = -.13 vs. -.15), t
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(23) = .11, as; MisRP- (M= -.15 vs. -.19), t (23) = .46, as; and MisNRP (M = -.14 vs 
-.24), t (23) = 1.02, a s  (see Appendix B8).
Decreased NRP Performance: I. Cross-Category Inhibition
Cross-category inhibition may also be a possible explanation of the decreased recall in 
the NRP baseline compared to the control baseline (an effect not typically found in 
studies employing non-relevant retrieval practice control conditions, e.g., Macrae & 
MacLeod, 1999) as both sets of items from each house share a degree of relatedness 
within each house, and across categories. Not only are the items all “stealable” but the 
items from each house are also described in the presentation phase as being ‘stolen 
items fi'om a household’. In addition, items within each house and across categories 
share a degree of association with each other, which while not a direct one-to-one 
association, may have unintentionally caused cross-categoiy inhibition. For example, 
the item printer in the Smith’s house is associated with computer from the Jones’ 
house, while television in the Smith’s house is associated with video recorder from the 
Jones’ house. It is possible that retrieving printer from the Smith’s house during the 
retrieval practice phase may not only have led to the intended inhibition of the 
unpracticed item television from the same house, but also the unintentional inhibition 
of computer and video recorder from the unpracticed Jones’ house as well.
While cross-categoiy effects would explain the drop in the NRP baseline, and 
suggest that the presence of inhibitoiy processes may be affecting recall, it would make 
it unlikely that inhibition was also influencing the misinformation effect. This is 
because the level of reported misinformation effects in the MisNRP condition was 
equal to that reported in the MisControl condition, suggesting that the critical original 
items in the MisNRP condition were not inhibited. If cross-category inhibition was
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present then some of the NRP items should have been subjected to the same inhibitoiy 
processes that are thought to suppress the recall of the RP- items. Therefore, the 
critical original NRP items would have been unavailable for retrieval and the level of 
misinformation effects should have been somewhere between that reported in the 
MisRP+ and MisControl conditions (i.e., where misinformation was introduced on 
non-inhibited items), and the MisRP- condition (i.e., where misinformation was 
introduced on inhibited items). If cross-category inhibitoiy effect were present, then 
the level of expected misinformation effects would have been somewhere between 
these two conditions because not every NRP item will have been subjected to 
inhibition. This is due to the randomisation of items in the retrieval practice phase for 
each participant, and because the association between items in each house was not a 
direct one-to-one match. Therefore, misinformation will have been introduced on an 
inhibited NRP item for only a proportion of participants in the MisNRP condition. For 
the remaining participants, misinformation will have been introduced on non-inhibited 
NRP items. However, as there were no significant differences in the level of 
misinformation effects in the MisRP+ and MisNRP conditions (.16 vs .20), this 
suggests that cross-categoiy inhibition did not occur. This assertion is further 
supported by the finding of no differences between the levels of misinformation effects 
between the MisControl condition (.24), where no retrieval practice occurred and 
therefore no cross-categoiy inhibition can occur, and the MisNRP condition (.20).
Therefore, in order to assess the claim that inhibitory processes facilitate the 
reporting of misinformation, it is first essential to demonstrate that cross-category 
inhibition is not present, and thus, the NRP items in the MisNRP condition are not 
subjected to inhibition. Most of all, it is critical that cross-category inhibition is not 
present in the MisNRP condition. In order to demonstrate this, participants’ recall of
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NRP items was divided into those NRP items that were associated or semantically 
similar to RP+ items (i.e., NRP-Similar items) and those items that were dissimilar 
(i.e., NRP-Dissimilar). The associations between the items fiom both houses where 
assessed by an independent reviewer (M.C. Anderson, see Appendix B9). A series of 
pairwise comparisons were performed that compared the recall of NRP-Similar items 
associated to RP+ items with the recall of NRP-Dissimilar items for each of the 
experimental conditions. The mean recall of NRP-Similar and NRP-Dissimilar items 
was as follows: MisRP+ condition {M = .35 vs .37), t (24) = -.31, p  = n.s; MisRP- 
condition (M = .44 vs .36), t (24) = 1.10,7J> = n.s; and MisNRP condition (M = .47 vs 
.39), t (24) = .95, p  = n.s (see Appendix BIO). In line with M.C. Anderson and 
Spellman’s (1995) findings of impaired recall of NRP items that are semantically 
similar to RP- items, a series of paii*wise comparisons was conducted that considered 
difference in the recall of NRP items that were semantically similar to RP- items and 
NRP items that were semantically dissimilar. The mean recall of NRP-Similar and 
NRP-Dissimilar items was as follows: MisRP+ condition (M ~ ,41 vs .32), t (24) = 
2 .04,77 = n.s; MisRP- condition (M = .40 vs .41), t (24) = -.03,77 = n.s; and MisNRP 
condition (M = .58 vs .38), t (24) = 1.49,7? (see Appendix Bll).  Overall, there 
are no significant differences in the recall of NRP-Similar and NRP-Dissimilar within 
the experimental conditions and, most importantly, there is no evidence of cross- 
categoiy inhibition operating within the MisNRP condition.
While there is no evidence of reliable cross-categoiy inhibitoiy effects this 
does not constitute evidence that inhibitory processes do not underlie the reduced 
NRP performance present in the experimental conditions. Failure to demonstrate 
cross-category impairment in the NRP category may be due to nominal versus 
functional similarity (see M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995, for further details).
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whereby there needs to be enough similar items on a list to highlight those 
similarities. As an item in one house was only associated with one item fiom the 
other house, it is unlikely that the similarities were salient enough for participants to 
be strongly influenced by them. This interpretation also fits with M.C. Anderson and 
Spellman’s (1995) findings of cross-categoiy inhibition with three semantically 
similar items in each categoiy. It should also be noted that Experiment la was not 
designed a priori to investigate the role of cross-categoiy inhibition in the 
misinformation effect. Thus, the materials, and the experimental design, did not 
control for the associations and semantic similarity between items.
II. Source Corifusion
If cross-categoiy inhibition cannot explain the decrease in NRP performance perhaps 
non-inhibitory processes can. Source confusion operates without the need to assert 
the presence of inhibitoiy processes and, as noted earlier, the items from each house 
share similarities with one another. In addition, the items are grouped into arbitrary 
categories (i.e.. Smith’s house and Jones’ house were experimentally constmcted 
categories that have no implicit meaning). Participants could easily have become 
confused over which house items belonged to and recalled items from the wrong 
house (e.g., mis-remembering items from the Smith’s house as belonging to the 
Jones’ house), thus leading to lowered NRP scores. However, the possibility of 
source conftision occurring can be discounted as participants were not cued to recall 
items in a specific order or from a specific house and the recalled items were coded as 
being correct regardless of which house they had belonged to.
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HI. Categoiy Dropout
Another possible explanation of the low NRP recall in the delayed test condition is 
also based on the associations between item in both houses. Categoiy dropout is a 
common finding in free recall tests. Recall performance in free recall tests follows a 
two-stage process whereby participants first recall a category and then recall the items 
within that categoiy. Thus, recall performance can be poor for two reasons; the 
forgetting of whole categories, and the forgetting of individual items within each 
category. However, recall can be restored through the cueing of those categories 
(Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966; Rundus, 1971).
All of the items can fall into two equal-sized sub-categories: electrical and 
non-electrical goods. If all of the RP+ items come from one of these sub-categories 
then participants may benefit from having recently practiced items from that category 
leading to increased accessibility of that categoiy (e.g., electrical items). This may 
increase the recall of electrical items in the NRP categoiy while decreasing the recall 
of the non-electrical NRP items. Participants would also be more likely to suffer 
categoiy dropout for the non-electrical set as these items represent a less coherent 
group of items (e.g., painting and binoculars have little common features) than the 
electrical items (e.g., computer and Discman have several common features). 
However, care was taken to ensure that RP+ sets did not solely constitute these kinds 
of sub-categories (i.e., practice sets consisted of both electrical and non-electrical 
goods that were randomly selected for each paiticipant).
Despite this reasoning, the possibility that the decrease in NRP performance 
compared to the control baseline was due to category dropout was examined. The 
proportion of NRP items recalled for each sub-category (i.e., electrical and non­
electrical goods) was calculated using paiiwise comparisons: MisRP+ (M = .38 vs
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.42), t (24) = -.71, p  = n.s; MisRP- (A/ = .41 vs .42, t (24) = -.21, p  = n.s. and; 
MisNRP (M= .41 vs .46), t (24) = -.74,7? = n.s (see Appendix B12). Therefore, there 
appears to be no evidence of category dropout of electrical or non-electrical goods. 
Although it is a possible that participants may have grouped the items into different 
smaller categories, the randomisation of retrieval practice sets for each participant and 
the small size of remaining sub-categories should have effectively reduced the 
likelihood of category dropout producing a significant effect on recall performance.
Discussion
The results from this study strongly indicate a potential role for retrieval-induced 
forgetting in the production of misinformation effects. In fact, the retrieval status of 
items appeal's to allow for predictions to be made with relative ease concerning the 
success of introducing misinformation. The introduction of misinformation was 
relatively unsuccessful in conditions where the original items were not subjected to 
retrieval-induced forgetting, thereby suggesting that the original items were freely 
available to conscious inspection. As such, participants were able to compare their 
memory for the original item from the study phase and the misleading item from the 
post-event questioning. Having compared these items, the majority of participants 
chose the original item.
In contrast, misinformation is more likely to be reported when it is introduced 
on an item that is subjected to retrievâl-induced forgetting. Significantly more 
misinformation effects were found in the MisRP- condition than in any other 
condition. As alternative non-inhibitory explanations have been discounted as having 
played a significant role in the production of misinformation effects, a retrieval 
inhibition account can be considered. If this is indeed the case, then it is only RP-
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items that are subject to retrieval inhibition, and as a result, it is only these items that 
should be unavailable to conscious inspection. As the RP- items are not available for 
retrieval, participants may be forced to rely on their memoiy for the misleading 
information from the post-event questioning.
The magnitude of the misinformation effect in the MisRP- condition is 
actually quite startling given that the RP-, NRP and MisControl items have been 
treated in the same manner. That is, participants only saw these items once during the 
study phase. Yet, there were around three times as many misinformation effects in 
the MisRP- condition compared to the MisNRP and MisControl conditions. The only 
difference between these three items is their relation to the practiced items: only the 
RP- items are drawn from the same categoiy as items that underwent retrieval 
practice. As the goal of retrieval practice is to retrieve the RP+ items, RP- items were 
subjected to retrieval inhibition in order to prevent them from dismpting the 
preferential retrieval of the practiced items. As the RP- items were less available to 
conscious inspection, significant misinformation effects were only detected in the 
MisRP- condition.
In addition, the prior practice of items appeared not to garner any substantial 
protection from misleading information. Participants who received misinformation 
about an item that they had previously practiced mistakenly reported the misleading 
item at a similar level to that of participants who received misinformation about an 
NRP or Control item. Given that the retrieval of information is believed to strengthen 
those items in memory (e.g., Allen et al., 1969), evidenced by the increased recall of 
RP+ items compared to NRP and Control baseline recall, this finding of comparable 
misinformation effects in the MisRP+, MisNRP, and MisControl conditions is 
actually quite surprising. While a certain proportion of these misinformation effects
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may be due to social factors (e.g., demand characteristics -  the experimenter wrote the 
post-event questions and therefore must know what was contained within the 
narratives), it is also possible that the presence of retrieval inhibition plays is a more 
influential role in an individual’s vulnerability to misleading information. 
Specifically, the retrieval inhibition of an item may leave individuals more susceptible 
to misleading information in compaiison to any increase in resistance to 
misinformation that is created tlnough retrieval practice.
EXPERIMENT lb: ENCODING CHECK
While retrieval-induced forgetting provides a compelling explanation of 
misinformation effects, it remains possible that participants only chose the misleading 
item because they never encoded the original item during the study phase. The non­
retention hypothesis (cf. McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a) asserts that the 
misinformation effect is not the result of genuine memoiy impairment, and that the 
misleading item can only be integrated into event memory if the original item was 
never encoded. Thus, post-event misleading information merely acts as a piece of 
additional information, filling a gap in an individual’s memoiy for an event. If true, 
therefore, it cannot inform us about the processes behind memory updating. In an 
attempt to address this concern. Experiment lb examines whether participants 
encoded the information contained within the initial study phase.
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Method
Participants
20 undergraduate psychology students participated in this experiment on a voluntaiy 
basis. Participants were tested individually.
Materials 
Study Materials
As this experiment examined the possibility that misinformation effects may be due to 
participants failing to encode the tai'get stolen item the materials used in the study 
phase of the current experiment were identical to those previously used in Experiment 
la.
Forced-choice Recognition
Memory for the stolen items was assessed using a forced-choice recognition test. 
There were twenty questions containing two possible correct answers (the coirect 
item and an incorrect but novel item). Unlike in Experiment la, misinformation was 
not an option (see Appendix C).
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment lb resembled the Control condition of Experiment la 
(i.e., no relevant retrieval practice) with the exception of the initial free recall and 
misinformation phases (which were replaced with additional distracter tasks). On 
arrival at the laboratoiy, participants were informed that they would be taking part in 
a memory task. Participants read two narratives about two houses that had been 
burgled and ten items had been stolen from each one. Participants then completed the
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expanding retrieval practice schedule that control participants received in Experiment 
1 a. This task was followed by a name generation task whereby participants were cued 
to recall the name of an animal for each letter of the alphabet. After working on this 
task for five minutes participants were asked to work on a word generation task, in 
which they had to think of items that were black, made of wood, blue, round, and 
green, for two minutes (these tasks substituted the initial free recall task from 
Experiment la). Finally, participants were asked to recite the alphabet backwards for 
two minutes. No participant finished any of these tasks in the allocated time. On 
completion of these tasks participants were presented with another distracter task 
where they had to write down the names of ten countries for each letter of the 
alphabet. Participants worked on this task for nine minutes. Again, participants did 
not complete this task within the allocated time limit. Finally, participants were asked 
to complete a forced-choice recognition task that contained twenty multiple-choice 
questions about each of the stolen items. Participants had to choose the correct stolen 
item from a choice of the original item and one new incorrect item. On completion of 
this task, participants were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.
Results
The mean correct recognition of original items was calculated to determine how well 
participants had encoded the original information from the study phase. Mean 
recognition for all twenty original items was extremely high at 96.33% (s.d. = .04). 
This extremely high recognition rate was similar to recognition scores for non-critical 
items in the Control condition (91%) of Experiment la.
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Discussion
In prior studies employing the typical misinformation paradigm, the possibility that 
misinformation effects were due to a failure to encode the original information always 
remained a strong possibility, especially given the highly complex nature of the visual 
materials used (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). The finding of intact recognition 
memory in the current experiment strongly indicates that individuals encoded 
information contained within the narratives of the study phase. As a result, the 
misinformation effects observed in Experiment la are unlikely to be due to any failure 
to encode the information.
Despite the importance that some researchers have attributed to the non­
retention account (e.g., McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), it can, however, only explain 
a proportion of misinformation effects using the typical misinformation paradigm. It 
is unlikely that a significant proportion of participants would fail to encode the 
original item, or to forget those items during a retention inteiwal. However, the non­
retention account, in combination with the possible effects of demand characteristics 
and guessing, continues to provide a strong argument against memoiy impairment 
accounts. Fortunately, as each participant receives misinformation in the modified 
misinformation paradigm, demand characteristics and guessing rates should be 
approximately equal across conditions, and so cannot account for the varying success 
of misleading information. The finding in Experiment lb that participants not only 
encode the target items during the study phase, but that they also retain them in 
memory across the experimental session until final test, forther supports a memory 
impairment account (and specifically a retrieval inhibition account) rather than 
McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) non-cognitive explanations.
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As significant misinformation effects were only found in the MisRP- condition 
in Experiment la it suggests that a possible boundary condition of the misinformation 
effect is retrieval availability of the original item. The results of Experiment la 
suggest that the original item may need to be unavailable for conscious inspection in 
order for misinformation to take effect. The retrieval inhibition account of the 
misinformation effect was further supported by the finding that participants in the 
MisRP- condition who demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting were over four times 
as likely to choose the misleading item (fourteen of nineteen participants == 74%) than 
participants who failed to demonstrate retrieval-induced forgetting (one of six 
participants = 17%). These two findings suggest that the presence of retrieval 
inhibition may greatly facilitate the misinformation effect. If this is indeed the case, 
then significant misinformation effects should only be found when retrieval inhibition 
is present. This prediction can be tested in several ways, either through varying the 
presence of retrieval-induced forgetting within a condition, as well as manipulating 
the retrieval status of a specific item (e.g., RP- or RP+). Experiment 2 tests the 
former prediction by varying the length of the retention interval between study and 
retrieval practice, and between retrieval practice and test, in order to see whether the 
dissipation of retrieval-induced forgetting has an effect on the misinformation effect.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 2A; THE DISSIPATION OF RETRIEVAL-INDUCED 
FORGETTING WITH DELAYED TESTING
Research has previously highlighted the goal-directed nature of forgetting in social 
cognition (Macrae & MacLeod, 1999; M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 2001), suggesting 
that the retrieval inhibition of unwanted information should only be present so long as 
it satisfies current memorial goals. If this assumption is correct, then in order for 
retrieval-induced forgetting to serve an adaptive role in memory it may be necessary 
for its effects to be relatively short-lived. For example, when an individual is asked 
for their home postcode, the retrieval efficiency and retrieval speed of that 
information would be increased if all prior home postcodes could be suppressed. 
However, there would be little adaptive benefit in permanently erasing previous 
postcodes due to the possibility that this information may be required at a later date 
(e.g., previous postcodes can sometimes be required in order to open a bank account).
Thus, the temporaiy inhibition of competing information may allow our 
memory systems to be able to adapt to the rapidly changing goal states that 
characterise eveiyday memoiy (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). In line with this assumption, M.D. MacLeod and Macrae 
(2001) have previously demonstrated that under certain conditions retrieval-induced 
forgetting is a temporary phenomenon. Specifically, M.D. MacLeod and Macrae 
found that retrieval-induced forgetting dissipated when a 24-hour delay was inserted 
between retrieval practice and final recall.
Similarly, as there are unlikely to be many real world situations in which 
retrieval practice occurs directly after encoding, retrieval inhibition must be able to
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act on old and newly encoded memories alike for it to be considered an adaptive 
forgetting process. M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001) investigated this potential 
constraint on the retrieval-induced forgetting effect by inserting a 24-hour delay after 
encoding but before retrieval practice. A reduced, but significant, retrieval-induced 
forgetting effect was still evident under these conditions, suggesting that the effect is 
not constrained by the age of the memoiy. This finding was also reported by 
Koutstaal et al. (1999) using a two-day delay.
The current chapter further considers the role of delay on retrieval-induced 
forgetting, and its effect on the misinformation effect. Experiment 2a attempts to 
replicate the delayed test condition from M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001, 
Experiment 1) using material from Experiment la in order to determine whether 
retrieval-induced forgetting will dissipate over a 24-hour delay. Following this 
groundwork. Experiment 2b examines the effects of the possible temporaiy boundary 
condition (delayed test and delayed practice) on the misinformation effect.
Hypotheses
Following on from the prior work by M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001) concerning 
the effects of delay on retrieval-induced forgetting, two main predictions can be made 
concerning the current study. As there is a 24-hour delay between retrieval practice 
and final test in the Delayed Test condition retrieval-induced forgetting effects are not 
expected. In contrast, as there is no delay between retrieval practice and final test in 
the Immediate Test condition the retrieval-induced forgetting effect is expected.
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Method
Pcn'ticipants and Design
Sixty undergraduate students (12 males and 48 females) participated on a voluntary 
basis in this experiment. The study had a single factor (recall test: immediate or 
delayed) between-subjects design. The Immediate Test condition consisted of 
presentation, retrieval practice and free recall. The Delayed Test condition followed 
this format with the insertion of a 24-hour delay between the retrieval practice and 
free recall phases. Each condition contained 30 participants.
Materials 
Study Materials
The study materials in the presentation phase were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1 (see Appendix Al).
Retrieval Practice Questions
The retrieval practice questions were identical to those used in Experiment 1 (see 
Appendix A2).
Fr'ee Recall
A free recall task was employed to determine whether retrieval-induced forgetting had 
occurred or not. The task required a written response and encouraged the recall of all 
items from both houses.
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Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratoiy individually or in groups of up to four and were 
randomly assigned to one of the testing conditions where either a 24-hour delay 
occurred prior to final recall, or where no such delay occurred. Instructions to 
participants, retrieval practice procedures, distracter tasks, and the free recall test were 
identical to those used in the retrieval practice half of Experiment la (see Appendix 
A8 for distracter tasks). As in the previous studies, no participant completed any of 
the distracter tasks. On completion of the final recall task, participants were 
debriefed, thanked for their participation, and dismissed.
Results
Retrieval Pr’actice Success and Mean Recall Performance
Retrieval practice success was 92% {SD = .09) for the Immediate Test condition, and 
86% {SD =.11) for the Delayed Test condition. In the Immediate Test condition, the 
mean recall of RP+ items was .87, .41 for RP- items, and .54 for NRP items. In the 
Delayed Test condition, recall of RP+, RP-, and NRP items was .37, .32, and .35 
respectively (see Table 3), thereby confirming M.D. MacLeod and Macrae’s (2001, 
Exp. 1) results of the effect of delay on retrieval-induced forgetting.
Transformation o f Data
The recall scores (proportion conect) within each condition were transformed using 
arcsin transformation in order to establish homogeneity of variance for all subsequent 
analyses (see Snedecor & Cochran, 1980, pp. 290-291).
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Table 3: Mean performance as a function o f item status
Item Type Retrieval-induced
Forgetting
Condition RP+ RP- NRP (RP-)-NRP
Immediate .87 .41 .54 -.13
Test (15) (.25) (.18)
Delayed Test .37 .32 .35 -.03
C17) (.14) (16)
Note. RP+ items are practiced items from the practiced categor) . RP- items are impracticed 
items from the practiced categoiy. NRP items are items from the impracticed categoi*)'. 
Standard deviations are enclosed in parentheses.
Rettieval-induced Forgetting 
Immediate Test Condition
A single factor (item type: RR+, RP- or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of item type on recall performance, F  (2,58) = 57.03,77 < .01 , MSq = 
.09. Calculations of effect size indicated the presence of a large effect (/’= .89). A 
series of pairwise comparisons using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach to 
control for familywise error revealed that significantly more RP+ items were recalled 
compared to NRP items, t (29) = 6 .84,77 < .01, demonstrating the facilitatoiy effects 
of practice on memory performance. In addition, significantly fewer RP- items were 
recalled compared to NRP items, t (29) = -2.06, p  < .05, revealing the detrimental 
effects of the retrieval of related information on memory performance (see Appendix 
D1 for statistical tables).
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Delayed Test. Condition
A single factor (item type: RP+, RP- or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA revealed no 
significant effect of item type on memoiy performance, F  (2,58) = .93,77 = n.s., MSe = 
.0 3 ,/=  .03 (see Appendix D2 for statistical tables). This absence of retrieval-induced 
forgetting effects after a substantial retention inteiwal thereby confirms M.D. 
MacLeod and Macrae’s (2001) previous findings.
Additional A nalysis 
Output Interference
Using the procedure outlined in Experiment la, the possibility that the retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect found in the Immediate Test condition was due to output 
interference was examined. As the previous practice of RP+ items leads to these items 
becoming more accessible in memory, participants may recall these items first 
decreasing the chances of the weaker RP- items being recalled. The retrieval-induced 
forgetting effect was calculated for the early RP+ and early RP- output groups in the 
Immediate Test condition (cf. Macrae & MacLeod, 1999). A paiiwise comparison 
revealed that there was actually a stronger retrieval-induced forgetting effect in the 
early RP- output group (M= -.26) than the early RP+ group (M = -.07), t (28) = 2.37, 
77 < .05 (see Appendix D3 for statistical tables). This effect was contrary to what 
would have been predicted if output interference had significantly contributed to the 
obseiwed effect.
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Decrease in NRP Performance
I. Cross-categoiy Inhibition
A series of paiiwise comparisons were conducted to determine whether cross­
category inhibition was present. This analysis is critical due to the absence of a no 
retrieval-practice control baseline condition in the current series of experiments (due 
to the main manipulation being delay). It is necessaiy to demonstrate that the NRP 
baseline is a relatively pure measure of the recall of unpracticed items from an 
unpracticed category and that this measure has not been contaminated by the retrieval 
activity of items in the retrieval practice set. This was accomplished following the 
same procedure as outlined in Experiment la. No significant differences were 
detected between NRP-Similar to RP+ items and NRP-Dissimilar to RP+ items in the 
Immediate Test condition {M~ .38 vs .43), t (29) = -.75,/? = n.s (see Appendix D4 for 
statistical tables). A separate set of paiiwise comparisons examined the recall of NRP 
items that were similar to RP- items (i.e., NRP-Similar) and NRP items that were 
dissimilar (i.e., NRP-Dissimilar) in the Immediate Test condition (M = .43 vs .39), 
t (29) = .69, p  = n.s. (see Appendix D5 for statistical tables). Thus, there was no 
consistent impairment of NRP-Similar items that were associated with RP+ or RP- 
items.
II. Categoiy Dropout
As in Experiment la, all of the items can potentially fall into two broad categories; 
electrical and non-electrical items. Therefore, categoiy dropout may be a factor in both 
the loss of the retrieval-induced forgetting effect, and the practice effect, in the 
Delayed Test condition, or the retrieval-induced forgetting effect in the Immediate Test 
condition. Participants in the Immediate Test condition may benefit from having
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recently practiced items from the electrical or non-electrical sub-set leading to 
increased accessibility of that category (e.g., electrical items). This may increase (or 
decrease) the likelihood of electrical items in the NRP categoiy being recalled and lead 
to an increase in NRP items in the Immediate Test condition. Thus, the retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect might be explained entirely by category dropout. Participants 
in the Delayed Test condition would not benefit from this increase in accessibility of 
sub-categories due to the retrieval practice phase occurring before the delay and would 
suffer from the dropping out of categories. Participants would also be more likely to 
suffer categoiy dropout for the non-electrical set as these items represent a less 
coherent group of items (e.g., painting and binoculars have little common features). If, 
on the other hand, participants were cued with the sub-categories, the recall of NRP 
items would be restored and may reveal RP- impairment that was otheiwise masked by 
category dropout. However, care was taken to ensure that RP+ sets did not constitute 
solely these kinds of sub-categories (i.e., practice sets consisted of both electrical and 
non-electrical goods that were randomised for each participant).
Despite this reasoning, the possibility that fluctuations in the recall of NRP 
items may be due to category dropout was examined. The proportion of NRP items 
recalled for each sub-category (i.e., electrical and non-electrical goods) was calculated 
using paiiwise comparisons: Immediate Test (M = .49 vs .54), t (29) = -.73, p  = n.s; 
and; Delayed Test (M = .29 vs .33), t (29) = -.78, p  = n.s. (see Appendix D6 for 
statistical tables). Therefore, there appears to be no evidence of categoiy dropout of 
electrical or non-electrical goods. As in Experiment la, it remains a possibility that 
participants may have grouped the items into different smaller categories. However, 
the randomisation of retrieval practice sets for each participant, and the small size of
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remaining sub-categories should have reduced the likelihood of categoiy dropout 
producing any significant effect on recall performance.
Discussion
The results of the current study support the previous findings by M.D. MacLeod and 
Macrae (2001) that retrieval-induced forgetting can be a transitory forgetting process. 
When recall is delayed by a substantial retention inteiwal, retrieval-induced forgetting 
is found to be absent while, in contrast, a significant retrieval-induced forgetting effect 
was evident when memory was tested immediately. Retrieval-induced forgetting may 
dissipate due to memoiy having sufficient time to adapt to the change in the goal of the 
experiment. That is, during retrieval practice, the goal of the task is to retrieve the 
target RP+ items as quickly and as accurately as possible in response to a set of 
questions, and that this is achieved through the suppression of unwanted but related 
information that may compete for retrieval with target items. However, at final recall, 
the goal changes and participants must try to recall all items. Under conditions where 
this test immediately follows retrieval practice, the retrieval-induced forgetting of the 
competing items continues to influence the recall of information. In contrast, if a long 
delay occurs directly after the retrieval practice task, retrieval-induced forgetting 
dissipates and the previously suppressed items become available for retrieval. Thus, 
participants are able to satisfy the new goal of the final recall task.
However, although retrieval-induced forgetting was found to have dissipated 
after a delay following retrieval practice, no strong recoveiy in RP- recall was 
observed. In fact, recall for all item types was found to be quite poor. While it could 
be ai'gued that the RP- items actually remained inhibited, and the absence of retrieval- 
induced forgetting is entirely the result of a drop in the NRP baseline, there are other
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factors to consider that do not support this interpretation. First of all, M.D. MacLeod 
and Macrae (2001) did find a slight recovery in recall for RP- items without any 
significant drop in the NRP baseline, suggesting that the RP- items did indeed recover 
from a prior state of inhibition. Given this slight recovery, it may require a longer 
delay in order for the recall of RP- items to reach that of the NRP items.
Secondly, the recoveiy in RP- items can not only be measured by the ability to 
recall RP- items, but also in terms of the extent to which these items can interfere with 
the retrieval of RP+ items. As retrieval-induced forgetting is believed to be a method 
of resolving competition at retrieval, if those competing RP- items were again made 
available for retrieval they could be expected to compete and interfere with the 
retrieval of RP+ items. This possibility may have actually been obseiwed during the 
current study as recall performance for RP+ items decreased after the 24-hour delay 
following retrieval practice. Thus, this inability of participants to recall the previously 
practiced items may have been due to the related RP- items becoming available to 
conscious inspection and interfering with the retrieval of RP+ items.
A third finding that would not support the poor performance account of the 
dissipation of retrieval-induced forgetting would be if significant misinformation 
effects were only found in conditions where retrieval-induced forgetting was found to 
still be present. Experiment la suggests that participants who exhibit retrieval-induced 
forgetting are more likely to report the misleading item than are participants who do 
not demonstrate retrieval-induced forgetting. In order to examine this possibility in 
further detail, the following experiment seeks to examine the effects of delay on the 
production of misinformation effects.
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EXPERIMENT 2B: THE EFFECTS OF DELAYED TESTING AND DELAYED 
PRACTICE ON THE MISINFORMATION EFFECT
The results of Experiment la suggest that the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting 
may be a necessary condition in the production of the misinformation effect. Not 
only were significant misinformation effects only found in the condition where 
misinformation was introduced on RP- items but this effect was most noticeable when 
participants also demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting. Therefore, the 
presentation of misinformation about an RP- item in itself appears to be insufficient to 
produce misinformation effects; participants must also exhibit retrieval-induced 
forgetting. These two boundary conditions suggest that the RP- item must be 
unavailable for retrieval, and unable to compete with the misinformation at test.
The current study further examines these possible boundary conditions of the 
misinformation effect by manipulating the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting 
through the insertion of a substantial delay between retrieval practice and final recall.
The current study also examines whether the misinformation effect is constrained by 
the age of the initial memory and this is accomplished through the insertion of a delay 
between the study and retrieval practice phases.
Hypotheses
If retrieval-induced forgetting and the retrieval inhibition of the RP- items are 
necessary conditions for the production of the misinformation effect, then significant I
misinformation effect should only be found when retrieval-induced forgetting is 
present. Under such condition, the RP- items should be unavailable for conscious IIinspection at both the time of misinformation exposure, as well as at the time of test, |
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in order for the misinformation effect to occur. If retrieval-induced forgetting 
dissipates when a substantial delay occurs after retrieval practice, as evidenced by 
Experiment 2a of the present thesis and M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001), then the 
release of retrieval inhibition for RP- items should allow retrieval access to those 
items. As the critical RP- item will be available to conscious inspection it will be able 
to compete with the misinformation at forced-choice recognition. Given a choice at 
test between the original critical item, the misinformation, and a new item, 
participants are likely to choose the original item. However, if a delay of similar 
length occurs after encoding, but before retrieval practice, both retrieval-induced 
forgetting and misinformation effects can be expected. While retrieval-induced 
forgetting may be reduced due to some degrading of the original event over the delay, 
the effect will remain sufficiently strong for RP- items to be unavailable for retrieval 
during the presentation and testing of misinformation.
Method
Pcn'ticipants and Design
Ninety undergraduate students (37 males and 53 females) participated on a voluntaiy 
basis in this study. The experiment had a single factor (timing of delay: No Delay, 
Delayed Practice, or Delayed Test) between-subj ects design. The main phases of the 
No Delay condition comprised a presentation phase, retrieval practice, free recall, 
misinformation and additional questioning phase, and a forced-choice recognition 
test. The Delayed Practice condition followed this format with the inclusion of a 24- 
hour delay between the presentation and retrieval practice phases. For the Delayed
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Test condition, this 24-hour delay occurred between the retrieval practice and free 
recall phases. Each condition contained 30 participants.
Maierials 
Study Materials
The study materials used in the presentation phase were identical to those used in 
Experiment la (see Appendix Al).
Retrieval Practice Questions
The retrieval practice questions were identical to those used in Experiment 1 (see 
Appendix A2).
Free Recall
A free recall task was employed as a manipulation check to determine whether 
retrieval-induced forgetting had occurred or not. The task required a written response 
and encouraged the recall of all items from both houses.
Misinformation and Additional Questioning
The additional questions used in this phase were identical to those used in Experiment 
la (see Appendix A6). However, unlike this previous study, misinformation was only 
presented on RP- items.
Forced-choice Recognition
This recognition test was identical to that used in Experiment la (see Appendix A7).
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Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratoiy individually or in groups of up to four and were 
randomly assigned to one of the conditions. Instmctions to participants, retrieval 
practice procedures, filler tasks, free recall test, additional questioning procedure, and 
forced-choice recognition test were all identical to those used in Experiment la. As in 
the previous studies, no participant completed any of the distracter tasks. On 
completion of the forced-choice recognition test, participants were debriefed, thanked 
for their participation, and dismissed (see Figure 23 for an outline of the procedure for 
the Delayed Test condition, and Figure 24 for an outline of the procedure for the 
Delayed Practice condition).
Results
Retrieval Practice Success and Mean Memory Performance
The retrieval practice success rate was 86.7% (SD -  .08), 88.4% (SD = .12) and 88.2% 
(SD = .07) in the Delayed Test, Delayed Practice, and No Delay conditions 
respectively. Mean recall of the thi ee item types in conditions where retrieval-induced 
forgetting was predicted (i.e., no delay and delayed practice conditions) was .83 for 
RP+ items, .37 for RP- items, and .51 for NRP items (see Table 4 for recall 
performance for individual item types in each condition). This difference of +.32 
between practiced items and the unpracticed baseline confirms the facilitatory effect 
that practice has on memoiy performance. However, the prior retrieval of items also 
had a deleterious effect on related items in the no delay and delayed practice 
conditions. A mean difference of -.14 was calculated between the RP- and NRP items 
indicating the presence of strong retrieval-induced forgetting effects.
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Figure 23: Procedure for Delayed Test condition
Experiment 2
DISTRACTER
DISTRACTER
FREE RECALL
24-HOUR DELAY
MISINFORMATION PHASE 
MisRP-: MI presented on RP- items onl>
STUDY PHASE 
Presentation of items stolen from 2 
houses (10 items per house)
RETRIEVAL PRACTICE 
Half the items from one of die houses 
(each item cued 3 times) 
and interleaved with distracter tasks
FORCED-CHOICE RECOGNITION TEST 
Critical Question: original vs. MI. vs. new 
Non-critical questions: original vs. new vs. new
Note. MI = misinformation
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Figure 24: Procedure for the Delayed Practice condition
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DISTRACTER
DISTRACTER
FREE RECALL
24-HOUR DELAY
MISINFORMATION PHASE 
MisRP-; MI presented on RP- items only
STUDY PHASE 
Presentation of items stolen from 2 
houses (10 items per house)
RETRIEVAL PRACTICE 
Half the items from one of the houses 
(each item cued 3 times) 
and interleaved with distracter tasks
FORCED-CHOICE RECOGNITION TEST 
Critical Question: original vs. MI. vs. new 
Non-critical questions: original vs. new vs. new
Note. MI = misinfonnation
In contrast, no practice or retrieval-induced forgetting effects were detected in 
the Delayed Test condition. Recall of RP+ items (.33) was only slightly greater than 
that of the NRP items (.29), an improvement of only +.04. Similarly, recall of RP- 
items (.33) was slightly higher than recall for the NRP items (.29).
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Transformation of Data
The recall scores (proportion correct) within each condition were transformed using 
arcsin transformation in order to establish homogeneity of variance for all subsequent 
analyses (see Snedecor & Cochran, 1980, pp. 290-291).
Table 4: Mean recall performance as a function o f item type
Item T)pe Retrieval-induced
Forgetting
Condition RP+ RP- NRP (RP-)-NRP
Delat ed Practice .80 .37 .51 -.14
(17) (26) (.18)
No Delay .85 .37 .50 -.13
(.14) (26) (.18)
Delayed Test .33 .33 .29 +.04
(22) (21) (.17)
Note. RP+ items are practiced items from the practiced category. RP- items are impracticed 
items from the practiced categoiy. NRP items are items from the unpracticed categoi')'. 
Standard deviations are enclosed in parentheses.
Manipulation Check: Retrieval-induced Forgetting 
No Delay
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA revealed 
main effects for item type, F  (2,58) = 50.86, p  < .01, MS'e = .04, and this effect size 
was large (/’ = 1.32). Familywise error was controlled for in a series of pairwise 
comparisons by using the Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach and revealed that 
significantly more RP+ items were recalled compared to NRP items, t (29) -  7.93,
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p  < .01, confirming the positive impact prior retrieval has on subsequent memoiy 
performance. Paiiwise comparisons also confirmed the presence of significant 
retrieval-induced forgetting effects in this condition with significantly fewer RP- items 
recalled than NRP items, t (29) = -2.55, p  < .05 (see Appendix D7 for statistical 
tables).
Delayed Retrieval Practice
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA revealed 
main effects of item type, F  (2,58) = 30.41, p  < .01, MSq = .05. Calculations of effect 
size revealed the presence of a lai'ge effect (f= 1.02). A series of paimise comparisons 
using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach confirmed the facilitatory effects on 
memoiy performance of prior practice with significantly more RP+ items reported than 
NRP items, t (29) = 5.84, p  < .01. Fewer RP- items were also recalled compared to 
NRP items, t (29) = -2.38,/? < .05, thereby confirming that retrieval-induced forgetting 
had taken place (see Appendix D8 for statistical tables).
Delayed Test
Using a single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA no 
significant effects of item type were found in the Delayed Test condition, F  (2,58) = 
0,44,/jf = n.s. (see Appendix D9 for statistical tables). The failure of retrieval practice 
to have a significant impact on the recall of any of the item sub-sets replicates the 
findings from the Delayed Test in experiment 2a and confirms the findings from the 
Delayed Test in M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001, Exp. 1).
The results of these manipulation checks in the Delayed Test condition are 
consistent with the idea that retrieval-induced forgetting effects are transitory in nature
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(M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 2001). If a 24-hour delay occurs between retrieval practice 
and recall then retrieval-induced forgetting effects are not detected. Thus, if a 
sufficiently long delay is inserted after practice then any retrieval-induced forgetting of 
RP- items resulting from retrieval practice will dissipate. In contrast, when a 24-hour 
delay occurs between presentation and retrieval practice, retrieval-induced forgetting 
effects remain evident.
Misinformation Effects
The results of Experiment la suggest that it is the ‘inhibitory’ state of an item that 
governs the success of introducing misinformation on a critical original item. In 
Experiment la, misinformation was easily introduced on inhibited items (i.e., RP- 
items), but not on non-inhibited information (i.e., RP+, NRP, or control items). 
Extending this line of enquhy, misinformation should only be successftilly introduced 
on a critical original item that is cinrently inhibited and, is thus, unavailable for 
conscious inspection. If the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting in this manner is 
an essential boundaiy condition, then significant misinformation effects are only 
expected in conditions where retrieval-induced forgetting is demonstrated (i.e.. No 
Delay and Delayed Practice conditions). In contrast, if retrieval-induced forgetting has 
dissipated then the original item should be available in memory and thus 
misinformation is expected to have little effect on participant’s memory for an event. 
Under these conditions, where retrieval-induced forgetting is absent (i.e.. Delayed Test 
condition), only low levels of misinformation effects are expected. Thus, in order to 
examine the effects of delay on the misinformation effect, the proportion of 
misinformation effects in the No Delay and Delayed Practice conditions were 
compared with the Delayed Test condition.
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As expected, misinformation effects were greatest in conditions where 
retrieval-induced forgetting was still present, with 50% of participants choosing the 
misinformation in the No Delay condition and 57% in the Delayed Practice condition 
(see Figure 25). Misinformation effects were lowest in the Delayed Test condition 
where retrieval-induced forgetting effects were absent (see Table 5 for proportion of 
participants choosing the original, misinformation, or new item). Only 20% of 
participants in this condition chose the misinformation over the critical original item. 
These differences were confirmed with chi square analysis. Misinformation had a 
greater effect in conditions where retrieval-induced forgetting was present and the 
critical original item was still inhibited, (1, M = 60) = 5.93,/? < .01, %^(1, n = 60) = 
8.53,/? < .01, No Delay and Delayed Practice conditions respectively. Calculations of 
effect size revealed the presence of medium sized effects in both conditions, 0 =  31 
and 0  = .37, No Delay and Delayed Practice conditions respectively (see Appendix 
DIO for statistical tables).
Additional Analysis 
Output Interference
Using the procedure outlined in Experiment la, the possibility that the retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect found in the No Delay and Delayed Practice conditions was 
due to output interference was examined. The retrieval-induced forgetting effect for 
each condition was calculated for the early RP+ and early RP- output groups. Paiiwise 
comparisons confirmed that there were no differences in the magnitude of the retrieval- 
induced forgetting effects in the early RP+ output group and the early RP- output 
group in either the No Delay condition (M = -.13 vs. -.13), t (28) = 0.06, p  = n.s., or
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the Delayed Practice condition {M~  -.18 vs. -. 13), / (28) = -.38, p  -  n.s (see Appendix 
D ll for statistical tables).
Table 5: Likelihood o f participants choosing the original item, misinformation, and 
new erroneous item at forced-choice recognition
Critical item Non-critical items
Condition Original Misinfo New error Mean Error
Delayed Practice .33 .57 .10 .08
(.11)
No Delay .50 .50 0 .06
(.06)
Delat ed test .70 .20 .10 .06
(.08)
Note. Misinformation has been presented on RP- items onl). For the critical question 
measuring the misinformation effect, participants had to choose from the correct original 
item, the misinformation, and a new erroneous item. Proportion of errors on non-critical 
items (i.e., original item vs. new item vs. new item) is also included as a baseline measure of 
the proportion of enors made at forced-choice recognition. Standard deviations are enclosed 
in parentheses.
Decreased NRP Performance 
I. Cross-category Inhibition
A series of pairwise comparisons were conducted to determine whether cross-category 
inhibition was present. This analysis is critical due to the absence of a no retrieval- 
practice control baseline condition in the current series of experiments (due to the main 
manipulation being delay). It is necessary to demonstrate that the NRP baseline is a 
relatively pure measure of the recall of unpracticed items from an unpracticed category 
and that this measure has not been contaminated by the retrieval activity of items in the
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retrieval practice set. This was accomplished following the same procedure as outlined 
previously in Experiment la. The mean recall of NRP items that were similar to RP+ 
items (i.e., NRP-Similar), and of NRP items that were dissimilar (i.e., NRP- 
Dissimilar), for each condition, was as follows: No Delay (M = .49 vs .38), t (29) = 
1.83, p  = n.s and; Delayed Practice {M = .48 vs .49), t (29) = -.15, p  = n.s (see 
Appendix D12 for statistical tables). A separate set of pairwise comparisons examined 
the recall of NRP items that were similar to RP- items (i.e., NRP-Similar) and NRP 
items that were dissimilar (i.e., NRP-Dissimilar): No Delay (M = .57 vs .46), t (29) = 
-.81, p  = n.s and; Delayed Practice {M = .44 vs .49), t (29) = 1.98, p = n.s (see 
Appendix D13 for statistical tables). Therefore, there was no consistent impairment of 
NRP-Similar items associated with RP+ or RP- items.
Figure 25: Percentage o f participants choosing the misinformation option during 
forced-choice recognition in Experiment 2b
%
Misinfo.
Effect
Delayed
Practice
No Delay Delayed
Test
TYPE OF DELAY CONDITION
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IL Category Dropout
As in Experiment la, all of the items can fall into two equal-sized sub-categories: 
electrical and non-electrical goods, and thus, category dropout may account for the 
drop in NRP recall in the Delayed Test condition compared to the Delayed Practice 
condition. Participants in the Delayed Practice condition may benefit from having 
recently practiced items from these categories leading to increased accessibility of that 
categoiy (e.g., electrical items). This may increase the likelihood of electrical items in 
the NRP category being recalled and lead to an increase in NRP items in the Delayed 
Practice condition. Participants in the Delayed Test condition would not benefit from 
this increase in accessibility of sub-categories due to the retrieval practice phase 
occurring before the delay and would suffer from the dropping out of categories. 
Participants would also be more likely to suffer category dropout for the non-electrical 
set as these items represent a less coherent group of items (e.g., painting and binoculars 
have little common features). If, on the other hand, participants were cued with the 
sub-categories, the recall of NRP items would be restored and may reveal RP- 
impairment that was otherwise masked by category dropout. However, care was taken 
to ensure that RP+ sets did not constitute solely these kinds of sub-categories (i.e., 
practice sets consisted of both electrical and non-electrical goods that were randomised 
for each participant).
Despite this reasoning, the possibility that the decrease in NRP performance 
compared to the control baseline was due to categoiy dropout was examined. The 
proportion of NRP items recalled for each sub-category (i.e., electrical and non­
electrical goods) was calculated using paiiwise comparisons: Delayed Practice (M = 
.51 vs .47), t (29) = .11 yp  = n.s; No Delay (M = .48 vs .51, / (29) = -.45,/? = n.s; and 
Delayed Test (M = .28 vs .29), t (29) = -.23, j:? = n.s (see Appendix D14 for statistical
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tables). Therefore, there appears to be no evidence of categoiy dropout of electrical or 
non-electrical goods.
Discussion
The findings that retrieval-induced forgetting is a necessary condition for the 
production of misinformation effects replicates and extends the main findings of 
Experiment la. In this prior experiment, significant misinformation effects were only 
found when misinformation was introduced on RP- items, but this in itself was 
insufficient to account folly for the pattern of results. An even higher proportion of 
misinformation effects was found when the MisRP- condition was sub-divided into 
those participants who demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting (74% of these 
participants chose the misinformation item) and those who did not (only 17% of these 
participants did so). Given these prior findings, the current study sought to investigate 
this boundaiy condition more thoroughly. The presence of retrieval-induced forgetting 
during the introduction of misinformation was manipulated by inserting a 24-hour 
delay into the modified misinformation paradigm. This substantial delay occurred 
either before recall, before retrieval practice, or not at all.
The results of the current experiment indicate the presence of retrieval-induced 
forgetting as an essential condition in the production of misinformation effects. When 
a 24-hour delay was inserted between the retrieval practice phase and free recall, the 
retrieval-induced forgetting dissipated, suggesting that once sufficient time has 
elapsed, these related items were no longer subjected to inhibition and were again 
available for retrieval. Additionally, under these conditions where retrieval-induced 
forgetting was absent, misinformation also failed to influence responses on the forced- 
choice recognition test and no significant misinformation effects occurred. This
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suggests that previously inhibited RP- items were available in memory, but were not 
recallable, and able to compete for retrieval with misleading information.
In contrast, when a delay occurred between the presentation phase and retrieval 
practice, a strong retrieval-induced forgetting effect was elicited. As a result, retrieval- 
induced forgetting was still present at the introduction, and testing, of the 
misinformation item. With the RP- item still unavailable in memory it cannot compete 
with the misleading item, and thus, participants were more likely to choose the 
misinformation on the forced-choice recognition test.
The results of both Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that retrieval-induced 
forgetting may be a necessary condition in the production of the misinformation effect. 
Further, these studies suggest that the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting, as well 
as the retrieval inhibition of the RP- item, play a strong role in the reporting of the 
misleading item. Thus, it would appear that when an item is subjected to retrieval 
inhibition it is relatively easy to introduce information about that item. However, the 
success of introducing misleading information appears to be dependent on retrieval- 
induced forgetting currently being present so that the RP- item is subjected to retrieval 
inhibition. If retrieval-induced forgetting is absent, then RP- items are unlikely to be 
subjected to retrieval inhibition, and so significant misinformation effects are not 
found.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 also have a more general application to 
current theories of memoiy updating. As recent research suggests that retrieval 
inhibition may play an adaptive role in memoiy updating (e.g., R.A. Bjork, 1989; M.D. 
MacLeod et al., 2003), the finding that information can be introduced on items that are 
subjected to retrieval inhibition, and then reported in place of that original material, is 
an important advancement in memoiy research. Thus, the application of retrieval
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inhibition to the misinformation effect need not be seen as having exclusively negative 
consequences for memory. In fact, the prior inhibition of out-of-date or unwanted 
information may prevent it from interfering with the encoding of newer information, 
and so may ultimately be beneficial for the updating of memory.
These findings may also increase our understanding of the possible negative 
consequences of misleading post-event information on eyewitness memory. Not only 
do these findings support research that has previously demonstrated that repeated 
questioning can elicit retrieval-induced forgetting (M.D. MacLeod, 2002; Shaw et al,
1995), but also that this repeated questioning can leave individuals vulnerable to 
misinformation. Thus, this research may have some application to situations 
concerning the validity of testimony from witnesses, suggesting that the questioning of 
eyewitnesses may lead to omissions of some details, and an increased susceptibility to 
post-event misleading information. If this is indeed the case, then this is a double blow 
for questioning techniques, such as the standard police and cognitive interview, that are 
based on repeated questioning (e.g., Fisher & Geiselman, 1988).
Both Experiments 1 and 2 have examined the role of retrieval-induced 
forgetting in the promotion of misinformation effects. The impaired recall of RP- 
items in both of these studies have been assumed to be the result of the retrieval i
inhibition of related information competing with the RP+ items for retrieval. However, j
the modified misinformation paradigm employed in both of these experiments was not Idesigned specifically to explore the activation status of the underlying memorial a
representations of the RP- items. Specifically, the paradigm does not differentiate 4
' jbetween retrieval inhibition that may be the result of inhibitory or non-inhibitory 
mechanisms. Thus, the term ‘retrieval inhibition’ has been used in a fairly weak
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descriptive sense to indicate that the effect is an empirical effect that is the opposite of 
facilitation (e.g., R.A. Bjork, 1989), rather in a mechanistic sense.
However, in order to look more closely at the underlying mechanisms of 
retrieval-induced forgetting, and to specifically examine whether inhibitoiy processes 
are an underlying mechanism to the misinformation effect, a more specialised 
paradigm is required. M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995) designed a retrieval 
method, the independent probe method, which can measure the presence of ‘true’ 
inhibitoiy processes (i.e., inhibitoiy mechanisms). Therefore, Experiment 3 will adapt 
this independent probe method for use with the type of materials that were used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 in order to investigate whether RP- items are tmly inhibited in 
retrieval-induced forgetting or not.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENT 3: INHIBITORY PROCESSES IN RETRIEVAL-INDUCED
FORGETTING
As Experiments 1 and 2 have demonstrated a role for retrieval-induced forgetting in 
the production of misinformation effects, Experiments 3 - 5  will examine whether the 
mechanism underlying the misinformation effect is inhibitory in nature. But it must 
first be established whether inhibitoiy or non-inhibitory processes underlie retrieval- 
induced forgetting. As such, the current study will examine the underlying processes 
of retrieval-induced forgetting by adapting the independent probe method designed by 
M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995) for use with materials similar to those use in 
Experiments 1 and 2.
The independent probe method is a cued-recall method that employs retrieval 
cues during the final memoiy test that differ to those that were used during the 
retrieval practice phase. The independent probe method can differentiate the actions 
of inhibitoiy from non-inhibitoiy mechanisms through the use of retrieval cues at final 
recall that differ to the ones that where used during retrieval practice. Thus, inhibitory 
theories predict a different pattern of results using novel retrieval cues to that of non- 
inhibitory theories. This difference in predictions is primarily due to the way that 
non-inhibitory theories explain retrieval inhibition effects. Non-inhibitoiy theories 
assume that strengthening the association between a cue and an item (i.e., RP+ items) 
during retrieval practice results in a corresponding weakening in the association 
between that retrieval practice cue and the RP- items. Thus, non-inhibitory theories 
predict that the main site of interference is at the level of the retrieval routes between 
cue and memory. As a result, if non-retrieval practice cues are used during final
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recall then interference will be overcome and retrieval-induced forgetting will not be 
found. Such forgetting is typically referred to as being cue-dependent (M.C. 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Tulving, 1974).
In contrast, inhibitoiy theories assume that retrieval-induced forgetting is the 
result of inhibitory processes directly acting on the memorial representations of 
competing items (i.e., RP- items). As a result, the memorial representation of RP- 
items is suppressed. In addition, as the suppression of RP- items is not due to their 
association with the retrieval practice cue (unlike non-inhibitory theories), these items 
will remain inhibited even when novel retrieval cues (i.e., cues that differ to those 
used during retrieval practice) are employed at final recall. Thus, inhibitoiy theories 
assume that retrieval-induced forgetting is an example of cue-independent forgetting 
(M.C. Anderson & Green, 2001; M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; M.C. Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995; Levy & Anderson, 2002).
Adapting the independent probe method for use with materials that would be 
appropriate for the subsequent exploration of inhibitoiy processes in producing the 
misinformation effect is, however, problematic. This is primarily due to the 
independent probe method having only been used with well-defined pre-experimental 
categories in the past, such as semantic categories (e.g., FRUIT; M.C. Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995), or geometric shapes (e.g., triangles, crosses; Ciranni & Shimamura, 
1999). However, the stimuli typically used to examine misinformation effects do not 
fall into such well-defined semantic categories. For example, the materials used in 
Experiment la formed only episodic categories, rather than semantic categories, and 
can only be loosely defined as items found in à house’. Despite this problem, the 
independent probe method should be able to be adapted for use with episodic 
memories by changing the retrieval practice cues from semantic category cues that are
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typically used in the retrieval practice paradigm to episodic cues. For example, if the 
target items are divided into ‘Thompson’s House’ and ‘Williams’ House’ then using 
these labels as retrieval practice cues should be sufficient.
Hypotheses
The prior use of the independent probe method for investigating the underlying 
mechanisms of retrieval-induced forgetting allows several predictions to be made. If 
the retrieval-induced forgetting effect typically found for complex episodes is an 
inhibitory one, then the retrieval-induced forgetting effect should still be found even 
when novel cues are used to prompt recall. Specifically, if the memorial 
representations of the RP- items are taily inhibited, then recall of these items should 
still be impaired, even when the retrieval cues used to aid the recall of the RP- items 
differs from the retrieval practice cue used to strengthen the RP+ items. However, if 
the retrieval-induced forgetting effect is in fact a non-inhibitory one, then the recall 
performance of RP- items can be expected to be similar to the NRP category (i.e., 
retrieval-induced forgetting will be absent).
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty undergraduate and postgraduate students and members of the public (32 men 
and 18 women) participated on a voluntaiy basis in this study. Item type was 
manipulated within subjects and had three levels: (1) RP+ items, which were 
practiced items from the practiced set; (2) RP- items, which were unpracticed items 
from the same practiced set, and (3) NRP items, which were items from a separate
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1and unpracticed set. Treatment was manipulated between subjects and had two ?
levels: (1) retrieval practiced condition, where participants practiced the RP+ items 
three times each, and (2) no relevant retrieval practice, which acted as a control 
measure. Both conditions each contained twenty-five participants.
Materials 
Study Materials
In the study phase participants were required to read two narratives containing 
information about two sepai ate burglaries. The first part of each narrative contained 
scene-setting information about when and where the incidents occurred. One 
narrative concerned the theft of ten items from the Thompson’s house while the 
family were on vacation. The second theft concerned the theft of ten items from the 
Williams’ house while the family had been visiting relatives. Each item was 
presented embedded within a sentence describing where in the house the item had 
been stolen from, e.g. ‘The mobile phone had been in the hallway. It had belonged to 
Mr. Thompson who needed it for his job as a doctor’. Participants were informed that 
the underlined words represented the stolen items. Each item was presented on a 
separate page of a booklet. Items for each burglary were presented in block format 
(i.e., the narrative and all items from the Thompson’s house was followed by the 
narrative and all the items from the Williams’ house, or vice versa), and their 
presentation was randomised within each block. The information sets for each house 
could be divided into two subgroups, each containing five items, in order to create a 
practiced set (i.e., RP+ group), and an unpracticed set (i.e., RP- group) for each house.
Experiment 3
Items were chosen that had only weak semantic associations to other items^, as 
established in previous pilot work (see Appendix El), and whose first two letters were 
different to every other target item (Thompson’s house: hockey stick, mobile phone, 
PlayStation, necklace, guitar, armchair, painting, microwave, lamp, vase; Williams’ 
house: perfume, mcksack, hammer, fountain pen, telescope, clock, stereo, leather 
jacket, printer, calculator). See Appendix E2 for both narratives.
Retrieval Practice Questions
As there were ten items in each house, items from one house could form the practiced 
category (i.e., RP+ and RP- sub-sets), and those items from the other house could 
form the unpracticed categoiy (i.e., NRP group). Paiticipants in the experimental 
condition received three sets of questions about half of the items from one of the 
houses. Therefore, these participants received fifteen retrieval cues in total related to 
the same five items (see Appendix E3 for a frill list of retrieval practice questions). 
Each question increased in difficulty as participants progressed through the booklet; 
previous work has determined that increasing the difficulty of the retrieval task leads 
to maximised practice effects (Landauer & Bjork, 1978). The difficulty of each set of 
retrieval practice questions had been determined in earlier pilot work (cf. M.D. 
MacLeod, 2002). An independent group of participants {n = 15), who had not 
previously read either of the narratives, had been presented with questions from either 
Set 1 (M = .97), Set 2 (M = .62), or Set 3 {M = .33). Questions from Set 1 were 
determined to be significantly easier than questions from Set 2, / (8) = 19.30,/? < .01, 
and Set 3, t (8) = 10.98,/? < .01. Similarly, questions from Set 2 were found to be
“ 111 a  p i l o t  s t u d y ,  1 0  p a i t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  p r e s e n t e d  w i t l i  a  l i s t  o f  8 3  i t e m s  t l i a t  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  a  b o u s e  a n d  
w h e r e  a s k e d  t o  g r o u p  d i e m  b y  s i m i l a r i t y ,  a n d  t o  s t a t e  w h y  U ie y  w e r e  s i m i l a i .  N o  p m t i c i p m i t  d i v i d e d  
d i e  i t e m s  i n t o  " e l e c t r i c a l"  a n d  " n o n - e l e c t i ' i c a l "  i t e m s ,  o r  d e c i d e d  d ia t  a l l  8 3  i t e m s  w e r e  s i m i l a r  b e c a u s e  
d i e y  c o u l d  b e  f o u n d  i n  a  h o u s e ,  o r  w e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  " s t e a la b le " .
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significantly easier than questions from Set 3, t (8) = 4.99, p <  .01, see Appendix E4 
for statistical tables. In addition, the time of the distracter tasks increased in length 
between each of the retrieval practice sets in order to produce an expanding schedule 
that maximised task difficulty (M.C. Anderson et al., 1994; Shaw et al., 1995).
Participants in the control condition did not receive a retrieval practice task about any |
of the stolen items. Rather, they received the same non-relevant retrieval practice task 
(cf. Macrae & MacLeod, 1999) that was used in the control condition of Experiment 
la (e.g., the capital city of Cuba is Ha ), see Appendix A4.
Recall Booklets
A cued-recall task based on M.C. Anderson and Spellman’s (1995) independent probe 
technique was employed as a manipulation check. The independent probe technique 
uses novel cues that have not previously been used to prompt recall in the experiment 
(see Figure 26). The appropriateness of the cues was examined in previous pilot work 
where participants had to match items to category names^ (see Appendix E5). This 
determined whether the categoiy name was appropriate for its members. In addition, 
each cue was followed by a two-letter stem to prompt recall. The stem completion 
task was contained in a four page booklet, where five items were cued on each page.
 ^ B a s e d  o n  p r e v i o u s  p i l o t  w o r k  e x a m i n i n g  s i m i l a i i l y  o f  i t e m s  ( f o r  s t u d y  m a t e r i a l s ) ,  c a t e g o i y  n a m e s  
w e r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  f o r  Ü ie  s a m e  l i s t  o f  8 3  i t e m s .  P a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  a s k e d  t o  m a t c h  t l i e s e  i t e m s  t o  a  
c a t e g o i y  l a b e l ,  a n d  t o  i n d i c a t e  w h i c h  i t e m s  w e r e  t l i e  b e s t  a n d  w o r s t  e x m n p l e s  o f  t l i e  c a t e g o i y  l a b e l .  F o r  
i t e m s  t l i a t  w e r e  d e e m e d  a  p o o r  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  c a t e g o i y  l a b e l  ( b u t  d i d n ' t  f i t  i m d e r  a n y  o f  t l i e  o i l i e r  
l a b e l s ) ,  p a i t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  p r o m p t e d  t o  g e n e r a t e  a  b e t t e r  c a t e g o i y  l a b e l  f o r  t l i a t  i t e m .
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and recall never commenced with the cueing of previously practiced items to prevent 
the early recall of practiced items interfering with the output of later items (see 
Appendix E6 for this cued-recall test).
Figure 26: The independent probe method
{ MUSICAL 
\  INSTRUMENT /
Thompson’s
House
SPORTS ' 
EQUIPMENT J
Hockey Stick Guitar
Note. ‘Thompson’s House” is the experimental (episodic) cue used in the study and retrieval 
practice phases. Novel (semantic) cues (e.g., “SPORTS EQUIPMENT”) were employed in 
the recall phase. Participants were cued to recall each item using a novel cue followed b) the 
items first two letters (e.g., SPORTS EQUIPMENT- Ho_______ ).
Procedure
The experiment proceeded in a similar manner to that of Shaw et al. (1995) and M.D. 
MacLeod (2002) with each participant completing a study phase, a practice phase 
interleaved with distracter tasks, and a final recall task. Participants arrived at the 
laboratory in groups of up to five, were greeted by a female experimenter, and 
alternatively assigned to either the experimental condition or the control condition. 
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in a memory experiment
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and were instructed to read two narratives about two separate burglaries. The order of 
the presentation of the two narratives had been alternated throughout. Participants 
had 45 seconds to read the first part of the nanative containing the scene setting 
information and 5 seconds to read each sentence that contained the stolen item.
On completion of the study phase, participants in the experimental condition 
were presented with a retrieval practice task that contained three sets of questions that 
required participants to retrieve half of the items from one of the houses from memoiy 
(i.e., participants were cued to recall five items a total of thiee times each). These 
practiced tasks were also interleaved with distracter tasks that increased in length after 
each practiced set. That is, a three-minute distracter task followed the first practice 
set, a four-minute distracter task followed the second practice set, and a five-minute 
distracter task followed the final practice set. These distracter tasks took the form of 
anagrams of fruit, vegetables, and academic subjects, and no participant completed 
the tasks in the allocated time (see Appendix E7). Participants in the control 
condition followed this same procedure, except that they completed the non-relevant 
retrieval practice task.
Following completion of the final distracter task, participants were asked to tiy 
to recall the names of the stolen items from the two burglaries using a cued-recall 
stem completion task that was contained in a four-page booklet. Each item was cued 
with a novel cue that was unique to that item. There were five cued stems on each 
page and participants had fifty seconds to complete each page of the recall booklet 
before they were prompted to turn to the next page. This recall task measured 
whether retrieval-induced forgetting had occurred. On completion of this task, 
participants were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.
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Results
Reùieval Practice and Mean Recall Performance
The retrieval practice success rate for the practice condition was 85% {SD = .08). 
Table 6 displays the mean recall for each item type for the practice and the control 
conditions. Mean recall of the practiced (i.e., RP+) items was .90, while recall 
performance of the unpracticed set (i.e., NRP items) was .76. The difference between 
the RP+ items and NRP items (+.14) demonstrates the facilitatory effects of prior 
retrieval on memory performance. In addition, recall performance of the unpracticed 
items from the practiced set (i.e., RP- items) was .63 in comparison with the recall of 
the unpracticed set (i.e., NRP items, .76). This difference in recall performance (-.13) 
demonstrates the effects of retrieval-induced forgetting, whereby the prior retrieval of 
other items from memory leads to impaired recall of competing items, and is 
comparable to the level of impairment found in previous studies (e.g., M.C. Anderson 
et al., 1994; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995; M.D. MacLeod, 2002; M.D. 
MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999).
Transformation o f Data
The recall scores (proportion correct) within each condition were transformed using 
arcsin transformation in order to establish homogeneity of variance (see Snedecor & 
Cochran, 1980, pp. 290-291).
RetrievaUindiiced Forgetting
A single factor (item type; RP+, or RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant main effect of item type for the retrieval practice condition, 
F  (2, 48) = 22.70, p  < .01, MS'e = .08. Cohen’s /  was calculated as an unbiased
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measure of effect size (Cohen, 1988), and indicates the presence of a large effect 
(Cohen’s /  = 0.56). Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, a series of post- 
hoc paiiwise comparisons revealed both facilitatory effects (i.e., RP+ > NRP, t (24) = 
4.37, jj < .01), and retrieval-induced forgetting effects (i.e., RP- < NRP, t (24) = 
-2.09, j!? < .05), see Appendix FI for statistical tables.
Table 6: Mean recall performance for retrieval jyractice and control (non-relevant 
practice) conditions
Item T)pe Retrieval-induced
Forgetting
Condition RP+ RP- NRP (RP-)-NRP
Practice .90 .63 .76 -.13
(.10) (.23) (.13)
Note. RP+ = practiced items from the practiced categoiy. RP- = impracticed items from the 
practiced categoiy. NRP = impracticed items from the unpracticed categoy. Recall of items 
in the control condition = .78 (SD = .09). Standard deviations are enclosed in parentheses.
Finally, to check that the retrieval-induced forgetting effect was not due to 
increased recall of the NRP items, rather than a decrease in the RP- items, the recall 
performance of the NRP items was compared with performance in the Control 
condition. No differences were found between these two groups, t (48) = .21,p  = n.s. 
suggesting that the retrieval-induced forgetting effect is due to a genuine decrease in 
the recall of RP- items (see Appendix F2 for statistical table).
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Output Interference
As the final recall task was a cued-recall task that commenced with unpracticed items 
(i.e., NRP and RP-), the RP+ items were not recalled first, and therefore could not 
have blocked retrieval of the unpracticed items, output interference is unlikely to have 
contributed to the observed recall performance.
Discussion
According to M.C. Anderson and Spellman’s (1995), the independent probe technique 
provides a method for determining whether retrieval-induced forgetting is primarily 
the result of inhibitoiy or non-inhibitoiy processes. Finding retrieval-induced 
forgetting using the independent probe method is. typically considered the strongest 
evidence for inhibitory processes acting in memoiy. Thus, the current finding that 
retrieval-induced forgetting is still evident in the independent probe method suggests 
that inhibitory processes do, in fact, underlie the effect. Recall of RP- items was 
impaired even though these items did not share the same retrieval cue that was used to 
strengthen the RP+ items during the retrieval practice phase. This suggests that the 
memorial representations of RP- items were inhibited rather than retrieval-induced 
forgetting being due to interference occurring between the retrieval practice cue and 
the RP- item (which would have indicated non-inhibitory processes).
More generally, the cunent finding suggests that inhibitory processes may 
play a role in setting aside unwanted or out-of-date information during the updating of 
memoiy. Thus, inhibitoiy processes may allow for the goal-directed forgetting of 
unwanted information in order to prevent it from interfering with the retrieval of 
desired memories.
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It should also be noted that retrieval-induced forgetting was found using the 
independent probe method even though the materials used in this study were quite 
different to those used by M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995). Target items and 
their presentation were very different, and for example, while M.C. Anderson and 
Spellman employed categories of items that formed well-defined semantically related 
groups (e.g., FRUIT, RED), the current study only used two categories (i.e., 
Thompson’s House, Williams’ House) of loosely related items, that only gained 
collective meaning within the context of the experiment (e.g., “stealable things” or 
“household items”). In addition, the use of questions as a retrieval practice task in the 
current study was quite different to that used by M.C. Anderson and Spellman, who 
used a cue-plus-stem task. However, these differences underline both the robustness 
of the retrieval-induced forgetting effect and the role of inhibitoiy processes in 
memory.
The inhibition of the memorial representation also has some implications for 
theories of memory, as well as for various real-world memory situations. Many 
theories of memoiy are primarily based on the assumption that forgetting is a cue- 
dependent phenomenon. For example, for example Mensink and Raajimakers (1988) 
SAM model assumes that forgetting occurs due to interference between the retrieval 
cue and the trace. As a result, if a novel cue is employed to test memoiy the 
interference is lifted. Similarly, Tulving’s encoding specificity principle (Tulving & 
Thompson, 1973) is based on the assumption that forgetting is primarily cue- 
dependent in nature. According to this view of memoiy, employing cues used at 
encoding should alleviate interference and increase the probability of a memory being 
retrieved. The idea of encoding specificity and cue-dependent forgetting has also 
formed the basis of the cognitive intemew for questioning witnesses (e.g., Fisher &
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Geiseiman, 1988). The cognitive interview attempts to gain a more complete account 
of an event through the use of multiple retrieval cues. Thus, if the retrieval of a 
memory is blocked due to interference, then employing different retrieval cues, or 
employing multiple retrieval cues, should aid in its retrieval. However, the increasing 
evidence for cue-independent forgetting suggests that theories of memoiy retrieval, 
and questioning techniques such as the cognitive interview, need to consider the 
possibility that memorial representations can themselves be inhibited, and that this 
retrieval inhibition is not easily resolved through employing multiple novel retrieval 
cues.
While the current experiment examined cue-independent forgetting -  perhaps 
the strongest evidence for inhibitory processes in forgetting -  another intriguing 
finding by M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995) is also consistent with an inhibitory 
account of retrieval-induced forgetting, that of cross-categoiy and second-order 
inhibition. M.C. Anderson and Spellman found that when an NRP item was 
semantically related to item from the practiced category recall performance of these 
NRP-SimUar items was also impaired. Thus, in order to investigate further the 
parameters of the inhibitoiy account of retrieval-induced forgetting, Experiment 4 will 
attempt to replicate cross-category and second-order inhibitory effects using similar 
materials to those employed in Experiment 3.
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CHAPTER 8
EXPERIMENT 4; CROSS-CATEGORY AND SECOND-ORDER INHIBITION IN 
RETRIEVAL-INDUCED FORGETTING
In addition to cue-independent forgetting with the independent probe method, M.C. 
Anderson and Spellman (1995) also found one unexpected result, an effect they 
named second-order inhibition. Second-order inhibition is a specific form of cross­
category inhibition, and occurs under condition where NRP items are similar to RP- 
items (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995, Experiment 2 and 4). NRP items that are 
semantically related to items from the practiced categoiy tend to be referred to as 
NRP-Similar items (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Typically, NRP item that are 
semantically similar to an inhibited RP- item are also inhibited, despite not being 
drawn from the same categoiy as the RP+ item, and as a result, are unlikely to 
compete with the RP+ item for retrieval. While inhibitory theories neither predict nor 
fully account for second-order effects, inhibitoiy processes do provide a more 
parsimonious account than non-inhibitoiy theories. As M.C. Anderson and Spellman 
have previously demonstrated that both the prior practice of items (rather than merely 
presenting items), as well as NRP items sharing a degree of similarity with the RP- 
items, are both essential conditions in the production of second-order inhibition 
effects (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995, Experiment 3a and 3b), inhibition 
provides a more complete and direct account of cross-categoiy inhibition than do non- 
inhibitoiy theories. Thus, in the case of second-order effects, any item that shares a 
degree of similarity or association with an inhibited RP- item may also be susceptible 
to inhibition, even if those items share no features directly with the RP+ items. It is 
almost as if the inhibition Teaks’ from the inhibited RP- items to any item that is
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related to it. In contrast, non-inhibitory theories are unable to account for second- 
order inhibition as NRP-Similar items are not drawn from the same categoiy as the 
practiced items. As a result, the RP+ items are studied, practiced, and tested under 
different retrieval cues to the NRP-Similar items.
Similarly, the more simplistic cross-category inhibition occurs when an NRP 
item is semantically similar to the RP+ items, and so competes directly for retrieval 
with these items. As a result of this competition, the semantically related NRP items 
are inhibited (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995, Experiment 1). NRP items that are 
similar to the practiced items, are in effect, merely acting like a second group of RP- 
items. This is perhaps quite surprising, given that facilitatory priming effects (e.g., 
Neely, 1976, 1977), and spreading activation models (J R. Anderson, 1983; Freedman 
& Loftus, 1971; E.F. Loftus, 1973; G.R. Loftus & Loftus, 1974; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995), would predict facilitated recall for any item that was semantically 
similar to practiced items.
In contrast to these two types of NRP-Similar items, items from the 
unpracticed category that are semantically dissimilar to items from the practiced 
category are not inhibited. As NRP-Dissimilar items are not drawn from the same 
categoiy as the practiced items they do not compete directly with the RP+ items for 
retrieval. In addition, as they are also unrelated to the inhibited RP- items recall of 
NRP-Dissimilar items is not impaired through inhibition spreading from the items.
M.C. Anderson and Spellman’s (1995) finding that recall performance for 
NRP-Similar items is impaired may suggest that inhibitoiy processes can control the 
effects of spreading activation from the practiced items (or vice versa). This 
interpretation is given credence when all the unpracticed items are considered. RP-, 
NRP-Similar and NRP-Dissimilar items have all been treated in the same manner
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during the experimental episode, with participants only viewing them during the 
initial study phase. Yet, recall performance of the NRP-Dissimilar items is the only 
item type that remains unaffected by the prior retrieval of the RP+ items. The 
likeliest explanation for this scenario is that recall performance is dependent on each 
class of item’s relation to the strengthened RP+ item. As the activation of an item is 
thought to result in the spreading of activation to the memorial representations of 
other related items (e.g., Neely, 1977; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) inhibitory 
processes may be brought to bear on related items in order to prevent them from being 
activated (i.e., RP- and NRP-Similai* items). If related items were not inhibited both 
RP- and NRP-Similar items are likely to become increasingly competitive and 
interfere with the retrieval of the RP+ items. In contrast, as the NRP-Dissimilar items 
are semantically unrelated to the practiced items they are unlikely to be the recipient 
of any kind of spreading semantic activation, or semantic (or associative) priming 
effects. As a result, NRP-Dissimilar items will neither compete for retrieval with the 
RP+ items, nor be subjected to inhibition.
In order to investigate these second-order and cross-category effects, related 
categories that span the two incidents will be introduced in the current study, allowing 
the role of inhibitoiy processes in the production of these effects to be examined (i.e., 
NRP items similar to RP+ items or RP- items). Specifically, if there are sub­
categories of related items that span both incidents, can the practice status of some of 
those items influence the recall of semantically similar items in the unpracticed 
incident? If the RP+ items are similar to some items from the unpracticed category, 
will these unpracticed items also benefit fi'om the prior retrieval of related 
information, or will they be impaired due to these items creating interference at 
retrieval (i.e., cross-categoiy impairment)? Also, if some items from the unpracticed
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category are similar to the RP- items from the practiced category, will these similar 
NRP items also be impaired, or will their recall be unaffected because their similarity 
lies with the competing information, not with the practiced items?
In order to accomplish this, the target items used in Experiment 3 need to be 
modified to include sub-categories of related items that span the two incidents. This 
will require the NRP categoiy to be sub-divided into two distinct item types: NRP- 
Similar items and NRP-Dissimilar items. Additionally, the category needs to be 
further divided into those items that are semantically similar to practiced items and 
those items that are semantically similar to the unpracticed RP- items.
Hypotheses
The independent probe method will again be used to measure whether inhibitory 
processes are responsible for both retrieval-induced forgetting, and cross-category and 
second-order effects. As a result, the current experiment will attempt to replicate the 
cue-independent forgetting of the RP- items that was demonstrated in Experiment 3.
In addition to the impaired recall of RP- items, if inhibitory processes are 
triggered by the selective retrieval of the RP+ items, then the recall performance of 
the NRP-Similar items is also expected to be impaired. This decrease in NRP-Similar 
performance compared to NRP-Dissimilar items should occur irrespective of whether 
the NRP-Similar items share a related sub-categoiy with the RP+ items or the RP- 
items. Under conditions where items from the unpracticed category are related to 
RP+ items, this semantic similarity should cause competition for retrieval between the 
RP+ items and the NRP-Similar items. These unpracticed but similar items should, 
therefore, be inhibited so that the RP+ items can be successfully recalled.
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In addition, items from the unpracticed category can also be semantically 
similar to RP- items. While these NRP-Similar items do not compete directly with 
the RP+ items for retrieval, they do share features with the competing RP- items and 
so inhibition is expected to spread to the NRP-Similar items. The remaining NRP 
items, which share no related features with the practiced category, are not expected to 
be affected by the prior retrieval of the RP+ items. As the NRP-Dissimilar items are 
unrelated to the practiced category they are not expected to compete for retrieval with 
the RP+ items and can therefore act as the baseline measure of recall.
Method
Pcn'ticipants and Design
Ninety students and members of the public (52 men and 38 women) participated on a 
voluntary basis in this study. Item type was manipulated within subjects and 
comprised four levels: (1) RP+ items, which were practiced items fi'om the practiced 
set; (2) RP- items, which were unpracticed items from the same practiced set; (3) 
NRP-Similar items, which were items from the unpracticed set that were semantically 
similar to items from the practiced set (either RP+ or RP- items), and (4) NRP- 
Dissimilar items, which were items from the unpracticed set that were semantically 
dissimilar to all items from the practiced set.
The semantic similarity of NRP-Similar items to items from the practiced 
category was manipulated between subjects and had three levels: (1) NRP-Similar 
items, semantically related to a sub-set of RP+ items (the NRP-Similar to RP+ 
condition); (2) NRP-Similar items, semantically related to a sub-set of RP- items (the 
NRP-Similar to RP- condition); and (3) no relevant retrieval practice {Conti'ol
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condition), which acted as a control measure. Each condition contained thirty 
participants.
Materials
Study Materials: Nairatives
In the study phase participants were requiied to read two narratives containing 
information about two separate burglaries. The first part of each narrative contained 
scene-setting information about when and where the incidents occurred. One 
narrative concerned the theft of twelve items from the Thompson’s house while the 
family were on vacation. The second theft concerned the theft of twelve items fi'om 
the Williams’ house while the family had been visiting relatives. Each item was 
presented embedded within a sentence describing where in the house the item had 
been stolen from, e.g. ‘The mobile phone had been in the hallway. It had belonged to 
Mr. Thompson who needed it fo r his job as a doctor '. Participants were informed that 
the underlined words represented the stolen items. Each item was presented on a 
separate page of a booklet. Items for each burglary were presented in block format 
(i.e., the narrative and all items from the Thompson’s house were followed by the 
narrative and all the items from the William’s house, or vice versa), and their 
presentation was randomised within each block (see Appendix G1 for both narratives 
in their entirety).
One house formed the practiced category and the remaining house formed the 
unpracticed categoiy. The stolen items for each house could be divided into four 
subgroups: practiced items from the practiced category (i.e., RP+); unpracticed items 
from the practiced categoiy (i.e., RP- items); items from the unpracticed category that 
were semantically similar to items from the practiced category (i.e., NRP-Similar), or;
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items from the unpracticed category that were semantically dissimilar to items from 
the practiced categoiy (i.e., NRP-Dissimilar). Six items from the practiced categoiy 
formed the RP+ sub-set and the remaining six items formed the RP- sub-set. Four 
items from the unpracticed categoiy formed the NRP-Similar sub-set and the 
remaining eight items formed the NRP-Dissimilar sub-set.
Study Materials: Semantically Dissimilar Target Items
Eight items from each house formed the NRP-Dissimilar set, and these items were 
chosen for their weak semantic associations to all other items. This semantic 
dissimilarity was determined in previous pilot work'^ (see Appendix El). In addition, 
no item commenced with the same first two letters (Thompson’s house: hockey stick, 
mobile phone, PlayStation, guitar, painting, microwave, lamp, vase; Williams’ house: 
perfume, rucksack, hammer, fountain pen, camera, telescope, clock, stereo).
Study Materials: Semantically Similar Target Items
The remaining four items in each house formed two sub-categories of implicitly 
related items, as determined by previous pilot work^ (see Appendix El). Specifically, 
these implicit sub-categories contained four related items that spanned both 
nanatives, (i.e., for the first sub-category, two related items were in the Williams 
narrative, and the remaining two items were in the Thompson narrative), and the same 
format was used for the second sub-category of related items. However, due to issues 
with item randomisation for the retrieval practice questions, there were actually three
Information concerning the semantic dissimilaiity of items was taken from tlie pilot study described in Experiment 3. ^This information was also taken from tlie pilot study of Experiment 3. Attempts were made to ensuie tliat items witliiii tliese implicit categories did not shaie too high or too low a degree of similaiity (see M.C Anderson et al.’s 2000b two-factor tlieoiy on tlie effects of similarity on retiieval-induced forgetting for further details on tliis problem).
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sets of implicit sub-categories (clothing: leather jacket, ti'ainers, sweater, jeans; 
jewelleiy: necklace, earrings, cufflinks, wedding ring; and furniture: bookcase, 
armchair, desk, table), but participants only read about two of them. This was to 
prevent all the RP+ items in the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition being from the 
implicit sub-categories (i.e., out of the 6 RP+ items, all 6 would be from the implicit 
sub-categories), and all the RP- items from the NRP-Similar to RP- condition being 
from the implicit categories, with no opportunity for randomisation. Therefore, each 
pair of implicit sub-categories that was shared across the narratives was randomised 
and counterbalanced throughout.
Rehieval Practice Questions
Participants in the experimental conditions received three sets of questions about half 
of the items from one of the houses (i.e., six RP+ items). Therefore, these participants 
received eighteen retrieval cues in total that related to the same six items (see 
Appendix G2 for the complete set of retrieval practice questions). Each retrieval 
practice task increased in difficulty in order to maximise practice effects (Landauer & 
Bjork, 1978) and question difficulty was established in previous pilot work, as 
described in Experiment 3 (see Appendix E4 for that statistical analysis concerning 
question set difficulty). In addition, the time of the distracter tasks increased in length 
between each of the retrieval practice sets in order to produce an expanding schedule 
that maximised task difficulty (M.C. Anderson et al., 1994; Shaw et al., 1995).
In the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, half of the items from the implicit sub­
categories formed part of the RP+ set in order for the corresponding implicit sub­
category members in the NRP set to be related to RP+ items (i.e., NRP-Similar items, 
see Figure 27). In the NRP-Similar to RP- condition, half of the items from the
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implicit sub-categories formed part of the RP- set in order for the remaining implicit 
sub-category members in the NRP set to be related to these RP- items (i.e., NRP- 
Similar to RP- items, see Figure 28). Participants in the Control condition did not 
receive a retrieval practice task about any of the stolen items. Rather, they received 
the same non-relevant retrieval practice task that was used in the Control condition of 
Experiment la (e.g., the capital city of Cuba is Ha ), see Appendix A4.
Figure 27: Organisation o f implicit categories in the NRP-Similar to RP-^ condition 
Practiced Set Unpracticed Set
1 wedding ring 
Î cuff links JEWELLERY
necklace \ 
earrings \
! leather jacket jeans \
j trainers CLOTHING sweater
clock ' paiiïtïïïg
stereo lamp
telescope guitar
camera PlayStation
fountain pen mobile phone
hammer hockey stickmcksack microwave
perfume vase
Note. An example of how implicit sub-categories span the practiced and unpracticed sets in 
the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition where items from the unpracticed set are semanticall) 
related to RP+ items. Practiced items are in bold type. NRP-Similar items are in italics, and 
are items from the unpracticed set that are semantically related to items from the practiced set. 
The remaining noii-italicised items in the unpracticed set are NRP-Dissimilar items, which are 
items from the unpracticed set that are semantically dissimilar to items from the practiced set.
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Figure 28: Organisation of implicit categories in the NRP-Similar to RP- condition
Practiced Set Unpracticed Set
telescope mobile phone
camera lamp
perfume hockey stick
stereo microwave
fountain pen vase
hammer painting
clock guitar
 rucksack---------------------------------------- PlayStation. -
leather jacket CLOTHING jeans }
_  _ t r a i i ^ r s ^ ______________________________________________________________________________  !
wedding ring necklace \cufflinks JEWELLERY earrings \
Note. An example of how implicit sub-categories span the practiced and unpracticed sets in 
the NRP-Similar to RP- condition where items from the unpracticed set are semantically 
related to RP- items. Practiced items are in bold type. NRP-Similar items are in italics, and 
are items from the unpracticed set that are semantically related to items from the practiced set. 
The remaining non-italicised items in the unpracticed set are NRP-Dissimilar items, which are 
items from the unpracticed set that are semantically dissimilar to items from the practiced set.
Recall Booklets
The independent probed task that was used in Experiment 4 was adapted for use with 
implicit sub-categories from the task employed in Experiment 3, and the 
appropriateness of these novel cues was established in pilot work (see Appendix E5 
for further details of this pilot study). This cue-plus-stem task (e.g., MUSICAL
INSTRUMENT-Gu_______) was spread over an eight-page booklet, where three
items were cued on each page (see Appendix G3 for this cued-recall test). This was 
to ensure that items belonging to the same implicit sub-categoiy never appeared on 
the same page, or on the page afterwards, in order to prevent participants using 
previously recalled items to prompt the recall of other items. In addition, recall never
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commenced with the cueing of previously practiced items (i.e., RP+ items were never 
cued on the first page of the recall booklet) to prevent the early recall of practiced 
items blocking the recall of weaker items (i.e., RP-, NRP-Similar and NRP-Dissimilar 
items). See Figure 29 for a diagram of the independent probe method used in the 
NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, and Figure 30 for the NRP-Similar to RP- condition.
Figure 29: Independent probe method in the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition
Practiced Categoiy Unpracticed Categoiy
Williams’
House Thompson’sHouseCLOTHING
leather
jacket lampstereo sweater
RP- RP+ NRP-Similar NRP-Dissimilar
Experimental and novel cues used at final recall in experiment 4. ‘Thompson’s House” is the 
experimental (episodic) cue used in the study and retrieval practice phases. Novel (semantic) 
cues (e.g., “SPORTS EQUIPMENT”) were employed in the recall phase. Participants were 
cued to recall each item using a novel cue followed b) the items first two letters (e.g., SPORTS EQUIPMENT- Ho_______ ).
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Figure 30: Independent probe method in the NRP-Similar to RP- condition
Practiced Categoi") Unpracticed Categoiy
Thompson's
House
Williams'
House CLOTHING )
leather
jacket lampsweaterstereo
NRP-DissimilarRP+ RP-
Note. Experimental and novel cues used at final recall in Experiment 4. ‘Thompson’s 
House” is the experimental (episodic) cue used in the stud) and retrieval practice phases. 
Novel (semantic) cues (e.g., “SPORTS EQUIPMENT”) were employed in the recall phase. 
Participants were cued to recall each item using a novel cue followed b) the items first two 
letters (e.g., SPORTS EQUIPMENT- Ho_______ ).
Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually or in groups of up to six and 
randomly assigned to one of the testing conditions. Participants were informed that 
they were to take part in a memoiy task and were instmcted to read two narratives 
about two separate burglai'ies. The order of presentation of the two narratives had 
been counterbalanced throughout. Participants had 45 seconds to read the first part of 
the narrative containing the scene-setting information and 5 seconds to read each 
sentence that contained the stolen item.
On completion of the study phase, participants in the experimental conditions 
were presented with a retrieval practice task that contained three sets of questions that
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required participants to retrieve half of the items from one of the houses from memory 
(i.e., participants were cued to recall six items a total of three times each). These 
practiced tasks were also interleaved with distracter tasks that increased in length after 
each practiced set. That is, a three-minute distracter task followed the first practice 
set, a four-minute distracter task followed the second practice set, and a five-minute 
distracter task followed the final practice set. These distracter tasks were the same as 
those used in Experiment 3 (see Appendix E7). Participants in the Control condition 
followed this same procedure, except that they completed a non-relevant retrieval 
practice task.
Following completion of the third distracter task, participants were asked to 
recall the names of the stolen items fi om the two burglaries using a cued-recall stem- 
completion task that was contained in an eight-page booklet. Each item was cued 
with a novel cue that was unique to that item. There were three cued stems on each 
page and participants had thirty seconds to complete each page of the recall booklet 
before they were prompted to move on to the next page. This recall task measured 
whether retrieval-induced forgetting had occurred. On completion of this task, 
participants were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.
Results
Retrieval Practice and Mean Recall Performance
Retrieval practice success rates for each condition were as follows; 86% {SD = .07) 
for the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, and 84% {SD = .10) for the NRP-Similar to 
RP- condition.
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Typically, the baseline measure in retrieval-induced forgetting studies is the 
unpracticed category (NRP items). However, as the unpracticed set has been further 
divided into those items that are semantically related to items from the practiced set, 
and items that are dissimilar to the practiced set, the NRP-Dissimilar sub-set is a more 
appropriate baseline measure. Table 7 displays the recall for each item type for the 
two experimental conditions, as well as the combined means. Mean recall across the 
conditions for the RP+ items was .92, while recall performance of the baseline NRP- 
Dissimilar items was .76, a facilitatory effect of ,16. In addition, recall of the RP- 
items was .58, which was considerably lower than for the NRP-Dissimilar items, thus 
demonstrating a retrieval-induced forgetting effect of -.18. This pattern of reduced 
recall of RP- items relative to the baseline demonstrates the detrimental effects on 
memoiy of the prior retrieval of other items from memory, and that retrieval-induced 
forgetting did occur. Finally, mean recall of the NRP-Similar items was .63, which 
was also lower than for the NRP-Dissimilar items, demonstrating a cross-category 
effect of -.13. Therefore, the impaired recall of RP- and NRP-Similar items, even 
when novel recall cues are used, strongly suggests that inhibitory processes are 
responsible for these interference effects.
Transformation o f Recall Scores
The recall scores (proportion correct) within each condition were transformed using 
arcsin transformation in order to establish homogeneity of variance for all subsequent 
analyses (see Snedecor & Cochran, 1980, pp. 290-291).
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NRP-Similar to RP+ Condition
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP-Similar items, or NRP-Dissimilar) 
within-subjects ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of item type for the 
NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, F  (3,87) = 30.44, p  < .01, MSq = .11. Cohen’s /  was 
calculated as an unbiased measure of effect size (Cohen, 1988), and indicates the 
presence of a large effect for the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition (Cohen’s /  = .60). 
Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, a series of post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed facilitatory effects (i.e., RP+ > NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = 4.83, 
p  < .01), retrieval-induced forgetting effects (i.e., RP- < NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = 
-4.159,/? < .01), and cross-categoiy impairment (i.e., NRP-Similar < NRP-Dissimilar, 
t (29) = -2.30,/? < .05), see Appendix HI for statistical tables).
NRP-Similar to RP- Condition
Similar patterns were also observed in the data for the second experimental condition, 
were items from the NRP set where similar to RP- items. A single factor (item type: 
RP+, or RP-, or NRP-Similar, or NRP-Dissimilar) within-subjects ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant main effect of item type for the NRP-Similar to RP- 
condition, F  (3,87) = 26.15, p  < .01, MSq = .08. Calculations of effect size 
demonstrate the presence of large effects for this condition (Cohen’s /  = .54). 
Employing Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, a series of post-hoc paiiwise 
comparisons revealed that participants recalled significantly more RP+ items than 
NRP-Dissimilar items, t (29) = 4.77,/? < .01, demonstrating the facilitatory effects of 
prior retrieval. Retrieval-induced forgetting effects were also found, where RP- items 
were recalled less than the NRP-Dissimilar items, t (29) = -3.40, /? < .01. Second- 
order impairment was also significant, t (29) = -2.14,/? < .05, with fewer NRP-Similar
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items recalled compared to NRP-Dissimilar items (see Appendix EL2 for statistical 
tables).
Table 7: Mean recall performance as a function o f item types
Item Type Retrieval-induced
Forgetting
Condition RP+ RP- NRP- NRP- (RP-)-NRP-
Similar Dissimilar Dissimilar
NRP-Similar .93 .60 .65 .78 -.18
toRP+ (.10) (.22) (.20) (.18)
NRP-Similar .91 .56 .60 .74 -.18
toRP- (.12) (.20) (.22) (.18)
Mean .92 .58 .63 .76 -.18
(.11) (.21) (.21) (.18)
Note, RP+ = practiced items from the practiced categor)’. RP- = mipracticed items from the 
practiced categoiy. NRP-Similar = mipracticed items from the unpracticed categoiy that are 
semantically similar to items from the practiced categoiy. NRP-Dissimilar = unpracticed 
items from the unpracticed categoiy that are semantically dissimilar to items from the 
practiced categoiy . NRP-Similar to RP+ = condition where a sub-set of NRP items are 
related to RP+ items. NRP-Similar to RP- = condition where a sub-set of NRP items are 
related to RP- items. Recall of items in the Control condition = .77 (SD = .12). Standard 
deviations are enclosed in parentheses.
Baseline Measures o f Recall
A between-subjects ANOVA confirmed that participants performance on NRP- 
Dissimilar items (overall M  = .76) was not significantly different from the recall 
performance of control participants (M = .78), E' (2,87) = .63,/? = n.s. (see Appendix 
H3 for statistical table).
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Discussion
In the current study, retrieval-induced forgetting was again found when the 
independent probe method was used as a tool for measuring recall, thereby replicating 
and extending the findings of Experiment 3. While the retrieval cues that were used 
at recall differed from those that were employed in both the study and retrieval 
practice phases recall performance for the RP- items was still impaired. Therefore, 
following M.C. Anderson and Spellman’s (1995) criteria, these results suggest that 
inhibitory mechanisms are the primaiy process underlying retrieval-induced 
forgetting.
In addition, evidence was found that indicated the presence of cross-categoiy 
inhibition. When some of the items from the NRP set were semantically similar to 
RP+ items, recall of these NRP-Similar items was markedly impaired in comparison 
to the NRP-Dissimilar items. This result suggests that items from the unpracticed 
categoiy that are semantically similar to the RP+ items compete directly with the 
practiced items for retrieval and thus need to be inhibited. This direct competition 
with the target items, and their subsequent inhibition, further suggests that these NRP- 
Similar to RP+ items may actually act like a second RP- sub-group.
Similarly, when NRP items were semantically related to inhibited RP- items, 
NRP-Similar items suffered the same fate as their counter-parts. The inhibition of the 
NRP-Similar items occurred despite these items not sharing a cue with the RP+ items 
and therefore they do not compete directly with the target RP+ items for retrieval. 
Thus, the impaired recall of NRP-Similar to RP- items cannot easily be explained by 
the strength-dependent actions of non-inhibitory theories of interference. Unlike non- 
inhibitory theories, inhibitoiy theories can accommodate the second-order inhibition 
of NRP-Similar items that are semantically associated with the RP- items. The
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pattern suppression model of inhibitory effects provides a particularly appealing 
account of second-order effects. The pattern suppression model assumes that 
memorial representations are composed of feature units and that semantically similar 
representations can overlap with one another resulting in the sharing of features. 
Should an NRP item be similar to an inhibited RP- item, the memorial representation 
of the NRP item may overlap with many of the inhibited features of the RP- item. 
Due to this sharing of inhibited features, an NRP item, which is itself unrelated to the 
RP+ item, may also be the focus of inhibitory processes. As with M.C. Anderson and 
Spellman’s (1995) findings of second-order inhibition, the results of the current 
experiment also appear to support the pattern suppression model. However, as 
identifying the specific type of inhibitory model was not an aim of the current 
experiment (nor of this thesis), the applicability of the pattern suppression model 
remains a point of conjecture.
The findings within the current experiment that NRP items that are similar to 
either RP+ or RP- items can be subjected to inhibitory processes also has more 
general implications for facilitatory priming effects (e.g., Neely, 1977), and models of 
spreading activation (e.g., JR. Anderson, 1983; E.F. Loftus, 1973; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). For example, the false memoiy effects using the Deese-Roediger- 
McDermott (DRM) paradigm is generally viewed as being due to the effect of 
spreading semantic activation. In the DRM paradigm, participants are presented with 
lists of semantically related items one list at a time (e.g., bed, rest, awake, tired, 
dream, wake, night, etc.), and either recall each list after study, or perform an 
um elated filler task. After having studied all of the lists participants have to complete 
a recognition task that consists of list items, critical lures (i.e., non-studied items that 
are semantically similar to the studied items such as ‘sleep’), and non-critical lures
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(i.e., non-studied items that are dissimilar to the studied items such as ‘bread’). 
Typically, participants recognise equally as many of the critical lures as they do the 
studied items, and this effect occurs independently of whether participants previously 
recalled list items or not. Roediger and McDermott (1995) have suggested that the 
prior study of items may lead to semantic activation spreading throughout the 
semantic memory network to all semantically related items. As a result of the 
activation of related memorial representations these items are more likely to be 
recognised than dissimilar items.
The finding that activation spreads to semantically similar items is not, 
however, necessarily incompatible with retrieval-induced forgetting and second-order 
inhibition if the change from facilitation to inhibition (or vice versa) is viewed as 
occurring on a continuum. Under many circumstances it may be more beneficial for 
activation to spread to related memorial representations, while in other situations it 
may be more beneficial for inhibition to counteract the effects of spreading activation. 
In pai adigms such as the DRM, or the lexical decision task that can be used to study 
facilitatoiy priming effects, the spreading of semantic activation between memorial 
representations may be advantageous to the current goal. For example, word 
identification is, in general, likely to benefit greatly from priming effects (Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971), while in the DRM procedure, recognition of the studied items, 
even without prior retrieval of those items, remains quite high (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). In contrast, as the goal of the retrieval practice task is to 
selectively retrieve a sub-set of items from a category it may be maladaptive for 
semantic activation to spread from the RP+ items to the RP- or NRP-Similar items. 
Under such conditions, inhibition may be activated in order to counteract the 
spreading of semantic activation.
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Having established robust retrieval-induced forgetting and cross-category 
inhibition (i.e., NRP-Similar to RP+ items) and second-order effects, (i.e., NRP- 
Similar to RP- items) the independent probe method can be applied to the modified 
misinformation paradigm previously used in Experiments la and 2b. As this 
technique can confirm whether the RP- and NRP-Similar items are inhibited before 
the introduction of misinformation it can be used to investigate the role of inhibitoiy 
processes in the production of misinformation effects. In addition, as the current 
experiment has demonstrated that NRP items that are related to the practiced category 
are also subjected to inhibition, the inclusion of the independent probe method within 
the modified misinformation paradigm can determine whether all inhibited 
information is ultimately susceptible to misleading information.
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CHAPTER 9
EXPERIMENT 5: INHIBITORY PROCESSES AND THE MISINFORMATION
EFFECT
Having established the groundwork for inhibitoiy processes in retrieval-induced 
forgetting through the use of the independent probe method, as well as the presence of 
cross-categoiy and second-order impairment, the role of inhibition in the 
misinformation effect can now be investigated. The current chapter describes the fifth 
and final experiment, which attempts to apply the independent probe method to the 
modified misinformation paradigm in order to examine whether inhibitoiy 
mechanisms can be responsible for misinformation effects.
While the misinformation effect can be used as a method for studying the 
processes involved in memoiy updating this avenue of research has remained largely 
ignored. As a result, the mechanisms that may underlie the misinformation effect and 
the possible role of these processes in the updating of memory have yet to be 
determined. Both supporters of the trace alteration and trace coexistence account of 
misinformation effects have advanced general ideas concerning how misinformation 
effects may occur, but veiy little research has specifically sought out to examine 
possible mechanisms.
During E.F. Loftus’ earlier reseai'ch she proposed a destmctive updating 
mechanism as the most likely cause of the misinformation effect (e.g., E.F. Loftus, 
1979a; E.F. Loftus et al., 1978). As E.F. Loftus and colleagues believed that only one 
representation of an event could be stored in memoiy, such a mechanism was thought 
to update the initial memoiy through the erasure of the original information (e.g., E.F. 
Loftus, 1979a; E.F. Loftus & Loftus, 1980). The misleading item was then thought to
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replace the original item. Although E.F. Loftus has since revised this rather extreme 
view of trace alteration to include a weakening or disintegration of the features of the 
original trace on the introduction of the misleading item (E.F. Loftus & Hoffman, 
1989) the mechanisms by which this alteration occurs remain unspecified. Other than 
the possible deleterious effects of the passage of time on memorial representations 
(E.F. Loftus et al., 1978) E.F. Loftus has advanced few specific details concerning 
how a destmctive updating process would achieve the misinformation effect.
Various retrieval accounts have also been proposed as possible explanations to 
the misinformation effect but these accounts have also remained insufficiently 
specified concerning the exact mechanisms by which misinformation effects occur. 
For example, while Bekerian and Bowers (1983) suggest that the misinformation 
effect may be due to a mismatch between encoding and retrieval cues their 
conclusions remain rather general. As a result, the possibility that this mismatch in 
cues may be due to non-inhibitory processes and, therefore, that some misinformation 
effects may be due to cue-dependent forgetting, remain relatively unexplored.
Perhaps one of the few researchers to more thoroughly explore the underlying 
mechanisms is Chandler and colleagues who have identified several possible retrieval 
processes (e.g.. Chandler, 1991; Chandler and Gargano, 1998; Chandler et al., 2001). 
Critically, Chandler and colleagues identified that misinformation effects are most 
likely to occur under conditions where the original and misinformation trace share the 
same retrieval cue (i.e., A-B, A-D paradigm) and the misinformation trace is accessed 
prior to that of the original trace during the retrieval process. From these initial 
principles. Chandler and colleagues have proposed at least three possible retrieval 
processes that may lead to the misinformation item being chosen at test. Cue-change, 
blocking and the discrimination account attempt to explain misinformation effects as
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being the result of various non-inhibitoiy mechanisms. Each of these accounts 
suggests that interference may occur at the level of the retrieval cues or along the 
retrieval routes, and as a result, are all examples of cue-dependent forgetting. Due to 
their cue-dependent nature, the accounts of cue-change, blocking and discrimination 
all suggest that misinformation effects can be avoided if the original trace can be 
selectively activated by the retrieval cue.
The non-inhibitory account of misinformation effects suggested by Chandler 
and colleagues may be one of the few examples of tme impairment in memoiy for an 
event, as well as implicating impairment occurring at the level of the retrieval cues 
and retrieval routes. This is quite an important observation given that some 
researchers have suggested that the misinformation effect may not be an indicator of 
genuine memoiy impairment at all (e.g., McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). Rather, the 
misinformation effect may only represent a change in performance by misled 
participants. The fact that the majority of misinformation studies measure the effects 
of misleading information through comparing misled performance with control 
performance, nor have they employed specific techniques for examining possible 
mechanisms, in anyway lessen this concern. Thus, this potential problem concerning 
the misinformation effect may explain why over three decades of research has been 
unable to provide any real degree of insight into the underlying mechanisms of the 
misinformation effect.
Perhaps the first to raise concern over the misinformation effect was 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) who suggested that the demand characteristics and 
guessing biases that are inherent to the typical misinformation paradigm make it 
unsuitable for addressing whether misleading information impairs memory. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza suggest that specific questions concerning memory
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impairment in the misinformation effect must be addressed through the use of a 
modified recognition test that removes the misleading item as a choice at test. By 
removing the misleading item the rates of guessing and the effects of demand 
characteristics should be equalised across misled and control conditions.
While the modified test may allow us to investigate whether misinformation 
impairs memory for the original item it, however, tells us little about the underlying 
mechanisms that may be responsible for memory impairment. Given that moderately- 
sized misinformation effects have been found using the modified test (Belli et al., 
1992; Ceci et al., 1987; Chandler, 1989, 1991; Chandler & Gargano, 1998; Toglia et 
al., 1992), it would appear that misinformation can still impair memory even after 
demand characteristics and guessing rates are controlled for. Thus, what processes 
could be responsible for such effects?
Similarly, Schooler and Tanaka (1991) have raised concerns over whether the 
representation of blended memories within a composite memoiy model (i.e., 
CHARM, Metcalfe, 1990) represent a change in performance on a test (i.e., 
performance blends), or a change to the underlying memorial representations (i.e., 
representational blends). Despite Schooler and Tanaka describing performance and 
representational blends as being two possible causes of blended memories in CHARM 
the basic premise may also be applied more generally to the misinformation literature. 
Performance blends could explain the misinformation effect as being due to post­
event information filling in ‘gaps' in memoiy for the original event and, thus, acting 
as supplementaiy information. Thus, under such conditions, the misleading 
information would not necessarily constitute contradictoiy information, but rather, 
memory may treat it as addition information that updates the initial representation of 
the event. Due to the similar nature of the original event and the post-event
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information participants may be unable to detect which parts of their memoiy for the 
event comes from which source. As a result, choosing the misleading item at test is 
unlikely to be the result of any time memory impairment (either through trace 
alteration or a change in the retrieval availability of memorial representations), nor 
does it tell us a great deal about the mechanisms underlying the memory updating 
process. Conversely, the misinformation effect could timly represent genuine 
impairment in memoiy through changes occurring at the level of the memorial 
representations. In order to address specifically this latter point, however, a suitable 
experimental procediue is required, such as the independent probe method.
77%g
Taking into account these prior problems concerning whether the misinformation 
effect represents genuine memory impairment occurring at the level of the memorial 
representations, the inhibitoiy account attempts to re-address these concerns thiough 
the adaptation of the modified misinformation paradigm. More specifically, in order 
to examine whether inhibitory processes can be responsible for misinformation 
effects, and if this impairment occurs at the level of the memorial representations, the 
independent probe method needs to be employed within the modified misinformation 
paradigm.
In contrast to the modified test, adapting the independent probe method for use 
with the modified misinformation paradigm can not only equalise demand 
characteristics and guessing rates across conditions but it can also directly measure 
possible underlying mechanisms to the misinformation effect. As a result, such a 
paradigm should have the ability to separate the actions of non-inhibitory processes 
from that of inhibitoiy processes. In addition to this, if inhibitoiy processes are found
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to be responsible for misinformation effects then the independent probe method can 
also measure what stage during the retrieval process this inhibition occurs. 
Specifically, the independent probe method can determine whether the memorial 
representation of the original item is itself subjected to inhibition.
As Chandler and colleagues research suggests that there can be multiple 
mechanisms involved in the production of misinformation effects (see also Belli, 
1989), it is possible that inhibitoiy processes may provide an additional mechanism 
by which misleading information becomes integrated into memory. If it is indeed the 
case that inhibitoiy processes are implicated in the misinformation effect, an 
inhibitoiy account may also have some advantages over a non-inhibitoiy account. 
Such differences can perhaps be seen more clearly in the differing predictions made 
by both the inhibitoiy and non-inhibitoiy accounts. For example, the non-inhibitoiy 
account assumes that misinformation effects are due to the accessing of the 
misleading trace (during the post-event information phase) just prior to test making 
this trace much more accessible than the original trace during the memory test (e.g.. 
Chandler, 1991; Chandler and Gargano, 1998; Chandler et al., 2001). However, in 
the inhibitory account the prior access of the misleading trace before test is not a 
necessary requirement, and as such, the misinformation effect may still occur even 
when the post-event information phase occurs before the study phase (i.e., the 
misleading item is presented before the original item). Thus, the inhibitory account 
predicts the reversed misinformation effect (Abeles & Morton, 1999; Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989b).
Another critical difference between the inhibitory and non-inhibitoiy accounts 
concerns the original and misleading trace sharing a retrieval cue. While the sharing 
of retrieval cues is a critical condition in the production of misinformation effects in
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non-inhibitory accounts the original and misleading item do not have to share a cue in 
the inhibitory account. So long as the misleading item is at least consistent with the 
overall theme of an event then the misinformation can be very different to the original 
item. Specifically, while an individual may reject misleading information that is 
inconsistent with an event (e.g., introducing post-event information concerning a car 
into an event about an office theft) the inhibitory account would predict that 
semantically dissimilar misleading information may be successfully introduced on an 
original item (e.g., the misleading item ‘wallet’ is introduced on ‘coffee machine’). 
Similarly, while non-inhibitoiy accounts predict stronger interference effects from 
semantically similar misleading information the inhibitoiy account makes no such 
prediction. In fact, the only critical conditions necessary in the inhibitory account for 
the production of the misinformation effect is that inhibition be present and that it be 
directed at the original item. Thus, if inhibitory processes can provide an additional 
route to misinformation effects, it would not only be able to explain many previously 
unaccounted misinformation effects, but also suggest than misleading post-event 
information can perhaps have more widespread deleterious effects.
Hypotheses
If inhibitoiy processes are found to be present, then significantly more misinformation 
effects should be found in conditions where misinformation is introduced on inhibited 
items than in conditions where it is introduced on non-inhibited items. Under 
conditions where misleading information is presented on an inhibited item then 
misled participants are unlikely to be able to bring that original item into conscious 
awareness and, therefore, are likely to choose the misinformation on a memory test. 
In contrast, participants who receive misinformation on a non-inhibited item are more
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likely to choose the original item on a memoiy test as these participants can easily 
examine their memory for an event and locate the original information.
More specifically, inhibitoiy theories predict that all information that has been 
inhibited will be susceptible to misinformation. This is irrespective of whether the 
original information belongs to the target event (i.e., the one the participant is 
questioned about in the retrieval practice phase) or not. This being so, if inhibition is 
the determining factor for the successful assimilation of misinformation into event 
memoiy, then information fiom the unpracticed house that has been inhibited (i.e., 
NRP-Similar to RP+ and NRP-Similar to RP- items) should also be susceptible to 
post-event misleading information. As NRP-Similar items that are related to either 
the RP+ sub-set or RP- sub-set are likely to be inhibited by the retrieval of the target 
practiced items, misled participants are less likely to choose NRP-Similar items on a 
memory test. The findings of increased misinformation effects on NRP-Similar items 
would strongly suggest that inhibition may be a critical determinant of the 
misinformation effect, and that information of little relevance to an event can still be 
susceptible to misleading information. On the other hand, if misinformation is 
introduced on a non-inhibited item, such as an NRP-Dissimilar item or a Control item, 
then significant misinformation effects are not expected due to the original target item 
remaining available in memoiy.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred and fifty students and members of the public (77 men and 73 women) 
participated on a voluntaiy basis in this study. The experiment had a single factor
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(misinformation item: NRP-Similar to RP+, NRP-Similar to RP-, NRP-Dissimilar, 
RP-, or Control) between-subjects design where misinformation was introduced on 
either an NRP item similar to RP+ items, or an NRP item similar to the RP- items, 
NRP items dissimilar to the retrieval practice categoiy, RP- items, or Control items. 
Each condition contained 30 participants.
Materials 
Study Materials
The study materials used in the presentation phase were identical to those used in 
Experiment 4 (see Appendix Gl).
Retrieval Practice Questions
The retrieval practice booklets were identical to those used in Experiment 4 (see 
Appendix G2). In the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, half of the items from the 
implicit sub-categories formed part of the RP+ set in order for the remaining implicit 
sub-category members in the NRP set to be related to RP+ items (i.e., NRP-Similar 
items). In the NRP-Similar to RP- condition, half of the items from the implicit sub­
categories formed part of the RP- set in order for the remaining implicit sub-categoiy 
members in the NRP set to be related to these RP- items (i.e., NRP-Similar items). 
Participants in the Control condition did not receive a retrieval practice task about any 
of the stolen items. Rather, they received the same non-relevant retrieval practice task 
that was used in the Control condition of Experiment la (e.g., the capital city of Cuba 
is Ha ), see Appendix A4.
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Recall Booklets
The stem completion task that was employed in the previous studies was changed 
from a two-letter stem to a one-letter stem due to the extremely high recall rates 
recorded across all item types in the previous study. To ensure that this alteration in 
stem length would not lead to the task becoming too difficult and result in floor 
effects, a pilot study was mn, in which ten participants completed the study phase, a 
ten-minute distracter task (three sets of anagrams, see Appendix E7), and the 8 page 
recall booklet that used the same cues as the previous experiment, with the new one- 
stem prompts. Average recall using this technique was 71.66% {SD = .08). 
Therefore, cues with one-letter stems were used to measure recall performance in this 
study (see Appendix II).
Additional Questioning and Misinformation Phase
Each participant received only one piece of misinformation in order to reduce the 
chances of suspicion being raised about the tme nature of the experiment. In addition, 
the misinformation was embedded in one of twelve questions about one of the 
burglaries (the name of the house, Thompson's or Williams’, appeared in each 
question). These questions referred to details that were neither the subject of the 
retrieval practice phase or formed the basis of the final memory test that measured the 
influence of the misinformation. All participants received questions concerning the 
practiced house (i.e., the house from which its items formed the basis of the retrieval 
practice task). Participants in the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition received a piece of 
misinformation targeted at an item from unpracticed house (i.e., non-target house) that 
was similar to RP+ items and thus was also an item from one of the implicit sub­
categories. Paiticipants in the NRP-Similar to RP- condition received a piece of
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misinformation targeted at an item from the unpracticed house that was similar to RP- 
items, and thus was also a member of one of the implicit sub-categories. Participants 
in the NRP-Dissimilar condition received misinformation on an item from the 
unpracticed house that was dissimilar to all items from the practiced house and thus 
was not a member of any of the implicit sub-categories. Participants in the RP- 
condition received misinformation about an unpracticed item from the practiced house 
(i.e., target house) that was also a member of one of the implicit sub-categories. For 
participants in the Control condition, choice of misinformation and, therefore, which 
burglary they received questions about, was randomised and counterbalanced. In the 
absence of a previous retrieval practice session, this particular condition acted as a 
baseline measure for the misinformation effect. The misinformation item was 
semantically related in each case to the critical item, as determined through previous 
pilot work, see Appendix 12 for a list of all misinformation items and questions^.
Forced-Choice Recognition Task
The misinformation effect was measured using a set of multiple-choice questions. 
There were eight questions containing three possible answers (the correct item and 
two novel items), and participants had to circle one item for each question. For the 
critical question measuring the effect of introducing misinformation, participants had 
to choose between the correct item, the misinformation item, or a novel item (see 
Appendix 13).
 ^ T i l l s  i i i f o i i n a t i o n  w a s  t a k e n  f r o m  ( l i e  p i l o t  s t u d y  d e s c r i b e d  i n  E x p e r i m e n t  3 ,  s e e  A p p e n d i x  E l ,
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Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually or in groups of up to four, were 
greeted by a female experimenter, and randomly assigned to one of the testing 
conditions. Participants were informed that they were to take part in a memory task. 
The study, retrieval practice and recall phases were the same as Experiment 4, except 
for the use of the one-letter stems during cued recall. Following completion of the 
recall task, participants were presented with twelve additional questions about one of 
the burglaries. Embedded in one of the questions was a single piece of post-event 
misinformation. Participants had four minutes to complete these questions. 
Following this, participants were presented with a distracter task, where they had to 
write down the names of ten countries for each letter of the alphabet. Participants 
were given five minutes for this task, and no participants completed this task in the 
allocated time. Finally, participants were presented with the forced-choice 
recognition task that measured the impact of misinformation on memory. Participants 
had to choose the correct stolen item from a choice of the original item, and two novel 
items for non-critical items. For the critical question that measured the 
misinformation effect, participants had to choose the correct item fi om a choice of the 
original item, the misinformation item, and a novel item. This final memory task was 
not timed, and participants could take as long as they needed in order to complete it. 
Once participants had finished, they were thanked, debriefed and dismissed (see 
Figure 31 for an outline of the procedure of this experiment).
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Figure 31: Outline ofprocedure for Experiment 5
DISTRACTER
FREE RECALL
STUDY PHASE 
Presentation of items stolen from 2 
houses (10 items per house)
FORCED-CHOICE RECOGNITION TEST 
Critical Question: original vs. MI. vs. new 
Non-critical questions: original vs. new vs. new
RETRIEVAL PRACTICE 
Half the items from one of the houses (each item 
cued 3 times) and interleaved with distracter tasks
MISINFORMATION PHASE 
NRP-Similar to RP^: MI presented on NRP-Similar to RP+ items 
NRP-Similar to RP-: MI presented on NRP-Similar to RP- items 
NRP-Dissimilar: MI presented on NRP-Dissimilar items 
RP-: MI presented on RP- items 
Control: MI presented on Control items
Note. M I  =  M i s i i i f o n n a t i o n
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Results
Retrieval Practice Success and Mean Recall Performance
Retrieval practice success rates for each condition were as follows; 85% {SD ~ .09) 
for the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, 89% {SD = .07) for the NRP-Similar to RP- 
condition, 87% {SD = .10) for the Dissimilar condition, and 90% {SD = .08) for the 
RP- condition.
Table 8 displays the recall for each item type for the four experimental 
conditions, including standard deviations, as well as their combined means. Mean 
recall across the conditions for the RP+ items was .84, while recall performance of the 
baseline NRP-Dissimilar items was .65, a facilitatoiy effect of .19. In addition, recall 
of the RP- items was .49, which was considerably lower than for the NRP-Dissimilar 
items, thus demonstrating a retrieval-induced forgetting effect of -.16. This pattern of 
reduced recall of RP- items relative to the baseline demonstrates the deleterious 
effects that prior practice has on memory for other items. Finally, mean recall of the 
NRP-Similar items was .51, which was also lower than for the NRP-Dissimilar items, 
demonstrating a cross-categoiy/second-order effect of -. 14. Therefore, the impaired 
recall of RP- and NRP-Similar items, even when novel recall cues are used, strongly 
suggests that inhibitory processes are responsible for these interference effects.
Transformation o f Data
The recall scores (proportion correct) within each condition were transformed using 
arcsin transformation in order to establish homogeneity of variance for all subsequent 
analyses (see Snedecor & Cochran, 1980, pp. 290-291).
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Table 8: Mean recall performance as a fimction o f item type
Item T)pe Retrieval-induced
Forgetting
Condition RP+ RP- NRP- NRP- (RP-)-NRP-
Similar Dissimilar Dissimilar
NRP-Similar to .86 .49 .53 .66 -.17
RP+ (.10) (15) (27) (.20)
NRP-Similar to .83 .48 .48 .64 -.16
RP- (13) (21) (25) (19)
NRP-Dissimilar .83 .50 .51 .65 -.15
(12) (22) (24) (18)
RP- .85 .49 .53 .66 -.17
(14) (21) (20) (21)
Mean .84 .49 .51 .65 -.16
(.12) (20) (24) (20)
Note. RP+ = pmcticed items from the practiced categoiy. RP- = impracticed items fiom the 
practiced categoiy. NRP-Similar = mipracticed items fiom the unpracticed categoy that are 
semantically similar to items from the practiced categoiy. NRP-Dissimilar = impracticed 
items from the unpracticed categoiy that are semantically dissimilar to items from the 
practiced categoiy. Recall of items in the Control condition = .71 (SD = .10). Standard 
deviations are enclosed in parentheses.
Manipulation Check: Retrieval-induced Forgetting 
NRP-Similar to RP+ Condition
Table 8 displays the recall for each item type for all experimental conditions. Mean 
recall of the RP+ items was .86, while recall performance for the NRP-Dissimilar 
items was .66 demonstrating the positive effects of practice on recall. However, recall 
of the RP- items was much lower at .49, and adequately demonstrates the negative
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effects of retrieval on related information. This pattern was further observed between 
the NRP-Similar and NRP-Dissimilar items, with recall performance for NRP-Similar 
items only .53.
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP-Similar, or NRP-Dissimilar) 
within-subjects ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of item types for the 
NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, F  (3,87) = 1 8 . 9 3 , <  .01, MS’e = .10. Cohen’s /  
indicated the presence of large effects for this condition ( /  = .43). Using Holm’s 
sequential Bonferroni approach, a series of pairwise comparisons revealed the 
facilitatory effects of practice on recall (i.e., RP+ > NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = 3.16,/? < 
.01), and the detrimental effect on related but unpracticed members of the same 
categoiy (i.e., RP- < NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = -4.42, p  < .01). In addition, evidence 
was found for cross-category impairment, whereby fewer items from the unpracticed 
categoiy that were semantically similar to the practiced items were recalled compared 
to the remaining dissimilar items from the unpracticed category (i.e., NRP-Similar < 
NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = -1.01, p <  .05) see Appendix J1 for statistical tables.
NRP-Similar to RP- Condition
Mean recall of the RP+ items was .83, while recall performance of the NRP- 
Dissimilar items was .64 demonstrating the positive effects of practice on recall. 
However, recall of the RP- item was only .48 and adequately demonstrates the 
negative effects of retrieval on related information. This pattern was further obseiwed 
between items from the NRP-Similar and NRP-Dissimilar items with recall 
performance for NRP-Similar items only .48.
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP-Similar, or NRP-Dissimilar) 
within-subjects ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of item types for the
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NRP-Similar to RP- condition, F  (3 ,87) = 21.11, <  .01, MSe =  .09. Cohen’s /
indicated the presence of large effects for this condition ( /  = .46). Using Holm’s 
sequential Bonferroni approach, a series of paiiwise compaiisons revealed the 
facilitatoiy effects of practice on recall (i.e., RP+ > NRP-Dissimilar, / (29) = 3.85,/? < 
.01), and the detrimental effect on related but unpracticed members of the same 
categoiy (i.e., RP- < NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = -2.99, p  < .01). In addition, evidence 
was found for second-order inhibition, whereby fewer items from the unpracticed 
category that were semantically similar to the unpracticed items from the practiced 
categoiy were recalled compared to the remaining dissimilar items from the 
unpracticed categoiy (i.e., NRP-Similar < NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = -3.15, p  < .01), 
see Appendix J2 for statistical tables.
NRP-Dissimilar Condition
Mean recall of the RP+ items was .83, while recall performance of the NRP- 
Dissimilar items was .65 demonstrating the positive effects of practice on recall. 
However, recall of the RP- items was only .50, demonstrating the negative effects of 
retrieval on related information. This pattern was fiirther obseived between NRP- 
Similar and NRP-Dissimilar items with recall of NRP-Similar items only .51.
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP-Similar, or NRP-Dissimilar) 
within-subjects ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of item type for the 
NRP-Dissimilar condition, F  (3,87) = 19.35,/? < .01, MSe -  .08. Cohen’s /  indicated 
the presence of large effects for this condition (/' = .44). Using Holm’s sequential 
Bonferroni approach, a series of pairwise comparisons revealed the facilitatory effects 
of practice on recall (i.e., RP+ > NRP-Disslmilai, t (29) = 4.03, p  < .01), and the 
detrimental effect on related but unpracticed members of the same categoiy (i.e., RP-
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< NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = -2.54, p  < .05). In addition, evidence was found for cross- 
categoiy/second-order inhibition, whereby fewer items from the unpracticed category 
that were semantically similar to the items from the practiced categoiy were recalled 
compaied to the remaining dissimilar items from the unpracticed category (i.e., NRP- 
Similar < NRP-Dissimilar, i. (29) = -2.20, p  < .05), see Appendix J3 for statistical 
tables.
RP- Condition
Mean recall of the RP+ items was .85, while recall performance of the NRP- 
Dissimilar items was .66 demonstrating the positive effects of practice on recall. 
However, recall of the RP- items was only .49, and demonstrates the negative effects 
of retrieval on related information. This pattern was further obseiwed between the 
NRP-Similar and NRP-Dissimilar items with recall of NRP-Similar items only .53.
A single factor (item type: RP+, or RP-, or NRP-Similar, or NRP-Dissimilar) 
within-subjects ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of item type for the 
RP- condition, F (3,87) = 23.29, p  < ,0\,MS& = .01. Cohen’s /  indicated the presence 
of large effects for this condition ( /  = .50). Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni 
approach, a series of pairwise comparisons revealed the facilitatory effects of practice 
on recall (i.e., RP+ > NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = 4.42, p  < .01), and the detrimental 
effect on related but unpracticed members of the same categoiy (i.e., RP- < NRP- 
Dissimilar, t (29) = -2.93, /7 < .01). In addition, evidence was found for cross- 
categoiy/second-order inhibition, whereby fewer items from the unpracticed categoiy 
that were semantically similar to items from the practiced categoiy were recalled 
compared to the remaining dissimilar items from the unpracticed categoiy (i.e., NRP-
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Similar < NRP-Dissimilar, t (29) = -2.82, p  < .01), see Appendix J4 for statistical 
tables.
Baseline Measures o f Recall
A between-subjects ANOVA confirmed that participants performance on NRP- 
Dissimilar items (overall M  = .65) was not significantly different from the recall 
performance of Control participants (M = .71), F  (4, 145) = .42, p  = n.s, MSq = .09. 
(see Appendix J5 for statistical tables).
Misinformation Effects
After having confirmed the presence of inhibitory processes underlying the retrieval- 
induced forgetting effect in each of the four experimental conditions, the effects of 
introducing misinformation on items that vaiy in their activation status (i.e., inhibition 
versus non-inhibition) can be considered. As inhibitory theories predict that 
participants are more likely to choose the misleading item when it is presented on an 
inhibited item, significant misinformation effects are only expected in the RP-, NRP- 
Similar to RP+, and NRP-Similar to RP- conditions. This hypothesis was confirmed. 
The largest misinformation effects occurred in the NRP-Similar to RP- condition, 
where 67% of participants chose the misinformation item over the correct original 
item (see Figure 32). Similarly, in the RP- and NRP-Similar to RP+ conditions, 
participants chose the misinformation item 57% and 47% of the time, respectively 
(see Table 9 for proportion of paiticipants choosing the original, misinformation, or 
new item at test).
A chi square analysis was conducted to evaluate whether misinformation had a 
more deleterious effect in conditions where misleading information was introduced on
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items that were subjected to inhibition. Condition and misinformation effect were 
found to be significantly related, (4, n = 100) = 22.61,/? < .01 (see Appendix J6). 
Effect size was computed Phi (0  = .39) which indicated the presence of a medium 
sized effect.
Table 9: Likelihood o f participants choosing the correct original item, the 
misinformation items, and the new item during forced-choice recognition
Critical item Non-critical items
Condition Original Misinfo. New error Mean Error
NRP-Similar to RP+ .40 .47 .13 .07
(.11)
NRP-Similar to RP- .30 .67 .03 .04
(.08)
NRP-Dissimilar .73 .23 .03 .07
(ril)
RP- .43 .57 .00 .08
(.08)
Control .83 .17 .00 .05
(.08)
Note. NRP-Similar to RP+: were misinformation was presented on NRP-Similar items that 
were related to RP+ items. NRP-Similar to RP-: were misinformation was presented on NRP- 
Similar items that were related to RP- items. NRP-Dissimilar: were misinformation was 
presented on NRP items tliat were dissimilar to tlie practiced categoy. RP-: were 
misinformation was presented on RP- items. Control: where no relevant retrieval practice 
occurred and misinformation was randomly presented. For the critical question measuring the 
misinformation effect, participants had to choose from the correct original item, the 
misinformation, and a new erroneous item. Proportion of errors on non-critical items (i.e., 
original item vs. new item vs. new item) is also included as a baseline measure of the 
proportion of errors made at forced-choice recognition. Standard deviations are enclosed in parentheses.
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Figure 32: Percentage o f participants choosing the misinformation option at forced- 
choice recognition in Experiment 5
%
Misinfo.
Effects
%
NRP-Similar NRP-Similar NRP- 
to RP+ to RP- Dissimilar
RP- Control
TYPE OF ITEM MISINFOMRATION PRESENTED ON (CONDITION)
Additional pairwise comparisons between the control and experimental 
conditions confirmed that misinformation had its greatest impact when it was 
presented on inhibited items, NRP-Similar to RP+: (1, /? = 60) = 6.24, p  < .05;
NRP-Similar to RP-: (1, n = 60) = 15.43, p < .01; RP- % \l, n = 60) = 10.34,
/? < .01. Effect size was calculated for each comparison using Phi (NRP-Similar to 
RP+: (j) = .32; NRP-Similar to RP-: (|) = .54; RP- (j) = .42), indicating the presence of a 
medium effect for the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, a large effect for the NRP- 
Similar to RP- condition, and a medium effect for the RP- condition (see Appendix J7
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for statistical tables). In addition, no significant differences were found between any 
of these conditions (NRP-Similar to RP+ versus NRP-Similar to RP-: (I, n = 60) =
2.44, p  = n.s; NRP-Similar to RP+ versus RP-: (1, n = 60) = .60, p  = n.s; NRP-
Similar to RP- versus RP-; (1, ri ~ 60) = .64,/? = n.s, see Appendix 18 for statistical 
tables).
In contrast, inhibitory theories predict that very few participants will choose 
the misleading item when it is introduced on non-inhibited items. This hypothesis 
was also supported, with participants in the NRP-Dissimilar and Control conditions 
choosing the misinformation item only 23% and 17% of the time, respectively. Chi 
square analysis confirmed there were no differences in the proportion of 
misinformation effects reported between the NRP-Dissimilar and Control conditions, 
y^ (1, n = 60) = .42,/? = n.s (see Appendix J9 for statistical table).
Therefore, it appears that that any information that creates competition at 
retrieval will be subject to inhibition which, in turn, greatly increases the likelihood of 
participants reporting misinformation at test. This conclusion is further strengthened 
when only these participants who demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting are 
considered. Sixty-three percent of participants in the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition 
who exhibited retrieval-induced forgetting (» = 19) chose the misinformation over the 
original item, compared with 18% of participants when retrieval-induced forgetting 
was absent {ri =11). Similar patterns were also found in the two other conditions 
where misinformation was presented on inhibited items. In the NRP-Similar to RP- 
and RP- conditions, participants chose the misinformation when retrieval-induced 
forgetting was present 86% {n = 22) and 74% {n = 19) of the time, respectively. 
However, when retrieval-induced forgetting was absent, participants in the NRP- 
Similar to RP- condition chose the misinformation only 13% {n = 8) of the time,
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while participants in the RP- conditions chose the misinformation only 27% (n =11)  
of the time. Retrieval-induced forgetting should not have this varying effect on the 
misinformation effect in conditions where misinformation is introduced on a non- 
inhibited item. This obseivation was supported by the findings in the NRP-Dissimilar 
condition where participants who chose the misinformation at a comparable level 
regardless of whether retrieval-induced forgetting was present or absent. Twenty-two 
percent of participants (n = 1 8 )  exhibiting retrieval-induced forgetting chose the 
misinformation, while 25% (n = 12) chose the misinformation when retrieval-induced 
forgetting was absent. Therefore, not only are participants 3-4 times more likely to 
choose the misinformation item over the original item when it is presented on an 
inhibited item (i.e., RP-, NRP-Similar), participants are also nearly 3-7 times more 
likely to choose the misinformation when retrieval-induced forgetting is present than 
when it is absent.
In addition, there was no differences in performance on the forced-choice 
recognition task for non-critical items between any of the conditions (93%, 96%, 
93%, 92%, 95% correct for the NRP-Similar to RP+, NRP-Similar to RP-, NRP- 
Dissimilar, RP-, and Control conditions, respectively). Therefore, the misinformation 
effects found in the conditions where misleading information was introduced on items 
confirmed as inhibited was not due to poor overall test performances, which may have 
indicated a failure to encode the target information at study.
Discussion
Having established in Experiment 3 that the memorial representation of RP- items 
were actively inhibited, as well as demonstrating both cross-categoiy and second- 
order inhibitoiy effects in Experiment 4, the current study focused on whether the
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inhibitoiy state of the original item was a critical determinant of the success of 
introducing misinformation. This was accomplished through the application of the 
independent probe method (M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995) to the modified 
misinformation paradigm, which could confirm whether the original item was 
inhibited or not before misleading post-event information was introduced on it.
In support of the inhibitory account, significant retrieval-induced forgetting 
effects were found using the independent probe method in all four of the experimental 
conditions (i.e., NRP-Similar to RP+ condition, NRP-Similar to RP- condition, NRP- 
Dissimilar condition, RP- condition). Not only does this finding suggest that 
inhibitory processes are responsible for retrieval-induced forgetting, but it also 
suggests that the memorial representations of RP- items are inhibited. The inhibition 
of the memorial representations of RP- items is likely the result of their direct 
competition for retrieval with the practiced items (i.e., the RP+ and RP- items belong 
to the same event).
Additionally, cross-categoiy and second-order impairment was also found. 
That is, recall of NRP items that were semantically similar to RP+ items (i.e., NRP- 
Similar to RP+) or RP- items (i.e., NRP-Similar to RP-) were also impaired. As these 
findings were still found using the independent probe method it strongly suggests that 
the memorial representations of NRP-Similar items were also inhibited. More 
specifically, NRP-Similar to RP+ items are still subject to inhibition even though they 
appear in an unrelated event. As these items share a sub-category with the practiced 
items, they may compete directly for retrieval with the RP+ items in a similar manner 
to that of the RP- items (in effect, making this group a second RP- category). As a 
result of this competition, these NRP-Similar to RP+ items will be inhibited. In 
contrast, the NRP-Similar to RP- items do not compete directly with the RP+ items
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for retrieval, but do instead share a related sub-category with the RP- items. As RP- 
items are inhibited to prevent them from interfering with the retrieval of the RP+ 
items (and this is confirmed using the independent probe method), inhibition is 
thought to leak to any other items that are related to the RP- items. This inhibitory 
account of the impaired recall of the NRP-Similar to RP- items is also supported by 
the observation that the strength-dependent competition assumptions of gwnon- 
inhibitoiy theories are unable to explain this finding, as well as the unimpaired recall 
of the NRP-Dissimilar items. These items were unrelated to any of the items from the 
practiced categoiy and so will not have competed for retrieval with the RP+ items. 
Therefore, NRP-Dissimilar items were not subject to inhibition and were recalled at a 
similar level to that of the Control items.
The introduction of misleading post-event information had a further 
(impairing) effect on memoiy performance but only for inhibited items. 
Misinformation had its greatest impact when presented on items that were determined 
to have been inhibited before misleading information was presented (i.e., NRP- 
Similar to RP+, NRP-Similar to RP- and RP- items). Thus, when participants were 
faced with the critical question on the forced-choice recognition task measuring the 
misinformation effect, the original target item was unavailable in memory and unable 
to compete with the misinformation. Under these conditions, participants chose the 
misinformation item. Additionally, there were no significant differences between the 
proportion of misinformation effects between any of these conditions despite the 
differences in each of the item type’s relationship to RP+ items.
Further support for the inhibitory account of misinformation effects was found 
when only participants who demonstrated retrieval-induced forgetting were 
considered. That is, each condition can be divided into those participants who
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demonstrate retrieval-induced forgetting (i.e., the specific inhibition of the memorial 
representations of the RP- items) and those who do not. Those participants who 
received misinformation on an inhibited item in addition to retrieval-induced 
forgetting also being present (i.e., RP- items were inhibited) were 3-7 times more 
likely to choose the misleading item at test than participants who received 
misinformation on an inhibited item but fail to demonstrate retrieval-induced 
forgetting (i.e., RP- item was unlikely to have been inhibited).
Similarly, significant misinformation effects were not detected in conditions 
where misinformation was presented on non-inhibited items (i.e., NRP-Dissimilar and 
Control items), and in the case of the NRP-Dissimilar items, this was regardless of 
whether retrieval-induced forgetting was present or not. This finding suggests that 
the NRP-Dissimilar and Control items were still available in memory at the time of 
the forced-choice recognition test and, as a result, were able to compete for retrieval 
with the misinformation item. As such items were available in memory participants 
were able to choose that item on the recognition test and correctly discard the 
misinformation item.
These findings strongly suggest that information that has been actively 
inhibited through the retrieval process is highly susceptible to misinformation and 
thus inhibitoiy processes are likely to be at least one of the mechanisms that mediates 
the misinformation effect. As a result, these findings may have a more general 
application to theories of memory updating. The inhibitoiy account suggests that the 
process of updating memory may be much easier when potentially unwanted or out- 
of-date information is first inhibited. This first step in the updating process may 
decrease the likelihood of older material interfering with the encoding or retrieval of 
newer information, while the potentially deleterious effects of non-inhibited
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information on the memoiy updating process can be clearly seen in the NRP- 
Dissimilar and Control conditions. In these conditions, the memorial representations 
of the original items have not been subjected to inhibition, and as a result, post-event 
information is unsuccessfully introduced on NRP-Dissimilar and Control items. In 
terms of memory updating, these findings suggest that the updating process may be 
relatively unsuccessful if the unwanted or out-of-date information is not first 
suppressed.
As the retrieval process appears to play a key role in retrieval-induced 
forgetting and in leaving memory vulnerable to misleading information these findings 
may also have implications for questioning techniques employed by the police for the 
interviewing of eyewitnesses. The police typically rely on the standard inteiview and 
the cognitive interview for questioning witnesses but both of these methods are based 
on the repeated retrieval of information concerning a criminal episode. That is, the 
police typically ask the same, or very similar, questions repeatedly in order to 
determine the facts of a case. However, the current findings suggest that this 
questioning process may not only cause witnesses to forget potentially important 
details concerning an incident but also, in addition, leave those forgotten details 
vulnerable to being superseded by potentially misleading information. Additionally, 
as NRP-Similar items appear to be equally as susceptible to both inhibition and 
misleading information it suggests that the retrieval of seemingly unrelated 
information about a separate event can still result in retrieval-induced forgetting and 
misinformation effects.
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CHAPTER 10 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
One of the longest mnning, and controversial, debates in psychology concerns the 
issue of memoiy permanence. Of critical importance is whether information that is 
currently inaccessible in memoiy is permanently lost, or is all information encoded 
into long-term memoiy ultimately recoverable? Despite vigorous psychological 
research, using paradigms vaiying from retroactive interference and misinformation 
paradigms to thought suppression and directed forgetting paradigms, our 
understanding of how memory is updated remains limited.
The present thesis has focused on the misinformation effect, which has been 
used as a method for investigating how new or contradictory information updates 
older memories, thereby allowing questions concerning the fate of older memories to 
be investigated. While the effect in itself is a widely replicated finding within 
cognitive and applied psychology, there has been little agreement as to the underlying 
mechanisms. There has been much discussion as to whether the original memory 
remains intact, but that retrieval access is blocked in some way, or whether the 
original memoiy is cormpted in some way by the presentation of misinformation. To 
date, no mechanism has been put foiward that can adequately explain how 
misinformation effects are produced.
The present thesis represents an attempt to apply recent research concerning 
inhibitoiy retrieval processes in forgetting to the study of the misinformation effect. 
The current findings suggest that inhibitoiy processes acting during retrieval may be 
at least one of the mechanisms that lead to misled participants reporting post-event 
misleading information in preference to the original information. This inhibitoiy
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account of misinformation effects also allows for the interesting possibility of cross­
category misinformation effects, which suggests that all information that is currently 
inhibited is susceptible to misleading information, irrespective of whether the original 
item occurred in the target event or not.
Experiment la suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting can be a critical 
boundary condition in the production of misinformation effects. The success of 
introducing misinformation appears to be determined by the type of item about which 
misinformation is introduced, with significant misinformation effects only to be found 
when misleading information is presented on items that have been subjected to 
retrieval-induced forgetting. Experiment 2a and 2b also suggest that retrieval-induced 
forgetting must be present at the time of introducing the misleading information. 
When retrieval-induced forgetting is absent due to its dissipation over a prolonged 
retention inteiwal participants seem to be less likely to choose the misleading item at 
test than in conditions where retrieval-induced forgetting is evident. Experiment 3 
examined the primary mechanisms underlying the retrieval-induced forgetting effect 
by using the independent probe method to test for inhibitory and non-inhibitory 
processes. Experiment 3 determined that retrieval-induced forgetting was still present 
when memory was tested using novel retrieval cues (i.e., ‘independent probes’). Not 
only does the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting suggest that inhibitory 
processes are primarily responsible for retrieval-induced forgetting, but it also 
suggests that the memorial representations of the RP- items are genuinely inhibited. 
This important finding was replicated in both Experiments 4 and 5, and extended to 
include NRP items that were semantically similar to items from the practiced 
categoty. Specifically, the memorial representations of NRP items that were related 
to practiced RP+ items (i.e., cross-categoiy effects) or inhibited RP- items (i.e.,
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second-order effects) were also suppressed. The finding of inhibitory processes in 
retrieval-induced forgetting (Experiments 3 -  4), and cross-category/second-order 
impairment (Experiment 4) formed the basis of a further investigation into the role of 
inhibitoiy process in misinformation effects in Experiment 5. In this study, 
misinformation was found to have its greatest influence on memoiy when it was 
present on items that were inhibited (i.e., RP- and NRP-Similar items), but not on 
non-inhibited items (i.e., NRP-Dissimilar and Control items). This finding suggests 
that inhibitory processes may be at least one of the mechanisms influencing the 
misinformation effect.
Retrieval as a Memory Modifier
Unlike artificial memory storage systems, such as computers or compact discs, where 
the retrieval of stored information does not alter that information, the retrieval of 
information from human memoiy is thought to modify that system. It is a long 
established finding that the prior retrieval of information increases the probability of 
that item being successfully retrieved at a later date (e.g., Allen et al., 1969; R.A. 
Bjork, 1975; Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Koutstaal et al., 1998; Morris & Fritz, 2000, 
2002), and the more difficult this initial retrieval is, the greater the benefit to 
subsequent recall attempts (Landauer & Bjork, 1978). Retrieval, however, not only 
strengthens those recalled items in memory; it can also modify the system by making 
other related items less available for retrieval. This form of forgetting associated with 
the retrieval of other related information is a property of human memory that has 
remained largely unexplored until recently when it has been identified as having a 
possible adaptive function in the maintenance of an efficient and flexible memory 
system.
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To many people, forgetting is merely an irritating aspect of eveiyday life, and 
is seen as a wholly negative experience. However, it has recently been argued that 
forgetting is a necessary function in order to keep our memoiy system flexible and up- 
to-date (e.g., E.L. Bjork et al, in press; R.A. Bjork, 1989; M.D. MacLeod et al, 2003; 
Macrae & MacLeod, 1999). Previously stored out-of-date information could 
potentially dismpt the retrieval of desired memories if it is not forgotten in some way. 
Whether this forgetting consists of permanent erasure, or merely putting it aside in 
some way, it can provide a vital and adaptive fonction in memoiy preventing this 
unwanted information from competing for retrieval with target information and 
interfering with retrieval. Arguably, if we did not have a way of preventing redundant 
memories from vying for retrieval, we would likely fail to recall desired memories.
Despite such assertions that forgetting is an adaptive response to the goal- 
directed nature of our memories, and represents a way of controlling the contents of 
conscious memoiy, there may also be unintentional costs. While retrieval-induced 
forgetting has been explained as an adaptive feature of our memoiy systems in terms 
of current goals, it may not be consistent with the attainment of foture goals. That is, 
while retrieval-induced forgetting can resolve competition at retrieval, resulting in the 
suppression of unwanted competitors, it may also prevent us from being able to recall 
one of those previously unwanted items at a later date. For example, in the retrieval 
practice paradigm, the RP- items are prevented from disaipting the selective retrieval 
of the target RP+ items, but retrieval-induced forgetting also prevents an individual 
from satisfying the foture goal of reporting all of the study items during the final 
recall test. Current research has extended this finding to various social situations, 
discovering that the suppression of competing information may have negative 
consequences for interpersonal perceptions (M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Macrae
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& MacLeod, 1999), completing exams (Macrae & MacLeod, 1999), reporting a 
criminal event (M.D. MacLeod, 2002; Shaw et al., 1995), and the maintenance of 
stereotypical and individuating information (Dunn & Spellman, 2003). The current 
studies add to our understanding of the deleterious side-effects of an otherwise 
adaptive process in memoiy and, in particular, suggests that the unintentional 
forgetting of information may leave those items particularly susceptible to the effects 
of misleading post-event information.
Retrieval-induced Forgetting and the Role o f Competition
The retrieval practice of the RP+ items has previously been identified as a necessary 
condition for retrieval-induced forgetting to occur (M.C. Anderson et al, 2000a) and, 
similarly in Experiments 1 -5, participants were significantly better at recalling 
practiced items than either unrelated NRP items or control items. This suggests that 
retrieving an item from memory has a strong facilitatoiy effect on our ability to recall 
those items later. In contrast, as no relevant retrieval practice occurred in the control 
conditions of Experiments 1 - 5  there was no evidence of any facilitatoiy effects on 
memoiy performance. Similarly, no evidence was found of activation spreading 
from practiced items to unrelated NRP-Dissimilar items in Experiments 3 - 5 .
The retrieval of a sub-set of items from a categoiy not only had a direct effect 
on the subsequent reporting of those items (i.e., RP+), but it also directly affected the 
probability of related items being retrieved as well. The remaining items from the 
practiced categoiy that were not themselves practiced (i.e., RP- items) were found to 
be recalled at a poorer level than other non-practiced items from unrelated categories 
(i.e., NRP-Dissimilar, control) throughout Experiments 1 - 5 .  This is despite the RP-, 
NRP-Dissimilar and control items all being unpracticed items. These three items only
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differ in their degree of relatedness to the practiced items. While items from the 
NRP-Dissimilar category remain unrelated to the practiced items, and there are no 
practiced items in the control condition, the RP- items differ due to their episodic 
similarity to the RP+ items. That is, the RP- items appear in the same event as the 
practiced items. As the goal of retrieval practice was to retrieve only a sub-set of 
items, it may have been necessary for the RP- items to be prevented from attempting 
to compete for retrieval during this task. If the RP- items were allowed to compete 
for retrieval, they would have interfered with the goal of the retrieval practice task, 
and may have resulted in participants having difficulty in selectively retrieving the 
target RP+ items. As only the RP- items are similar to the target information, they are 
the only items that are likely to create interference, and thus, only the recall of these 
RP- items is selectively impaired.
Similarly, items in the unpracticed category that are semantically similar to 
items from the practiced category may also compete for retrieval and interfere with 
the selective retrieval of the target material (Experiments 4 -  5). These NRP-Similar 
to RP+ items are likely to compete directly with the RP+ items during retrieval 
practice. As these items are drawn from the same semantic category as the practiced 
item, they may be acting like a second RP- group, and thus suffer the same fate. 
However, this cross-category impairment is not just restricted to NRP items that are 
semantically related to practiced items, but also to NRP items that are related to RP- 
items as well. The impairment of these items is perhaps less intuitive given that the 
NRP-Similar to RP- items neither share a semantic link with the practiced item 
(although they do share an episodic link as both the practiced and unpracticed 
categories appeared within the same experiment). However, NRP-Similar to RP- 
items may be subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting because of their semantic
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similarity with items that do compete with the RP+ items for retrieval (i.e., RP- 
items). This is discussed in more detail later in this chapter in terms of inhibitoiy 
processes.
Competition due to Similarity in the NRP Baseline Measure
Recall performance of the baseline NRP items was found to be impaired in 
Experiment 1 when it was compared to the control condition. This was likely to be 
due to the unintentional sharing of similarity between items across the two categories 
of items. While no significant cross-category inhibition was actually detected, this 
may have been due to the issue of nominal versus functional similarity (M.C. 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995). As a result, there may not have been enough related 
items to make any similarities salient, and thus participants will have failed to employ 
such relationships to aid or impair recall. However, there may have been sufficient 
competition for retrieval under some circumstance to lead to the retrieval-induced 
forgetting of some items, thus resulting in the depressed NRP performance.
In contrast, the possible contaminating effect of cross-category inhibition 
operating in the baseline NRP condition was controlled in Experiment 3. Items were 
specifically chosen that contained only weak relationships with each other, and these 
weak similarities were established thiough pilot work. Without the shared similarity 
between items these NRP items should not have competed for retrieval with the 
practiced items during the retrieval practice phase, and thus should not have been at 
risk of retrieval-induced forgetting.
The ability of this NRP category to act as a true unrelated unpracticed baseline 
measure was confirmed by participants’ ability to recall these items at a similar level 
to that of the control items. This finding that memory for such unrelated items
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remains unimpaired by the prior retrieval of practiced items was supported by the 
unimpaired recall of NRP-Dissimilar items in the final two studies. The recall 
performance for NRP-Dissimilar items in Experiments 4 - 5  was found to be of a 
similar level to that for control items. Therefore, items that are unrelated to either 
practiced items or inhibited items appeal* to be neither facilitated nor impaired by the 
retrieval of other items.
Does Inhibition Cônlrol the Spread o f Activation?
The selective retrieval impairment of items that are similar to practiced items is 
perhaps surprising given the findings from studies using the DRM paradigm. This 
paradigm suggests that the prior study of items can lead to the spreading of activation 
fi*om studied items to related but non-presented information (Roediger & McDermott, 
1995), resulting in participants being more likely to mistake such similar Tures’ as 
having appeared in a previous list than dissimilar lures. However, if retrieval-induced 
forgetting is examined within this framework of spreading activation, it suggests that 
the selective impairment of RP- items may be a reaction to their prior activation. If 
the retrieval of RP+ items increases their retrieval strength in memoi*y, then the 
activation of practiced items may spread to other items that are related either 
semantically (i.e., RP- and NRP-Similar items) or episodically (RP- items). 
Therefore, items semantically related to RP+ items that are either in the same 
practiced category or from a different unpracticed categoiy could also be strengthened 
in memory. In addition, items that are in the same episode as the practiced items may 
also share in this facilitatoiy effect. However, as the retrieval practice task is goal- 
directed in the sense that it requires only a sub-set of items to be retrieved (in a time- 
constrained task as well), it would be inefficient for memoiy to allow all of these
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related items to remain in a heightened state of activation. That is, these activated 
related items are likely to compete for retrieval with the RP+ items and therefore 
create a great deal of interference during the retrieval practice phase. Thus, retrieval- 
induced forgetting effects may be the result of a mechanism that dampens down the 
activation of these similar but unwanted items, thereby allowing the fast and efficient 
retrieval of desired memories.
Output Interference at Final Recall
Output interference was also dismissed as playing a primary role in the production of 
retrieval-induced forgetting effects. While output interference is an interesting 
phenomenon in itself, which can influence what information is retrieved and what 
remains unavailable for recollection, it is a process that operates only during the final 
retrieval of information. Thus, output interference can influence what information is 
recalled, but it is not a process that is triggered by the selective retrieval of 
information during the retrieval practice stage. As retrieval-induced forgetting is 
believed to be a result of retrieving only a sub-set of items it was vital that the effects 
of output interference are excluded as a possible explanation for these results.
Despite excluding output interference as a primary influence on the retrieval- 
induced forgetting effects found in Experiments 1 - 5 ,  h should be noted that recent 
reseai'ch provides preliminary evidence for inhibitoiy processes operating within 
output interference. Bauml (1998) found that the prior recall of moderately strong 
exemplars in an output interference paradigm suppressed recall for strong items but 
not weak exemplars. This suggests that inhibition may not only be elicited during the 
retrieval practice of information, as implied by retrieval-induced forgetting (e.g., M.C. 
Anderson et al., 1994), but it may also be operating during the final recall phase.
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The Inhibition o f Competing Representations: I  Non-inhibitory Models 
As both non-inhibitory strength-dependent competition models and inhibitory models 
can explain the basic retrieval-induced forgetting effect, it was necessaiy to identify 
areas where both models predict different patterns of results. It is vital that these 
distinctions are identified and explored as in many instances non-inhibitory models 
provide a more parsimonious explanation of retrieval-induced forgetting. Non- 
inhibitoiy and inhibitoiy models do differ on a number of predictions. Strength- 
dependent models assume that the strengthening of features is a non-specific process 
whereby memorial representations can be strengthened not just through retrieval, but 
also by simply presenting information. In contrast, inhibitory models specify that 
strengthening is specific to the retrieval process. Both models also differ in their 
predictions concerning the pre-experimental strength of memorial representations. 
Strength-dependent models do not consider the pre-experimental strength of 
representations so that the effects of strengthening on a pre-experimentally strong 
item should be the same as strengthening in a pre-experimentally weak item. On the 
other hand, inhibitory models do consider the pre-experimental strength of an item. 
Items that are considered strong members of a category should be subjected to a 
greater degree of inhibition than are items that are considered weak members of a 
category. Thus, strong items are assumed to create more competition and interference 
at retrieval than do weak members of a category.
A third difference between strength-dependent competition models and 
inhibitoiy models concerns predictions of cue-dependent and cue-independent 
forgetting. Strength-dependent competition models exclusively predict cue-dependent 
forgetting. That is, failure to recollect the target memory is due to changes in the 
association between the retrieval cue and the representation, such as tlii'ough the use
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of an inappropriate cue or associative blocking, thus preventing the trace being 
retrieved. This interference typically occurs because a competing item has been 
strengthened, resulting in the association between that retrieval cue and the related 
target item being weakened. However, if a new cue is used, and there is no 
interference occurring along the retrieval route between the cue and the memorial 
representation, then the memory should be successfully recollected. Thus, this type of 
interference is cue-dependent. In contrast, inhibitory models place the interference at 
the level of the memorial representation. Thus, it is the actual memorial 
representation that is inhibited in memory. This cue-independent forgetting continues 
to persist even when alternative cues and associative routes are used in a retrieval 
attempt.
Cue-independent forgetting is currently understood to be the strongest 
evidence for inhibitory processes in retrieval (M.C. Anderson & Bjork, 1994; M.C. 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995). At the core of strength-dependent competition models 
is the notion of cue-dependent retrieval and interference between traces that share the 
same retrieval cue. The remaining three studies (i.e.. Experiments 3 - 5 )  attempted to 
establish whether cue-dependent or cue-independent forgetting was present in the 
retrieval-induced forgetting effect. This was investigated by using the independent 
probe technique whereby different retrieval cues were used at recall to the ones that 
were used during retrieval practice. By using novel cues in this way, it ensures that 
any strengthening between the RP+ items and the study cue does not affect the 
retrieval strength of any other item through processes such as blocking.
Although Experiments 1 and 2 did not set out to test any of these predictions, 
Experiment 3 established, according to M.C. Anderson and Spellman’s (1995) 
criteria, that inhibitory processes were responsible for the observed retrieval-induced
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forgetting effects. Even when the cues used to prompt recall differed from those used 
at both the study and retrieval practice phases, a pattern of retrieval-induced forgetting 
still emerged. As non-inhibitory theories of forgetting suggest that impaired RP- 
performance will only occur when RP- items share the same retrieval practice cue as 
the RP+ items (as it is the strengthening of the RP+ items association to the its cue 
through practice that blocks access to the RP- items), these theories would predict an 
absence of retrieval-induced forgetting when novel cues are used at recall. On the 
other hand, inhibitory theories of forgetting suggest that the activity of competing 
representations is actively reduced so that the target item can be retrieved. Therefore, 
as it is the actual item that is suppressed in memory, rather than it merely being 
blocked by the activity of a more highly activated representation, inhibitoiy theories 
would predict that the recall of competitors should still be impaired even when novel 
cues are used at test. As RP- recall performance was still impaired when novel 
retrieval cues were used (Experiments 3 -  5), the current set of results suggest that 
inhibitoiy processes represent the primary process governing the retrieval-induced 
forgetting effect in episodic memory. This suggests that non-inhibitory strength- 
dependent models of retrieval are insufficient (at least, as the primary process) to 
explain the presence of retrieval-induced forgetting using the independent probe 
method. In addition, retrieval-induced forgetting was not found in the control 
condition where participants engaged in a non-relevant practice task (Experiments 3 -  
5). As this task was the only difference between the control and experimental 
condition, it strongly suggests that the inhibitoiy processes found in the experimental 
condition were elicited by retrieval practice. The inhibitory interpretation of 
Experiment 3 is fiirther strengthened by evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting using 
the independent probe method in Experiments 4 and 5. Thus, the finding of inhibited
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RP- items has been found in three separate experiments, and with changes in 
materials, suggesting a fairly robust inhibitory effect. In addition. Experiments 3 -5 
currently represents the only set of studies other than those conducted by M.C. 
Anderson and colleagues (M.C. Anderson & Bell, 2001; M.C. Anderson & Green, 
2001; M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; M.C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995) to have found 
support for inhibitory process using the independent probe method.
The Inhibition o f Competing Representations: II. Cross-category Inhibition 
As M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995) discovered that the likelihood of information 
being inhibited was dependent on its relatedness to items from practiced category, 
related sub-categories were introduced that spanned the two incidents in order to 
investigate cross-category effects. In Experiment 4, items from the unpracticed 
categoiy (i.e., NRP items) were inhibited if they were semantically similar to 
practiced items (i.e., RP+), as well as if they where similar to inhibited items (i.e., 
RP-) from the practiced category. Inhibitory processes can be inferred as having been 
active because the recall of NRP-Similar items was impaired even though they were 
tested under a different cue to those cues used during the retrieval practice phase. 
Specifically, while NRP-Similar to RP+ items were tested using the same retrieval 
cue as the RP+ items (e.g., clothing), the RP+ items were studied and practiced under 
a different cue (e.g., Williams’ House) to the NRP-Similar items (e.g., Thompson’s 
House). As it is the strength of the association between the RP+ items and the 
retrieval practice cue that blocks retrieval of competing information in non-inhibitory 
theories of forgetting (e.g., Thompson’s House -  RP+ association), the use of shared 
novel cues at recall between the RP+ and NRP-Similar to RP+ items should still be 
sufficient to test the predictions put foiivard by inhibitoiy theories. Thus, the
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impaired recall of NRP items that were similar to RP+ items suggests that these 
unpracticed but competing items are inhibited at retrieval, much like RP- items are. 
In fact, as these NRP-Similar items share a semantic categoiy with the RP+ items, 
they may actually be acting like a second RP- group and are therefore competing 
directly with the practiced items for retrieval. In order to reduce the interference these 
similar items from the unpracticed category create during retrieval, they are inhibited 
in a similar fashion to the RP- items. This conclusion, that the NRP-Similar to RP+ 
items are acting in a similar way to the RP- items, is further supported by the finding 
that the difference in recall for the RP- and NRP-Similar to RP+ items was 5% or 
below (i.e.. Experiment 4 -  5).
Similarly, in Experiments 4 -5, the RP+ items were tested, as well as being 
studied and practiced, under a different cue to the NRP-Similar to RP- items. This 
was due to the NRP-Similar items in this condition sharing an implicit categoiy with 
the RP- items, and thus being dissimilar to the RP+ items. Despite this change, the 
recall performance of NRP-Similar to RP- items remained impaired, even though 
these items did not compete directly for retrieval with the RP+ items. The 
presentation of items in the study phase is likely to raise the activation level of these 
items, and this activation may spread to all related information. The strengthening of 
associations between items that are semantically and episodically related may occur 
regardless of whether they were present in the study phase or not (as suggested by 
studies employing the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, e.g., Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). An inhibitory process may provide a mechanism by which this 
activation can be counteracted and, therefore, prevent unwanted information 
cluttering up the retrieval of desired memories.
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This activation during the study phase can potentially explain the inhibition of 
items from the unpracticed category that shares semantic features with the RP- items. 
If the association between RP- and related items is strengthened through their 
presentation in the study phase (e.g., leather jacket and trainers from the practiced 
house, sweater and jeans from the unpracticed house), then the inhibition of RP- items 
will also lead to the inhibition of related information (e.g., sweater and jeans). 
Therefore, it appears that when RP- items are inhibited, inhibition Teaks’ or ‘spreads’ 
from these items to any information that is related to. This means that items from the 
unpracticed categoiy that are similar to the RP- items appear to suffer the same fate as 
their related RP- items. This pattern of impairment suggests that information that 
competes for retrieval with the target information, or that is similar to information that 
does compete, would create interference at retrieval and thus would be inhibited to 
allow for fast and accurate retrieval of the target material. In contrast, non-inhibitoiy 
strength-dependent competition models of interference cannot explain the impaired 
recall of NRP-Similar to RP- items. This type of NRP-Similar item does not share a 
retrieval cue with the target RP+ items and, therefore, cannot compete for retrieval 
with these items. Thus, as two of the assumptions of strength-dependent competition 
models have been violated, non-inhibitory theories would have predicted that recall of 
these items would not have been impaired. This additional exclusion of non- 
inhibitoiy theories as a possible alternative explanation of second-order impairment 
further strengthens the assertion that inhibitoiy processes are present in the current set 
of studies.
On the other hand, items from the unpracticed categoiy that were semantically 
dissimilar to all items from the practiced categoiy were unaffected by the prior 
retrieval of practiced items (Experiments 4 -  5). As these NRP-Dissimilar items are
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not related to the practiced items, they do not share any facilitatoiy effects of 
activation spreading from the practiced items. Similarly, as these unrelated items are 
not activated by the retrieval of the target items, they are unlikely to compete for 
retrieval and therefore do not need to be inhibited in order to prevent them interfering 
with the retrieval of the RP+ items.
The current findings of impaired recall of RP- and both types of NRP-Similar 
items suggests that inhibition in retrieval-based theories of forgetting can be inferred 
in a mechanistic sense (as defined by R.A. Bjork, 1989). In the independent probe 
method, the “inhibition” of these competing items goes beyond the term’s use in a 
theoretically neutral or weak descriptive sense. Thus, it is proposed that a mechanism 
is present that reduces the activation levels of competing representations which, in 
turn, allows for the quick and successful recollection of target memories. Such 
inhibitory processes would allow the human memoiy system to remain flexible and 
stable (Dagenbach & Carr, 1994) during the updating of memory. Therefore, the 
system would remain sufficiently modifiable tlirough the temporary inhibition of 
competing representations, rather than the permanent erasure of information, allowing 
the system to be adaptable to changes in eveiyday memorial goals (M.D. MacLeod & 
Macrae, 2001; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999).
The only previous findings of inhibition in retrieval-induced forgetting has 
been by M.C. Anderson and Spellman (1995), who used lists of categoiy exemplars, 
and Ciranni and Shimamura (1999), who used visuo-spatial materials, such as 
coloured shapes at different locations. Thus, these studies have employed very 
different materials to those reported in Experiments 3 - 5 .  The materials employed in 
these three experiments were episodically collected under arbitrary categories of 
“Thompson’s House” and “Williams’ House”, rather than forming categories of
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semantic or perceptually similar items. In addition, the target items appeared within a 
context (e.g., burglaries, houses), and appeared embedded within sentences, rather 
than being presented as word lists. The retrieval practice phase also differed 
significantly from that used by M.C. Anderson and Spellman and Ciranni and 
Shimamura. Rather than using a cue-plus-stem task, the retrieval practice task 
employed here consisted of repeated questioning that increased in difficulty with each 
proceeding set of questions. However, participants were explicitly informed which 
house they would be retrieving items from. Finally, the findings of retrieval-induced 
forgetting with the independent probe method using these materials suggests that 
inhibitoiy processes in retrieval can be examined in simpler stripped-down paradigms 
than that previously used by M.C. Anderson and Spellman. The number of target 
items used in the current set of experiments employing the independent probe method 
was approximately half that used by M.C. Anderson and Spellman, as well as the 
number of retrieval practice questions being greatly reduced. Therefore, much in the 
same way as Macrae and MacLeod (1999) demonstrated that the standard retrieval- 
induced forgetting paradigm could be simplified, the current experiments demonstrate 
that cue-independence can also be investigated using a more simplified paradigm.
The Inhibition o f Competing Representations: III The Role o f Similaiity in the 
Pattern Suppression Inhibition Model
The findings that NRP-Similar items also suffered from inhibition if they were 
semantically similar to items from the practiced categoiy (Experiments 4 - 5 )  can be 
easily accommodated by the pattern suppression inhibition model (M.C. Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995). This model assumes that each item’s memorial representation 
consists of semantic feature units that can be activated through the retrieval process or
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can be inhibited through that same retrieval process. Thus, the retrieval of an item 
from memoiy will activate those features with that specific representation. In 
addition, if those activated semantic features appear in any other representation, then 
those features will also be activated. A similar pattern should occur for inhibited 
features. The retrieval of a representation will activate those features related to it and, 
in order to increase discrimination between that target trace and competing traces, 
those activated features within the competing memorial representations will be 
actively inhibited. Any other unwanted representation that shares these activated 
features will also be inhibited. Thus, a competing memorial representation can be 
facilitated through its similarity to the target trace, or conversely, it can also be 
suppressed due to its similarity. Whether a competing representation is inhibited or 
not will be dependent on the proportion of activated features compared to the 
proportion of inhibited features. If a competing trace is highly similar to the target 
representation, there will be a great deal of overlap between the features of the target 
and competing representations. This means that the number of shared activated 
features will be maximised and the competing trace should be greatly facilitated by 
the retrieval practice of the target representation (M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; Bauml 
& Hartinger, 2002). On the other hand, if the competing trace is similar to the target, 
but is not highly similar, then the number of overlapping features will be smaller. 
This means that the competing trace will share fewer activated features with the target 
representation. In order to increase discriminability between the target and competitor 
the features of the competing memorial representation are likely to be subjected to 
strong inhibition (Bauml & Hartinger, 2002; R.E. Smith & Hunt, 2000).
The latter prediction of the pattern suppression model was upheld by the 
findings of Experiment 4 - 5 .  While members of the practiced categoiy did share
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similarities with members of the unpracticed categoiy, each individual item within 
that shared categoiy still retained several unique features. This is a vital factor when 
the NRP-Similar to RP+ condition is considered. In this condition, a sub-category of 
NRP items shares a category with a sub-set of RP+ items. Thus, sharing features with 
items that are facilitated through retrieval could also result in the recall of these NRP- 
Similar items being facilitated. However, unlike the materials used by M.C. 
Anderson et al. (2000b) and Bauml and Hartinger (2002), individual items within the 
shared category contained several characteristics unique to each item, which were 
identified in pilot work. Further to this, if the net inhibitory, or facilitatoiy, effect is a 
result of the proportion of activated and inhibited features, then the fact that the NRP- 
Similar items were only moderately related should have resulted in the inhibition of 
those items. That is, the number of shared facilitated features was less than the 
number of unique inhibited features. This prediction, that moderately related 
competitors are subjected to inhibition, was confirmed.
It does remain possible that these semantically dissimilar NRP items are 
affected by the inhibited NRP items in their episodic category, and that this effect is 
not strong enough to be measured by recall. This possibility is dependent on whether 
inhibition is an ‘all-or-nothing” effect, or occurs in increments. If inhibition is either 
‘on’ or ‘off then perhaps dissimilar NRP items remain unaffected by the inhibited 
members of its episodic category. However, if inhibition occurs on a continuum, 
fiom ‘slightly inhibited’ to ‘completely inhibited’ then it remains possible that the 
NRP-Dissimilar items are affected by the inhibited NRP-Similar items. For example, 
inhibition from the NRP-Similar items could ‘leak’ across to the NRP-Dissimilar 
item, simply because they share an episodic category, in a similar manner to that of 
the ‘leaking’ of inhibition from RP- items to NRP-Similar items. Unfortunately, if
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this inhibition is fairly weak, a cued-recall task may be insufficiently sensitive to 
measure it. Other measures, such as reaction times, have previously been advanced as 
a more sensitive measure of memory (E.F. Loftus et al., 1989), Thus, while NRP- 
Dissimilar items may appear not to suffer any inhibition, as measured by cued-recall, 
there may be a slowing down of retrieval access. Comparing retrieval speed between 
the various types of items may reveal some very interesting findings. As RP+ items 
have been strengthened through practice, retrieval speed of these items on a cued- 
recall test would be expected to be quick. In contrast, as the RP- and NRP-Similar 
items have been strongly inhibited in memoiy, participants are not expected to be able 
to retrieve these items at all. However, RP- and NRP-Similar items that are more 
weakly inhibited may be eventually retrievable, but with great effort. For these items, 
retrieval speeds are expected to be very slow. Control items, for which no practice 
has occurred on any of these items, is expected to be relatively fast and easy, though 
not as fast as for RP+ items, as control items have not benefited from strengthening 
through prior retrieval. Finally, if some inhibition has leaked from the NRP-Similar 
items to the NRP-Dissimilar items, then retrieval speeds can be expected to be slower 
than for control items, though not as slow as for the strongly inhibited RP- and NRP- 
Similar items. However, if there are weakly inhibited RP- and NRP-Similar items 
that were eventually recalled, then retrieval speed for NRP-Dissimilar items may be 
of a similar speed to these items. Unfortunately, while this would be interesting to 
investigate, if NRP-Dissimilar impairment was found it could be argued that it was 
not due to inhibition leaking to episodically related items, but is in fact due to a poor 
choice of materials. That is, extensive piloting would have to be undertaken in order 
to prevent unknown semantic associations between NRP items obscuring the results.
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Retrieval Status: I. Retrieval-induced Forgetting as a Boundary Condition to the 
Misinformation Effect
Experiment la  demonstrated that misinformation effects were largest when 
misleading information was presented on items that were subjected to retrieval- 
induced forgetting, such as RP- items. In contrast, very few participants chose the 
misleading item when it had been introduced on an item that was not subjected to 
retrieval-induced forgetting. This non-significant effect of post-event misleading 
information was found irrespective of whether the misinformation was introduced on 
a practiced item, or on an item from the unrelated unpracticed categoiy, or on a 
control item were no relevant retrieval practice had occurred, and was unlikely to be 
due to a lack of power values were extremely low in these conditions). This 
difference in the magnitude of the misinformation effect based on the' retrieval status 
of the original item suggests that misinformation has its greatest impact on 
performance on the recognition test when the original item was unavailable to 
conscious inspection (e.g.. Experiment la; 60% of participants chose the 
misinformation item in the MisRP- condition). When the original item cannot be 
brought into consciousness, participants are more likely to choose the misleading 
item, which is available for retrieval. On the other hand, if the original item can be 
brought forth into conscious awareness, then participants appear to be more likely to 
choose that item over the misinformation (e.g.. Experiment la: 20% of participants 
chose the misinformation item in the MisNRP condition).
That the retrieval availability of the original item is critical to the 
misinformation effect is fiirther supported by the obseiwation that participants in the 
MisRP- condition who demonstrate retrieval-induced forgetting are far more likely to 
choose the misleading item than are participants who do not demonstrate retrieval-
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induced forgetting. Taking these findings together suggests that misinformation must 
be introduced on an item that is not only subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting, 
such as RP- items, but also that participants are themselves demonstrating a 
significant retrieval-induced forgetting effect. The possibility of retrieval-induced 
forgetting being a boundary condition in the production of misinformation effects was 
fiirther investigated in Experiment 2b through the manipulation of a delay. As 
retrieval-induced forgetting has been found to be a temporary forgetting effect that 
dissipates over time (Experiment 2a of the current thesis; M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 
2001), the possibility that it is an essential condition for the successful introduction of 
misinformation can be investigated. In support of the conclusions of Experiment la, 
misinformation only had a significant effect on memoiy when retrieval-induced 
forgetting was still present during the experimental session. In contrast, when 
retrieval-induced forgetting had dissipated over a 24-hour delay, the level of 
misinformation effects were comparable to that of Experiment la where 
misinformation was introduced on items not subjected to retrieval-induced forgetting 
(i.e., RP+, NRP, or control items).
Retrieval Status: II. Inti'oducing Misinformation on Inhibited Items 
The presence of retrieval-induced forgetting and the retrieval status of an original item 
(i.e.. Experiment la and 2b) may be strong predictors of misinformation effects but, 
on their own tell, us little about the specific mechanisms underlying the 
misinformation effect. However, by employing the independent probe method (i.e., 
Experiment 5), the level at which inhibition operates, as well as the type of 
mechanisms present, can be examined. As the independent probe method confirmed 
that the RP- items were inhibited, as well as the NRP items that were semantically
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related to either the practiced RP+ items or the inhibited RP- items, the impact of 
introducing misinformation on these inhibited memorial representations could be 
examined. As expected, misinformation was obseiwed to have its greatest impact 
when presented on inhibited items. Fifty-seven percent of participants were found to 
choose the misinformation item when misleading information was presented on an 
RP- item, which is comparable to that found in Experiments la and 2b. Interestingly, 
when misinformation is introduced on items from the unpracticed category that are 
semantically related to items from the practiced category, the magnitude of the 
misinformation effect is of a similar size. When misinformation is introduced on 
NRP items that share a semantic categoiy with the practiced items, 47% of 
participants chose the misinformation item, while 67% of participants chose the 
misinformation when the NRP item is semantically related to an inhibited RP- item. 
While this latter misinformation effect is slightly larger than that typically found on 
RP- items (and on NRP-Similar to RP+ items), this difference was not significant. 
Similarly, the difference between the size of the misinformation effects for NRP- 
Similar to RP+ and NRP-Similar to RP- items was not significant. Thus, it appears 
that both NRP-Similar to RP+ and NRP-Similar to RP- items have a similar degree of 
susceptibility to the introduction of misinformation as the RP- items are. Thus, due to 
their inhibitoiy status, these items are also susceptible to misinformation, despite not 
having appeared in the target event. This conclusion was fiirther supported by the 
finding that misinformation had its greatest effect when participants demonstrated 
retrieval-induced forgetting (i.e., inhibition) and the misinformation was presented on 
an inhibited item. That is, each condition can be divided into those participants who 
demonstrate retrieval-induced forgetting and those who do not. Those participants 
who received misinformation on an inhibited item and who showed evidence of
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retrieval-induced forgetting were 2 - 7  times more likely to choose the 
misinformation at test than participants who received misinformation on an inhibited 
item but who failed to demonstrate retrieval-induced forgetting. Further to this, the 
proportion of misinformation effects found in the inhibited conditions of Experiments 
la, 2b, and Experiment 5 were of similar magnitude.
Reti’ieval Status: III. Impaired Performance or Inhibited Representations?
As the independent probe method confirmed that inhibitory processes were present in 
Experiment 5 it can allow for conclusions to be drawn concerning the memorial 
representations of the original items after the presentation of misleading information. 
Perhaps most importantly, the findings of Experiment 5 suggest that the 
misinformation effect not only represents a change in performance but, critically, it 
also represents a change in the availability of the underlying memorial 
representations. Not only does presenting misleading information in each condition 
help to control demand and social factors (which would otherwise suggest that 
participants choose misinformation even though the original item was freely available 
for retrieval), but the employment of the independent probe method strongly suggests 
that the memorial representation of the RP- items, and the NRP-Similar items, have 
been actively (and specifically) suppressed. Therefore, the finding that the success of 
introducing misinformation is dependent on the inhibitory status of the original item 
that is targeted by the misleading information suggests that previous criticisms that 
the misinformation effect does not represent taie memoiy impairment (e.g., 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a), or that it fails to coiTespond to a change in the 
underlying memorial representations (e.g., Schooler & Tanaka, 1991) do not, in this 
case, appear to be justified. The use of the independent probe method provides strong
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evidence that participants who demonstrate inhibition tmly have ‘impaired memory’
(Belli, 1989), or a ‘change in memorial representation’ (Schooler & Tanaka, 1991) for 
the events contained within the study phase.
Retf ieval Status: IV  Intt’odiicingMisinformatioyi on Non-inhibited Items 
Using the independent probe method in Experiment 5 also allowed for the retrieval i
status RP+, NRP-Dissimilar and control items to be confirmed. Although these items 
differed as to whether they had been previously retrieved (i.e., RP+ items) or not (i.e.,
NRP-Dissimilar and control items), all of these items were confirmed as not presently 
being the focus of inhibition. Significant misinformation effects were not detected in 
these conditions, and in the case of the NRP-Dissimilar items, this was regardless of 
whether retrieval-induced forgetting was present or not. Similarly, the proportion of 
misinformation effects for RP+ items (16%) in Experiment la is comparable with that 
for NRP-Dissimilar items (23%) and control items (17%) in Experiment 5, with veiy 
little difference in the size of the observed misinformation effect. This is despite the 
RP+ items having been strengthened in memoiy through retrieval practice. Thus, it 
would seem that additional retrieval, while strengthening the item in memory, does 
not really garner any extra resistance to misleading information compared to 
unpracticed, but non-inhibited, items. These latter points further support the notion 
that not all items in an event are susceptible to misinformation but that only inhibited 
items are indeed vulnerable.
The differences in retrieval-induced forgetting and misinformation effects 
between the RP- and NRP-Similar items, and the NRP-Dissimilar and control items, 
are of interest given that all four of these item types are all non-retrieved items that 
only differ in their relation to information that has previously been retrieved. Due to
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these items all being non-retrieved, they adequately demonstrate how retrieval can act 
as a memoiy modifier in two distinct ways (i.e., it may both increase and decrease the 
retrieval availability of information in memoiy) that may promote the updating of our 
memory systems, as well as regulating what material is available to conscious 
awareness at any given time.
Addressing the Issue o f Memory Pennanence: I. Alteration or Coexistence o f 
Memories
The current studies also address the debate concerning the permanency of memory. 
Previous research investigating retrieval-induced forgetting, retroactive interference 
and misinformation effects have attempted to address this most fundamental of 
questions within cognitive psychology. The current set of findings strongly suggests 
that once information has been encoded into long-term memory, it resides there (for 
all intent and purpose) permanently. In Experiment 2,'the impaired recall of RP- 
items was found to be temporaiy, with retrieval-induced forgetting dissipating over 
the coui'se of a 24-hour delay. The idea of retrieval-induced forgetting as a temporaiy 
forgetting mechanism is strengthened by prior research demonstrating a slight 
recoveiy in participants reporting RP- items over the course of a delay (M.D. 
MacLeod & Macrae, 2001). However, a similar recovery in RP- performance was not 
found in Experiment 2, but this could have been due to reasons consistent with the 
arguments put foiward by M.D. MacLeod and Macrae (2001). Perhaps retrieval- 
induced forgetting (and inhibition) is an ‘on/off process, whereby it is either present 
or absent, or is a graded process that accumulates and dissipates in increments. The 
latter type of process seems most probable given that M.D. MacLeod and Macrae and 
found only a slight recoveiy in the recollection of RP- items, and no such recoveiy
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was actually observed in Experiment 2. This then raises the fiirther possibility that if 
a longer delay was employed in Experiment 2, then a full recoveiy in RP- 
performance (i.e., to a level comparable with that of the other unpracticed NRP items) 
may have been observed. Of course, given its proposed role as an adaptive forgetting 
mechanism, retrieval-induced forgetting is unlikely to be bound by a ‘24-hour mle’ 
whereby it is always found to dissipate over this time period. In fact, under some 
circumstances it may be more adaptive to suppress unwanted memories for longer 
periods, or even permanently (M.C. Anderson, 2001; M.D. MacLeod et al., 2003).
While retrieval-induced forgetting is one method of examining questions that 
concern memory permanence, the manipulation of retrieval status within the 
misinformation effect provided an alternative way of addressing these questions. The 
findings of Experiments la, 2b, and Experiment 5 not only support the notion of the 
original trace coexisting after the encoding of the misleading item, but that 
misinformation effects can be controlled through the manipulation of the retrieval 
status of the original item. If the encoding of the post-event misleading information 
erased the original trace, as proposed by the alteration hypothesis, then a similar level 
of misinformation effects should have been obseiwed across conditions. However, 
significant misinformation effects were only found when misleading information was 
presented on inhibited items. This finding also fails to support the alteration 
hypothesis’ proposal that the destruction of the original trace through the encoding of 
the misinformation item is a relatively quick and fairly automatic process that is only 
circumvented though strengthening an individual’s resistance to misinformation prior 
to its encoding (e.g., E.F. Loflus, 1979b; Tousignant et al., 1986).
The finding that the inhibition of the original item is a strong predictor of how 
successful the introduction of misinformation will be further suggests that retrieval
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failures may be implicated in the production of misinformation effects. This finding 
is consistent with the coexistence hypothesis, which not only assumes that the original 
item can continue to reside in memory after the encoding of the misleading item, but 
also that retrieval failures are the primary cause of misinformation effects. In the 
current studies (especially Experiment 5), significant misinformation effects were 
primarily observed where retrieval failures (i.e., inhibition) were present, which was 
seen mainly with competing items such as RP- items and NRP-Similar items. In 
contrast, items that were not subjected to significant retrieval failures, such as the 
RP+, NRP-Dissimilar and control items, were fairly resistant to misleading 
information, with these items being successfully reported the majority of the time. 
The strong retrieval component that appears to be present in misinformation effects 
can also be interpreted as further evidence against the alteration hypothesis.
Addressing the Issue o f Memory Permanence: II. Level at which Rettieval Impairment 
Occurs
While the findings of Experiments la, 2b and Experiment 5 support the assumption of 
the coexistence hypothesis (that the original item and the misleading item coexist in 
memory) this does not itself inform us of where in the retrieval process such retrieval 
failures occur. That is, the interference could occur at the level of the retrieval cue, 
the retrieval route, or at the level of the memorial representation. Prior retrieval 
accounts of misinformation effects have typically explained the effect as being due to 
the use of inappropriate retrieval cues and retrieval routes. This makes the encoding 
specificity hypothesis (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983), cue-change (Chandler & 
Gargano, 1995; Chandler et al., 2001), and blocking and discrimination (Chandler & 
Gargano, 1998; Chandler et al., 2001), all examples of cue-dependent forgetting and.
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therefore, non-inhibitory accounts of misinformation effects. This means that 
previous retrieval interference accounts have never implicated the role of inhibitory 
processes, or placing the interference at the level of the memorial representation, 
when attempting to explain why these types of memory errors occur.
The difference between non-inhibitory and inhibitory accounts of 
misinformation effects is most apparent when techniques that target the original item 
for retrieval are considered. Some non-inhibitory theories, such as cue-change and 
blocking, assume that the reason that the misinformation item is reported is due to it 
being encountered after the original item and therefore closer to the recognition test. 
As the misinformation was encoded closer in time to this test, the retrieval route from 
the cues present at test to the misinformation trace are stronger than the retrieval route 
miming from those cues to the original trace. As a result, the accessing of the 
misinformation trace through this strengthened retrieval route prevents the original 
trace from being specifically accessed by its own unique cue, either through a 
blocking or discrimination process (Chandler & Gargano, 1998), or through the 
misinformation altering the properties of the retrieval cue (i.e., cue-change. Chandler 
& Gargano, 1995). These explanations would therefore suggest that this 
strengthening of the retrieval route between the cue and the misinformation item, and 
the changing of the properties of the retrieval cue by the misleading item, can be 
overcome be increasing the length of time between presenting of misinformation and 
final test. This is due to retrieval changes being fairly transitory and, in the case of a 
blocking process, the strength of the retrieval route to the misleading item will 
decrease over time. However, employing retrieval cues that will either specifically 
activate the original trace, or that will activate the original trace before it activates the
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misinformation trace, should also prove a success&l method in recovering the original 
item.
With cue-change, the assimilation of features from the misinformation trace 
on to the retrieval cue will be a better match to the misleading items, but only while 
those features remain activated. After a prolonged delay these features will become 
deactivated making it less of a match to the misleading item. Similarly, cue-change 
predicts that the probability of either the original item or the misinformation item 
being recalled is dependent on how many activated features of the cue match each 
trace. Therefore, employing retrieval cues that share more features with the original 
trace than with the misinformation trace increases the likelihood of the original trace 
being specifically activated.
The encoding specificity account of misinformation effects provides a similar 
account proposing that the cues that are present during the recognition test are a better 
match to the misinformation item than to the original item. This is primarily due to 
the misinformation item being encoded closer to the test than the original item 
resulting in the retrieval route between the cues at test and the trace of the misleading 
item being stronger than that for the original item. Thus, in a similar manner to the 
previous retrieval accounts proposed by Chandler and colleagues (e.g., Chandler & 
Gargano, 1995, 1998), employing retrieval cues that are a better match to the original 
trace, or that uniquely activate that trace, should see the original item being reported 
without interference from the misleading item.
All of these non-inhibitory accounts assume that retrieval interference occurs 
before the memorial representation, which means that any retrieval route used that is 
free fi'om interference should result in the successful retrieval of the original item. In 
contrast, as inhibitory theories assume that the memorial representation of the original
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item is specifically inhibited, this means that employing new retrieval cues and 
retrieval routes that are free from interference should fail to see the original trace 
being accessed and retrieved. This may mean that the original item will remain 
suppressed irrespective of the quality and quantity of the retrieval cues employed. 
Even if a retrieval cue is used that would only access the original trace, it will still not 
result in the retrieval of that item. In this sense, the failure to find a successful 
retrieval method within the framework of the inhibitory account is similar to that of 
the alteration hypothesis, which also suggests that retrieval techniques would always 
fail to access the original item. However, while the alteration hypothesis proposes 
that the only way to recover the original item is to re-encode that item, the only 
successfid technique that sees the original information again becoming available in 
memoiy thus far, where an inhibitoiy mechanism has been implicated, is time (M.D. 
MacLeod & Macrae, 2001).
Thus, it would appear that an inhibitory account of misinformation effects has 
some properties in common with the coexistence hypothesis, and more surprisingly, 
with the alteration hypothesis. However, the inhibitory account has several critical 
differences with both the alteration and coexistence hypotheses, suggesting that 
perhaps interpreting the current results within these previous explanations of 
misinformation effects may be inappropriate. In fact, the inhibitory account may 
actually have more in common with McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985a) non­
retention explanation of misinformation effects. The non-retention hypothesis 
assumes that memoiy for an event can only be modified if the original item is not 
available in memory, thus suggesting that misinformation effects are due to issues 
with the memorial representation of the original item. This general assumption is 
quite similar to that of the inhibitoiy account, which suggests that misinformation can
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only be successfully introduced on an item when it is unavailable to conscious 
inspection. In contrast, when the original item is freely available for retrieval, very 
few participants choose the misleading item. Thus, in this way, the inhibitory 
account’s assumption that memory for an event can only be manipulated by 
misleading information when the original trace is unavailable in memoiy is very 
similar to that of the non-retention account’s assumption that the original trace is not 
present in memoiy. However, both accounts differ concerning the reasons why the 
original trace is absent from conscious awareness at the time of the recognition test. 
While the non-retention account assumes that the original item was never encoded in 
the first place, suggesting that the misinformation effect does not represent tiue 
memory impairment, the inhibitory account assumes that the original item is not 
available to conscious inspection because of the actions of inhibitory processes, rather 
than any failure to encode (Experiment lb). Thus, the inliibitory account strongly 
suggests that the misinformation effect is the result of genuine memory impairment.
Non-inhibitojy Processes in Retrieval-induced Forgetting and Misinformation Effects 
It should also be noted that inhibitoiy processes are unlikely to be triggered under 
eveiy situation in which only a sub-set of items is retrieved, and inhibitoiy processes 
will not underlie eveiy individual who demonstrates a retrieval-induced forgetting 
effect. For example, M.D. MacLeod (2003) has found that older adults can 
demonstrate a strong retrieval-induced forgetting effect, but that this effect is 
primarily due to output interference acting at the retrieval stage, rather than inhibitory 
processes elicited at the retrieval practice stage. A possible role for non-inhibitoiy 
processes in retrieval-induced forgetting can also be seen in studies by Shaw et al. 
(1995), where output interference may have influenced the pattern of recall, and
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studies by various other researchers who have failed to discount non-inhibitory 
processes, either through controlling output order or by calculating their impact 
statistically post-hoc (e.g., Moulin et al., 2002; Williams & Zacks, 2001). It should 
however be noted that, under certain circumstances, output interference could also be 
the result of inhibitory processes acting at the final recall stage (Bauml, 1998). Thus, 
Belli’s (1989) conclusion that there can be multiple routes to misinformation effects 
may also apply to the production of retrieval-induced forgetting effects.
The Role o f Demand Characteristics
One of the primary criticisms against the typical misinformation paradigm has been 
the contamination of the misinformation effect by demand characteristics inherent in 
the typical misinformation procedure (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a). In the typical 
misinformation paradigm, misled participants may report misleading information in 
accordance with their belief that the experimenter wishes them to, rather than because 
they genuinely believe that the misleading item originates from the target event. Such 
demand characteristics can influence the misinformation effect when the post-event 
misleading item occurs only in a sub-set of conditions. This situation arises in the 
majority of misinformation studies due to the misinformation effect typically being 
measured by comparing the reporting of the original item by misled participants to 
that of control participants who have only received consistent post-event information. 
However, the possibility of misinformation effects arising through differences in 
demand characteristics across conditions has been removed in the modified 
misinformation paradigm employed in Experiments la, 2b and Experiment 5. By 
introducing post-event misleading information in every condition, the misinformation
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effect is measured by comparing the reporting of misinformation in conditions where 
misleading information has previously been encountered.
Demand characteristics can also contribute more specifically to the 
misinformation effect when participants in the misled condition remember both the 
original item and the misinformation item. When participants remember both items 
they may report the misleading item because they believe that the experimenter 
composed the post-event questions or narratives and must therefore know what was 
present in the original target event. This bias is typically absent from the control 
condition of misinformation studies (e.g. E.F. Loftus et al., 1978) as only consistent 
post-event information has been presented, and thus participants are unlikely to 
choose the misleading item for this reason. In this case, the misinformation effect is 
not measuring whether the misleading item has been integrated into memory for the 
target event, but instead is measuring a bias towards choosing the misinformation. 
There remains the possibility that this bias towards reporting the misleading item 
could be present in the modified misinformation paradigm described within the 
present thesis (Experiments la, 2b and 5) although it is unlikely to be equal over 
conditions and most likely to be present in conditions where both the original item 
and the misleading item are available for retrieval. The probability of participants 
recollecting both of these items is most likely to occur where misleading information 
is introduced on the non-inhibited RP+, NRP-Dissimilar, and control items. It is in 
these conditions that participants are most likely to recall both the original and the 
misinformation item due to the original item not being subjected to inhibition. Thus, 
a bias towards choosing the misleading item in conditions where misinformation is 
introduced on non-inhibited items cannot be discounted. However, this does not 
really create problems for the inhibitoiy account of the misinformation effect as a bias
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towards reporting misleading information is reduced in conditions where 
misinformation is presented on inhibited items (i.e., RP- and NRP-Similar). Under 
such inhibitoiy conditions, participants are unlikely to be able to bring the original 
item readily into consciousness. Thus, participants are more likely to choose the 
misinformation item as it is available in memory, and not because participants have to 
choose between items that they remember.
Applying Retrieval-induced Forgetting to Real-M^oiid and other Psychological 
Phenomenon
This research has obvious implications for any situation where only a sub-set of items 
is reviewed. While the current findings suggest that inhibitory processes play a strong 
role, thus suggesting that any task that requires only a sub-set of items to be retrieved 
can elicit this type of forgetting, the results could have also been the product of non- 
inhibitory processes. As retrieval-induced forgetting can also be explained by the 
actions of non-inhibitoiy processes, strengthening one retrieval route at the expense of 
related routes, this would imply that tasks that require only a selective review of 
information may also elicit retrieval-induced forgetting (e.g., extra study time, 
presentation of information). The type of tasks that have this minimal retrieval 
component could be tasks such as reading of a witness’ statement, or a newspaper 
article about a crime, or having trial statements read back during jury deliberation, 
and may be sufficient to elicit non-inhibitoiy processes.
This research not only has applications to real-world memory problems, but 
also other psychological phenomenon. Retrieval-induced forgetting has obvious 
applications to both the verbal overshadowing effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 
1990), whereby describing a face impairs ability to later recognise that same face, and
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the imagination inflation effect (Gariy, Manning, Loftus & Sherman, 1996), whereby 
imagining untrue life events increases confidence that it is a real memoiy at a later 
date. Both of these types of memoiy impairment are triggered by memory tasks that 
have a high retrieval component to them, a component that has been largely ignored. 
In addition, the underlying memorial mechanisms have also been largely ignored in 
favour of researchers investigating the boundaiy conditions of these effects.
The underlying mechanisms of verbal overshadowing remain relatively 
ignored, with only recent interest in a possible processing shift elicited by the 
descriptor task. It has been suggested that the verbal descriptor task encourages 
individuals to engage in more feature-based processing, while the recognition task 
requires individuals to engage in the more appropriate holistic processing that would 
normally be used in face recognition (Macrae & Lewis, 2002). However, Meissner 
and colleagues have recently suggested that retrieval processes may influence the 
verbal overshadowing effect (e.g., Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Meissner, Brigham & 
Kelley, 2001).
There are some features of the verbal overshadowing effect that easily fit into 
a retrieval-induced forgetting ftamework. Most critically, the descriptor task that 
requires participants to describe a face can not only be conceived as a retrieval task, 
but also as an incomplete retrieval task. This is due to participants being unable to 
adequately re-interpret complex visual information into words and so a great deal of 
vital information remains unretrieved. Further to this, verbally describing this type of 
visual information could also be argued to be a veiy difficult retrieval task. As 
difficult retrievals are thought to have the greatest impact on memoiy (R.A. Bjork & 
Bjork, 1992; Landauer & Bjork, 1978), the verbal descriptor task may set up the 
conditions necessaiy to produce retrieval-induced forgetting -  in a similar way to
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post-event questioning in the misinformation paradigm. These notions are supported 
by the finding that the standard interview and the cognitive interview, that are both 
based on the repeated retrieval of the same information, both elicit verbal 
overshadowing effects (Finger & Pezdek, 1999). In addition, the verbal 
overshadowing effect has been found to disappear when a two-day delay occurs after 
the descriptor task, a finding consistent with the temporal boundaiy of retrieval- 
induced forgetting (Experiment 2 of the present thesis; M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 
2001). Further to this, if describing a face results in the suppression of non-retrieved 
facial information, this information could be left vulnerable to any incorrect 
information encountered after the event. The assimilation of this incorrect 
information into an individual’s memory for that suspect’s face could result not only 
in the constmction of a misleading photograph but also in the assembly of live line­
ups and photographic line-ups.
Inhibitory retrieval processes may also play a role in the imagination inflation 
effect. Gariy et al. (1996) originally suggested that the increased confidence that an 
untme memoiy had actually happened after imagining that untnie event may be due to 
several possibilities, such as source misattribution error, hypermnesia, familiarity 
effects, repeated exposure to the materials, or a combination of all of them. However, 
the mechanisms that could produce these effects remain unknown (Garry & 
Polaschek, 2000), and a strong role for retrieval process has yet to be implicated. But, 
as the imagination task requiies participants to generate information consistent with 
the suggested event, it may strengthen the imagined event in memoiy and result in the 
suppression of information that may help an individual detect that the memory is 
false. This possibility is strengthened by recent finding that semantic generation 
(Bauml, 2002) can elicit retrieval-induced forgetting.
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Implications for Questioning Techniques
For many years, researchers have been interested in investigating memoiy processes 
in order to better understand and improve eyewitnesses’ ability to recall events. As an 
eyewitness can portray an understandable and human element of a crime, their 
statement can be central to the prosecution’s case. It is crucial, therefore, that an 
eyewitness account is as accurate and as compete as possible. Memory researchers 
hope that the study and understanding of retrieval and storage processes will allow a 
certain degree of control to be exerted over a witness’ retelling of an event.
The potential deleterious effects of retrieval-induced forgetting on eyewitness 
memory has been studied and discussed by previous researchers (Shaw et al., 1995; 
M.D. MacLeod, 2002). Eyewitnesses are subjected to repeated questioning by police 
interviewers in an effort to gain as complete and as accurate a report as possible, as 
well as retelling the event to friends and family. Shaw et al. (1995) suggested that this 
questioning could be considered an incomplete retrieval task much like retrieval 
practice. This questioning, as Shaw et al. points out is more than “ a simple matter of 
taking a reading on the witness’s memory” (p.249). Both Shaw et al. and M.D. 
MacLeod have demonstrated that items that are questioned in an eyewitness paradigm 
are better recalled than items from non-questioned categories. In addition, the current 
findings demonstrate that these practiced items are fairly resistant to misinformation. 
Unfortunately, items related to these questioned items but are not themselves asked 
about, appear to be impaired by this interrogation process (i.e., RP- items). In 
addition, these impaired items are very susceptible to the effects of misinformation. 
This is a double blow for the reliability and accuracy of an eyewitness’ statement as 
these results suggest that not only may the questioning process employed by police
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inteiwiewers lead to impaired recall in itself, but it also leaves inhibited items open to 
being replaced by incorrect information.
In recent years, the cognitive interview has been advanced as an alternative 
questioning technique that has been shown to increase the average number of correct 
facts retrieved about an incident by about 25-35% compared to the standard internew 
(Geiselman & Fisher, 1997). In addition, the cognitive inteiwiew has been shown to 
reduce the number of incorrect responses (Geiselman & Fisher, 1997), although this is 
not always the case (e.g., Fisher, Geiselman, Raymond, Jurkevich & Warhaftig, 
1987). Despite the perceived superiority of the cognitive inteiwiew, it may be as 
susceptible to retrieval-induced forgetting and, therefore misinformation effects, as 
the standard inteiwiew. The cognitive interview is based on the assumptions of the 
encoding specificity hypothesis, and therefore assumes that the retrieval of 
information about an event is cue-dependent. By using techniques such as context 
reinstatement (e.g., environmental and internal information), as well as encouraging 
witnesses to report information in different temporal orders and perspectives, it is 
assumed that these methods will provide multiple retrieval cues to information stored 
in memory. Even if some of the cues prove to be ineffective, encoding specificity 
would predict that the information will be retrievable given the employment of the 
con ect retrieval cues. However, if details from that event were subjected to inhibition 
triggered by the incomplete retrieval of information, then the use of such multiple 
cues would still fail to see the desired information being retrieved. These inhibited 
items in the cognitive interview could also be just as susceptible to misleading post- 
event information as information may be in the standard inteiwiew. In fact, after some 
of those details have been suppressed, questions that encourage witnesses to report 
event details from different perspectives, or ftom different temporal orders, may
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unintentionally lead to the confabulation of details in order to fill in the ‘missing’ 
parts of an individual’s memory. The possibility gains credence from Meissner et 
al.’s (2001) finding that forcing an individual to complete a description of a face can 
lead to the self-generation of misinformation in order to fill in gaps in the memory 
report.
The current findings add to other researchers’ prior conclusions that the 
incomplete questioning of witnesses can result in the impaired recall of some details 
of an event, in addition to leaving those details susceptible to misleading information.
While techniques such as the cognitive interview would suggest that memory 
impairment can be overcome thiough the employment of multiple retrieval cues, the 
inhibitoiy account of retrieval failures would suggest that this technique is unlikely to 
successful. This creates some problems for questioning techniques as reversing the 
inhibitoiy status of information has proven difficult, with the length of the retention 
inteiwal after retrieval being the only successflil method discovered so far for 
overcoming suppression (M.D. MacLeod & Macrae, 2001). Even re-presenting items 
during a recognition test has failed to reverse the retrieval-induced forgetting effect 
(M.C. Anderson et al., 1997; Hicks & Starns, in press). Thus, the only way to 
overcome the inhibition of event details would be to question witnesses in more than 
one inteiwiew session, with a considerable delay between sessions.
Despite these issues with overcoming inhibition there is some evidence to |
suggest that there may be methods that can prevent inhibition from being triggered, j
!
Research examining the effects of integration on memory suggests that integrating |
I
RP+ and RP- items can protect memory from inhibition (M.C. Anderson et al., 2000b; j
!Bauml & Hartinger, 2002). Specifically, encoding explicit links between target items 1
and their competitors may prevent retrieval-induced forgetting from being triggered.
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Thus, it may be possible to design questioning techniques based on the idea of 
integration as a way of protecting witnesses’ memory for an event from inhibition 
(and, therefore, misinformation).
Conclusions
The current thesis represents an attempt to apply recent research to an old debate 
concerning memory updating; the role of inhibitory processes in the misinformation 
effect. While the misinformation effect is typically viewed as a method for examining 
memory updating, very little research has actually focused on the underlying 
processes in memoiy. Therefore, the construction of a novel misinformation 
paradigm, and the five experiments included herein, provide an initial step towards 
understanding the mechanisms underlying the misinformation effect, and memory 
updating in general.
Recently, researchers have suggested that forgetting may be a requirement of 
memory in order for current memorial goals to be satisfied. Without this ability to 
forget unwanted or out-of-date information, it may interfere with attempts to retrieve 
desired memories, leading to a slow and highly inefficient retrieval system, as well as 
an inflexible memory updating process. Inhibitoiy processes may provide a 
mechanism by which unwanted information is set aside, thus preventing it from 
interfering with cun ent goals. Similarly, the inhibition of out-of-date or contradictory 
information can allow for memory updating to occur with relative ease. As older 
information will be unavailable to conscious inspection, newer information can more 
easily be integrated into memoiy.
However, the current research suggests that memoiy updating through the 
inhibition of older or unwanted information may not always have desirable outcomes
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and, thus, there may be negative consequences to an otherwise adaptive process. The 
current research suggests that when information has been inhibited, contradictory 
information is easily integrated into event memory and is reported in place of the 
correct information. This altering of memory for an event has obvious negative 
consequences, especially for circumstances where the veracity of our memories is 
imperative, such as eyewitness memory. However, the vulnerable position of 
inhibited memories in the face of conflicting information need not be of over-riding 
concern to those groups that rely on the accuracy of memory. Inhibition appears to be 
a fairly transitoiy process that dissipates over time, although this area of reseaich 
requires a great deal of further research to determine those conditions that promote 
this dissipation, as well as identifying those conditions that promote the maintenance 
of inhibition.
357
References
CHAPTER 11: REFERENCES
Abeles, P. & Morton, J. (1999). Avoiding misinformation: Reinstating target 
modality. The Qucnterly Journal o f Experimental Psycholog)}, 52A, 581-92.
Abra, J.C. (1967). Time changes in the strength of forward and backward 
associations. Journal o f Verbal Learming and Verbal Behcnior, 6, 640-45.
Allen, G.A., Mahler, W.A. & Estes, W.K. (1969). Effects of recall tests on long-term 
retention of paired associates. Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5, 
463-70.
Amir, N., Coles, M E., Brigidi, B. & Foa, E.B. (2001). The effect of practice on 
recall of emotional information in individuals with generalised social phobia. Journal 
o f Abnormal Ps))cholog)), 110  ^76-82.
Anderson, J.R. (1974). Retrieval of propositional information from long-term 
memory. Cognitive Psychology, 6,451-74.
Anderson, J.R. (1983). The Architecture o f Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Haiward 
University Press.
Anderson, M.C. (2001). Active forgetting: Evidence for functional inhibition as a 
source of memory failure. Journal o f Aggression, Malti^eatment & Trauma, 4, 185- 
210.
Anderson, M.C. & Bell, T. (2001). Forgetting our facts: The role of inhibitoiy 
processes in the loss of propositional knowledge. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: General, 130, 544-570.
Anderson, M.C., Bjork, E.L. & Bjork, R A. (2000a). Retrieval-induced forgetting: 
Evidence for a recall-specific mechanism. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7, 522- 
30.
358
References
Anderson, M.C., & Bjork, R.A. (1994). Mechanisms of inhibition in long-term 
memory: A new taxonomy. In D. Dagenbach & T. Carr (Eds.), Inhibitory processes 
in attention, memory, and language (pp. 265-325). San Diego, CA; Academic Press. 
Anderson, M.C., Bjork, R.A., Bjork, E.L. (1994). Remembering can cause forgetting: 
Retrieval dynamics in long-term memory. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 20, 1063-87.
Anderson, M.C., DeKok, D., & Child, C. (1997, November). Retrieval-induced 
forgetting on a test of recognition memory. Abstiricts o f the Psychonomic Society, 2, 
Volume 2.
Anderson, M.C. & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive 
control. Nature, 410, 366-69.
Anderson, M.C., Green, C., & McCulloch, K.C. (2000b). Similarity and inhibition in 
long-term-memoiy: Evidence for a two-factor theory. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: Learriing, Memory & Cognition, 26, 1141-59.
Anderson, M.C. & McCulloch, K.C. (1999). Integration as a general boundary 
condition on retrieval-induced forgetting. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory Æ Cognition, 25, 608-629.
Anderson, M.C., & Neely, J.H. (1996). Interference and inhibition in memory 
retrieval. In E.L. Bjork & R.A. Bjork (Eds.), Memory (pp. 237-313). San Diego: 
Academic Press.
Anderson, M.C. & Spellman, B.A. (1995). On the status of inhibitoiy mechanisms in 
cognition: Memory retrieval as a model case. Psychological Review, 102, 68-100. 
Baddeley, A.D. (1986). Working Memory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Baddeley, A.D. (1997). Human Memory: Theory and Pr'actice. Hove, UK: 
Psychology Press.
359
References
Barnes, J.M. & Undemood, BJ. (1959). “Fate” of first-list associations in transfer 
theory. Joiirrial o f Experimental Psychology, 58, 95-105.
Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.
Battig, W.F. & Montague, W.E. (1969). Categoiy norms for verbal items in 56 
categories: A replication and extension of the Connecticut norms. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology Monographs, SO, Pt. 2.
Basden, B.H. & Basden, D R. (1996). Directed forgetting: A further comparison of 
the list and item methods. Memory, 4, 633-53.
Basden, B.H. & Basden, D R. (1998). Directed forgetting: A contrast of methods and 
interpretations. In J.M. Golding & C M. MacLeod (Eds.), Intentional Forgetting (pp. 
139-171. Mahway, N J : Erlbaum.
Basden, B.H., Basden, D R. & Gargano, G.J. (1993). Directed forgetting in implicit 
and explicit memoiy tests; A comparison of methods. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 19, 603-16.
Basden, D R. & Basden, B.H. (1995). Part-list cueing: A retrieval strategy disruption 
interpretation. Journal o f Experimental Psycholog)}: Learning, Memory <&. Cognition, 
27, 1656-669.
Basden, D R., Basden, B.H. & Galloway, B.C. (1977). Inhibition with part-list 
cueing. Journal o f Expérimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 3, 100- 
08.
Bauml, K-H. (1996). Revisiting an old issue: Retroactive interference as a function of 
the degree of original and interpolated learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Reviev}, 3,
380-84.
360
References
Bauml, K-H. (1997). The list-strength effect: Strength-dependent competition or 
suppression? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 260-64.
Bauml, K-H. (1998). Strong items get suppressed, weak items do not: The role of 
strength in output interference. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5, 4459-63.
Bauml, K-H. (2002). Semantic generation can cause episodic forgetting. 
Psychological Science, 13, 356-60.
Bauml, K-H. & Hartinger, A. (2002). On the role of item similarity in retrieval- 
induced forgetting. Memoiy, 10, 215-24.
Bauml, K-H., Kissler, J. & Rak, A. (2002). Part-list cuing in amnesic patients: 
Evidence for a retrieval deficit. Memory & Cognition, 30, 862-70.
Bekerian, D A. & Bowers, J.M. (1983). Eyewitness Testimony: Were we misled? 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Lecrrning, Memory & Cognition, 9, 139-145. 
Bekerian, D.A. & Dennett, J.L. (1993). The cognitive interview technique: Reviving 
the issues. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 7, 275-98.
Belli, R.F. (1988). Color blend retrievals: Compromise memories or deliberate 
compromise responses? Memoiy & Cognition, 16, 314-326.
Belli, R.F. (1989). Influences of misleading postevent information: Misinformation 
interference and acceptance. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 72- 
85.
Belli, R.F. (1993). Failure of interpolated tests in inducing memory impairment with 
final modified tests: Evidence unfavourable to the blocking hypothesis. American 
Journal o f Psychology, 106, 407-27.
Belli, R.F., Lindsay, D.S., Gales, M.S. & McCarthy, T.T. (1994). Memory 
impairment and source misattribution in postevent misinformation experiments with 
short retention intervals. Memory Æ Cognition, 22, 40-54.
361
References
Belli, R.F., Windschitl, P.D., McCarthy, T.T. & Winfrey, S.E, (1992). Detecting 
memory impairment with a modified test procedure: Manipulating retention intei^val 
with centrally presented event items. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory & Cognition, 18, 356-367.
Benzing, W. (1985). Betting form: A more sensitive measure o f the impact o f post- 
event information. Unpublished honours thesis. University of Seattle.
Birnbaum, I.M. (1965). Long-term retention of first-list associations in the A-B, A-C 
paradigm. Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 515-20.
Bjork, E.L. & Bjork, R.A. (1996). Continuing influences of to-be-forgotten 
information. Consciousness & Cognition, 5, 176-96.
Bjork, E.L., Bjork, R.A., & Anderson, M.C. (1998). Varieties of goal-directed 
forgetting. In J.M. Golding & CM. MacLeod (Eds.), Intentional forgetting (pp. 103- 
137). Mahway, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bjork, E.L., Bjork, R.A. & MacLeod, M.D. (in press). Types and consequences of 
forgetting: Intended and unintended. In N. Ohta & L-G. Nilson (Eds ), Memory and 
Society.
Bjork, R.A. (1970). Positive forgetting: The non-interference of items intentionally 
forgotten. Journal o f Verbal Lecwnlng and Verbal Behavior, 9, 255-68.
Bjork, R A. (1975). Retrieval as a memory modifier: An interpretation of negative 
recency and related phenomena. In R.L. Solso (Ed.), Information Processing and 
Cognition 123-144). New York: Wiley.
Bjork, R.A. (1989). Retrieval inhibition as an adaptive mechanism in human 
memoiy. In H.L. Roediger & F.I.M. Craik (Eds.), Vcnieties o f memoiy and 
consciousness: Essays in honor o f Endel Tulving (pp. 309-330. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum.
362
References
Bjork, R.A. & Bjork, E.L. (1992). A new theoiy of disuse and an old theory of 
stimulus fluctuation. In A.F. Healy, S.M. Kosslyn & R.M. Shifffin, From Learning 
Processes to Cognitive Processes: Essays in Honour o f William K. Estes, Volume 2 
(pp. 35-67). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Bjork, R.A. & Geiselman, R E. (1978). Constituent processes in the differentiation of 
items in memory. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 
4, 344-361.
Bjorklund, D.F. & Harnishfeger, K.K. (1995). The evolution of inhibition 
mechanisms and their role in human cognition and behavior. In F.N. Dempster & C.J. 
Brainerd, Interference and Inhibition in Cognition (pp. 141-173). San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press, Inc.
Blaxton, T.A. & Neely, J.H. (1983). Inhibition from semantically related primes: 
Evidence of a category-specific inhibition. Memory Æ Cognition, I f  500-10 
Block, R.A. (1971). Effects of instnictions to forget in short-term memory. Journal 
o f Experimental Ps)}chology, 89, 1-9.
Bodenhausen, G.V. & Macrae, C.N. (1998). Stereotype activation and inhibition. In 
R.S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed ), Stereotype Activation & Inhibition: Advances in social cognition 
Vol. 11 (pp. 1-52). Mahway, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bonto, M.A. & Payne, D.G. (1991). Role of environmental context in eyewitness 
memory. American Jomiial o f Psychology, 104, 117-34.
Bowers, J.M. & Bekerian, D.A. (1984). When will post-event information distort 
eyewitness testimony? Journal o f Applied Psychology, 69, 466-472.
Brainerd, C.J. & Reyna, V.F. (1988). Development o f forgetting and reminiscence: A 
disintegration Te-integt'ation theory. Unpublished manuscript. University of Arizona
363
References
Brewer, W.F. & Treyens, J.C. (1981). Role of schemata in memoiy for places. 
Cognitive Psychology, 13, 207-30.
Butler, K.M., Williams, C.C., Zacks, R.T. & Maki, R.H. (2001). A limit on retrieval- 
induced forgetting. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Lecnning, Memory & 
Cognition, 27, 1314-319.
Carretta, T.R. & Moreland, R.L. (1983), The direct and indirect effects of 
inadmissible evidence. Journal o f Applied Social Psychology, 13, 291-309.
Carrier, M. & Pashler, FI. (1992). The influence of retrieval on retention. Memory & 
Cognition, 20, 633-42.
Ceci, S.J., Ross, D.F. & Toglia, M.P. (1987). Suggestibility of children’s memoiy; 
Psycholegal implications. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 116, 38-49. 
Chandler, C.C. (1989). Specific retroactive interference in modified recognition tests: 
Evidence for an unknown cause of interference. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 15, 256-265.
Chander, C.C. (1991). Flow memoiy for an event is influenced by related events: 
Interference in modified recognition tests. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 13, 115-125.
Chander, C.C. (1993). Accessing related events increases retroactive interference in a 
matching recognition test. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory 
& Cognition, 19, 967-74.
Chandler, C.C. & Gargano, G.J. (1995). Item-specific interference caused by cue- 
dependent forgetting. Memory & Cognition, 23, 701-08.
Chandler, C.C. & Gargano, G.J. (1998). Retrieval processes that produce interference 
in modified forced-choice recognition tests. Memory d  Cognition, 26, 220-31.
364
References
Chandler, C.C., Gargano, GJ. & Holt, B.C. (2001). Witnessing postevent does not 
change memory traces, but can affect their retrieval. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
76, 3-22.
Christiaansen, R.E. & Ochalek, K. (1983). Editing misleading information from 
memory: Evidence for the coexistence of original and post-event information. 
Memoiy <Sc Cognition, 77, 467-475.
Ciranni, M.A. & Shimamura, A.P. (1999). Retrieval-induced forgetting in episodic 
memoiy. Joinrial o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 25, 
1403-1414.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2"‘* ed). 
Hillsdale, NJ; Erlbaum.
Cole, W.G. & Loftus, E.F. (1979). Incorporating new information into memory. 
American Journal o f Psychology, 92, 413-25.
Constantini, E. & King, J. (1980/1981). The partial juror: Correlates and causes of 
prejudgement. Law & Society Review, 15, 9-40.
Crosland, HR. (1921). A qualitative analysis of the processes of forgetting. 
Psychological Monographs, 29 (Whole Issue).
Dagenbach, D. & Carr, T.H. (1994). Inhibitory processes in perceptual recognition: 
Evidence for a centre-sunound attentional mechanism. In D. Dagenbach & T. Carr 
(Eds.), Inhibitory processes in attention, memoiy, and language (pp. 327-357). San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Dagenbach, D., Carr, T H., & Barnhardt, T.M. (1990). Inhibitory semantic priming of 
lexical decisions due to failure to retrieve weakly activated codes. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memoiy, and Cognition, 16, 328-340.
365
References
Dagenbach, D., Horst, S. & Carr, T.H. (1990). Adding new information to semantic 
memory; How much learning is enough to produce automatic priming? Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 76, 581-91.
Daniel, T.C. (1972). Nature of the effect of verbal labels on recognition memory for 
form. Journal o f Experimental Psychology}, 96, 152-57.
Dodd, D.H. & Bradshaw, J.M. (1980). Leading questions and memory: Pragmatic 
constraints. Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 695-704.
Dodson, C. & Reisberg, D. (1991). Indirect testing of eyewitness memoiy: The (non) 
effect of misinformation. Bulletin o f the Psychonomic Society, 29, 333-36.
Dritsas, W.J. & Hamilton, V.L. (1977). Evidence about evidence: Effects o f 
presuppositions, item salience, sti'ess, and perceiver set on accident recall. 
Unpublished manuscript. University of Michigan.
Dunn, E. W. & Spellman, B. A. (2003). Forgetting by remembering: Stereotype 
inhibition through rehearsal of alternative aspects of identity. Journal o f 
Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 420-33.
Einstein, G.O. & Hunt, R.R. (1980). Levels of processing and organisation: Additive 
effects of individual-item and relational processing. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 588-98.
Elmes, F.J., Adams, C. & Roediger, H.L. (1970). Cued forgetting in short-term 
memoiy: Response selection. Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 86, 103-07. 
Enright, S.J. & Beech, A.R. (1993). Further evidence of reduced cognitive inhibition 
in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Personality and Individual Differences, 14, 387- 
95.
366
References
Erdelyi, M.H. (1993). Repression; The mechanism and the defense. In D.M. Wegner 
& J.W. Pennebaker, Handbook o f Mental Control (pp. 126-148). Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Faust, ME., Balota, D.A., Duchek, J.M., Gernsbacher, M.A. & Smith, S. (1997). 
Inhibitoiy control during sentence comprehension in individuals with dementia of the 
Alzheimer type. Brain & Language, 57, 88-108.
Finger, K. & Pezdek, K. (1999). The effects of verbal description on face 
identification accuracy: Release from verbal overshadowing. Journal o f Applied 
Psychology, 84, 340-48.
Finke, R.A., Johnson, M.K. & Shyi, G.C. (1988). Memoiy confusions for real and 
imagined completions of symmetrical visual patterns. Memory & Cognition, 16, 133- 
37.
Fisher, R.P. & Geiselman, R.E. (1988). Enhancing eyewitness memory with 
cognitive interview. In M.M. Gmnneberg, R E. Morris & R.N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical 
Aspects o f Memoiy: Cmrent research and issues. Volume I: Memory in Everyday 
Life (pp. 34-39). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Fisher, R.P., Geisleman, R.E., Raymond, D.S., Jurkevich, L.M. & Warhaftig, M.L. 
(1987). Enhancing enhanced eyewitness memory: Refining the cognitive interview. 
Journal o f Police Science and Administration, 15, 291-97.
Freedman, J.L. & Loftus, E.F. (1971). Retrieval time from semantic memory. Journal 
o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaxnor, 10, \ 07-15.
Freyd, J.J. (1996). Beti'oyal trauma: The logic o f forgetting childhood abuse. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Freud, S. (1915). Repression. In Freud’s Collected Papers, Volume IV. London: 
Hogarth.
367
References
Friedman, A. (1979). Framing pictures: The role of knowledge in automatized 
encoding and memoiy for gist. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 
316-55.
Garry, M., Manning, C.G., Loftus, E.F. & Sherman, S.J. (1996). Imagination 
inflation: imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3, 208-214.
Gariy, M & Polaschek, D L L. (2000). Imagination and memoiy. Cmrent Directions 
in Psychological Science, 9, 6-10.
Geiselman, R.E., & Bagheri, B. (1985). Repetition effects in directed forgetting: 
Evidence for retrieval inhibition. Memory & Cognition, 13, 57-62.
Geiselman, R E, Bjork, R.A. & Fishman, D. (1983). Disiiipted retrieval in diiected 
forgetting: A link with posthypnotic amnesia. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
General, 112, 58-72.
Geiselman, R E. & Fisher, R.P. (1997). Ten years of cognitive interviewing. In D.G. 
Payne & F.G. Conrad (Eds.), Intersections in basic and applied memoiy research (pp. 
291-310). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
Geiselman, R.E., Fisher, R.P., MacKinnon, D P. & Holland, H.L. (1985). Eyewitness 
memoiy enhancement in police interview: Cognitive retrieval mnemonics versus 
hypnosis. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 70, 401-12.
Gernsbacher, M.A. & Faust, ME. (1991). The mechanism of suppression: A 
component of general comprehension skill. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 17, 245-62.
Gold, D.B. & Wegner, D.M. (1995). Origins of mminative thought: Trauma, 
incompleteness, nondisclosure and suppression. Journal o f Applied Social 
Psy^chology, 25, 1245-261.
368
References
Golding, J.M., Fowler, S.B., Long, D.L. & Latta, H. (1990). Instructions to disregard 
potentionally useful information; The effects of pragmatics on evaluative judgements 
and recall. Journal o f Memory Language, 29, 212-27.
Graesser, A.C., Woll, S.B., Kowalski, D.J. & Smith, D.A. (1980). Memory for 
typical and atypical actions in scripted activities. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 6, 503-15.
Greene, E., Flynn, M.S. & Loftus, E.F. (1982). Inducing resistance to misleading 
information. Journal o f Verbal Leai'ning & Verbal Behaxnor, 21, 207-19.
Gmder, C.L., Coolc, T.D., Hennigan, K.M., Flay, B.R., Alessis, C. & Halamaj, J. 
(1978). Empirical tests of the absolute sleeper effecr predicted from the discounting 
cue hypothesis. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology?, 36, 1061-74.
Harris, R.J. (1973). Answering questions containing marked and unmarked adjectives 
and adverbs. Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 97, 399-401.
Hasher, L., Stoltzfus, E. R., Zacks, R. T., & Rypma, B. (1991). Age and inhibition. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Leairiing, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 163-169. 
Hasher, L. & Zacks, R.T. (1988). Working memoiy, comprehension, and ageing: A 
review and a new view. In G.H. Bower (Ed ), The Psychology o f Learriing and 
Motivation, Vol. 22 (pp. 193-225). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Hasher, L., Zacks, R.T. & May, C.P. (1999). Inhibitory control, circadian arousal, 
and age. In D. Gopher & A. Koriat (Eds.), Attention and Performance XVII (pp. 653- 
675). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hertel, P.T. & Gerstle, M. (in press). Depressive deficits in forgetting. Psychological 
Science.
Hicks, J.L. & Starns, J.J. (in press). Retrieval-induced forgetting occurs in test of 
item recognition. Psychonomic Bidletin & Reviev?.
369
References
Hintzman, D.L. (1976). Repetition and memory. In G.H. Bower (Ed.), The 
Psychology o f Learning and Motivation, Volume 10 (pp. 297-304). New York: 
Academic Press.
Howe, M L. (1991). Misleading children’s story recall: Forgetting and reminiscence 
of the facts. Developmental Psychology, 27, 746-62.
Howell, D.L. (1973). Representation of frequency in memory. Psychological 
Bulletin, 80, 44-53.
Hunt, R.R. & Einstein, G.O. (1981). Relational and item-specific information in 
memory. Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 497-514.
Intraub, H. & Hoffman, I.E. (1992). Reading and visual memory: Remembering 
scenes that were never seen. American Journal o f Psychology?, 105, 101-14.
Isaac, C.L. & Mayes, A.R (1999). Rate of forgetting in amnesia: I. Recall and 
recognition of prose. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Leai'ning, Memory Æ 
Cognition, 25, 963-77.
Jacoby, L.L. & Hollingshead, A. (1990). Reading student essays may be hazardous to 
your spelling: Effects of reading incorrectly and correctly spelled words. Canadian 
Journal o f Psychology, 44, 345-58.
Jacoby, L.L., Woloshyn, V. & Kelley, C M. (1989). Becoming famous without being 
recognised: Unconscious influences of memory produced by divided attention. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 115-25.
Johnson, M.K. & Raye, C.L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88, 
67-85.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1977). Procedural semantics. Cognition, 5, 189-214.
370
References
Klatzky?^ , R.L. & Erdelyi, M.H. (1985). The response criterion problem in tests of 
hypnosis and memoiy. InternationalJournal o f Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 
246-57.
Koppenaal, R.J. (1963). Spontaneous recovery? Journal o f Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 2, 310-19.
Koutstall, W., Schacter, D.L., Johnson, M.K. & Galluccio, L. (1999). Facilitation and 
impairment of event memory produced by photograph review. Memory <Sc Cognition, 
27, 478-493.
Kroll, N.E., Ogawa, K.H. & Nieters, J.E. (1988). Eyewitness memory and the 
importance of sequential information. Bulletin o f the Psychonomic Society, 26, 395-
98.
Landauer, T.K. & Bjork, R.A. (1978). Optimum rehearsal patterns and name 
learning. In M.M. Gmnneberg, R E. Monis & R.N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical Aspects 
o f Memory (pp. 625-632). London: Academic Press.
Levy, B.J. & Anderson, M.C. (2002). Inhibitoiy processes and the control of memory 
retrieval. Trends in Cognitive Science, 6, 299-305.
Lindsay, D.S. (1990). Misleading suggestions can impair eyewitnesses’ ability to 
remember event details. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 16, 1077-83.
Lindsay, D.S. & Johnson, M.K. (1989a). The eyewitness suggestibility effect and 
memory source. Memory and Cognition, 17, 349-358.
Lindsay, D.S. & Johnson, M.K. (1989b). The reversed eyewitness suggestibility 
effect. Bulletin o f the Psychonomic Society?, 27, 111-13.
Loftus, E.F. (1973). Categoiy dominance, instance dominance, and categorisation 
time. Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 97, 70-74.
371
References
Loftus, E.F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive 
Psychology, 7, 560-72.
Loftus, E.F. (1977). Shifting human color memoiy. Memory & Cognition, 5, 696-99. 
Loftus, E.F. (1979a). Eyewitness Testimony. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Loftus, E.F. (1979b). Reactions to blatantly contradictory information. Memory & 
Cognition, 7, 368-74.
Loftus, E.F., Donders, K., Hoffman, H.G. & Schooler, J.W. (1989). Creating new 
memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held. Memory & Cognition, 17, 
607-16.
Loftus, E.F. & Hoffman, H.G. (1989). Misinformation and memoiy: The creation of 
new memories. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 100-104.
Loftus, E.F. & Ketcham, K. (1994). The Myth o f the Repressed: False Memories and 
A negations o f Sexual A buse. St. Martin’s Press : New York.
Loftus, E.F. & Loftus, G.R. (1980). On the permanence of stored information in the 
human brain. American Psychologist, 35, 409-20.
Loftus, E.F., Miller, D. & Burns, H. (1978). Semantic integration of verbal 
information into a visual memoiy. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning & Memory, 4, 19-31.
Loftus, E.F. & Palmer, J.C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destniction: An 
example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal o f Verbal 
Learning & Verbal Behavior, 13, 585-89.
Loftus, E.F., Schooler, J.W. & Wagenaar, W.A. (1985). The fate of memory: 
Comment on McCloskey and Zaiagoza. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
General, 114, 375-80.
372
References
Loftus, E.F. & Zanni, G. (1975). Eyewitness testimony: The influence of the wording 
of a question. Bulletin o f the Psychonomic Society, 5, 86-88.
Loftus, G.R. & Loftus, E.F. (1974). The influence of one memoiy retrieval on a 
subsequent memoiy retrieval. Memory & Cognition, 2, 467-71.
Logan, G.D. (1994). On the ability to inhibit thought and action: A users guide to the 
stop signal paradigm. In D. Dagenbach & T. Carr (Eds.), Inhibitoiy processes in 
attention, memory, and language (pp. 265-325). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Luria, A.R. (1966). Higher cortical junctions in man. English translation (B. Haigh). 
New York: Basic Books and Plenum Press.
MacLeod, C M. (1989). Directed forgetting affects both direct and indirect tests of 
memory. Journal o f Experimental Psychology?: Leai'ning, Memory & Cognition, 15, 
13-21.
MacLeod, C M. (1998). Directed forgetting. In J.M. Golding & C.M. MacLeod 
Intentional Forgetting {pp 1-57). Mahway, NJ: Erlbaum.
MacLeod, C.M. Dodd, M.D., Sheard, ED., Wilson, D.E. & Bibi, U. (2003). In 
opposition to inhibition. In B.H. Rodd (Ed.), The Psychology o f Leai'ning and 
Motivation, 43, 163-214.
MacLeod, M.D. (2002). Retrieval-induced forgetting in eyewitness memory: 
Forgetting as a consequence of remembering. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 
135-149.
MacLeod, M.D. (2003). Retrieval-induced forgetting in normal ageing. Paper 
presented during the Inhibitory Processes in Memory Symposium, Society of Applied 
Research in Memoiy and Cognition Conference, Aberdeen, Scotland, July 2003. 
MacLeod, M.D., Bjork, E.L. & Bjork, R.A. (2003). The role of retrieval-induced 
forgetting in the constniction and distortion of memories. In B. Kokinov & W. Hirst
373
References
(Eds.), Consttnctive Memoiy. NBU Series in Cognitive Science. Sophia: New 
Bulgarian University.
MacLeod, M.D. & Macrae, C.N. (2001). Gone but not forgotten: The transient nature 
of retrieval-induced forgetting. Psychological Science, 12, 148-152.
Macrae, C.N. & Bodenhausen, G.V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically 
about others. Annual Review o f Psychology, 51, 93-120.
Macrae, C.M., Bodenhausen, G.V., Milne, A.B. & Ford, R.L. (1997). On the 
regulation of recollection: The intentional forgetting of stereotypical memories. 
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 709-19.
Macrae, C.M. & Lewis, H.L. (2002). Do I know you? Processing orientation and 
face recognition. Psychological Science, 13, 194-96.
Macrae, C.N. & MacLeod, M.D. (1999). On recollections lost: When practice makes 
imperfect. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 163-473.
Macrae, C.N. & Roseveare, T.A. (2002). I was always on my mind: The self and 
temporally forgetting. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 611-14.
Mayr, U. (2002). Inhibition of action mles. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 93- 
99.
McCloskey, M. & Zaragoza, M. (1985a). Misleading postevent information and 
memory for events: Arguments and evidence against memoiy impairment hypotheses. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 1-16.
McCloskey, M. & Zaragoza, M. (1985b). Postevent information and memoiy: Reply 
to Loftus, Schooler & Wagenaar. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 114,
381-87.
374
References
McGeoch, J.A. (1936). Studies in retroactive inhibition: VII. Retroactive inhibition 
as a llinction of the length and frequency of presentation of the interpolated lists. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 19, 674-693.
McGeoch, J.A. (1942). The psychology o f human learning. New York: Longmans, 
Green.
McGeoch, J.A. & McDonald, W.T. (1931). Meaningful relations and retroactive 
inhibition. American Journal o f Psychology?, 43, 579-88.
McGovern, J.B. (1964). Extinction of associations in four transfer paradigms: 
PsychologicalMonogtaphs, 78 (Whole Issue).
McSpadden, M.D., Schooler, J.W. & Loftus, E.F. (1988). Here today, gone 
tomorrow: The appearance and disappearance of context effects. In G.M. Davies & 
D.M. Thompson (Eds.), Memory in Context: Context in Memory (pp. 215-230). John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Meissner, C.A. & Brigham, J.C. (2001). A meta-analysis of the verbal 
overshadowing effect in face identification. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15, 603- 
16.
Meissner, C.A., Brigham, J.C. & Kelley, C.M. (2001). The influence of retrieval 
processes in verbal overshadowing. Memoiy & Cognition, 29, 176-86.
Memon, A. & Higham, P.A. (1999). A review of the cognitive interview. 
Psychology, Crime &La\v, 5, 177-96.
Mensink, G.J.M. & Raajimakers, J.G.W. (1988). A model of interference and 
forgetting. Psychological Review, 95,434-55.
Metcalfe, J. (1990). Composite Holographic Associative Recall Model (CHARM) 
and blended memories in eyewitness testimony. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: General, 119, 145-60.
375
References
Meyer, D.E. & Schvaiideveldt, R.W. (1971). Facilitation in recognising pairs of 
words: Evidence of a dependence between retrieval operations. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology, 90, 227-34.
Mills, J. & Haiwey, J. (1972). Opinion change as a fiinction of when information 
about the communicator is received and whether he is attractive or expert. Journal o f 
Personality and Social Psychology?, 21, 52-53.
Moran, G. & Cutler, B.L. (1991). The prejudicial impact of pretrial publicity. 
Journal o f Applied Social Psychology, 21, 345-67.
Morris, P.E. & Fritz, C O. (2000). The name game: Using retrieval practice to 
improve the learning of names. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Applied, 6, 
124-29.
Morris, P.E. & Fritz, C O. (2002). The improved name game: Better use of 
expanding retrieval practice. Memory, 10, 259-66.
Morton, J., Hammersley, R. & Bekerian, D. (1985). Headed records: a model for 
memory and its failures. Cognition, 20, 1-23.
Moulin, C.J.A, Perfect, T.J., Conway, M.A., North, A.S., Jones, R W. & James, N. 
(2002). Retrieval-induced forgetting in Alzheimer’s disease. Neuropsychologia, 40, 
862-67.
Mueller, C.W. & Watkins, M.J. (1977). Inhibition from part-set cueing: A cue- 
overload interpretation. Journal o f Verbal Lecmning and Verbal Behavior, 16, 699- 
710.
Muther, W.S. (1965). Erasure or partitioning in short-term memory. Psychonomic 
Science, 3, 429-30.
Neely, J.H. (1976). Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memoiy: Evidence 
for facilitatory and inhibitory processes. Memoiy & Cognition, 4, 648-54.
376
References
Neely, J.H. (1977). Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of 
inhibitionless spreading activation and limited capacity attention. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology: General, 106, 226-54.
Neisser, U. (1981). John Dean’s memory: A case study. Cognition, 9, 1-22.
Neumann, P.G. (1977). Visual prototype formation with discontinuous representation 
of dimensions of variability. Memoiy & Cognition, 5, 187-97.
Nickerson, R.S. (1984). Retrieval inhibition from part-set cueing: A persistent 
enigma in memory research. Memoiy & Cognition, 12, 531-52.
Ofshe, R. J. (1992). Inadvertent hypnosis during interrogation: false confession due 
to dissociative state, misidentified multiple personality and the Satanic cult hypothesis. 
International Journal o f Clinical Experimental Hypnosis, 40, 125-156.
Osgood, C.E. (1946). Meaningful stimuli and interference in learning. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology, 36, 277-301.
Osgood, C.E. (1949). The similarity paradox in human learning: A resolution. 
Psychological Revievf, 56, 132-43.
Palier, K.A. (1990). Recall and stem-completion priming have different 
electrophysiological correlates and are modified differentially by directed forgetting. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 16, 1021-032. 
Pezdek, K. (1977). Cross-modality semantic integration of sentence and picture 
memory. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human Leai'ning & Memoiy, 3, 515- 
24.
Pirolli, P.L. & Mitterer, J O. (1984). The effect of leading questions on prior memory: 
Evidence for the coexistence of inconsistent memoiy traces. Canadian Journal o f 
Psychology, 38, 135-41.
377
References
Postman, L. (1964). Studies of learning to learn: Changes in transfer as a flinction of 
practice. Journal o f Verbal Leai'ning and Verbal Behavior, 3, 437-47.
Postman, L. (1971). Transfer, interference and forgetting. In J.W. Kling & L.A. 
Riggs (Eds ), Woodworth and Schlosberg’s: Experimental Ps)?chology (3“  ^ Ed, pp. 
1019-1132). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Postman, L. & Stark, K (1969). The role of response availability in transfer and 
interference. Journal o f Experimental Psychology?, 79, 168-77.
Postman, L., Stark, K., & Fraser, J. (1968). Temporal changes in interference. 
Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Beha\?ior, 7, 672-694.
Raajimakers, J.W. & Shiffrin, R.M.. (1981). Search of associative memory. 
Psychological Review, 88, 93-134.
Radvansky, G.A. & Zacks, R.T. (1991). Mental models and the fan effect. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology?: Lear ning, Memory & Cognition, 17, 940-953.
Ratcliff, R., Clark, S.E. & Shiffrin, R.M. (1990). The list-strength effect: I. Data and 
discussion. Journal o f Experimental Psychology?: Leai'ning, Memoiy & Cognition, 
76, 163-78.
Richardson-Klavehn, A. (1988). Effects o f incidental environmental contest on 
human memoiy: Elusive or non-existent? Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of California, Los Angeles.
Roberts, W.T. & Higham, P.A. (2002). Selecting accurate statements from the 
cognitive interview using confidence ratings. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: 
Applied, 8, 33-43.
Roediger, H.L. (1973). Inhibition in recall from cueing with recall targets. Journal o f 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 12, 644-57.
Roediger, H.L. (1974). Inhibiting effects of recall. Memory? & Cognition, 2, 261-69.
378
References
Roediger, H.L. (1978). Recall as a self-limiting process. Memory <& Cognition, 6, 
54-63.
Roediger, H.L., & Neely, J.H. (1982). Retrieval blocks in episodic and semantic 
memory. Canadian Journal o f Psychology, 36, 213-242.
Roediger, H.L. & McDermott, K.B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remebering 
words not presented in lists. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory 
& Cognition, 21, 803-14.
Roediger, H.L. & Schmidt, S.R. (1980). Output interference in the recall of 
categorised and paired associate lists. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human 
Lecn'ning and Memory, 6, 91-105.
Roediger, H.L., Stellon, C. & Tulving, E. (1977). Inhibition from part-set cues and 
rates of recall. Journal o f Experimental Psychology?: Human Lecmning and Memory, 
3, 174-88.
Rundus, D. (1973). Negative effects of using list items as recall cues. Journal o f  
Verbal learning and Verbal Behavior, 12, 43-50.
Schachar, R.J. & Logan, G.D. (1990). Impulsivity and inhibitoiy control in normal 
development and childhood psychopathology. Developmental Psychology, 26, 710- 
20.
Schacter, D.L., Moscovitch, M., Tulving, E., McLachlan, DR., & Freedman, M. 
(1986). Mnemonic precedence in amnesic patients: An analogue of the AB error in 
infants? Child Development, 57  ^816-823.
Schooler, J.S. & Engstler-Schooler, T.Y. (1990). Verbal overshadowing of visual 
memories: Some things are better left unsaid. Cognitive Psychology, 22, 36-71. 
Schooler, J.W., Foster, R.A. & Loftus, E.F. (1988). Some deleterious consequences 
of the act of recollection. Memory cfe Cognition, 16, 243-51.
379
References
Schooler, J.W., Gehard, D. & Loftus, E.F. (1986). Qualities of the unreal. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology?: Leai'ning, Memory and Cognition, 12, 171-81.
Schooler, J.W. & Tanaka, (1991). Composites, compromises, and CHARM: What is 
the evidence for blend memory representations? Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: General, 120, 96-100.
Shaughnessy, J.J. & Mand, J.L. (1982). How permanent are memories for real 
events? American Journal o f Psychology, 95, 51-65.
Shaw, J.S. Ill, Bjork, R.A. & Handal, A. (1995). Retrieval-induced forgetting in an 
eyewitness-memoiy paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin &RevieM?, 2, 249-253.
Shaw, J.S. Ill & McClure. (1996). Repeated postevent questioning can lead to 
elevated levels of eyewitness confidence. Law and Human Behavior, 20, 629-53. 
Sheehan, P., Giigg, L. & McCann, T. (1984). Memory distortion following exposure 
to false information in hypnosis. Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 93, 95-127.
Shuell, T.J. (1968). Retroactive inhibition in free-recall learning of categorised lists. 
Journal o f Verbal Leai'ning and Verbal Behavior, 7, 797-805.
Slamecka, N.L. (1966). Supplementary report: A search for spontaneous recovery of 
verbal associations. Journal o f Verbal Leai'ning and Verbal Behavior, 5, 205-07. 
Slamecka, N.L. (1972). The question of associative growth in the learning of 
categorised materials. Journal o f Verbal Leai'ning and Verbal Beha\?ior, 11, 324-332. 
Slamecka, N.J. (1975). Intralist cueing of recognition. Journal o f Verbal Learning & 
Verbal Behavior, 14, 630-37.
Sloman, S.A., Bower, G.H. & Roher, D. (1991). Congmency effects in part-list 
cueing inhibition. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Leai'ning, Memoiy & 
Cognition, 17, 974-82.
380
References
Smith, A.D. (1971). Output interference and organised recall from long-term 
memory. Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 10, 400-08.
Smith, E.E., Adams, N. & Schorr, D. (1978). Fact retrieval and the paradox of 
interference. Cognitive Psychology, 70,438-464.
Smith, R.E., & Hunt, R.R. (2000). The influence of distinctive processing on 
retrieval-induced forgetting. Memory & Cognition, 28, 503-508.
Snedecor, G.W. & Cochran, W.G. (1980). Statistical Methods (7^  ^Edition). Iowa 
University Press: Ames, lA.
Sporer, S.L., Penrod, S., Read, D. & Cutler, B. (1995). Choosing, confidence, and 
accuracy: A meta-analysis of the confidence-accuracy relationship in eyewitness 
identification studies. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 315-27.
Tipper, S.P. (2001). Does negative priming reflect inhibitory mechanisms? A review 
and integration of conflicting views. Quarterly Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 
544, 321-43.
Todres, A.K. & Watkins, M.J. (1981). A part-set cueing effect in recognition 
memoiy. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 7, 91-
99.
Toglia, M. P., Ross, D. F., Ceci, S. I ,  & Hembrooke, H. (1992). The suggestibility of 
children's memoiy: A social-psychological and cognitive interpretation. In M. L. 
Howe, C. J. Brainerd, & V. F. Reyna (Eds.), The development o f long-term retention 
(pp. 217-241). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Tousignant, J.P., Hall, D. & Loftus, E.F. (1986). Discrepancy detection and 
vulnerability to misleading postevent information. Memory & Cognition, 14, 329- 
338.
381
References
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memoiy. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson 
(Eds.), Organisation o f Memory. New York: Academic Press.
Tulving, E. (1974). Cue-dependent forgetting. American Scientist, 62, 74-82.
Tulving, E. & Osier, S. (1968). Effectiveness of retrieval cues in memory for words. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 77, 593-601.
Tulving, E. & Pearlstone, Z. (1966). Availability and accessibility of information in 
memoiy for words. Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5, 381-91. 
Tulving, E. & Psotka, J. (1971). Retroactive inhibition in free recall: Inaccessibility 
of information available in the memory trace. Journal o f Experimental Psychology?, 
,^ 7, 1-8.
Tulving, E. & Thompson, D.M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes 
in episodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352-73.
Underwood, B.J. (1948a). ‘Spontaneous recovery’ of verbal associations. Journal o f 
Experimental Psychology, 38, 429-439.
Undeiwood, B.J. (1948b). Retroactive and proactive inhibition after five and forty- 
eight hours. Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 38, 29-38.
Undeiwood, B.J. & Postman, L. (1960). Extra-experimental sources of interference 
in forgetting. Psychological Reviev?, 67,73-95.
Voss, J.F., Vereb, C. & Bisanz, G. (1975). Stimulus frequency judgements and 
latency of stimulus frequency judgements as a function of constant and variable 
response conditions. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human Lecn-ning & 
Memory, 7, 337-50.
Warrington, E.K. & Weiskiantz, L. (1978). Further analysis of the prior learning 
effect in amnesic patients. Neuropsychologia, 16, 169-77.
382
References
Watkins, M.J. (1975). Inhibition in recall with extralist “cues”. Journal o f Verbal 
Lecn'ning and Verbal Behavior, 14, 294-303.
Watkins, M.J. (1978). Engrains and cuegrams and forgetting as cue-overload: A 
cueing approach to the structure of memory. In C.R. Puff (Ed ), The Structure o f 
Memoiy (pp. 347-372). New York: Academic Press.
Wegner, D.M. & Erber, R. (1992). The hyperaccessibility of suppressed thoughts. 
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 903-12.
Weinberg, H I., Wadsworth, J. & Baron, R.S. (1983). Demand and the impact of 
leading questions in eyewitness testimony. Memory & Cognition, 11, 101-04. 
Weingardt, K.R., Loftus, E.F. & Lindsay, D.S. (1995). Misinformation revisited: 
New evidence on the suggestibility of memory. Memoiy & Cognition, 23, 72-82. 
Weingardt, K.R., Toland, H.K. & Loftus, E.F. (1994). Reports of suggested 
memories: do people tmly believe them? In D.F. Ross, J.D. Read & M.P. Toglia 
(Eds.), Adult Eyewitness Testimony (pp. 3-26). Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, UK.
Wheeler, M.A. (1995). Improvement in recall over time without repeated testing: 
spontaneous recovery revisited. Journal o f Experimental Psychology?: Leai'ning, 
Memoiy & Cognition, 21, 173-184.
Whitten, W.B. & Bjork, R.A. (1977). Learning from tests: Effects of spacing. 
Journal o f Verbal Leai'ning and Verbal Behavior, /  6, 465-78.
Whitten, W. B. & Leonard, J. (1981). Directed search through autobiographical 
memory. Memory & Cognition, 9, 566-579.
Williams, C.C. & Zacks, R.T. (2001). Is retrieval-induced forgetting an inhibitory 
process? American Journal o f Psychology, 114, 329-54.
383
References
Windschitl, P.D. (1996). Memory for faces; Evidence of retrieval-based impairment. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Leairiing, Memoiy & Cognition, 22, 1101-122. 
Wiseman, S. & Tulving, E. (1976). Encoding specificity: Relations between recall 
superiority and recognition failure. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human 
Leai'ning &. Memoiy, 2, 349-61.
Zaragoza, M.S. & Koshmider, J.W. (1989). Misled subjects may know more than 
their performance implies. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & 
Cognition, 15, 246-55.
Zaragoza, M.S. & Lane, S.M. (1994). Source misattributions and the suggestibility of 
eyewitness memory. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Leai'ning, Memoiy <& 
Cognition, 20, 934-45.
Zaragoza, M.S. & McCloskey, M. (1989). Misleading postevent information and the 
memory impairment hypothesis: Comment of Belli and reply to Tversky and Tuchin. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 92-99.
Zaragoza, M.S. & McCloskey, M., & Jamis, M. (1987). Misleading postevent 
information and recall of the original event: Further evidence against the memoiy 
impairment hypothesis. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & 
Cognition, 13, 36-44.
384
APPENDIX A
Stimuli used in Experiment la 
Appendix A1 
Study Phase: Narratives 
Jones’ House
The Jones’ house was burgled at the New Year. Mr. and Mrs. Jones were out at an 
office party, while their children were at their friends. Their daughter arrived back at 
1 Ip.m shortly before her parents. Police believe that the burglars gained access to the 
Jones’ house through the study window situated on the ground floor at the back of the 
house. The window had been left unlocked. No one saw the burglars break in, 
although neighbours told the police that they had seen a white van parked across the 
street from the Jones’ house before they had gone out to the pub at 9:30p.m. Police 
believe the burglars moved the picnic table in the back garden to underneath the study 
window in order to gain access to the house. Footprints in the mud suggest that there 
were three individuals present. Attached is a list of items that were stolen (they are 
underlined).
The binoculars had been in the conseiwatory, at the back of the house. They were 
used for spotting wildlife in the garden and were next to several nature and wildlife 
books.
The wristwatch had been upstairs in the master bedroom. It had been lying on the 
bedside table. The burglars had broken a lamp that was next to it.
The Game Boy had been in the children’s room lying on the bed. The burglars never 
found the games for it, which were on the shelf.
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The sunglasses had been in the kitchen next to the kettle and some holiday brochures. 
They were an expensive designer pair bought last summer.
The television had been in the sitting room, which is situated at the front of the house. 
It was sitting in the corner of the room. The remote control for it hadn’t been taken. 
The painting had been in the dining room, near a table with art books sitting on it. It 
had a silver engraved frame. An empty wallet was found near the table.
The printer had been in the study, which is at the back of the house. It was on a desk 
and the burglars had knocked the ream of paper that was next to it all over the floor. 
The mobile phone had been in the hallway on the table charging its batteiy. An 
address book was beside it and the burglars had left the hall light switched on.
The coffee maker had been in the kitchen next to the tea, sugar jars and cappuccino 
mugs.
The china plate had been in the display case in the living room. It was the last 
remaining piece from a set that had been in the family for years.
Smith’s House
The Smith’s house had been burgled at Christmas. Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their 
daughter were out visiting relatives, while their son was at a friend’s house playing 
computer games. The Smith’s son arrived back home first to discover that they had 
been broken into. The rest of the family arrived back only a few minutes later at 
10p.m. The police believe that the burglars broke in through the window in the 
master bedroom. The police suspect that the burglars used the ladders that were in the 
back garden in order to reach the window. No one saw the burglars break in although 
neighbours said that they had seen two individuals in a black van parked in front of 
the Smith’s house at around 8p.m. They had noticed it when they were going to the
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park to walk their dog although it had gone by the time they had returned. Attached is 
a list of items that were stolen (underlined).
The computer had been in the study, which is situated at the back of the house. It was 
on a desk but the burglars left the keyboard behind.
The video recorder had been on the floor in the sitting room. Movie magazines had 
been thrown about the room and one of the burglars had dropped a pack of Wrigley’s 
gum.
The telescope had been temporarily set up in the consei*vatoiy next to several 
astronomy books and maps. It was in there while the attic was being renovated.
The rollerblades had been in the son’s room. They were lying on the floor with the 
knee and elbow pads.
The necklace had been in the kitchen. It had been left by the sink in its presentation 
box. The burglars had smashed several plates on the floor.
The Discman had been on the dresser in the master bedroom. The burglars had 
knocked the headphones for it on to the floor.
The camcorder had been in the dining room and was lying on the table with the film 
of a friend’s wedding.
The leather coat had been in the hallway. It was with the rest of the jackets on the 
coat rack by the front door. It belonged to a friend.
The crystal vase had been on the Welsh dresser in the sitting room. The flowers that 
had been in it had been thrown over the floor.
The microwave was in the kitchen. It had been set up on top of the fridge freezer.
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Appendix A l
Retrieval Practice Questions 
Jones’ House 
Set 1
1. This item is a type of hand held game.
2. Shades the eyes from the sunlight.
3. A portable communications device.
4. These pictures can be done in watercolour, oils or acrylics.
5. A small instrument that can be used to look at wildlife from a distance.
6. A box for watching programs and films on.
7. Makes hardcopies of documents.
8. This machine makes hot beverages.
9. This item from a dinner set is made from a fragile material.
10. A portable timepiece.
Set 2
1. A device using an electronic control to move points of light or the graphical 
symbols of a game on the screen of a visual display unit.
2. An output device that produces hardcopy results.
3. Electrical signals, converted from optical images and transmitted by UHF or VHF 
radio waves and reconverted into optical images by means of a “tube”.
4. A pot in which water is infused with roasted or ground beans.
5. A ceramic ware of a type originally from the East.
6. This item has mechanical or electrically driven pointers that move constantly over 
a dial showing 12 numbers.
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7. This wire frame contains darkened or polarised lenses that reduce the amount of 
light hitting the pupil.
8. An electronic device operated by cellular radio for transmitting speech, consisting 
of a microphone and receiver.
9. A canvas surface covered in a mixture consisting of pigments suspended in a 
liquid that dries on application.
10. An optical instmment for use with both eyes.
Set 3
1. The games were left behind for this device. What was it?
2. This set of visual protection was near some holiday brochures. What were they?
3. This personal communications system was beside an address book. What was it?
4. This artistic composition was framed in silver. What was it?
5. These “field glasses” were next to some wildlife books. What were they?
6. This fragile ceramic table item was in the display case. What was it?
7. This beverage-making machine was next to the tea and sugar jars. What was it?
8. The handset wasn’t taken for this visual system. What was it?
9. The paper for this hardcopy machine was knocked onto the floor. What was it?
10. This “dial” was on the bedside table next to a lamp. What was it?
Smith’s House 
Set 1
1. They can be used for word processing, the Internet and games.
2. They are used to record programs and films.
3. This is an instrument used in astronomy.
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4. This type of jewelleiy is worn around the neck.
5. This musical system plays compact disks.
6. This form of clothing is made from animal skins.
7. This item can be used to put flowers in.
8. This item is used to re-heat food.
9. This item captures events, such as weddings and birthdays, on tape as they 
happen.
10. This footwear is a style of inline skate.
Set 2
1. This device processes data according to a set of instructions, as well as storing 
data and performing arithmetical and logical operations at very high speeds.
2. Records on magnetic tape transmitted vision and sound signals.
3. An optical instrument for studying extra-terrestrial bodies that uses a combination 
of lenses and cui'ved mirrors
4. A chain, band, or cord, often bearing beads or stones, worn as an ornament on the 
body.
5. A machine with optical laser beams for playing small digital audio discs on which 
sound is recorded as a series of metallic pits enclosed in PVC.
6. An outdoor garment made from a material made smooth by tanning.
7. An ornamental vessel made from a highly transparent and brilliant type of cut 
glass.
8. This hand held equipment captures live events by converting the optical image of 
a scene into the corresponding electrical signals and storing them on magnetic 
tape.
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9. Cooks using electromagnetic radiation in the wavelength range of 0.3 to 0.001 
metres.
10. A device that has clamps and straps for fastening to a boot or shoe and small 
wheels that enable the wearer to glide over the floor.
Sets
1. The keyboard was left behind for this data storage system. What was it?
2. This play-back device was next to a set of movie magazines. What was it?
3. This “far seeing” instrument was next to some star maps. What was it?
4. The presentation box was left behind for this item, which is usually made of silver 
or gold. What was it?
5. This garment belonged to a friend. What was it?
6. The flowers from this cut glass container were thrown on the floor. What was it?
7. This device for recording live action shots was lying next to the film of a friend’s 
wedding. What was it?
8. This oven, which cooks from the inside out, was on top of fridge freezer. What 
was it?
9. The headphones for this digital audio system were left behind. What was it?
10. The knee and elbow pads were left behind for this item with wheels. What was it?
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Appendix A3
Experiment 1 a: Independent t-tests to determine question set difficulty
Mean Difference t df P
Set 1 V Set 2 .238 4 302 6 .005
Set 1 V Set 3 24.074 6 ^01
Set 2 V Set 3 308 S.664 6 .001
Appendix A4
Full List of Non-relevant Retrieval Practice Questions
The capital of Australia is Ca___________
The capital of Greece is At___________
The capital of Iraq is Ba___________
The capital of Canada is Ot___________
The capital of France is Pa___________
The capital of Eue is Du
The capital of Italy is Ro
The capital of Portugal is Li
The capital of Vietnam is Ho 
The capital of Turkey is Is__
The capital of Bulgaria is So 
The capital of Chile is Sa___
The capital of Argentina is Bu 
The capital of Cuba is Ha____
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The capital of Albania is A1 
The capital of Tunisia is Tu
The capital of Tasmania is Ho 
The capital of Burma is Ra___
The capital of Bangladesh is Da
The capital of Cambodia is Ph_
The capital of Nigeria is La____
The capital of Bolivia is La____
The capital of Peru is Li______
The capital of Philippines is Ma
Appendix A5 
Free Recall
Please write down the names of the items that were stolen from both of the houses 
Appendix A6
Additional Questioning Phase 
Non-critical Questions 
Jones’ House
1. How did the burglars gain access to the Jones’ house?
2. What time of year was it when the Jones’ were broken into?
3. How many children do the Jones’ have?
4. At what time did the Jones’ neighbours see the van?
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5. Where were the Jones’ neighbours going to when they saw the van?
6. What object did the burglars use to climb up to reach the window of the Jones’ 
house
7. Who were the Jones’ children visiting?
8. What time did the Jones’ get back at?
9. How many burglars broke into the Jones’ house?
10. Where was the van parked that the Jones’ neighbours saw?
11. What colour was the van that the Jones’ neighbours saw?
Smith’s House
1. How many burglars broke into the Smith’s house?
2. Who were the Smith’s children visiting?
3. What time of year was it when the Smiths were broken into?
4. Where was the van parked that the Smith’s neighbours saw?
5. How many children do the Smiths have?
6. What colour was the van that the Smith’s neighbours saw?
7. At what time did the Smith’s neighbours see the van?
8. How did the burglars gain access to the Smith’s house?
9. What object did the burglars use to climb up to reach the Smith’s window?
10. What time did the Smiths get back at?
11. Where were the Smith’s neighbours going to when they saw the van? 1
Î
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Critical Questions containing Misinformation
Jones’ House
1. The burglars gained access to the Jones’ house through the study window 
knocking the paper over for the scanner, which was on the desk. Where were Mr. 
and Mrs. Jones?
2. When the burglars stole the Jones’ briefcase from their hallway, they also left the 
hallway light switched on. Who was the first home to find out that they had been 
burgled?
3. When the burglars stole the Jones’ sculpture from their dining room they also 
stole the contents of a wallet. Where did they leave the empty wallet?
4. When the burglars stole the alarm clock that was on the bedside table in the Jones’ 
master bedroom, they broke an item. What was broken?
Smith’s House
1. The burglars gained access to the Smith’s house through the master bedroom 
window, knocking the headphones for the Walkman of the dresser. Where were 
the Smiths?
2. When the burglars stole the earrings that were next to the. sink in the kitchen, they 
knocked some items onto the floor breaking them. What did they break?
3. When the burglais stole the skateboard from the children’s bedroom they knocked 
some safety equipment off the shelf. What were they?
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4. When the burglars stole the DVD player from the living room they threw movie 
magazines over the room. They also dropped a pack of chewing gum. What was 
the brand?
Appendix A7
Forced-choice Recognition Test
Which of these items were stolen from the Jones’ house:
1. printer laptop
2. mobile phone filofax
3. carriage clock
4. sculpture
alarm clock
figurine
scanner
briefcase
wristwatch
painting
Which of these items where stolen fi'om the Smith’s house:
1. Walkman Discman Mini Disc
2. rollerblades snow board skateboard
3. bracelet earrings necklace
4. DVD player monitor video recorder
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Distracter Tasks 
Appendix A8
Distracter Tasks from Retrieval Practice Schedule 
Set 1
2389 45910 
+456 +1576
891 785394
-47 +7891
458 486 6458 1746 1674
x8  +89 -487 X 10 -890
20876106
1671 
X 4
1671187 
+ 56901 4)13968
10)45460
458
-59 3)8916
4589
X  1
3895478 458 754692 7845
+ 99012 -78 + 560 -846
6720801
+780210
Set 2
1958
+458
89520
+4851
75136
-4859
7859123 
- 45892
78459621
1011
5)45682
45626
+4578
4588956
-458910
456
xlO
562378
X 2
8)456
48546
X 12
9856
-859
99
x9
10023
+8912
9)2727
78959
-2023
56891202
+8925610
7859
X  1 1
1631891 
X  3
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458941285
+15615792
1200325
X  6
156 895662
- 456
789613002
+45896137
Set 3
Name Generation Task
A e.g. alligator
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1
J
K
L
M
N
0
PQR
S .
T
U
Vw
X
Y
Z
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Appendix A9
Distracter Following Free Recall; Word Generation 
Black
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
QR
S
T
U
V
w
X
Y
Z
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Wood
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
0
P
QR
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
400
Blue
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N0
PQR
S
T
U
Vw
X
Y
Z
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Round
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
0
P
QR
S
T
U
V
w
X
Y
Z
402
Green
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
FI
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
QR
S
T
U
V
w
X
Y
Z
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Appendix AlO
Distracter Following Misinformation and Additional Questioning Phase 
Name Generation Task
A e.g. Australia
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
0
P
QR
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
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APPENDIX B
Statistical Tables for Experiment 1 
Experiment la 
MisRP+ Condition 
Appendix B 1
Experiment la: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for MisRP+ condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items /L885 2 2.443 79.132 .001 .767
Error 1.482 48 .039
Experiment 1 a: Paired samples t-test for MisRP+ condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+vNRP .452 .271 .054 .340 .564 8.340 24 .001
RP-vNRP -.148 .274 .055 -261 -.035 -2.700 24 .012
MisRP- Condition 
Appendix B2
Experiment la: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for MisRP- condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 4.001 2 2.002 85.014 .001 .780
Error 1.130 48 .024
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Experiment la: Paired samples t-test for MisRP- condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteiwal
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+vNRP .384 .251 .050 .280 .488 7.877 24 .001
RP-vNRP -.168 .184 .037 -.244 -.092 -4 560 24 .001
MisNRP Condition 
Appendix B3
Experiment la: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for MisNRP condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 4.174 2 2.087 67.104 .001 .737
Error 1.493 48 .031
Experiment la: Paired samples t-test for MisNRP condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+vNRP .376 .291 .058 .256 .496 6.471 24 .001
RP-vNRP -.192 238 .048 ^290 -.094 -4.035 24 .001
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Between Subject Comparisons 
Appendix B4
Experiment la: Single factor between subjects ANOVA
Source SS df MS F Sig EtaSq
Items 282 3 .127 /k012 .010 .111
Error 3.044 96 .032
Experiment la: Summaty of independent t-tests comparing control condition to NRP 
items in each condition
Mean df t Sig
MisRP+ -.168 48 2251 .002
MisRP- -.124 48 ^L854 .006
MisNRP -.108 48 ^^680 .010
Appendix B5
Experiment la: Omnibus chi square
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 14.667 3 .002
N 100
Phi 283 .002
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.50
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Appendix B6
Experiment la: Chi square analysis and Phi value for MisRP+ condition versus
control condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq .500 1 .480
N 50
Phi .100 .480
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5
Experiment la: Chi square analysis and Phi value for MisRP- condition versus control 
condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq (1650 1 .010
N 50
Phi -265 .010
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.50
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Experiment la: Chi square analysis and Phi value for MisNRP condition versus
control condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq .117 1 .733
N 50
Phi .048 .733
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.50
Appendix B7
Experiment la: Chi square analysis and Phi value for MisRP- versus MisRP+ 
condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 10.272 1 .001
N 50
Phi -.453 .001
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.50
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Experiment la: Chi square analysis and Phi value for MisRP- versus MisNRP
condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 8 333 1 .004
N 50
Phi -.408 .004
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.0
Additional Analysis 
Appendix B8
Experiment la: Group statistics of output interference analysis
Condition Output
Order
N Mean Std. Dev Std. Error 
Mean
MisRP+ Early RP+ 12 -233 .314 .091
Early RP- 13 -.126 .254 .070
MisRP- Early RP+ 12 -.150 .207 .060
Early RP- 13 -.185 .168 .047
MisNRP Early RP+ 12 -.142 281 .081
Early RP- 13 ^239 .190 .053
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Experiment la: Paired samples t-test analysing output inteiference
Condition t df Sig
MisRP+ .113 23 .911
MisRP- .462 23 649
MisNRP 1.017 23 .320
Appendix B9
Binoculars -  Telescope 
Wristwatsch -  Necklace 
Printer -  Computer 
Coffee Maker -  Microwave 
Painting -  Vase 
Mobile Phone -  Discman 
Sunglasses -  Leather jacket 
Television -  Video recorder 
Game Boy - Rollerblades
Appendix BIO
Experiment la: Paired samples t-test of cross-categoiy (NRP-Similarity based on RP+ 
items) analysis
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
9554 (k)
Inte
Lower
nfidence
i*val
Upper
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)
MisRP+ -.022 245 .069 ^164 .121 -213 24 .757
MisRP- .083 .378 .076 -073 .239 1.102 24 .282
MisNRP .077 .403 .081 -.090 .243 .952 24 .351
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Appendix B 11
Experiment la; Paired samples t-test of cross-categoiy (NRP-Similarity based on RP-
items) analysis
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Coi 
Inte 
Lower
ifidence
iwal
Upper
t df Sig
en­
tailed)
MisRP+ .093 .228 .046 -.012 .187 2.037 24 .053
MisRP- -.020 .313 .063 -.131 .127 -.032 24 .975
MisNRP .200 .673 .1347 -.078 .478 1.488 24 .150
Appendix B 12
Experiment la: Pj i^red samples t-test analysis of categoiy dropout
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
En'or
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteiwal
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
MisRP+ -.048 .38 .068 -.188 .092 -.710 24 .485
MisRP- -.012 .283 .057 -.130 .105 -.212 24 834
MisNRP -.052 253 .071 -198 .094 -238 24 468
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APPENDIX C
Stimuli used in Experiment lb 
Recognition Task 
Jones’ House 
Nintendo vs.
painting vs.
wristwatch vs.
videotapes vs.
china plate vs.
wallet vs.
mobile phone vs.
coffee maker vs.
fax machine vs.
spectacles vs.
Smith’s House 
trainers vs.
toaster vs.
paperweight vs.
necklace vs.
Discman vs.
DVD player vs.
computer vs.
camcorder vs.
handbag vs.
magnifying glass vs.
GameBoy
photo frame
calculator
television
candleholder
sunglasses
answer-phone
wine glass
printer
binoculars
rollerblades 
microwave 
crystal vase 
bracelet 
portable radio 
video recorder 
laptop 
modem 
leather coat 
telescope
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APPENDIX D
Statistical Table for Experiment 2 
Appendix DI 
Experiment 2a 
Immediate Test Condition
Experiment 2a: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for Immediate Test condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 9.778 2 ^1889 5T033 .001 .663
Error 4.972 58 .086
Experiment 2a: Paired samples t-test for Immediate Test condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+ vNRP .614 .492 .090 .430 298 6.839 29 .001
RP-vNRP -.147 .392 .071 -293 -.094 -2 058 29 .049
Appendix D2 
Delayed Test Condition
Experiment 2a: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for Delayed Test condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items .005 2 .025 .926 .402 .031
Error /T553 58 .027
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Appendix D3
Experiment 2a: Group statistics of output interference analysis for Immediate Test
condition
Condition Output
Order
N Mean Std. Dev Std. Error 
Mean
Immediate Early RP+ 14 -.071 385 .103
Test Early RP- 16 -.26 .228 .006
Experiment 2a: Paired samples t-test analysing output interference
Condition t df Sig
Immediate Test 2.370 28 .025
Appendix D4
Experiment 2a: Paired samples t-test of cross-category (NRP-Similarity based on RP+ 
items) analysis
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
Immediate
Test
-.048 .347 .063 -273 .082 -252 29 .458
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Appendix D5
Experiment 2a: Paired samples t-test of cross-categoiy (NRP-Similarity based on RP-
items) analysis
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Intei*val
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
Immediate
Test
.037 .290 .053 -.072 .145 .693 29 .494
Appendix D6
Experiment 2a: Paired samples t-test analysis of categoiy dropout
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteiwal
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
Immediate
Test
-.047 .351 .064 -.178 .084 -228 29 .472
Delayed
Test
^033 .235 .043 -224 .055 -276 29 .444
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Appendix D7 
Experiment 2b 
No Delay Condition
Experiment 2b: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for No Delay condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 3.698 2 1.849 50.858 .001 .637
Error 2.109 58 .036
Experiment 2b: Paired samples t-test for No Delay condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
EiTor
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+vNRP J50 .242 .044 .260 .440 7.929 29 .001
RP- vNRP -.130 .279 .051 -.234 -.257 -2.549 29 .016
Appendix D8
Delayed Practice Condition
Experiment 2b: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for Delayed Practice condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 2.915 2 1.457 30.419 .001 ^12
Error 2.779 58 .048
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Experiment 2b; Paired samples t-test for Delayed Practice condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+vNRP .287 .268 .049 .187 J87 5.870 29 .001
RP-vNRP -.147 .337 .062 -.273 -.021 -Z383 29 .024
Appendix D9 
Delayed Test Condition
Experiment 2b: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for Delayed Test condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 053 2 .026 499 .610 .017
Error 3.079 58 .053
Appendix DIO
Experiment 2b: Chi square analysis and Phi value for No Delay condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 5.934 1 .015
N 60
Phi -.314 .015
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.50
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Experiment 2b: Chi square analysis and Phi value for Delayed Practice condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq &531 1 .003
N 60
Phi -J77 .003
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.50
Appendix D ll 
Additional Analysis
Experiment 2b: Group statistics of output interference analy sis
Condition Output
Order
N Mean Std. Dev Std. Error 
Mean
No Delay Early RP+ 15 -.127 .279 067
Early RP- 15 -.133 .290 .079
Delayed Early RP+ 14 TT79 .197 .050
Practice Early RP- 16 -.131 .432 .108
Experiment 2b: Paired samples t-test analysing output interference
Condition t df Sig
No Delay .064 28 .949
Delayed Practice J77 28 .709
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Appendix D12
Experiment 2b: Paired samples t-test of cross-category (NRP-Similarity based on RP+
items) analysis
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
No Delay .117 .372 .064 -.014 .248 1.826 29 .078
Delayed
Practice
-.010 .340 .066 -.144 .125 -.147 29 .884
Appendix D 13
Experiment 2b: Paired samples t-test of cross-category (NRP-Similarity based on RP- 
items) analysis
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteival
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
No Delay -.050 J37 062 -J76 .076 -.807 29 .426
Delayed
Practice
.110 305 .056 -.003 .224 1.983 29 357
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Appendix D14
Experiment 2b; Paired samples t-test analysis of category dropout
Condition Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Intei*val
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
No Delay ^033 .407 .074 -.185 .119 -^48 29 357
Delayed
Practice
.040 385 .052 -.066 .146 369 29 A48
Delayed
Test
-.013 .315 .057 -.131 .104 -332 29 318
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APPENDIX E
Stimuli used in Experiment 3 
Appendix El
Pilot study to determine similarity between items:
Can you please group these items by similaiity and write down why you think that 
they are similar. For example, if apple, banana, and orange where present on the list 
they could be classed as "fruits", while orange, football and wheel are all items that 
are “round”. Each item can belong to as many groups as you want (e.g., orange 
belonged to the groups “finit” and “round”).
Binoculars
Sunglasses
Coffee maker
Filofax
Tennis racket
Wallet
Fax machine
Desk
Chisel
Nintendo
Bicycle
Sculpture
Television
Rocking chair
Shoulder bag
Skate board
Earrings
MP3 Player
Waterproof jacket
Ai'inchair
Hairdryer
Pearls
Figurine
Mirror
Wristwatch
Guitar
Lamp
Trainers
Perflime
Game Boy 
Drawers 
China plate 
Jeans
Laptop computer 
Bracelet 
Snow board 
Walkman 
Letter opener 
Kettle
Wedding ring
Mini Disc
Denim jacket
Golf clubs
DVD player
Briefcase
Microwave
Screwdriver
Papemeight
Signet ring
Hockey stick
Violin
Toaster
Skirt
Sofa
Filing cabinet 
Necklace 
Vase 
Sweater
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Table 
Rucksack 
Mobile phone 
Painting
Leather jacket .
Clock
Printer
Stereo
Camera
Video recorder
Shirt
Discman
Engagement ring
PlayStation
Hammer
Fountain pen
Telescope
Bookcase
Keyboard
Calculator
Cuff links
Desktop Computer
Rollerblades
Locket
Camcorder
Significant groupings of items (where at least 50% of participants identified 
groupings or dominant features
Items Dominant features identified
Leather jacket'*, denim jacket^ waterproof 
jacket^ trainers^
Shirt ,^ sweater'’, jeans'’, skirt'’
Clothing
’’Outdoor clothing 
'’Indoor clothing
Television^, DVD player^, video 
recorded’,
Nintendo'’, GameBoy'’, PlayStation'’
Entertainment 
”Related to TV 
'’Playing games on
Rocking chair*’, armchair*’, sofa*’, 
drawers'’, table, bookcase'’, desk'’
Furniture
’’Chairs, things to sit on 
'’Storage, put things in
Tennis racket, bicycle, skateboard, 
snowboard, golf clubs, hockey stick, 
rollerblades
Sports items/items associated with 
exercise
Filofax, fax machine, printer, laptop 
computer, letter opener, briefcase, 
papemeight, fountain pen, calculator, 
desktop computer, bookcase*’, filing 
cabinet”, desk”
Office equipment 
”Office furniture
Tennis racket, golf clubs, bicycle, 
shoulder bag, mcksack, briefcase
Has handles
Wallet, shoulder bag, mcksack, briefcase Luggage, used to carry other items
Chisel, screwdriver, hammer tools
Guitar, violin, keyboard Musical instmments
Hairdiyer, mirror, perfume, wedding ring, 
necklace, earrings
Things found in a bathroom
Locket”, necklace”, pearls”,
signet ring'’, wedding ring'’, engagement
ring'’,
bracelet, earrings, cufflinks, wristwatch
Jewellery
”Worn round the neck 
'’Worn on the finger
Coffee maker, toaster, kettle, microwave Items found in a kitchen
Hairdryer, lamp, perfume, clock, drawers Items typically found in a bedroom
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Sculpture”, painting”, figurine”. 
Vase, papemeight, china plate
Decorative 
”Items of fine art
Discman, stereo, MiniDisc, Walkman, 
MP3 player
Stereo/audio equipment
Appendix E2
Study Materials: Narratives 
Thompson’s House
Mr. and Mrs. Thompson and their twelve year old daughter Elizabeth live in the 
countiy. During the school holidays the Thompson’s spent a week in Italy. On 
arriving back from their vacation, they discovered that their house had been broken 
into during their absence. Once the police arrived, the family was asked to take an 
inventoiy of all the missing items. Due to the dry weather that week tyre tracks were 
found in the dirt of the drive and the police believed that this indicated that the burglar 
or burglars had been driving a van. The police also believe that the burglar or 
burglars broke into the house through the patio doors.
Attached is a list of items that where stolen (the items are underlined).
The hockey stick had been stored in the cupboard in the hallway. It had belonged to 
the daughter who had been part of the school’s team.
The mobile phone had been in the hallway. It had belonged to Mr. Thompson who 
needed it for his job as a doctor.
The Playstation had been in the sitting room. It had been lying on the floor.
The armchair had been in the sitting room. It had been next to the patio doors.
The guitar had been in the daughter’s room. She had been learning to play.
The painting had been in the dining room. It had been framed in the middle of the 
wall.
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The microwave had been in the kitchen. It had been by the window.
The lamp had been in the kitchen. It had been in the corner of the room.
The necklace had been in the master bedroom. It had been in a red presentation box. 
The vase had been in the sitting room. It had been on the window ledge.
Williams’ House
Mr. and Mrs. Williams and their sixteen year old son, Jack, live in the suburbs of a 
city. On New Year’s Day, Mi*, arid Mi*s. Williams dropped their son off at a friend’s 
house for the evening and then went to relatives. On arriving back at 10pm the 
Williams discovered that they had been burgled. Once the police arrived, the family 
where asked to take an inventoiy of all the missing items. After the police had 
examined the area, they believed that the burglars had gained access to the house by 
breaking the study window. Footprints in the snow also suggested that there were two 
burglars.
Attached is a list of items that where stolen (the items are underlined).
The perfume had been in the bathroom. It had belonged to Mrs. Williams and had 
been a Christmas gift.
The rucksack had been in the son’s bedroom. It had been in his school bag but the 
police believe that the burglars had used it for carrying small items.
The hammer had been in the workshop. It had been lying on the floor.
The fountain pen had been in the study. Mrs. Williams is a teacher and used it to 
mark schoolwork.
The telescope had been in the conseiwatory. It had been set up so that it was pointing 
at the sky.
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The leather jacket had been in the son’s bedroom. It had been hanging from a clothes 
hook on the wall.
The clock had been in the batlii'oom. It had been hanging on the wall.
The printer had been in the study. It had been a Christmas present for the Williams’ 
son.
The calculator had been in the study. The Williams use it for their accounts.
The stereo had been in the son’s bedroom. It had been on a shelf.
Appendix E3 
Retrieval Practice 
Thompson’s House 
Set I
1. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and has 6 strings, a fretted fingerboard 
and a flat sounding board with a circular hole in the centre.
2. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a long stick with a cui*ved end that 
is used to hit a ball.
3. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a device for giving light via an 
electric bulb.
4. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a container for holding flowers.
5. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and individuals sit on this item.
6. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a portable communications 
device.
7. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an artistic composition.
8. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is used for playing games on. This 
special unit is plugged into a TV and has manual controls for one or two players.
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9. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is usually made of an inert metal 
and/or semi-precious stones that loops around the neck.
10. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is used to cook, re-heat and defrost 
food.
Set 2
1. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and produces notes when it’s strings are 
plucked
2. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is used to play a field game where 2 
opposing teams of 11 players each tiy to hit a ball into their opponent’s goal.
3. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and produces illumination.
4. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a decorative container.
5. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and has 2 arms and 4 legs.
6. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an electronic device operated by 
cellular radio for transmitting speech
7. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a canvas composed in 
watercolour, oils or aciylics.
8. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a brand of game.
9. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a chain, band, or cord, often 
bearing beads or stones, worn as an ornament around the neck area.
10. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a machine that cooks food very 
quickly
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Set 3
1. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and was invented by Spanish musicians 
in the 17"’ centuiy
2. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a piece of sporting apparatus that 
was invented in the 19"’ centuiy.
3. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and can be found in electric, gas and oil 
types.
4. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an ornamental vessel.
5. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an upholstered item.
6. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and consists of a microphone and 
receiver.
7. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a surface covered in a mixture 
consisting of solid pigments suspended in a liquid that dries after application,
8. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a device that uses electronic 
controls to move points of light or graphical symbols of a game about on a screen.
9. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is worn around the neck.
10. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an appliance that produces 
electro-magnetic radiation in the wavelength range of 0.3 to 0.001 metres.
Williams’ House
Set 1
1. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a fragrance.
2. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a timepiece for a wall or 
mantelpiece.
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3. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an outdoor garment is made from 
animal skin.
4. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an instrument used in astronomy.
5. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a piece of audio equipment short for 
“stereophonic”
6. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a type of large bag.
7. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a long thin object that contains ink.
8. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a machine that uses ink to produce 
letters, numbers, words, or symbols on paper.
9. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is used for driving nails into wood.
10. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an electronic mathematical device 
that can be held in the palm of the hand.
Set 2
1. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a liquid with a pleasant smell.
2. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a device for measuring and showing 
time.
3. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a garment made from a material 
made smooth by tanning.
4. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an optical instrument for studying 
extra-terrestrial bodies.
5. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a music system that usually comes 
with a cassette player, CD player and a set of speakers.
6. This item was in the Williams’ House, and usually has 2 straps for cariying it on 
the back.
429
7. This item was in the Williams’ House, and when pressure is placed on the nib, ink 
is produced on paper
8. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an output device that produces 
hardcopy results.
9. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an item used in carpentry.
10. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a device for performing 
mathematical calculations.
Sets
1. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a mixture of alcohol and essential 
oils extracted from flowers, spices, etc, or made synthetically.
2. This item was in the Williams’ House, and has mechanical or electrically driven 
pointers that move constantly over a dial showing 12 numbers.
3. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is worn around the upper body and is 
usually either waist or hip length with an opening that runs fi'om the neck to the 
hem.
4. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a cylindrical device that uses a 
combination of lenses and/or curved mirrors
5. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a piece of equipment for playing 
music on.
6. This item was in the Williams’ House, and has a supporting frame so that it can be 
carried by campers and climbers.
7. This item was in the Williams’ House, and the point of this item is supplied with a 
coloured liquid from the cartridge inside the barrel
8. This item was in the Williams’ House, Produces hard copies of documents.
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9. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a heavy steel head with a flattened 
end held transversely on the end of a wooden handle.
10. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a small device that is used for doing 
calculations.
Appendix E4
Experiment 3: Independent t-tests to determine question set difficulty
Mean Difference t df Sig
Set 1 V Set 2 342 19300 8 301
Set 1 V Set 3 .632 10.978 8 301
Set 2 V Set 3 .290 /k988 8 .001
Appendix E5
Pilot work examining the appropriateness of category labels (using same items in 
Appendix E l)
For this task we’d like you to match the items on the following page to the category 
labels in the tables. We believe that all of these items can fit under one of these 18 
category labels, however, if you can think of a better label for an item then please 
write it down in one of the blank tables. Even if it is just one item that you don’t think 
is suited to any of these categoiy labels it is important that you write it down.
Also, could you indicate which item you think is the best example of the category and 
which item you think is the worst example of the category (this item would probably 
be an item you think is better described by another category label).
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For example, if “apple” was on this list, you might think that the item fits best under 
the categoiy label “FRUIT” but poorly under the category “ROUND”
Sports Equipment Clothing Jewelleiy
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6. 6.
Furniture Computer Equipment Technology
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6. 6.
Musical Instrument Audio Equipment Tool
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6. 6.
Cookware Kitchenware Baggage
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6. 6.
Office Equipment Decorative Art
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5. .
6. 6. 6.
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Bathroom Equipment Bedroom Items Sitting Room
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6. 6.
These would be better category names for these items....
1. 1. 1.
2. 2. 2.
3. 3. 3.
4. 4. 4.
5. 5. 5.
6. 6. 6.
7. 7. 7.
8. 8. 8.
Mean rankings assigned by participants for pilot items (1 indicating item is best 
example of categoiy, and 6 and above indicating item is worst example of category)
Sports Equipment Clothing Jewellery
1. tennis racket
2. hockey stick
3. golf clubs
4. bicycle
5. skateboard
6. snowboard
7. rollerblades
1. jeans
2. shirt
3. sweater
4. denim jacket
5. trainer
6. skirt = leather jacket 
8. waterproof jacket
1. necklace
2. earrings
3. wedding ring
4. bracelet
5. engagement ring
6. watch = cufflinks 
8. pearls = locket 
10. signet ring
Furniture Computer Equipment Technology
1. armchair
2. sofa
3. table
4. bookcase = desk
6. drawers
7. rocking chair
8. filing cabinet
1. desktop computer
2. printer
3. laptop computer
4. Nintendo
5. PlayStation = GameBoy 
7. fax machine
1. desktop computer
2. printer
3. laptop computer = DVD 
player
5. Nintendo
6. PlayStation
7. GameBoy
8. mobile phone
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Musical Instrument Audio Equipment Tool
1. guitar 1. stereo 1. hammer
2. violin 2. Walkman = Discman 2. screwdriver
3. keyboard 3. MP3 player 3. chisel
4. 4. MiniDisc 4. letter opener
5. 5. keyboard 5.
6. 6. 6.
Cookware Kitchenware Baggage/Luggage
1. toaster
2. microwave
3.
1. kettle
2. toaster
3. microwave = coffee 
maker
1. rucksack
2. shoulder bag
3. briefcase
4. wallet
Office Equipment Decorative Art
1. desktop computer
2. desk
3. printer
4. briefcase = filing 
cabinet
6. fax machine = filofax 
8. calculator = bookcase
11. fountain pen = 
paperweight
12. mobile phone
1. painting
2. vase
3.china plate
4. figurine = sculpture
6. paperweight
7. mirror
1. painting
2. sculpture
3. figurine
4. vase
5. china plate
6.
Bathroom Equipment Bedroom Items Sitting Room
1. mirror 1. clock 1. sofa
2. hairdiyer 2. drawers 2. television = armchair
3. perfume 3. mirror = lamp 4. DVD player
4. 5. hairdiyer 5. video recorder = stereo
5. 6. television = perfume 7. lamp
6. 8. jeans 8. painting = Nintendo
9. sweater 10. figurine
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These would be better categoiy names for these items.
Items used to contain 
things (in addition to 
luggage items)
Rectangular in shape Games/gaming
equipment ii
1. vase (keeps flowers) 1. laptop 1. Nintendo
2. kettle (keeps water) 2, DVD player 2. PlayStation =
3. coffee maker (keeps 3. video recorder GameBoy
coffee) 4. briefcase 4. Desktop
4. filofax (keeps info) 5. filofax 5.
5. locket (keeps photos) 6. calculator 6.
6. 7. television 7.
7. 8. microwave 8.
8. 9. toaster
10. filing cabinet
Look through to make Ornaments Performs calculations,
things bigger/magnifies mathematical device ÎJ
1. binoculars 1. vase 1. calculator
2. telescope 2. china plate 2. desktop computer (stats)
3. 3. figurine 3. laptop computer ‘4. 4. sculpture 4.
5. 5. paperweight 5.
.Î
Used for communicating Audio-visual Photography Equipment
with others i1. mobile phone 1. stereo 1. camera
2. fax machine 2. DVD player 2. camcorder 1
3. fountain pen (writing 3. television 3.
letters) 4. video recorder 4.
4. desktop computer (e- 5. Discman 5.
mailing) 6. walkman 6.
5. 7. MP3 player 7.
Measures time Used to write Illuminates, lights up the
dark
1. Clock 1. Fountain pen 1. Lamp
2. Wristwatch 2. Desktop computer
3. Laptop computer
Fragrance
1. Perfume
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Appendix E6
Independent Probe Cued-recall 
MATHEMATICAL DEVICE-Ca_ 
COMPUTER HARDWARE-Pr_
COOKWARE-Mi_____________
ART-Pa_____________
BAGGAGE-Ru_____________
TOOL-Ha
CLOTHING-Le
FRAGRANCE-Pe_ 
CONTAINER-Va_ 
TIME PIECE-C1_ 
GAME-Pl
COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE-Mo
MAGNIFICATION EQUIPMENT-Te_
ILLUMINATION DEVICE-La______
AUDIO EQUIPMENT-St__________
F U R N IT U R E -A i________________
WRITING IMPLIMENT-Fo________
SPORTS EQUIPMENT-Ho_________
MUSICAL INSTRUMENT-Gu 
JEWELLERY-Ne
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Appendix E7 
Distracter Tasks
Distracter Tasks from Retrieval Practice Schedule 
Set 1 ; Emit
AMONG..................................................................................................................mango
BREW STARRY............................................................................................. strawberry
GO NEAR...............................................................................................................orange
LAPEP.......................................................   apple
HER CRY................................................................................................................cherry
ANNA BA..............................................................................................................banana
ALERT W OMEN........................................................................................... watermelon
PERRY BARS....................................................................................................raspberry
PAGER...................................................................................................................... grape
LUMP........................................................................................................................ plum
CHEAP.......................  peach
RIP COAT...............................................................................................................apricot
DAMN RAIN......................................................................................................mandarin
A MOTTO...............................................................................................................tomato
BLUNT CARRACK..........................................................   blackcurrant
ROGER OBEYS..............................................................   gooseberiy
REAP..........................................................................................................................pear
PLANE PIPE......................................................................................................pineapple
PUN ER.....................................................................................................................prune
ELIM..............................................  lime
AT ED.......................................................................................................................... date
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GIF................................................................................................................................. fig
WIKI........................................................................................................................... kiwi
BAH BURR...........................................................................................................rhubarb
TUN COCO.....................................................................   coconut
Set 2: Vegetables
LET CUTE....................................................................  lettuce
STUPORS.............................................................................................................. sprouts
LUCIFOR AWOL.......................................................................................... cauliflower
PEP REP..................................................................................................................pepper
CRUMB CUE.....................................................................................................cucumber
CUTTER OGE................................................................................................... courgette
MOMS HOUR..................................................................................................mushroom
RUG BEANIE....................................................................................................aubergine
SNAP CHI..............................................................................................................spinach
I NOON..............     onion
COOL CRIB..................; ...................................................................................... broccoli
CHUNKY EAR curly kane
TETANUS WRETCH water chestnut
BOOM BA............................................................................................................bamboo
PRECHILL PIPE......................................................   chilli pepper
OAT POT.................................................................................................................potato
TREE BOOT........................................................................................................beetroot
CENSOR WET.................................................................................................sweet corn
PLAYERS...............................................................................................................parsley
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SLEEK....................................................................................................................... leeks
CRY EEL..................................................................................................................celery
SPINS RAP...........................................................................................................parsnips
COAT HIKER.....................................................................................................artichoke
SIR HAD.................................................................................................................. radish
ELMS ORGANS..............................................................................................lemongrass
MINK PUP  ............................................................................................. pumpkin
LASH LOTS..........................................................................................................shallots
Set 3: Academic Subjects
MAYAN TO........................................................................................................anatomy
LOGY ZOO...........................................................................................................zoology
SHY TRIO..............................................................................................................history
BOGY OIL.............................................................................................................biology
METRIC SHY....................................................................................................chemistry
ENGRAM...............................................................................................................german
GNOMIC PUT................................................................................   computing
NIDI TIVY............................................................................................................divinity
LEG SHIN..............................................................................................................english
PAY HOGGER.................................................................................................geography
KEGER.....................................................................................................................greek
CHOLERA YOGA.........................................................................................archaeology
MISMATCH TEA........................................................................................ mathematics
GLOOMY SOC.  .........................................................................................cosmology
CHFREN..............................................................   french
439
LOGY EGO.................................................................................   geology
INSECURE CONE....................................................................................... neuroscience
HOLY HIPPOS............................................................................................... philosophy
A LINT........................................................................................................................ latin
ART PHONOLOGY  ..............................................   anthropology
PSYCH SI..............................................................................................................physics
ARMY TOONS.................................................................................................astronomy
MICE DINE.........................................................................................................medicine
GYPSY CHOLO......................................................   psychology
RAINS US.............................................................................................................. russian
ITS STATICS.......................................................................................................statistics
COMIC NOSE..................................................................................................economics
MAGENTA MEN........................................................................................ management
SASH PIN............................................................................................................. sash pin
ANOINTER REINSTALLATIO.................................................. international relations
SYMBIOTIC HER.......................  biochemistiy
DIRTY NEST......................................................................................................dentistry
TINA ALI................................................................................................................ Italian
ALLIED GUESTS....................................................................................... legal studies
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APPENDIX F
Appendix F 1
Experiment 3: Single factor within subjects ANOVA
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 3.751 2 1.875 22.695 .001 A86
Error 3367 48 .083 .
Experiment 3; Paired samples t-test
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteiwal
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+ V NRP 364 .417 .008 .192 336 4.369 24 .001
RP- vNRP -.172 .412 .008 ^343 -302 -2.089 24 .048
Appendix F2
Experiment 3 : Independent samples t-test
t df Sig
(2-tailed)
Mean
Diff.
Std.
Error
Diff
95% Confidence 
Inteiwal
Lower Upper
NRP V Control .273 48 .786 .016 359 -.102 .134
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APPENDIX G
Stimuli used in Experiment 4 
Appendix G1
Study Materials: Narratives 
Thompson’s House
Ml', and Mrs. Thompson and their twelve-year old daughter Elizabeth live in the 
countiy. During the school holidays the Thompson’s spent a week in Italy. On 
arriving back from their vacation, they discovered that their house had been broken 
into during their absence. Once the police arrived, the family were asked to take an 
inventoiy of all the missing items. Due to the dry weather that week the police found 
tyre track marks in the dirt of the drive and they believed that the burglar or burglars 
had been driving a van. The police also believe that the burglar or burglars broke into 
the house through the patio doors.
Below is a description of items that where stolen (the items are underlines)
The hockey stick had been in the cupboard in the hallway. It had belonged to the 
daughter who had been part of the school’s team.
The mobile phone had been in the hallway. It had belonged to Mr. Thompson who 
needed it for his job as a doctor.
The Playstation had been in the sitting room. It had been lying on the floor.
The armchair had been in the sitting room. It had been next to the patio doors.
The guitar had been in the daughter’s room. She had been learning to play.
The jeans had been in the daughter’s room. They had been lying on the floor.
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The painting had been in the dining room. It had been framed in the middle of the 
wall.
The table had been in the dining room. The Thompson family ate their breakfast at it 
every morning.
The microwave had been in the kitchen. It had been by the kitchen window.
The lamp had been in the kitchen. It had been in the corner of the room.
The sweater had been in the master bedroom. It had been hung on a clothes hook on 
the back of the door.
The necklace had been in the master bedroom. It had been in a red presentation box. 
The earrings had been in the daughter’s room. They had been in a small jewelleiy 
box.
The vase had been in the sitting room. It had been on the window ledge.
Williams’ House
Mr. and Mis. Williams and their sixteen-year old son, Jack, live in the suburbs of a 
city. On New Year’s Day Mi*, and Mrs. Williams dropped their son off at a friend’s 
house for the evening and then went to relatives. On arriving back at 10pm, the 
Williams discovered that they had been burgled. Once the police arrived the family 
were asked to take an inventory of all the missing items. After the police had 
examined the area, they believed that the burglars had gained access to the house by 
breaking the study window. Footprints in the snow also suggested that there where 
two burglars.
Below is a description of items that where stolen (the items are underlines)
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The cuff links had been in the master bedroom. Mi Williams wore them on formal 
occasions.
The perfume had been in the bathroom. It had belonged to Mrs. Williams and had 
been a Christmas gift.
The trainers had been in the workshop. Mr. Williams had just bought them in the 
sales.
The rucksack had been in the son’s bedroom. It had been his school bag but the 
police believe that the burglars had used it to cany small items in.
The hammer had been in the workshop. It had been lying on the floor.
The fountain pen had been in the study. Mrs. Williams is a teacher and used it to 
mark schoolwork.
The camera had been in the conseiwatoiy. It had been set up on a tripod.
The telescope had been in the conservatoiy. It had been set up so that it was pointing 
at the sky.
The leather jacket had been in the son’s bedroom. It had been hung on a clothes hook 
on wall.
The clock had been in the bathroom. It had been hung on the wall.
The wedding ring had been in the bathroom. Mrs. Williams has arthritis and had left it 
by the sink.
The desk had been in the study. Mrs. Williams is a teacher and prepares her lessons at 
it.
The bookcase had been in the master bedroom. It had been by the door.
The stereo had been in the son’s bedroom. It had been on a shelf.
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Appendix G2
Retrieval Practice Questions
Thompson’s House
Setl
1. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and has 6 strings, a fretted fingerboard
and a flat sounding board with a circular hole in the centre.
2. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a long stick with a curved end that 
is used to hit a ball.
3. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a device for giving light via an 
electric bulb.
4. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a container for holding flowers.
5. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and individuals sit on this item.
6. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and has a horizontal surface for placing 
objects on.
7. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an artistic composition.
8. Tills item was in the Thompson’s House, and is used for playing games on. This 
special unit is plugged into a TV and has manual controls for one or two players.
9. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is used to cook, re-heat and defrost 
food.
10. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a portable communications 
device.
11. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is usually made of an inert metal 
and/or semi-precious stones that loops around the neck.
12. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is worn on the fleshy lower pait of 
the ear.
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13. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is made from denim
14. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a knitted item that is usually worn 
in the winter to keep warm.
Set 2
1. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and produces notes when it’s strings are 
plucked
2. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is used to play a field game where 2 
opposing teams of 11 players each tiy to hit a ball into their opponent’s goal.
3. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and produces illumination.
4. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a decorative container.
5. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and has 2 arms and 4 legs.
6. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a slab or board supported by 4 
legs
7. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a canvas composed in 
watercolour, oils or acrylics.
8. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a brand of game.
9. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a machine that cooks food very 
quickly.
10. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an electronic device operated by 
cellular radio for transmitting speech.
11. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a chain, band, or cord, often 
bearing beads or stones, worn as an ornament around the neck area.
12. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an ornament for the ear.
13. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a form of casual trousers.
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14. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is worn indoors on the upper part of 
the body.
Set 3
1. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and was invented by Spanish musicians 
in the 17^ ’^ centuiy
2. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a piece of sporting apparatus that 
was invented in the 19^*^ century.
3. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and can be found in electric, gas and oil 
types.
4. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an ornamental vessel.
5. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an upholstered item.
6. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and has a flat surface.
7. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a surface covered in a mixture
consisting of solid pigments suspended in a liquid that dries after application.
8. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a device that uses electronic 
controls to move points of light or graphical symbols of a game about on a screen.
9. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is an appliance that produces 
electro-magnetic radiation in the wavelength range of 0.3 to 0.0001 metres.
10. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and consists of a microphone and 
receiver.
11. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is worn around the neck.
12. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and has a “stalk” and “butterfly”.
13. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a types of trousers made from 
hard-wearing twill-weave cotton fabric.
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14. This item was in the Thompson’s House, and is a woollen garment.
Williams’ House
Set 1
1. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a device for taking photographs.
2. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a fragrance.
3. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a timepiece for a wall or 
mantelpiece.
4. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an outdoor garment is made from 
animal skin.
5. This item was in the Williams’ House, and forms a pair of linked buttons that are 
used to join the buttonholes of the cuffs of men’s shirts.
6. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an instmment used in astronomy.
7. This item was in the Williams’ House, and has a writing surface, as well as 
drawers and other compartments for storing paperwork.
8. This item was in the Williams’ House, and contains shelves for storing books.
9. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is usually worn on the finger and is 
made of a valuable yellow coloured metal.
10. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a piece of audio equipment short for 
“stereophonic”
11. Tliis item was in the Williams’ House, and is manufactured by the likes of Nike, 
Adidas, and Reebok.
12. This item was in the William’s House, and is a type of large bag.
13. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is used for driving nails into wood.
14. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a long thin object that contains ink.
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Set 2
1. This item was in the Williams’ House, and records pictures onto film.
2. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a liquid with a pleasant smell.
3. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a device for measuring and showing 
time.
4. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a garment made from a material 
made smooth by tanning.
5. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is worn through the cuffs of a shirt.
6. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an optical instmment for studying 
extra-terrestrial bodies.
7. This item was in the Williams’ House, and individuals can sit at this item to work 
or to use a computer.
8. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is used to contain books that are 
organised into alphabetical order.
9. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a band of yellow metal often 
exchanged in wedding ceremonies.
10. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a music system that usually comes 
with a cassette player, CD player and a set of speakers.
11. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a type of shoe primarily used when 
performing sports or leisure activities.
12. This item was in the Williams’ House, and usually has 2 straps for canying it on 
the back.
13. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is used in carpentiy.
14. This item was in the Williams’ House, and ink is produced on paper when 
pressure is placed on the nib.
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Set 3
1. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an optical device consisting of a lens 
system and a highly sensitive film.
2. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a mixture of alcohol and essential 
oils extracted from flowers, spices, etc, or made synthetically.
3. This item was in the Williams’ House, and has mechanical or electrically driven 
pointers that move constantly over a dial showing 12 numbers.
4. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is worn around the upper body and is 
usually either waist or hip length with an opening that runs from the neck to the 
hem.
5. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is worn by men primarily for formal 
events.
6. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a cylindrical device that uses a 
combination of lenses and/or curved mirrors
7. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is an item that is highly associated with 
office work.
8. This item was in the Williams’ House, and houses large numbers of items 
containing printed pages that are bound together.
9. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a circular band of inert metal.
10. This item was in the Williams’ House, and is a piece of equipment for playing 
music on.
11. This item was in the Williams’ House, and can be worn on the feet.
12. This item was in the Williams’ House, and has a supporting frame so that it can be
carried by campers and climbers.
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13. This item was in the Williams’ House, and its point is supplied with a coloured 
liquid from the cartridge inside the barrel.
14. This item was in the Williams’ House, and has a heavy steel head with a flattened 
end held transversely on the end of a wooden handle.
Appendix G3
Independent Probe Cued-recall Test
CLOTHING-Je_____________
FURMTURE-Bo
COOKWARE-Mi
PHOTOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT~Ca_
ART-Pa_____________
BAGGAGE-Ru
FURNITURE-Ta
CLOTHING-Le
FRAGRANCE-Pe_
CONTAINER-Va_
TIMEPIECE-C1_
GAME-Pl
CLOTHING-Sw
FURNTIURE-De
COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE-Mo
MAGNIFICATION EQUIPMENT-Te_
ILLUMINATION DEVICE-La______
AUDIO EQUIPMENT-St__________
451
FURNITURE-Ar_
CLOTHING-Tr_
TOOL-Ha
WRITING IMPLIMENT-Fo 
SPORTS EQUIPMENT-Ho_
MUSICAL INSTRUMENT-Gu
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APPENDIX H
Appendix HI
NRP-Similar to RP+ Condition
Experiment 4: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for NRP-Similar to RP+ 
condition
Source SS df MS F Eta Sq
Items 7.911 3 :2.637 30.443 .001 .512
Error 7.536 87 ^87
Experiment 4; Paired samples t-test for NRP-Similar to RP+ condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteiwal
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+v
NRP-Dis
.361 .409 .075 .208 .514 4.834 29 .001
RP-vNRP-
Dis
-.307 405 .074 -.458 -.156 -4rt59 29 .001
NRP-Sim V  
NRP-Dis
-.213 .507 .093 ^403 -.024 -2.303 29 .029
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Appendix H2
NRP-Similar to RP- Condition
Experiment 4: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for NRP-Similar to RP- 
condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 8.469 3 2.823 2&145 .001 .474
Error 9J93 87 108
Experiment 4: Paired samples t-test for NRP-Similar to RP- condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteival
t df Sig
( 2 -
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+v
NRP-Dis
J97 .464 .083 236 J#3 4.833 29 .001
RP-v NRP- 
Dis
-294 .471 .086 -.457 -.105 -L265 29 .002
NRP-Sim V  
NRP-Dis
-.203 .520 010 -J97 .009 -Z136 29 .041
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Appendix H3
Between Subjects Comparisons
Experiment 4: Single factor between subjects ANOVA
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items .116 2 .058 ^28 536 .014
Error 8.015 87 .092
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APPENDIX I
Appendix II
Independent Probe Method 
CLOTHING-J
FURNITURE-B
COOKWARE-M
PHOTOGRAPFIY EQUIPMENT-C
ART-P_____________
BAGGAGE-R
FURNITURE-T
CLOTHING-L
FRAGRANCE-P
CONTAINER-V_
TIMEPIECE-C_
GAME-P
CLOTHING-S
FURNTIURE-D
COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE-M
MAGNIFICATION EQUIPMENT-T
ILLUMINATION DEVICE-L______
AUDIO EQUIPMENT-S__________
FURNITURE-A_____________
CLOTHING-T_____________
TOOL-H
456
WRITING IMPLIMENT-F_ 
SPORTS EQUIPMENT-H_
MUSICAL INSTRUMENT-G
Appendix 12
Additional Questioning and Misinformation Phase 
Non-critical Questions 
Thompson’s House
1. How old is the Thompson’s daughter?
2. What time of year did the Thompson’s go on holiday?
3. What type of vehicle did the police suspect the burglar or burglars of the 
Thompson’s house had been driving?
4. For how long did the Thompson’s go on holiday?
5. How many items where stolen from the Thompson’s dining room?
6. Where did the Thompson’s go on holiday?
7. What is the Thompson’s daughter called?
8. Where do the Thompson’s live?
9. What is Mr. Thompson’s job?
10. How many items where stolen from the Thompson’s sitting room?
11. How did the burglar or burglars break into the Thompson’s house?
Williams’ House
1. What is Mis. Williams’ job?
2. What time of year where the Williams’ burgled?
3. What was the weather like the day the Williams’ were burgled?
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4. When did the Williams’ get home?
5. How many items where stolen from the Williams’ study?
6. What is the Williams’ son called?
7. How did the burglars break into the Williams’ house?
8. How many burglars do the police suspect broke into the Williams’ house?
9. How many items where stolen from the Williams’ bathroom?
10. Where do the Williams’ live?
11. How old is the Williams’ son?
Critical Questions
Thompson’s House
1. In the Thompson’s House, this shirt had been hung up on a hook on the back of a 
door, but what room was it stolen from?
2. In the Thompson’s House, the pearls had been in a red presentation box, but what 
room where they stolen from?
3. In the Thompson’s House, the rocking chair had been by the patio doors, but what 
room was it stolen from?
4. In the Thompson’s House, the tennis racket had been in a cupboard, but what 
room was it stolen from?
5. In the Thompson’s House, the Nintendo had been lying on the floor, but what 
room had it been stolen from?
Williams’ House
1. In the Williams’ House, the denim jacket had been hung up on a hook on a wall, 
but what room was it stolen from?
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2. In the Williams’ House, the engagement ring was left by the sink, but what room 
was it stolen from?
3. In the Williams’ House, the filing cabinet had been by the door, but what room 
was it stolen from?
4. In the Williams’ House, the Walkman had been lying on a shelf, but what room 
was it stolen from?
5. In the Williams’ House, the screwdriver had been lying on the floor, but what 
room had it been stolen from?
Appendix 13
Forced-choice Recognition Test
Which of these items where stolen from the Thompson’s house:
1. hockey stick tennis racket golf clubs
2. Nintendo Playstation Game Boy
3. sweater skirt shirt
4. bracelet pearls necklace
5. sofa armchair rocking chair
Which of these items where stolen from the Williams’ house:
1. Discman stereo Walkman
2. hammer chisel screwdriver
3. denim jacket waterproof jacket leather jacket
4. signet ring engagement ring wedding ring
5. bookcase drawers filing cabinet
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APPENDIX J
Appendix J 1
NRP-Similar to RP+ Condition
Experiment 5: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for NRP-Similar to RP+ 
condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 5.905 3 1.968 18.925 .001 395
Error 9.049 87 .104
Experiment 5: Paired samples t-test for NRP-Similar to RP+ condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
(2-
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+v
NRP-Dis
.272 A72 086 .010 A48 3.159 29 .004
RP-v NRP- 
Dis
-J08 .381 .070 -.450 -.165 -4.419 29 .001
NRP-Sim V 
NRP-Dis
-.207 .549 .100 -.412 .026 -2.071 29 .047
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Appendix J2
NRP-Similar to RP- Condition
Experiment 5; Single factor within subjects ANOVA for NRP-Similar to RP- 
condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 5.479 3 1826 21.106 .001 .421
Error 7.528 87 .087
Experiment 5: Paired samples t-test for NRP-Similar to RP- condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
EiTor
Mean
95% Confidence 
Inteiwal
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+v
NRP-Dis
.310 .441 .080 .1453 .474 3.851 29 .001
RP-v NRP- 
Dis
-.209 382 .070 -352 ^066 -2.994 29 .006
NRP-Sim V  
NRP-Dis
-.215 .374 .068 -.355 -.075 -3.146 29 .004
Appendix J3
NRP-Dissimilar Condition
Experiment 5: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for NRP-Dissimilar condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 4.717 3 1.572 19.347 ^01 .400
Error 7.070 87 .081
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Experiment 5: Paired samples t-test for NRP-Dissimilar condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+v
NRP-Dis
.299 .406 .074 .147 .451 4.033 29 .001
RP-v NRP- 
Dis
-.197 .424 .077 -355 -.038 -2340 29 .017
NRP-Sim V 
NRP-Dis
-.174 435 .079 -.337 -.012 -2.195 29 .036
Appendix J4 
RP- Condition
Experiment 5: Single factor within subjects ANOVA for RP- condition
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items 6.794 3 2.265 23.293 .001 .445
Error 8A59 87 .010
462
T3:
Experiment 5 : Paired samples t-test for RP- condition
Mean Std.
Dev
Std.
Error
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval
t df Sig
en­
tailed)Lower Upper
RP+v
NRP-Dis
334 .414 .076 .179 488 4.419 29 .001
RP-v NRP- 
Dis
-362 .491 .090 -.446 -.079 -2.928 29 .007
NRP-Sim V  
NRP-Dis
^229 .445 081 -395 -.063 -2.822 29 .009
Appendix J5
Between Subjects Comparisons
Experiment 5: Single factor between subjects ANOVA
Source SS df MS F Sig Eta Sq
Items .157 4 .039 .422 393 .011
Error 13.538 145 .093
Appendix J6
Experiment 5; Omnibus chi square analysis and Phi value
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 22.605 4 .001
N 150
Phi 388 .001
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Appendix J7
Experiment 5; Chi square analysis and Phi value for NRP-Similar to RP+ condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 6239 1 .012
N 60
Phi -322 .012
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.60
Experiment 5: Chi square analysis and Phi value for NRP-Similar to RP- condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 15.429 1 .001
N 60
Phi -.507 .001
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.50
Experiment 5; Chi square analysis and Phi value for RP- condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 10.335 1 .001
N 60
Phi -.415 .001
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11
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Appendix J8
Experiment 5: Chi square analysis and Phi value comparing NRP-Similar to RP+ with
NRP-Similar to RP- conditions
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq 2.443 1 .118
N 60
Phi -.202 .118
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13
Experiment 5: Chi square analysis and Phi value comparing NRP-Similar to RP+ with 
RP- conditions
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq .601 1 .438
N 60
Phi -.100 .438
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.50
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Experiment 5: Chi square analysis and Phi values comparing NRP-Similar to RP-
with RP- conditions
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq .635 1 .426
N 60
Phi .103 .426
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.50
Appendix J9
Experiment 5; Chi square analysis and Phi value for NRP-Dissimilar condition
Value df Sig
Pearson Chi Sq .417 1 .519
N 60
Phi -.083 .519
0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6
466
tf:
